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‘Punitiveness’ has been the focus of increasing criminological attention in recent decades. 
This study extends this focus by taking a multi-disciplinary approach to examining 
punitiveness in the criminal justice system, the welfare system and the education system in 
British society today. In doing so, this study uses new survey data (n=5,781) applying ordinal 
and linear regression and structural equation modelling to examine the relationship between 
public punitiveness towards ‘rulebreakers’ and political values. This is explored through 
assessing punitive attitudes towards the treatment of i) school pupils who break school rules, 
ii) towards the treatment of benefit recipients who fail to comply with the rules, and iii) 
towards people who break the law. Findings suggest that neo-conservative values are 
consistently related to punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers. Neo-liberal values, and social, 
economic and political nostalgia also appear to play an important role, however. ‘Tiered 
punitiveness’ is also introduced, suggesting that ‘punitiveness’ is not a discrete attitude but 
has different degrees to it, identified here as ‘Basic Punitiveness’ and ‘Ultimate Punitiveness’.   
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Part One: What Do We Know About Punitiveness? 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. The aim of this study 
This study’s objective is to explore and explain the prevalence of punitive attitudes towards 
‘rulebreakers’ in three regulatory systems: the criminal justice system, the welfare system 
and the education system in contemporary British society. In doing so, it focuses on the 
relationship between punitiveness and political attitudes from the late 20th Century, when a 
change in government has been noted as definitively altering the political landscape in the 
UK.  
 
Whilst punitiveness towards lawbreakers has an established place in criminological literature, 
this is not the case for welfare claimants or school pupils in their respective literatures. An 
attempt then has been made to expand this punitiveness lens to rulebreaking welfare 
claimants and school pupils with the aim of examining similarities and differences between 
attitudes towards the different groups. This examination commences by reviewing the 
empirical literature on public attitudes towards the different groups of rulebreakers. 
Legislative changes, political attitudes and trends in public attitudes are then explored. The 
development of the new survey questions designed for this project are then presented, 
before moving on to present the findings of this study. Finally, this study’s contributions and 
implications for future research are discussed.  
 
1.2. Punitiveness and the Political Context  
‘The desire to punish those who break social rules is a widespread, if not universal, 
feature of human societies.’ (Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997:237) 
‘Punitiveness’ has been the focus of increasing criminological attention in recent decades 
(Farrall et al., 2016). Studies generally gauge punitiveness through the nature of 
punishments available or analysis of attitudinal data from surveys measuring public 
support for punitive actions (Farrall et al., 2016; Hogan et al., 2005). ‘Punitiveness’ then 
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can be operationalised through examining public attitudes or system operations; this 
study considers the former of these. The literature examining the general public’s support 
for the tough sentencing of offenders is dominated by three explanations (Gerber and 
Jackson, 2016). An instrumental perspective suggests that fear of crime and victimisation 
drive a desire for punishment to reduce potential future harm; a relational perspective 
proposes that concerns about community breakdown drive a desire for punishment to 
restore moral boundaries; and, a psychological model founded on ideological preferences 
suggests that people desire conformity and authority in society, and for institutions to 
punish those who threaten collective security (Gerber and Jackson, 2016). This study aims 
to extend this criminological focus by taking a multi-disciplinary approach to examining 
punitiveness, operationalised as a person’s level of support for harsher penalties with an 
emphasis on a desire for both tougher punishments and extreme sanctions, across three 
regulatory systems (criminal justice, education and welfare). In doing so, the literature on 
punitiveness towards lawbreakers, and the most relevant literature towards welfare 
claimants and school children will be examined, aiming to place this study in context and 
aid its design. The concept of ‘punitiveness’ has not been explored in relation to 
rulebreakers in the welfare system and the education system. The literature reviews for 
these two systems then aim to consider empirical research most relevant to the study of 
punitive attitudes placing this study into context within the frameworks of these two 
areas. The long-term trajectories of punitive attitudes towards the three distinct groups 
of rulebreakers will also be reviewed providing an analysis of government policies, 
political discourse and trends in public attitudes over the last forty years.  
 
This study aims to explore the extent to which a range of political values and social 
attitudes are related to punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers. These influences will be 
explored through assessing punitive attitudes towards the treatment of: 
 
i) school pupils who break school rules;  
ii) benefit recipients who fail to comply with the rules; and,  




These three areas will be explored with a view to understanding the various punitive 
attitudes of the general population and the influence of enduring political values on 
social attitudes in contemporary society.  
 
British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) data will also be drawn upon to consider trends in 
social attitudes over time. The BSAS has been conducted annually since 1983 with over 
90,000 people taking part in the study so far (NatCen, 2020). BSAS asks around 3,000 
people every year questions to understand current issues but also repeats questions 
periodically to chart changes over time (NatCen, 2020).  BSAS long-term existing data 
will be analysed to map trends in social attitudes and how these attitudes shift (on 
aggregate) over time.  
 
Recent research suggests that contemporary policy is influenced by the tough law and 
order agenda that emerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Farrall and Jennings, 
2014), raising standards in education driven by choice and competition (Dorey, 2014), 
and rhetorical hostility towards social security recipients (Hill and Walker, 2014). Lacey 
(2008:76) suggests that political leaders are ‘increasingly focussed on the median voter’ 
and leads to the ‘unmediated responsiveness of politics to popular opinion’. Analysis of 
social attitudes in this area will allow assessment of whether these same attitudes 
endure in the wider population, and whether public opinion has been shaped by 
political influences resulting in ‘political socialisation’ (Grasso et al., 2017).  
 
1.3. The Link between the Criminal Justice System, the Welfare System and the 
       Education System 
This study proposes that political discourse and policies within the criminal justice system, 
the welfare system and the education system demonstrate an increasing trend of 
punitiveness towards those who ‘break the rules’. ‘Law and order’ began its prominence 
within political discourse in the 1980s when the Conservative Party gained power (Reiner, 
2000:73). From the early 1990s, both the Conservative and Labour parties made significant 
efforts to be seen to be ‘tough on crime’ (Newburn, 2007). Consequently, an increase in the 
use of punishment resulted in a significant increase in the prison population (Newburn, 
2007). This trend of an increasing prison population has endured and has risen by 82% in 
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England and Wales since the early 1990s (Prison Reform Trust, 2017) and remains at high 
levels (Home Office, 2020). The Government is currently planning to create 10,000 new 
prison places as part of its ‘Prison Estate Transformation Programme’ in response to 
projected rises in the prison population (Beard, 2019). This punitiveness can be observed in 
the contemporary government’s response to crime in England and Wales, which centralises 
‘tough punishments’ and ‘tough’ approaches to crime (Ministry of Justice, 2010:9), ‘tougher 
sentencing’ and ‘tougher community sentences’ (The Conservative Manifesto, 2019:19) and 
‘restating our commitment to law and order’ (Priti Patel quoted by Gayle, 2019).  
 
Support for harsher responses to rulebreaking, however, is not limited to the criminal 
justice system and can be observed in other regulatory systems. Since the 1980s, the 
education system has received criticism for a range of social issues by government, such 
as anti-social behaviour, which has involved a political rhetoric of teachers ‘failing pupils’ 
by being incapable of maintaining classroom discipline (Dorey, 2014:109). Government 
discourse, which commenced during the 1980s, focuses on the failings of education, 
which enabled extensive policy reforms to be implemented driven by market principles 
and managerial authority over professionals (Dorey, 2014). Official data reported 6,685 
permanent exclusions in 2015/16, however, a further 48,000 school children were 
educated in the Alternative Provision sector catering for excluded pupils during this 
period (Gill et al., 2017). School children are much more likely to engage in criminal 
activity whilst excluded from school than those who have not been excluded (Ipsos MORI, 
2000). Negative outcomes such as unemployment and prison are more likely to be future 
experiences of excluded children with approximately 50% of the current prison 
population excluded from school (Gill et al., 2017).  
 
A punitive rhetoric towards benefit recipients was evident prior to the 1980s; however, 
punitive discourse towards welfare recipients escalated in the 1980s with ‘idleness and 
cheating’ used as common descriptors (Thatcher, 1993 in Hill and Walker, 2014:97). This 
attitude has permeated policy changes making access to benefits more difficult with a view to 
making cuts to the majority of the welfare system (Hill and Walker, 2014). Increasingly, 
changes to welfare policies have exposed claimants to sanctions aimed at effecting behaviour 
control and change (Wright et al., 2018). For some people, the current welfare system 
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dominated by conditionality and sanctions, has resulted in increased poverty, destitution and 
crime (Welfare Conditionality Project, 2018). Some claimants, particularly those with 
additional vulnerabilities, such as drug and alcohol dependencies and homelessness, 
withdraw from the welfare system all together (Welfare Conditionality Project, 2018).  
 
1.4.  Punitiveness and Neo-conservativism  
Punitiveness is explicitly related to attitudes to punishment, in particular about how people 
think that rulebreakers ought to be punished. Punitiveness has ‘connotations of excess’, 
suggests an intensification of punishment either by duration or severity, and is applied 
disproportionately (Matthews, 2005:179). The operationalisation of punitiveness in this study 
aims to tap into the public’s desire for harsher penalties (school punishments, welfare 
sanctions, sentences). It is an attitude that suggests that punishment as it is, in its present 
form, is not enough, and that it should be harsher (Kury and Ferdinand, 1999; Roberts and 
Indermauer, 2007; Roberts et al., 2003). It is a reflection on the present form of punishment 
and shows a desire for harsher punishments in the future.  
 
Neo-conservativism, on the other hand, is an evaluation of the past in response to how 
people observe and experience the present. It is an underlying belief and is a historical 
construction; it is rooted in the past. During the early 1980s, New Right political ideologies 
emerged in many western industrialised nations and are characterised by a combination of 
neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideals (Gamble, 1988; Hay, 1996; Hayes, 1994).  
Neo-conservative ideals assert social order, traditional values and the authoritarian state 
(Hayes, 1994). During the 1970s, there was an increasing concern over falling standards and 
‘violent’ schools (Hall, 1979). There were also concerns about the link between indiscipline in 
schools and anti-social behaviour in neighbourhoods (Berridge et al., 2001). An educational 
strategy emerged under the conservative governments during this period, which reiterated 
‘social skills, respect for authority, traditional values and discipline’ founded on a traditional 
education (Hall, 1979:19). Meanwhile, neo-liberal ideals assert the free market, competition, 
profit, and the belief that state authority should be limited to defence, the rule of law and 
monetary control (Hayes, 1994). New variables have been designed for this study to examine 
the relevance of neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values to understanding 
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punitiveness. A more in depth discussion of their theoretical and empirical construction is 
detailed in Chapter 5.  
 
1.5.      The Research Framework  
This project’s aim is to assess the extent to which people hold punitive attitudes, that is 
support harsher penalties and extreme sanctions, towards rulebreakers. This will be 
explored in the following areas: 
a) Compulsory education - attitudes towards the treatment of pupils who break 
school rules.  
b) Welfare – attitudes towards the treatment of benefit recipients who fail to comply 
with the rules.    
c) The Criminal Justice System – attitudes towards the treatment of adult lawbreakers.  
 
The research questions posed by this project are:  
• What is the relationship between punitive and political attitudes? 
• How prevalent are punitive attitudes towards ‘rulebreakers’ of the law, the welfare 
system, and compulsory education evident in British society today?  
• How do punitive attitudes vary towards different groups of ‘rulebreakers’? 
 
1.6.       Methodology  
The project comprises of a quantitative approach encompassing cognitive interviewing and a 
national web-based survey.  
• The main method is a new national web-based survey of 5,781 people conducted in 
England, Wales and Scotland in January and February 2019.  Survey research enables 
a large sample to be systematically examined (Denscombe, 2014). This examination 
will measure the prevalence of punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers and the 
influence of political values on these attitudes. The survey asked a range of existing 
and newly developed survey questions to explore contemporary social and political 
attitudes. A specific battery of questions was designed for this study aiming to assess 
the prevalence of punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers, which was embedded 
within the larger survey.  
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• Cognitive interviews were undertaken during the design phases of the survey. 
Cognitive interviewing is a key method in the question design process used for 
‘identifying and correcting problems with survey questions’ (Beatty and Willis, 
2007:287). Pre-testing methods in questionnaire design can be used to highlight 
problems in respondents’ interpretations and responses, enabling potential solutions 
to be explored (Conrad and Blair, 2009). The cognitive interviews also shed some light 
on the differences and similarities of public attitudes towards different groups of 
rulebreakers. Therefore, they have also been applied qualitatively.  
 
1.8. Structure of the Thesis: 
This thesis is comprised of four parts. Part one forms the theoretical basis for this study by 
exploring what we know about punitiveness. Chapter 2 presents the literature related to the 
areas under examination from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Firstly, by providing a 
literature review of public punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers, before presenting the 
most relevant literature to enable developing a ‘punitiveness’ perspective in relation to 
rulebreaking welfare claimants and school children.  
 
Part two then focuses on exploring long-term trends in punitiveness in relation to 
government policies, political discourse and public attitudes towards the distinct groups of 
rulebreakers. This considers the extent to which government policies have implemented 
harsher sanctions for rulebreakers, political discourse endures a punitive tone, and public 
attitudes have become less favourable towards the different groups of rulebreakers over 
time.   
 
Part three builds on what we have learned to this point and commences the process of 
researching punitiveness. Part one and part two formed the basis for the development of the 
newly designed questions detailed in part three. This commences by presenting a literature 
review of cognitive interviewing in the design process of new survey questions. Part three 
then progresses to detail how cognitive interviewing has been used in this study to explore 
attitudes towards rulebreakers, before presenting the final battery of questions designed for 
this project. The limitations of survey research are then discussed, before presenting the pilot 
study findings. Part three concludes by placing the quantitative analysis into context by 
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presenting the descriptive statistic and basis analyses for the battery of questions. The 
theoretical basis and practical process of constructing the conceptual variables are also 
detailed. 
 
Part four examines punitiveness towards rulebreakers and presents the findings to this thesis. 
Chapter 6 commences the quantitative analyses towards rulebreakers by exploring punitive 
attitudes towards rulebreaking school children though conducting ordinal regression and 
multiple linear regression. Chapter 7 repeats the same analyses in Chapter 6, this time in 
reference to rulebreaking welfare claimants. Finally, Chapter 8 completes the trilogy of 
distinct chapters by examining public attitudes towards lawbreakers. Chapter 9 then brings 
these three distinct chapters together by examining the variation in attitudes towards the 
three groups of rulebreakers. The chapter then progresses to merge these three groups of 
rulebreakers together to examine punitive attitudes towards them as a collective group. 
‘Tiered punitiveness’ is then introduced, suggesting that punitiveness is not a discrete 
attitude but consists of different degrees, identified here as ‘Basic Punitiveness’ and 
‘Ultimate Punitiveness’. Part four concludes with Chapter 10, which first provides a recap on 
what has been learned throughout this study before considering the limitations of the study. 
















Chapter 2.1. Literature Review: Exploring Punitiveness Towards Lawbreakers 
 
2.1.1. Introduction  
This chapter reviews the most relevant literature on public punitiveness towards the three 
groups of rulebreakers. Firstly, by exploring attitudes towards lawbreakers; secondly, towards 
rulebreaking welfare claimants; and then finally, towards rulebreaking school pupils.  
  
‘Punitiveness’ in the Criminal Justice System has been the focus of increasing criminological 
attention over the past few decades (Farrall et al., 2016). A search of ‘punitiveness’ on Web 
of Science (Figure 2.1.) shows the extent to which publications have increased in this area 
from the early 1980s (Web of Science, 2020).  
 
Figure 2.1. Publications on ‘punitiveness’     
 
Source: Web of Science (2020) 
 
Punitiveness can be operationalised in two ways: analysis of attitudinal data from surveys 
measuring public support for punitive sentences (Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997; King and 
Maruna, 2009) or the nature of punishments given out (Farrall et al., 2016; Hogan et al., 
2005); this project considers the former of these.  
 
Public demands for harsher sentences for offenders have become customary in many 
countries across the world (Gerber and Jackson, 2016). ‘Populist punitiveness’ is a feature of 
criminal justice over the past 40 years and has influenced sentencing policies observed in 











































































































































































In England and Wales between 1980 and 2010 the prison population more than doubled 
from around 40,000 to in excess of 80,000 (Jennings et al., 2017a). Jennings et al. (2017a) 
suggest that public punitiveness increased as a response to crime concerns influencing the 
incarceration rate as a policy response. Scotland followed this trend with a prison population 
increase from just under 5,000 in 1980 to approximately 8,000 prisoners in 2010 (Scottish 
Government, 2011). The prison population in England and Wales in June 2019 was 
approximately 83,500 (Home Office, 2019a) and 7,595 prisoners in Scotland (Sturge, 2019). 
Morgan and Clarkson (1995:7) attribute some of the prison increase in the early 1990s to the 
announcement of ‘get tough’ measures and the ‘prison works’ proposal of the Home 
Secretary, Michael Howard, at the Conservative Party Conference in 1993. Bottoms (1995) 
proposes that punitiveness appeals to some politicians due to their belief that prison reduces 
crime through general deterrence and incapacitation, increases society’s moral consensus 
against certain behaviours, and satisfies the electorate. ‘Populist punitiveness’ reflects the 
idea of politicians ‘tapping into, and using for their own purposes, what they believe to be the 
public’s generally punitive stance’ (Bottoms, 1995:40), therefore appealing to the public and 
politicians alike. Hough and Walker (1988:203) suggest that punitive is ‘shorthand to indicate 
a preference for heavy sentences’ irrespective of the basis of this punitiveness.  
 
Punitiveness is explicitly related to how people think rulebreakers ought to be punished. It is 
an attitude that suggests punishment, in its present form, is not enough and should be 
harsher (Kury and Ferdinand, 1999; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007; Roberts et al., 2003). 
Punitiveness implies excess, intensification, and is disproportionate (Matthews, 2005: 179). 
The literature as to why the general public are supportive of the tough sentencing of 
offenders is dominated by three theories: An instrumental perspective (fear of crime and 
victimisation drive a desire for punishment to reduce future harm); a relational perspective 
(concern about community breakdown results in a desire to restore moral boundaries 
through punishment); and, a psychological model founded on ideological preferences (a 
desire for societal conformity and authority, and for institutions to punish those who 
threaten collective security) (Gerber and Jackson, 2016). A range of national and 
international studies, reviewed below, have focussed on public preferences for harsher 
sentencing as a measure for punitiveness. The literature examining the publics’ desire for 
punitive sentences for offenders covers a relatively wide range of factors. This chapter begins 
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by reviewing the literature examining the relevance of socio-demographic factors to 
understanding punitive attitudes towards offenders. Crime experiences will then be 
considered assessing the importance of real threats of crime and victimisation to public 
punitiveness. Finally, the relevance of belief systems, including abstract anxieties, 
conservative beliefs, right-wing authoritarianism and economic beliefs, will be reviewed. 
Whilst there is some discrepancy between the measurements designed to assess 
punitiveness amongst these studies, certain trends in the data have emerged. The literature 
reviewed in this section is deemed the most relevant to this project in terms of how 
punitiveness has been operationalised drawing on empirical research using survey data.   
 
2.1.2. Socio-demographic factors  
A large volume of empirical research has sought to understand public sentiment towards 
offenders through exploring socio-demographic factors (King and Maruna, 2009; Costelloe et 
al., 2009; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). However, as this review shows there is conflicting 




In the UK, age has been found to be variably related to punitiveness. Hough and Moxon 
(1985) analysed the findings from the 1982 and 1984 sweeps of the British Crime Survey 
(BCS) and found that older individuals generally held more punitive views when questioned 
about the most appropriate sentence across a range of seven crimes. Those over 60 years old 
favoured longer prison sentences (one or more years in prison) across all crimes compared to 
lower age groups, with those under 30 years old being least punitive. Hough et al. (1988) 
found age made a statistically significant contribution to their scale of punitiveness (beta=.14, 
p=.05) with older people expressing more punitive views measured as ‘court sentences are 
too soft’. However, more recently, King and Maruna (2009) (n=940) operationalised 
‘punitiveness’ as a person’s level of support for harsher sanctions and/or crime policies (With 
most offenders, we need to ‘condemn more and understand less’; My general view towards 
offenders is that they should be treated harshly; and, We should bring back the death penalty 




Internationally, results have also varied. In Australia, Roberts and Indermaur (2007) 
operationalised punitiveness through statements relating to sentences (The death penalty 
should be the punishment for murder; People who break the law should be given stiffer 
sentences) and public opinion (Judges should reflect public opinion about crimes when 
sentencing criminals). They found age to be a significant factor with punitiveness increasing 
with age (n=4270, r=.009, p=<.05). Spiranovic et al. (2012) also found punitiveness increased 
with age (n=5571, r=.09, p=<.01) measured through a punitive scale of seven items designed 
to measure an individual's desire for harsher punishments, including People who break the 
law should be give stiffer sentences. However, they noted age was only a weak predictor 
accounting for less than 1% of unique variance (Spiranovic et al., 2012). In America, older 
respondents were also found to be more punitive in relation to punishment (n=156, 
beta=.192, p<.05) when measured as support for punitive responses to offenders (Cullen et 
al., 1985). In contrast, Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) found the young to be more punitive 
(n=166, beta=.22, p<.01) in Northern California in relation to support for the ‘three strikes’ 
initiatives. Useem et al. (2003) explored punitiveness towards criminal offenders (Favour for 
the death penalty; Courts in this area do not deal harshly enough with criminals; Spending too 
little money to halt the rising crime rate; Spending too little on law enforcement) constructing 
variables based on the core experiences that New Penology theorists propose are related to 
increased punitiveness: experience or anticipation of unemployment, life and financial 
satisfaction, and job prospects. They found that age generally had no effect on their 
measures, with the exception of the satisfaction measure (Generally ‘not too happy’; Not 
satisfied with city or place in which respondent lives; Not satisfied with financial situation; 
Financial situation has been getting worse), where support for the death penalty increased 
with age (r=.006, p=<001).  
 
The age, period and cohort (APC) approach recognises the complexity of using age to 
measure punitive attitudes (Gray et al., 2018) and may explain some of the differences found 
in punitive attitudes related to age in the aforementioned studies. Each study has measured 
punitiveness at a specific period of time, in a specific place and context.  The APC approach 
acknowledges the distinct temporal processes of individual ageing, contexts and generational 
membership and aids understanding of social changes (Gray et al., 2018). When measuring 
age in a group of people, Gray et al. (2018) highlight the importance of considering how 
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much change is related to the individual aging process, how much is due to the historical 
context of the data collection, and how much is related to the generation the individual grew 
up in. Gray et al. (2018) found that public perceptions of crime can be impacted by the  
socio-political environment in which people spend their formative years, that is the age at 
which individuals are most responsive to forming their opinions. This ‘political socialisation’ 
can impact on public perceptions and can endure throughout a person’s life course (Gray et 
al., 2018). The relevance of APC effects to punitiveness will be returned to in Chapter 10 of 
this thesis.   
 
Gender 
Hough et al. (1988) found that male attitudes to sentencing to be more punitive than 
females, however, this gender difference disappeared for those over the age of 55. Hough et 
al. (1988) also found gender made a statistically significant contribution to their scale of 
punitiveness (beta=.07, p=<.05) with males expressing more punitive views than females. 
Internationally, gender has been found to be predictive of punitive attitudes. In the US, 
Cullen et al. (1985) and Useem et al. (2003) found a statistically significant difference 
between males and females in relation to support for the death penalty, with females being 
more likely to oppose the death penalty (beta=-.300; p<.01 and p=<.001, respectively). In 
Australia, Roberts and Indermaur (2007) found that being male was a statistically significant 
predictor of increased punitiveness (beta=.082, p=<.001), and Spiranovic et al. (2012) found 
that being female was associated with lower scores for punitiveness (beta=-.112, p=<.01).  
 
Social Status 
Higher educational attainment, those with A levels or higher, have been found to be 
associated with less punitive attitudes (Hough and Walker, 1988; Hough and Park, 2002; 
Unnever and Cullen, 2010). King and Maruna (2009) found that when demographic factors 
were considered in isolation, education was found to have one of the strongest effects on 
punitive attitudes towards offenders (beta=-.300, p=.001) with those with more education 
being less punitive towards offenders. Education has also been found to be a strong predictor 
of punitiveness internationally. In Australia, Spiranovic et al. (2012) explored demographic, 
media usage and crime salience variables (Perceptions of crime levels, fear of crime, and 
personal experience with the criminal courts), and found education to be the strongest 
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demographic predictor of punitive attitudes (n=6,005, beta=-.516, p=<.01) accounting for 
11% of unique variance when demographic characteristics were considered in isolation. 
When media usage, crime salience and demographic factors were considered together, 
education remained the strongest demographic predictor of punitive attitudes (beta=-.219, 
p=<.01) accounting for 4 percent of unique variance. Roberts and Indermaur’s (2007) study 
also found that those with more years in education reported lower levels of punitiveness  
(beta=-.168, p=.001). Findings in America have also followed this trend. Tyler and Boeckmann 
(1997) found lower educational attainment to be the strongest individual predictor of 
increased punitiveness (beta=.30, p<.001). Costelloe et al. (2009) operationalised 
punitiveness through support for a range of punitive policies (Death penalty for juveniles who 
murder; Send repeat juvenile offenders to adult court; Lock up more juveniles offenders; Make 
sentences more severe for all crimes; Limit appeals to death sentences; Make prisoners work 
on chain gangs; Take away television and recreational privileges from prisoners). They found 
that higher educational attainment was a significant predictor of less punitive views  
(beta=-.086, p=<.01). Furthermore, Useem et al. (2003) found a curvilinear relationship 
between education and punitive attitudes in relation to their unemployment measure (Likely 
to lose job or be laid off in the next 12 months; Been unemployed; Seeking work any time in 
the past 10 years). High school graduates were more likely to support punitive policies, 
whereas both those with less than high school education (beta=-.222, p=<.05) and those with 
a college degree or more (beta=-.532, p=<.001) were more likely to oppose the death 
penalty. In relation to satisfaction variables (Generally ‘not too happy’; Not satisfied with city 
or place in which respondent lives; Not satisfied with financial situation; Financial situation 
has been getting worse), Useem at al. (2003) also found a curvilinear relationship with those 
with lower (beta=-.204, p=<001) and higher educational attainment (beta=-.476, p=<001) 
more likely to oppose the death penalty. Career advancement and job threat variables 
(Unlikely to be promoted in the next five years; Lost ground in job; Being a man/woman 
makes own promotion opportunities better or worse; Ethnic background makes promotion 
opportunities better or worse) followed a different pattern with only those with higher 
education (beta=-.734, p=<001) more likely to oppose the death penalty. However, in Illinois, 
Cullen et al. (1985) found that education was not a predictor of punitive attitudes when 
operationalised by measuring support for punitive responses to offenders based on the 
traditional punishment philosophies of retribution, deterrence and incapacitation.  
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King and Maruna (2009) found class origin to be a relatively stable predictor of punitiveness, 
suggesting that as self-reported class hierarchy ascends, the less likely a person is to express 
punitive attitudes (beta=-.154, p=<.001). Roberts and Indermaur (2007) found that those 
who described themselves as working class were associated with increased punitive attitudes 
(beta=.530, p=.001). Hough and Moxon (1985) found that manual workers and their families 
are generally more punitive than non-manual workers measured by their preference for 
custodial sentences of one year or more across a range of crimes. Manual workers (40%) 
were also found to favour the tougher sentencing of burglars compared to non-manual 
workers (34%).  
 
There is conflicting research regarding the influence of income on punitive attitudes. King and 
Maruna (2009) found that those earning more income are more likely to express punitive 
views (beta=.080, p=<.05). Spiranovic et al. (2012) found that upper income was a significant 
predictor of a less punitive attitude (beta=-.09, p=<.01) when demographic factors were 
considered in isolation, although this accounted for less than half a percentage of unique 
variance.  Whereas Cullen et al. (1985) and Costelloe et al. (2009) found that income was not 
a predictor of punitive attitudes. Lastly, Costelloe et al., (2009) found marriage to be a 
significant predictor of increased punitive attitudes (beta=.067, p=<.01). 
 
Religiosity 
In England, self-reported religiosity or spirituality was found to be related to decreased 
punitiveness (beta=-.125, p=<.001) (King and Maruna, 2009). Self-reported attendance at 
religious services at least once per month was also associated with lower punitiveness in 
Australia (beta=-.089, p=.001) (Roberts and Indermaur, 2007), whilst in America those 
considered religiously orientated people were also found to be less supportive of punitive 
responses to crime and the death penalty (Unnever and Cullen, 2010). However, when 
religion is based on fundamentalist beliefs, such as referring to more literal interpretations of 
the Bible, increased punitiveness towards juvenile offenders was found to be statistically 
significant (beta=.331, p=<.001) (Grasmick and McGill, 1994).  
Ethnicity 
Research in England suggest that ethnicity is not linked to punitiveness (King and Maruna, 
2009), whereas in the US, white people have been found to hold more punitive views  
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(beta=.17, p<.01) (Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997). African Americans have been found to be 
generally unsupportive of punitive responses to crime and the death penalty (Unnever and 
Cullen, 2010). Useem et al. (2003) found that African Americans were less likely to favour 
capital punishment (beta=-.928, p=<001) than white people, and also less likely to believe 
that the courts are too lenient on offenders (beta=-.436, p=<001). Costelloe et al. (2009) also 
found that black people were significantly less likely to hold punitive views (beta=-.081, 
p=<.01). Cohn et al. (1991) suggest that there is a distinction along ethnic lines to punitive 
attitudes in America whereby African American punitiveness may be explained by fear of 
crime, whereas punitiveness in the white population may be explained by prejudice. Unnever 
and Cullen (2010) also suggest that public punitiveness is entwinned by ethnic resentments 
and found that hostility towards ethnic groups was one of the most constant and substantive 
predictors of both a punitive approach to crime (beta=.230, p=<.001) and support for the 
death penalty (beta=.223, p=<.001).  
 
Summary 
Whilst there is some evidence to suggest that certain socio-demographic factors can account 
for some variance in punitive public sentiment, they alone are not particularly strong 
explanations of punitive attitudes (King and Maruna, 2009). Whilst some demographic 
factors, particularly education and gender, emerge as relevant predictors of punitive 
attitudes, collectively they are weak predictors accounting for a relatively small percentage of 
variance in punitive attitudes (Spiranovic et al., 2012). Roberts and Indermauer (2007) found 
that demographic factors alone accounted for 12.8 percent of the variance in their measure 
of punitiveness, whereas Cullen et al. (1985) found that socio-demographic factors accounted 
for no more than 10 percent of the variance in explaining punitiveness. In England, King and 
Maruna (2009) found the variance of demographic factors in their research to be consistent 
with previous research. Yet, the interaction of socio-demographic factors may be very 
powerful and increase our understandings of punitive attitudes. Attitudes shift within social 
cleavages; therefore, complex background information of respondents should be considered. 
APC modelling suggests that generational values can vary distinctly depending on when 





2.1.3. Crime Experiences  
Fear of crime 
Instrumental theories of public punitiveness suggest that people desire punishment to 
reduce the likelihood of harm to themselves and their communities through incapacitation 
and deterrence (Gerber and Jackson, 2016). Thus, punitive sentiment is measured through 
people’s personal experiences of crime and victimisation (King and Maruna, 2009). Several 
studies have found a small, but significant, effect of fear of crime on punitive attitudes 
(Hogan et al., 2005; Sprott and Doob, 1997), whilst Sprott (1999) found no effect on 
punitiveness. King and Maruna (2009) found that anxieties about crime (I consider myself to 
be at risk of crime; Crime is a serious problem where I live) was only a significant predictor of a 
punitive attitudes (beta=.186, p<.001) when relational factors were not considered in the 
model. In this latter scenario, crime concerns were not found to be statistically significant 
suggesting that relational factors inflated crime concern in the former model. In Florida, 
Costelloe et al.'s (2009) study (n=2,250) examining punitive attitudes towards criminals 
through support for crime policies (including death penalty for juveniles who murder; make 
sentences stiffer for all crimes) found that crime salience, particularly fear of victimisation 
(beta=.164, p=<.01) and concern about crime (beta=.304, p=<.01), consistently predicted 
punitiveness irrespective of sex or ethnicity of the respondents. Spiranovic et al. (2012) found 
that perceptions of crime (beta=.298, p=<.01) and fear of crime (beta=.140, p=<.01) were 
significant predictors of punitive attitudes accounting for 7 percent and 2 percent of unique 
variance respectively.  
 
Victimisation 
A considerable amount of research has failed to find support for the hypothesis that 
victimisation is a significant predictor of punitive attitudes (King and Maruna, 2009; Unnever 
et al., 2007; Hough and Moxon, 1985; Costelloe et al., 2009; Kleck and Baker Jackson, 2016). 
These studies operationalise victimisation in several ways. King and Maruna (2009) asked 
individuals if they had been the victim ‘of a personally damaging or serious crime’ and ‘the 
victim of crime on many occasions’ and found that experience of criminal victimisation did 
not have an effect of punitiveness in any of the models tested.  Unnever et al. (2007) used 
national-level US data from the General Social Survey, which asked ‘did anyone break into or 
somehow illegally get into your (apartment/home)?’, and ‘did anyone take something directly 
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from you by using force-such as a stickup, mugging, or threat?’ within the last year. They 
found no relationship between being a victim and support for harsher local courts or the 
death penalty (Unnever et al., 2007). In Hough and Moxon’s (1985) study, victimisation was 
operationalised through asking victims of residential burglary and car theft to choose their 
preferred sentence for the offender from a range of options shown on a card and found that 
victims of these offences were less likely to opt for imprisonment and fines. Costelloe et al. 
(2009) operationalised victimisation by asking whether anyone in the respondents’ 
household had been a victim of a crime within the past year. Finally, Kleck and Baker Jackson 
(2016) used a range of questions regarding personal victimisation experiences (a victim of 
robbery in the past year, a victim of burglary in the past year, a victim of an assault since 
becoming an adult), vicarious victimisation (knowing a person who has been a victim of a 
serious crime in the past year) and perceptions of future victimisation (the perceived 
likelihood that one will be murdered in the next 12 months, the perceived likelihood that one 
will be robbed or mugged in the next 12 months, and the perceived likelihood that one will be 
burgled in the next 12 months). Indeed being a victim of crime has been found to be 
negatively related to punitiveness when measuring burglary victimisation (Taylor et al., 1979). 
Jackson and Gray (2010) propose that victimisation experiences differ; thus, those who 
perceive a high likelihood of repeat victimisation that will result in high personal costs may 
express more concern about crime. 
 
2.1.4. Belief Systems 
Abstract Anxieties 
There is a body of empirical research that supports relational theories of punitiveness driven 
by socio-emotional responses to factors external to real threats of crime (King and Maruna, 
2009).  When norms and values are thought to be eroding, public support for authority to 
reassert those norms and values increases (Gerber and Jackson, 2016). Harsher punishments 
of lawbreakers are expressed by those who desire social values to be reasserted (Tyler and 
Boeckmann, 1997). King and Maruna (2009) found that punitiveness is strongly related to 
generational anxiety (beta=.395, p=<.001) expressed through concerns about loss of 
discipline and respect amongst young people in society (The behaviour of adolescents today 
is worse than it was in the past; Young people don’t seem to have any respect for anything 
anymore), which may relate to conservativism. In California, Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) 
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found that key predictors of punitiveness towards offenders (support for ‘Three Strikes and 
You’re Out’ initiatives) were concerns about the deterioration of social values (beta=.37, 
p=<.001), measured by authoritarianism, dogmatism and liberalism, and family social bonds 
(beta=.19, p=<.01). Unnever and Cullen (2010) found that those who believed society was in 
moral decline are significantly more likely to support a punitive approach to crime (beta=.89, 
p=<.01) and the death penalty (beta=.102, p=<.001), which again suggests that this may be 
related to conservativism. When the same online survey was conducted in Britain and 
Singapore (n=131), national identity (how British or Singaporean someone felt) was found to 
be a positive predictor for support for sentences without parole for repeat serious offenders 
(Palasinski and Shortland, 2017). Hough et al. (1988) proposed that punitive attitudes 
towards the punishment of offenders can be explained by broader attitudes linked to a 
disciplinarian outlook (support for more discipline in school, the workplace and the armed 
forces) (beta=.16, p=<.05).  
 
Conservative Beliefs 
Ideology affects people’s attitudes about offenders, beliefs about the causes of crime and 
appropriate institutional responses to rule-breaking (Carroll et al, 1987).  Several studies have 
found those of a conservative political orientation endorse tougher sentences. King and 
Maruna (2009) found that when background factors were considered in isolation, 
conservative self-identification (beta=.336, p=<.001) was found to be have the strongest 
effect on increased punitiveness. With the inclusion of relational factors in the model, the 
effect of conservative self-identification reduced but remained significant (beta=.237, 
p=<.001) (King and Maruna, 2009). A conservative orientation was also found to be a 
significant predictor of increased punitiveness in Costelloe et al.'s (2009) study (beta=.091, 
p=<.01). Hogan et al. (2005) found that conservative views (amount of tax money spent on 
welfare/health care for the poor; efforts to help women/ minorities achieve equality with 
men/white populations; and, the number of immigrants coming into the country) were more 
important at predicating punitiveness amongst minorities and females, but not white males. 
Unnever and Cullen (2010) also found that those who had a conservative political orientation 
were more likely to support a punitive approach to crime (beta=.124, p=<.001) and the death 
penalty (beta=.072, p=<.01). In Australia, Roberts and Indermaur (2007) found that a right-




Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) has been found to be a significant predictor for support 
for harsher punishments of offenders. RWA consists of a collection of beliefs about how 
people should behave and how institutions ought to respond to lawbreakers (Gerber and 
Jackson, 2016). Gerber and Jackson (2016) explored punitiveness by testing instrumental 
concerns, relational concerns, and ideological preferences drawing upon a sample of 20,480 
Londoners from the Public Attitudes Survey sweeps 2007/8 and 2008/9. Punitiveness was 
measured by using the item ‘People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences’. 
Punitive sentiment was found to correlate positively with all instrumental, relational and 
authoritarian (Schools should teach children to obey authority’; Young people today don’t 
have enough respect for traditional values) variables with the strongest correlation between 
punitive sentiment and authoritarianism (r=.59, p<.01). Authoritarianism was positively 
correlated with a number of instrumental and relational concerns regarding increased fear of 
crime (r=.22, p<.01), perceptions of crime level (r=.18, p=<.01), perceptions of anti-social 
behaviour (r=.22, p=<.01) and perceptions of disorder (r=.23, p=<.01), concerns about 
collective efficacy (r=.09, p=<.01), and concerns about local change (r=.14, p=<.01). Gerber 
and Jackson (2016) found that when authoritarianism (beta=.21, p=<.01) was entered into 
the model, the R-square value increased from .17 to .57. They propose that their findings 
support the idea that ideology has a stronger effect on punitive attitudes with instrumental 
and relational concerns playing a weaker role. Gerber and Jackson’s (2016) findings support 
those of Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) and King and Maruna (2009) in that instrumental 
concerns about future harm are less relevant than relational concerns and social anxieties, 
which explain a greater amount of variance in punitive sentiment. They argue that punitive 
sentiment and instrumental and relational concerns are driven by ‘authoritarian submission’ 
and concerns about traditional moral values where punishment is endorsed due to a 
‘symbolic attempt to defend social order and moral cohesion’ (Gerber and Jackson, 
2016:130). RWA has also been found to be a predictor for support for harsher punishments 
for first time and repeat fraud, sexual and violent offenders regardless of socio-demographic 






Economic Beliefs  
A number of studies have linked economic factors to punitiveness. Kornhauser (2015:27) 
examined the relationship between economic individualism, that is ‘a belief that individuals 
can and should be responsible for their own economic welfare’, and punitive attitudes 
measured by support for stiffer sentences and the death penalty in the English-speaking 
western world (US, Canada, Australia, UK, New Zealand) by using existing survey data. The 
study assessed the relationship between punitiveness and two dimensions of economic 
individualism: descriptive and normative economic individualism. Descriptive economic 
individualism is a belief that economic well-being is directly related to effort and the personal 
attributes of individuals, whilst normative economic individualism indicates a preference for 
individual economic responsibility (Kornhauser, 2015). Kornhauser (2015) found that 
economic individualism is a relatively consistent predictor of punitiveness cross-nationally, 
with the exception of support for the death penalty in the UK. In the UK, descriptive 
economic individualism (beta=0.29, p=<.05) and normative economic individualism 
(beta=.25, p=<.05) are associated with greater support for stiffer sentences. However, in 
relation to support for the death penalty only normative economic individualism (beta=.39, 
p=<.05) was statistically significant.      
 
Hogan et al. (2005:392) explored how punishment and the economy may be linked at the 
individual level in Florida through a survey of 1,476 residents. They examined whether 
punitiveness towards offenders measured by items assessing level of support for a range of 
crime control policies is associated with a general resentment towards the ‘undeserving 
poor’. Findings indicate that individual willingness to blame welfare, affirmative action, and 
immigration for declining wages is the strongest predictor of punitiveness when other 
relevant factors are controlled (beta=.42, p=<.001). Economic insecurity, the perception of 
being worse off next year compared to this year, was found to be statistically significant only 
for females and ethnic minorities. The effect of blame on punitiveness was stronger in white 
males than for any other group (beta=.46, p=<001). In contrast, Costelloe et al. (2009) found 
economic insecurity, the expectation that financial circumstances will worsen in the near 
future, to be significantly linked to punitive attitudes among white males (beta=.075, p=<.05), 
particularly those who are less well educated (beta=.149, p=<.01) and earn less income 
(beta=.126, p=<.05).  
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King and Maruna (2009) found that wider economic anxieties, measured by ‘I feel the 
economy in Britain is in serious trouble’ was positively related to punitiveness, but found that 
personal financial satisfaction was not significantly related to punitiveness. Hanslmaier and 
Baier (2016) measured punitiveness with four items (for many offenders, stricter sentencing is 
the only way to stop them repeating offences; many offences should receive stricter sentences 
than has been the case to date; stricter sentences are necessary to prevent others from 
committing crime; prisons should treat prisoners more harshly) by conducting a nationwide 
representative survey (n=3,073) in Germany. They found that the regional economic situation 
as a function of a higher unemployment rate (beta=.018, p=<.01) was related to increased 
punitiveness, whilst the individual situation (monthly household income and employment 
status) appeared not to be related to punitiveness. Additionally, Hanslmaier and Baier also 
found that relative deprivation (Compared to how others in Germany live, how much do you 
think you personally get?; How much of what you want can you afford to buy?)  has a 
significant impact on punitiveness (beta=.148, p=<.001).    
 
2.1.5. Summary 
Punitiveness towards lawbreakers suggests that people desire harsher responses when 
people break the law. This chapter has presented the literature on punitive attitudes towards 
offenders using surveys and measures most relevant to this study. Firstly, the relevance of 
socio-demographic factors was presented, which suggests education and gender emerge as 
relevant predictors of punitive attitudes. However, socio-demographic factors alone appear 
to be weak predictors accounting for a relatively small percentage of variance in punitive 
attitudes. The effect of crime experiences on punitive attitudes were then considered. Fear of 
crime, fear of victimisation and perceptions about crime have been found to be relevant 
factors increasing punitiveness towards offenders, albeit with a small effect. Whereas 
victimisation has consistently been found not to be a relevant factor in punitiveness. This 
suggests that punitiveness towards lawbreakers is related to attitudes rather than 
experiences. Finally, the importance of belief systems was presented. Beliefs that there has 
been a loss of discipline and respect in society, loss of social cohesion and moral decline 
appear to be relevant factors in understanding punitive attitudes. Additionally, conservative 
beliefs, right-wing authoritarianism and economic beliefs emerge as more relevant factors in 
understanding punitive attitudes towards offenders than socio-demographic factors and 
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crime experiences. The next subchapter now turns the attention to rulebreaking welfare 































Chapter 2.2. Literature Review: Public Attitudes Towards Welfare Claimants 
 
2.2.1. Introduction  
Public attitudes towards benefit recipients and poverty are increasingly punitive (McKay, 
2014) with hostility towards the unemployed, less well-off and welfare claimants increasing 
in recent years (Deeming, 2015). The majority of studies to date do not specifically examine 
public attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants, but instead explore attitudes more 
generally. This literature has generally assessed attitudes towards welfare claimants in Britain 
through analyzing longitudinal data measured by responses to questions regarding the 
welfare system and individuals in receipt of welfare. This literature generally shows a trend in 
attitudes towards welfare recipients hardening over time. However, ‘punitiveness’ is not 
explicitly linked to academic research on welfare claimants. The literature search1 indicates 
that there is no research connecting ‘punitive attitudes’ directly with welfare claimants who 
break the rules. However, a large body of research, with the most relevant outlined below, 
has found some socio-demographic factors, welfare beliefs and political beliefs relevant to 
the hardening of attitudes towards welfare claimants. This chapter begins with a review of 
the most relevant literature to this study by examining the relevance of socio-demographic 
factors to understanding attitudes towards welfare claimants. Beliefs systems and 
perceptions are then considered, which include conservative beliefs, attitudes towards tax 
avoidance versus benefit fraud, attitudes towards the use of sanctions, and undeservingness.  
 
2.2.2. Socio-demographic factors 
A very small field of empirical research has sought to explore the relationship between  
socio-demographic factors and public attitudes towards welfare and its claimants.  
 
Age 
Taylor-Gooby and Martin (2008) explored socio-demographic factors towards welfare 
spending using British Social Attitude Survey data (The government should spend more on 
welfare for the poor). Age was found to be a significant factor (beta=-.09, p=<.01) with the 
 
1 Electronic searches on Web of Science and Google Scholar were made using the terms ‘punitive attitudes to 
benefit recipients’, ‘punitive attitudes to benefits,’ ‘punitive attitudes to benefit claimants’, ‘punitive attitudes to 
welfare’, ‘tough attitudes to welfare’, ‘tough attitudes to benefits’, ‘punishment attitudes to welfare’, ‘harsh 
attitudes to welfare’, ‘punishment of benefit recipients’ and ‘punishment attitudes to welfare claimants’. 
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youngest age bracket (18-34) being least supportive of increased spending for welfare, and 
the oldest age bracket (55+) being most supportive (beta=.08, p=<.01), although different 
types of benefits were not measured. Deeming (2015) analysed British Social Attitudes 
Survey data to assess attitudes to work and welfare (Out-of-work benefits are too high and 
discourage people from finding work or too low and cause hardship; If benefits were not so 
generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet). Additionally, Deeming (2015) 
analysed opinions of requirements for unemployed people to show they are looking for work 
to assess whether welfare conditionality, that is the receipt of benefits on condition of 
meeting certain responsibilities (DWP, 2010:24), is too weak or too tough. Young adults (aged 
15-24) were found to be significantly more likely than older adults to believe that 
unemployment benefits are too high (odds ratio=3.24, p=<.05) as well as significantly more 
likely to believe that work conditionality is weak in the British welfare system (odds ratio 
=3.56, p=<.001) (Deeming, 2015). Baumberg Geiger (2017) sought to examine deservingness 
perceptions about benefit beliefs analysing questions fielded by the British Social Attitudes 
Survey (various years), the European Social Survey (2008), and TUC/YouGov (2012). 
Deservingness (Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help’ (BSAS); 
many people receive benefits/services to which they are not entitled (ESS); unemployed people 
are really trying to get a job (ESS) or could get one if they tried (BSAS); Britain’s welfare 
system has created a culture of dependency) versus claimants being ‘victims of circumstances 
beyond their control’ (TUC/YouGov). Perceived benefit fraud used three measurements, 
which asked people their estimates on the proportion of false claims (for sickness/disability 
and unemployment separately) and fraudulent claims as a proportion of the welfare budget 
(TUC/YouGov). Fraud perceptions were found to be related to perceived undeservingness as 
people get older (beta=.04, p=<.05). 
 
Schofield and Butterworth (2015) analysed Australian Survey of Social Attitudes data in 2009 
(n=3,241) to measure attitudes towards both welfare recipients and the welfare system 
(People who receive welfare benefits should be under more obligation to find work; Around 
here most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted to; Welfare benefits make 
people lazy and dependent; Most people getting welfare are trying to get a job). A range of 
socio-demographic factors were included in the analysis along with prior exposure to welfare 
measured by either the respondent or their partners receiving some form of government 
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benefit in the last five years. Using a canonical correlation approach, they found that the 
sample held much stronger negative attitudes towards welfare recipients than towards 
welfare itself. Older individuals were found to be more likely to hold stronger beliefs that it is 
‘too easy to qualify for welfare benefits’, which was accompanied by undeservingness 
attitudes towards people in receipt of parenting payments.  
 
Gender 
Deeming (2015) is the only study to explore the relationship between gender and welfare 
attitudes and found that gender was a significant factor with males more likely to believe that 
benefits were too generous compared to women (odds ratio =.67, p=<.05). 
 
Social Status 
Education (beta=.04, p=<.05) was found to be a significant factor in relation to welfare with 
those with higher levels of education being more supportive of increased welfare spending 
(Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008). Deeming (2015) also found levels of educational 
attainment to be a relevant factor. Those with no qualifications (odds ratio =2.33, p=<.01) 
and below degree level of educational attainment (odds ratio =1.88, p=<.01) were 
significantly more likely to believe that benefits were too generous compared to those with a 
university degree. Additionally, no qualifications (odds ratio =4.08, p=<.001) and below 
degree level education (odds ratio =2.33, p=<.001) were related to the belief that the welfare 
system disincentivises the unemployed from working compared to holding a university 
degree. However, Deeming (2015) also found that education was not a significant factor 
related to the belief that the welfare system suffers from weak conditionality. Schofield and 
Butterworth (2015) found that negative attitudes towards the welfare system and welfare 
recipients was linked to lower levels of education. Additionally, Schofield and Butterworth 
(2015) also found that those with lower levels of education were more likely to hold that the 
attitude that ‘welfare is important but the people on it are lazy and dependent’.  
 
Deeming (2015) found that attitudes towards welfare benefits for poor families were found 
to be fairly consistent across the classes. In 1987, 61% of working-class (skilled, low-skilled 
and unskilled workers) respondents thought that the government should spend more on 
welfare benefits for poor families, in comparison to approximately half of middle-class 
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(professionals and routine non-manual workers) respondents. In 2011, the proportion of 
working-class respondents had decreased to 33% in agreement with increased spending in 
comparison to 25% of middle-class respondents (Deeming, 2015). Deeming (2015) found 
class (measured by occupation) to be a relevant factor in beliefs about the benefit system. 
Professionals (odds ratio =2.84, p=<.05), managerial (odds ratio =2.40, p=<.05) and skilled 
manual workers (odds ratio =3.05, p=<.05) were more likely to believe that welfare benefits 
are too generous than unskilled workers. Professionals were also more likely to believe that 
the welfare system has weak conditionality (odds ratio =2.56, p=.01) than unskilled workers. 
Deeming (2015) also found labour force status to be a relevant factor with the employed 
(odds ratio =4.96, p=.001) and the economically inactive (odds ratio =3.00, p=.01), those who 
are retired, students, unpaid family workers and individuals engaged in home duties and child 
care, more likely to believe that benefits are too generous compared to the unemployed 
(Deeming, 2015). These differences were also evident regarding conditionality, with both the 
employed (odds ratio =3.52, p=<.001) and economically inactive (odds ratio =2.73, p=<.01) 
believing that the welfare system has weak conditionality compared to the unemployed 
(Deeming, 2015).    
 
Additionally, Deeming (2015) found strong interaction effects between occupational class 
and level of education and between partisanship and occupational class. Skilled manual 
workers with qualifications (with a degree: odds ratio =2.09, p=<.05, with below degree level 
qualifications: odds ratio =3.57, p=<.01) were significantly more likely to believe that welfare 
benefits are too generous compared to unskilled workers with no formal qualifications. The 
managerial class with a degree (odds ratio =1.98, p=<.01) were also more likely to believe 
that benefits are too generous compared to unskilled manual workers with no qualifications. 
Those believing that welfare disincentivises claimants from getting a job also increases when 
the interactions of class and education are combined. The strongest effects were being 
skilled manual workers with qualifications (degree: odds ratio =4.77, p=<.001; below degree: 
odds ratio =4.64, p=<.001), skilled non-manual workers with qualifications (degree: odds ratio 
=1.83, p=<.05; below degree: odds ratio =6.55, p=<.01) and managerial with a degree (odds 
ratio =1.87, p=<.01) being significantly more likely to hold this belief compared to unskilled 
workers without qualifications. There were also significant interaction effects between class 
and education in regard to the belief that the welfare system has weak conditionality, albeit 
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with weaker effects. Managerial workers with below degree level education (odds ratio 
=2.11, p=<.05) and skilled manual workers with a degree (odds ratio =1.55, p=<.05) more 
likely to support this belief than unskilled workers without qualifications (Deeming, 2015).  
 
Income was found to be a significant factor with those in the lowest quintile (beta=.04, 
p=<.01)  and the second lowest quintile (beta=.06, p=<.01) showing most support  for 
increased government spending on welfare for the poor (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008). 
Deeming (2015) found that as household income increases, so does the belief that welfare 
benefits are too generous (£1201–£2200: odds ratio=1.80, p=<.05; £2201-£3700: odds ratio 
=1.83, p=<.05; >£3701: odds ratio=2.44, p=<.001). However, income did not appear to be 
related to beliefs about welfare conditionality (Deeming, 2015).    
 
Religion 
Deeming (2015) found that those with religious views were more likely to believe that 
welfare conditionality was too harsh (odds ratio =.70, p=<.01). No other relevant studies have 
sought to explore the relationship between religion and welfare attitudes.   
 
Ethnicity 
The only study to explore ethnicity and welfare attitudes found that belonging to a BME 
group increased the likelihood of believing that unemployment benefits are too generous 




People living in central London were significantly more likely than people living in Outer 
London to believe that benefits are inadequate (odds ratio=.24, p=<.001) and deter people 
from finding work (odds ratio=.31, p=<.05) (Deeming, 2015). People living in Yorkshire and 
Humberside were also significantly more likely to believe that benefits are inadequate (odds 







Schofield and Butterworth (2015) found that those with no dependent children and those 
who had more stable housing were more likely to hold stronger attitudes towards welfare. 
Those with children were more likely to be positive about benefits for families, and those 
with life stability were less likely to be favourable towards welfare, thus suggesting welfare 
attitudes can be seen as self-serving (Schofield and Butterworth, 2015).  
 
Summary 
Few empirical studies have explored socio-demographic factors to understand attitudes 
towards welfare claimants. The few studies that have, have used a range of different 
measures to explore attitudes towards the welfare system and/or its claimants. Despite this 
limitation, age, education and occupational class appear to emerge as relevant factors in 
explaining punitive attitudes towards welfare and welfare claimants, albeit explaining a small 
amount of variance in attitudes. Taylor-Gooby and Martin (2008) found that  
socio-demographic factors explained 12% of the variance in attitudes in their model.   
 
2.2.3. Beliefs and Perceptions 
Conservative Beliefs 
Studies have found that those of a conservative political orientation are less likely to be 
supportive of social welfare spending (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008; Deeming, 2015). 
Taylor-Gooby and Martin (2008) found that those who identify with the Conservative Party 
showed less support for increased government spending on welfare for the poor (beta=-.16, 
p=<.01), whilst those identifying with the Labour Party showed more support (beta=.10, 
p=<.01). Deeming (2015) found that supporters of the Conservative Party were least likely to 
be supportive of better welfare benefits to help poor families. Whilst Labour Party supporters 
have traditionally been the most likely to be supportive of welfare, Deeming (2015) found 
that their support has been in steep decline in recent decades. In 1987, 73% of Labour Party 
supporters agreed that the government should spend more on welfare benefits for poor 
families compared to 36% in 2011. People who voted for the Conservative Party were 
significantly more likely to believe that unemployment benefits were too generous (odds 
ratio=4.75, p=.001), benefits disincentivise claimants (odds ratio=4.30, p=<.001), and the 
welfare system has weak conditionality (odds ratio=1.82, p=<.001) when compared to the 
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Liberal Democrats. When measuring the interactional effects of political party and class, 
comparing Conservative and Labour voters with Liberal Democrat voters, strong interactional 
effects were observed. Those voting conservative and belonging to the professional class 
were significantly more likely to believe that benefits are too generous (odds ratio=60.58, 
p=.01), welfare disincentivises claimants (odds ratio=5.02, p=.001), and the welfare system 
has weak conditionality (odds ratio=2.91, p=<.001) compared to unskilled voting Liberal 
Democrats. This strong interaction effect between Conservative Party supporters and 
occupational class is also observed across all welfare attitudes examined, with Conservative 
Party voters in the managerial class (generous benefits: odds ratio=7.61, p=<.001; work 
disincentives: odds ratio=3.66, p=<.001; weak conditionality: odds ratio=1.93, p=<.001), the 
skilled non-manual class (generous benefits: odds ratio=2.58, p=<.01; work disincentives: odds 
ratio=5.17, p=<.001; weak conditionality: odds ratio=1.65, p=<.05), the skilled manual class 
(generous benefits: odds ratio=4.00, p=<.01; work disincentives: odds ratio=6.52, p=<.001; 
weak conditionality: odds ratio=2.23, p=.01), and the semi-skilled manual class (generous 
benefits: odds ratio=3.86, p=<.05; work disincentives: odds ratio=6.97, p=<.01) consistently 
less supportive of social welfare. The single significant interaction effect with people who 
vote for the Labour Party was with the skilled manual workers believing that welfare benefits 
were too generous (odds ratio=2.40, p=<.05) when compared to the unskilled Liberal 
Democrat voters (Deeming, 2015).  
 
When analysing responses to ‘The government should spend more on welfare for the poor’ 
and perceptions (higher levels of poverty in Britain today), social values (agree the 
government should redistribute income), and beliefs (agree that many people claim falsely), 
Deeming (2015) found that all subjective measures were found to be significant (p=<.01) with 
social values having the strongest effect (beta=.26). Social values, perceptions and beliefs 
accounted for 14% of variance in the model. Deeming (2015) found that people’s perceptions 
and values are clearly related to their policy preferences; those who think there is a high level 
of poverty were more likely to support government spending on the poor and to support 
income redistribution from the well off to the less well off.   
 
Sefton (2005) analysed British Social Attitude Survey data using non-hierarchical cluster 
analysis to explore public attitudes to the welfare state (It’s only right that taxes paid by the 
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majority help support those in need; If we want to live in a healthy, well-educated society we 
have to be willing to pay the taxes to fund it; The best reason for paying taxes now is that you 
never know when you might need benefits and services yourself; It’s not fair that some pay a 
lot of money in tax and hardly use the services their taxes pay for; It’s not right that people 
benefit from services that they haven’t paid for) and it’s beneficiaries (If welfare benefits 
weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet; Many people who 
get social security don’t really deserve any help; Most people on the dole are fiddling in one 
way or another). Three key groups were identified: ‘The Samaritans’, comprising of about 
30% of the population (50% graduates, 45% in receipt of means-tested benefits, 39% Labour 
Party supporters, 38% on high incomes, 37% professional and managerial, 33% middle-aged 
and 19% with no educational qualifications), were supportive of the principles of the welfare 
state and that those in need should be entitled to support from those who were more able. 
‘Club Members’, comprised of around 45% of the population, were also supportive of the 
principles of the welfare, however, less so than the Samaritans and were more likely to 
support welfare benefits when those in receipt had met certain conditions. Lastly, ‘Robinson 
Crusoes’ (34% without educational qualifications, 11% with a degree qualification, and 33% 
Conservative Party supporters) were less supportive of the principles of the welfare state. 
Sefton (2005) suggests that lack of education may be a barrier to understanding how the 
welfare state operates and to the appreciation of the wider societal arguments for its 
benefits.  
 
Sefton (2005) identified that the ‘Samaritans’ believed that claimants were entitled as they 
were in need (94% in agreement), others have a responsibility to help those in need 
irrespective of whether they have previously contributed or not, have few concerns about 
claimants abusing the system (4% in agreement of fiddling the system), and were less likely to 
believe that claimants were undeserving or not in need. ‘Club Members’ generally showed a 
commitment to a system of social insurance through paying taxes (70% in agreement). This 
group mostly believed in redistribution from those who are able, to those in need on the 
condition that those in need have contributed what they can and only receive what they 
reasonably need. ‘Club Members’ were more likely to distinguish between the ‘deserving’ 
and the ‘undeserving’ poor. Concerns about fraud and claimants taking advantage were 
much more likely to be prevalent in this group (42% agree with most fiddling the system) 
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along with the idea that should claimants fail to adhere to the rules then benefits should not 
necessarily be distributed. Finally, the ‘Robinson Crusoes’ were less in favour of the welfare 
state and thought it is unfair that someone who pays more in taxes hardly uses the system 
they have contributed towards (75% in agreement). They were also more likely to believe 
that welfare benefits were too generous with 93% in agreement that ‘if welfare benefits 
weren’t so generous, people would learn to pay their own way’. The ‘Robinson Crusoes’ were 
more likely to believe that self-reliance is a key attribute where people should be more 
independent rather than depending on others. Those claiming unemployment benefits were 
generally thought to be fiddling the system by this group (86% in agreement).   
 
Tax avoidance versus benefit fraud 
Bamfield and Horton (2009) conducted a mixed methods study comprising of discussion 
groups (n=112) and a large-scale survey (n=3,316) to explore underlying drivers of attitudes 
to economic inequality and welfare. Through qualitative analysis they found that attitudes 
were harsher towards benefit fraud than tax avoidance due to the view that those avoiding 
tax were at least contributing in some way, whilst those committing benefit fraud were seen 
to be avoiding making any contribution at all. Individual responsibility and blame were more 
likely to be ascribed to benefit fraudsters than towards tax avoiders. Whilst the government 
was primarily blamed for not closing the loopholes to stop tax avoidance, rather than blame 
being attributed to the individuals concerned.  
 
Marriott (2017) also explored public attitudes (n=1,500) towards tax evasion and welfare 
fraud in New Zealand using social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA) for analysis. SDO relates to people supporting policies that enable 
dominance over groups, such as the criminal justice system sentencing subordinate social 
groups more harshly (Marriott, 2017). RWA refers to attitudes that express authoritarian 
submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Marriott, 2017). Welfare 
attitudes were explored using eight statements including People who commit welfare fraud 
deserve to be punished. New Zealanders were found to have differing attitudes towards 
welfare fraud and tax evasion with harsher attitudes being apparent towards tax evasion. 
Education and income were the most relevant factors related to attitudes towards welfare 
fraud (p=<.05). As education level and income increased tolerance of welfare fraud 
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decreased. Both SDO and RWA significantly predict attitudes to welfare fraud and tax evasion 
(p=<.05), accounting for 9.7% of the variability of attitudes to welfare fraud but only 2.1% of 
the variability for tax evasion. When demographic variables were added to the model as well 
as SDO and RWA the variance increased to 18.2% for welfare attitudes. Those who were  
self-employed were found to tolerate welfare fraud the least but were the most tolerant of 
tax evasion. No significant differences were found when considering occupation and benefit 
receipt. 
 
Contributing to society 
Bamfield and Horton (2009) also found that increased support for government welfare 
spending was related to subjective beliefs. The belief that ‘Most people who receive benefits 
now will make a contribution back to society in the future, through activities like employment 
or caring for others’ had the strongest effect (beta=.268, p=<.001) with those more likely to 
agree with this statement being supportive of increasing welfare spending. Baumberg et al. 
(2012) also found that beliefs about whether or not benefit recipients will make a reciprocal 
contribution in the future has the strongest effect on support for welfare policy. Additionally, 
Bamfield and Horton (2009) found that those who agreed that people are ‘disadvantaged 
because of their background, and find it impossible, however hard they work, to overcome the 
obstacles they face’ (beta=.154, p=<.001) were also more likely to support increased welfare 
spending. Those most likely to agree that people could ‘manage perfectly well on low income 
if they budgeted sensibly (beta=-.164, p=<.001) and that people ‘described as poor in Britain 
today have only themselves to blame for not having a higher income’ (beta=-.129, p=<.001) 
were more likely to be less supportive of increased welfare spending.   
 
Sanctions 
From April 2001 it became compulsory for lone parents in receipt of benefits with children 
aged over five years old to attend interviews at the Job Centre with no compulsion to take a 
job, but penalties of approximately £10 per week if they failed to attend (Hills, 2001). 
Analysing British Social Attitudes survey data, Hills (2001) found that there was support for 
cuts in benefits should lone parents fail to attend such an interview ‘when asked’. Forty-five 
percent thought that benefits in this instance should be cut ‘a little’, 12% ‘a lot’, and almost a 
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fifth (18%) thought they should be stopped altogether, whilst 22% thought that benefits 
should not be affected.  
 
Undeservingness 
Baumberg et al. (2012) explored the ‘stigma’ of claiming benefits, that is the extent to which 
being a recipient of welfare benefits is viewed as embarrassing or shameful and results in a 
lower social status. In doing so, they explored the hardening of attitudes towards those in 
receipt of a range of benefits through combining deliberative focus groups and large-scale 
opinion surveys between 2008 and 2009. They found that benefit stigma in Britain was 
mainly driven by the view that claimants are ‘undeserving’, those who lack criteria such as 
need, and the level to which claimants were viewed to be accountable for their own 
situation. Baumberg et al. (2012) examined respondents’ estimates of ‘claiming falsely’ and 
‘committing fraud’ to determine the extent to which claimants were seen as undeserving or 
deserving and found that the public vastly overestimate these numbers. People living in 
neighbourhoods with more benefit claimants had a greater perception of fraud and reported 
more self-stigma, but only when they were inclined to view benefit claimants negatively. 
 
Baumberg Geiger (2017) analysed data from the British Social Attitudes Survey, the European 
Social Survey and a TUC/YouGov 2012 online survey with a combined sample of 47,421 
respondents. The intention of the study was to assess ‘deservingness’ using 18 belief 
measures across seven survey waves using measures to assess the extent of benefits fraud 
(two questions asking about ‘false claims’ and one asking about ‘fraudulent’ claims as a 
proportion of the welfare budget). Deservingness was measured through analyzing ‘Many 
people who get social security don’t really deserve any help’ from BSAS and questions relating 
to ‘people manage to get benefits/services to which they are not entitled’, ‘unemployed 
people are really trying to get a job’, and ‘Britain’s welfare system has created a culture of 
dependency’. Baumberg Geiger found that there was a strong bivariate association between 
fraud knowledge and various deservingness perceptions. A one percentage point increase in 
the belief that disability claimants are ‘false’ is associated with 0.60 per cent increase in 
agreement with ‘many claimants don’t deserve any help’ (p=<.05). A one percentage point 
increase in the belief that unemployment claims are ‘false’ is associated with a 0.58 percent 




Whilst the literature regarding public attitudes towards the welfare system and welfare 
claimants is relatively expansive, this chapter has aimed to present empirical findings most 
pertinent to this project. Firstly, very few studies have sought to explore the relevance of 
socio-demographic factors to public attitudes towards welfare benefits. Age, education and 
occupational class emerge as relevant factors in explaining punitive attitudes towards welfare 
and welfare claimants, albeit explaining a small amount of variance in attitudes. Belief 
systems and perceptions were then reviewed. Those holding conservative beliefs have been 
found to be less supportive of increased spending on the welfare system and welfare 
benefits. Interactional effects between political party support and class have also been found 
to be relevant in explaining attitudes towards welfare, with conservative supporters and 
those belonging to the professional class being less supportive of welfare. Beliefs about the 
value of the welfare state and welfare claimants were also found to be relevant in explaining 
attitudes; those who hold negative beliefs were less supportive of welfare. Subjective beliefs 
about the reciprocal contribution of welfare claimants has also been found to be related to 
welfare attitudes. Finally, deservingness perceptions have been found to influence support 
for social welfare with those who perceive claimants as undeserving holding less supportive 
views. Harsher attitudes towards welfare claimants appears to be related to deservingness, 
fairness and stigmatising attitudes. The next subchapter will explore the literature towards 
















The examination of public attitudes towards school pupils has received little attention 
compared to lawbreakers and welfare claimants. The literature search2 indicates that there is 
no research linking ‘punitive attitudes’ directly with rulebreaking school pupils. Indeed, there 
is very little empirical research exploring public attitudes towards school pupils at all. Much of 
the research to date has explored teachers, parents and/or children’s attitudes to school 
behaviour and discipline, rather than members of the public. The most relevant literature to 
this study is recent research in America, which has explored public attitudes towards the use 
of corporal punishment due to its continued use in some US states. However, much of this 
research focuses on state-level data and factors rather than individual attitudes to its usage. 
This chapter aims to review the most relevant surveys conducted to explore attitudes 
towards the disciplining of school children. Firstly, this takes the form presenting surveys 
conducted in Britain to explore attitudes towards indiscipline, which has primarily been 
conducted with parents, teachers and children. Secondly, the literature relating to attitudes 
towards punishments will be reviewed, which has also involved surveying teachers, parents 
and children. The chapter will then move onto review surveys conducted to explore attitudes 
towards school exclusions. Finally, research relating to attitudes towards the use of corporal 
punishment will conclude the chapter.    
 
2.3.2. Attitudes Towards Indiscipline 
Teachers’ attitudes towards behaviour 
The Elton Report (1989) commissioned by the Committee of Enquiry into Disciple in Schools 
was the first major report, and remains the most comprehensive work, examining teachers’ 
perceptions and concerns about indiscipline. The report presents the findings from The 
National Survey of Teachers in England and Wales of primary and secondary school teachers. 
 
2 Electronic searches on Web of Science and Google Scholar were made using the terms ‘punitive attitudes to school pupils’, 
‘punitive attitudes to school punishments,’ ‘tough attitudes to school pupils’, ‘punishment od school pupils’, ‘attitudes to 
school exclusion’, ‘public attitudes to  truancy (discipline; poor behaviour; suspension)’; teachers attitudes to school 




Additionally, one hundred teachers from ten inner-city comprehensive schools were 
interviewed. The Elton Report was initiated by the Professional Association of Teachers (PAT) 
due to growing concern regarding poor behaviour in schools. A survey of PAT members’ 
views and experiences of discipline in schools, carried out by the PAT and the Daily Express 
newspaper, found that respondents believed indiscipline was on the increase (Elton, 1989). 
Just over six hundred written submissions were received from Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs), teacher training institutions and teachers. Evidence was also collected from school 
observations (both in the UK and overseas) and meetings with professionals. The report 
highlights the following from submitted evidence: 
 
• The 1985 National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers survey noted 
that 80% respondents thought that violence and disruption had become more frequent in 
the last 10 years (less than 4% response rate). 
• The 1987 PAT survey noted that 94% of teachers thought that indiscipline was on the 
increase (less than 4% response rate). 
• The 1988 National Union of Teachers survey found that 91% of respondents thought 
indiscipline was worse than 10 years ago (8% response rate). 
• The National Opinion Poll, which sampled just under 500 teachers, found that 36% of 
teachers thought that indiscipline had increased in their schools in comparison to five 
years earlier, whilst 33% viewed the same amount of indiscipline or less.  
• The National Association of Headteachers survey carried out in 15 LEAs (with a 45% 
response rate) found that a quarter of headteachers thought that there had been a 
significant increase in disruptive behaviour since 1985.  
 
The National Survey of Teachers in England and Wales consisted of 3,608 teachers and found 
that the majority of teachers (82% secondary and 81% primary) thought that tougher 
sanctions for certain types of indiscipline were needed and should be a priority (Elton, 1989). 
Teachers proposed a wide variety of views regarding the causes of poor behaviour, with 
parents, the government, teachers, heads, LEAs and broadcasters blamed for exacerbating 
indiscipline. Fundamental beliefs tended to influence views on the use of punishment in 
schools, such as punishment being a form of moral retribution or the importance of 
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children's rights, rather than evidence about what works in schools. Teachers who believed in 
tough discipline also tended to believe that parents’ attitudes were hostile to school values. 
In contrast, those teachers who did not believe in tough punishments tended to acknowledge 
the difficult circumstances experienced by parents, such as, marital breakdown and poverty, 
which may impact on their parenting capacity.  
 
The National Survey of Teachers in England and Wales also found that when questioned 
about the use of punishment strategies for managing difficult pupils or classes teachers 
answered as follows: 
 
• Keeping a pupil in detention: 67% used it at least once, 17% said they used it often or 
quite often, and 15% said it was the most effective strategy they used. 
• Removing the pupil temporarily out of the classroom: 61% have used it at least once, 11% 
used it often or quite often, 13% thought this was the most effective strategy. 
• Suspension: 9% of teachers reported this as the most effective strategy they had used, 
whilst 5% reported it was the ‘most ineffective’. 
 
In contrast, non-exclusionary strategies seemed to be more frequently used and were seen 
as more effective than punishment strategies. Fifty five percent of teachers said they tried to 
reason with a pupil in the classroom setting on a regular basis, with 21% believing this was 
the most effective strategy they used. Whilst 46% reasoned with pupils outside the classroom 
setting on a regular basis, with 32% finding this strategy most effective.  
 
School Pupils’ Views on Punishments 
Caffyn (1989) and Merrett and Tang (1994) explored school pupils views to school 
punishments. Caffyn (1989) found that secondary school children felt parental involvement 
was important in terms of improving behaviour rather than the more traditional forms of 
punishment. The study surveyed 510 pupils and asked them which two punishments, from a 
range of options, were likely to encourage them to behave better. Parents being asked to 
come into school scored the highest (74%), followed by 67% answering being placed on 
report, and 66% saying a negative letter home. Merrett and Tang (1994) surveyed 
approximately 1,800 primary school children between ages 8 and 11 exploring their views on 
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praise, rewards, punishment and reprimands. A letter home and/or being sent to the head 
teacher was viewed as the most effective punishment to improve behaviour. Neither of these 
studies explored the use of exclusions as a means of punishment. 
 
Following the initial studies conducted by Elton (1989), Caffyn (1989) and Merrett and Tang 
(1994), there was no research explicitly exploring attitudes towards indiscipline and 
punishments until 2012. The National Foundation for Educational Research’s (NFER) (2012) 
survey explored primary and secondary teachers’ perceptions of poor behaviour and found 
that the majority (76%) of teachers felt behaviour was good or very good with a minority (6%) 
feeling behaviour was poor or very poor. The classroom behaviour management strategies 
most often used were praising good behaviour (97% primary / 84% secondary), using a 
robust sanctions system (91% primary / 77% secondary), and using a reward system (91% 
primary / 72% secondary). 
 
In 2013, The Teacher Voice Omnibus Survey explored teachers’ attitudes towards pupil 
behaviour and found that the majority (77%) of all teachers said that the standard of 
behaviour was ‘good’ or ‘very good’ (85% primary, 68% secondary), with 6% feeling 
behaviour was poor or very poor (5% primary, 9% secondary) (Weaving et al., 2013). Only 5% 
of all teachers thought they have insufficient powers to manage pupil behaviour. In terms of 
removing pupils from the classroom, 46% primary and 12% secondary teachers said that they 
would use physical means to remove a disruptive pupil from the classroom. Eighty one 
percent primary and 61% secondary teachers viewed the most common factor in poor 
behaviour to be a lack of parental support or poor parenting skills. A parental lack of respect 
for authority and teachers was the second most frequently selected factor (25% primary/18% 
secondary). Similar trends were found in subsequent Teacher Voice Surveys between 2014 
and 2016 in relation to teachers’ perceptions of standards of behaviour (Bennett, 2017). 
 
2.3.3. Attitudes Towards School Exclusions 
In 1974, the Gallup Poll explored public attitudes towards pupils who fail to comply with 
school rules by asking, ‘What should be done with a high school student who refuses to obey 
his teachers?’ The sample consisted of approximately 2,000 adults (18+) and 250 high school 
pupils across numerous American states (Gallup, 1974). They found that the more punitive 
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attitudes were those of parents of school children and high school pupils themselves rather 
than people who have no children in school. Slightly more than half (57%) of the parents of 
school children suggested a type of punishment such as expelling the pupil. A similar 
percentage (59%) opted for a type of rehabilitation such as a change of teacher and/or 
courses.  
 
In Scotland, Adams (2005) found school exclusions received a high level of support from 
teachers, with 70% of those surveyed viewing it as positive or very positive in relation to pupil 
behaviour and learning. Munn and Lloyd (2005) interviewed 66 young people in Scotland and 
found that many of them felt that they had been unfairly treated by being excluded from 
school, and that there was a lack of consistency from teachers. Pupils did however tend to 
accept responsibility for those actions resulting in their exclusion. Sometimes, the young 
people felt that schools were unreasonable regarding pupil expectations and refused to 
assume automatic authority of the teacher, which had the potential to lead to aggressive 
behaviour. Many of the young people described experiencing difficult home circumstances, 
which resulted in poor emotional management at school. Most of the children valued 
schooling and were aware of the negative short and long term social and employment 
repercussions of exclusion. 
 
A YouGov survey in 2011 for the Times Educational Supplement found that support for fixed 
term and permanent exclusions remained high (Thompson, 2011). When asked whether they 
thought that expelling/suspending children was an appropriate form of discipline by teachers, 
84% of parents and 62% of secondary school children were in agreement, whilst 12% of 
parents and 23% of children were in disagreement. The NFER (2012) Teacher Voice Omnibus 
Survey of 1,609 teachers found that 90% of primary and 96% of secondary school teachers 
considered it reasonable for a school to formally exclude pupils for a fixed term for reasons of 
poor behaviour. This figure decreased to 65% primary and 87% secondary school teachers 
when considering it reasonable to formally exclude pupils permanently for reasons of poor 
behaviour. The survey also explored teachers’ attitudes to why certain groups of pupils (boys, 
those receiving free school meals, pupils with Special Educational Needs (SEN), and those 
from certain ethnic groups) are disproportionately more likely to be excluded from school. 
The results generally show that the teachers believe some groups of pupils are 
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disproportionally excluded due to social circumstances and parental attitudes. However, a 
smaller number of teachers believed other issues were reasons for exclusions, such as, the 
nature of the curriculum, poverty, financial issues, lack of confidence, and schools failing to 
be responsive to learners (Smith et al., 2012).  
 
In 2012, the Office for the Children’s Commissioner commissioned the NFER to conduct 
research into inequalities in education and illegal exclusions through focus groups with 
teachers and group interviews with non-teaching professionals working with schools and/or 
young people and their families (White et al., 2013). Reasons suggested for school exclusions 
were persistent disruptive behaviour, bad language, physical assault on pupils or staff, use of 
or possession of a weapon, drug-related incidents, racist incidents, gang-related incidents, 
and arson. Teachers also noted that systemic reasons for exclusions were also apparent, such 
as lack of training and time, lack of support from other services, few role models for some 
groups, failure to investigate causes of poor behaviour, rigid procedures and systems, and 
perceptions that some pupils would be more appropriately supported elsewhere. Teachers 
were found to be both positive and negative about school exclusions (White et al., 2013). 
Some described relief and viewed exclusion as a positive outcome for both the pupil and the 
school, whilst some felt guilt, failure and concern for the pupil on reintegrating back into 
school (White et al., 2013). In some cases, teachers desired stricter and more extensive 
exclusion policies for the most challenging pupils (White et al., 2013). White et al. (2013) 
found that following ineffective outcomes of alternative interventions, teachers generally felt 
that the use of exclusions were justified to protect both teaching and learning but were 
unlikely to benefit the excluded child or improve their behaviour. The general consensus was 
that if a permanent exclusion was needed, then it was ‘probably too late for that pupil’ and 
tended to be the catalyst for multi-agency input to meet the child’s needs (White et al., 
2013:4).  
 
2.3.4. The Corporal Punishment of School Children 
Grasmick et al. (1992) explored support for corporal punishment in schools through the 
Oklahoma City Survey in 1989 (n=330 face-to-face interviews of adults). Participants were 
asked their level of support for corporal punishment use ‘if the child talked back to other 
children; used obscene language; deliberately inflicted injury on another child; skipped school 
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without good reason; and, stole something from school or another child’. Fundamentalist 
Protestants (beta=.134, p=<.05), being male (beta=.279, p=<.001) and being older 
(beta=.217, p=<.001) were found to be more supportive of corporal punishment, whilst 
higher educational attainment (beta=-.188, p=<.001) was found to be related to less support 
of corporal punishment.       
 
In 2011, YouGov conducted a survey for the Times Educational Supplement consisting of 
2,014 parents with children and 530 school children (YouGov, 2011). The survey found that 
91% parents and 62% children were in agreement that Teachers should be allowed to be 
tougher when it comes to discipline, with 6% parents and 24% children in disagreement. 
Forty-nine percent parents and 19% children agreed that Corporal punishments, such as the 
cane or slipper, should be reintroduced for very bad behaviour, whilst 45% parents and 71% 
children disagreed. Finally, 40% teachers and 14% children were in agreement that smacking 
or caning children is an acceptable form of discipline by teachers, with 53% parents and 77% 
children in disagreement. 
 
School corporal punishment continues to be legally permitted in nineteen states in the USA 
(Font and Gershoff, 2017). Using state-level data, Owen and Wagner (2006) found that 
Evangelical Protestants were associated with the increased use of school corporal 
punishment (Owen and Wagner, 2006). Whilst a state-wide study of Kentucky counties found 
no association between religious affiliation and the prevalence or use of corporal punishment 
(McClure and May, 2008). More recently, Font and Gershoff (2017:410) used multi-level 
modeling to explore the factors relevant to ‘paddling, spanking, or other forms of physical 
punishment imposed on a student’ using data from the U.S. Department of Education Civil 
Rights Data Collection from the school year 2011-2012. Southern culture and rural states 
were found to be associated with higher odds of corporal punishment use with a one-point 
increase in the percent of Southern-born predicting a 3.7 percent increase in the odds of 
corporal punishment use, and the odds of use in rural counties twice that of metro counties. 
Religious and political affiliation were also found to be predictive of corporal punishment use 
with Evangelical Protestants (1-point increase associated with 1.3% increase in odds of 
corporal punishment use) and Republican voters (1-point increase in voters predicted 5.4% 
odds of corporal punishment use) increasing the odds of corporal punishment use.  
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Socio-economic variables were found to increase the odds of the use of corporal punishment 
with a $1000 increase in median income predicting a 4.5% decrease in the odds of corporal 
punishment use and a 1-point increase in percent college-educated predicting a 10.5% 
decrease in odds.  
 
Corporal punishment in schools was legislated against in the UK in 1986 (see Education Act, 
1986) (Gould, 2007) with the use of corporal punishment in state schools becoming illegal in 
1987 (Institute of Education, 1989). However, the physical punishment of children by parents 
continues to be debated in the UK (Brooks, 2017). In October 2019, Scotland became the first 
country in the UK to make it a criminal offence for parents to smack their children, through 
the implementation of the Children (Equal Protection from Assault) (Scotland) Bill 2019, 
abolishing the defence of reasonable chastisement (2019 asp 16). This abolition received 
strong support from Members of Scottish Parliament with 84 voting in favour and 29 voting 
against (Brooks, 2019). This move by Scottish Parliament was closely followed by the Welsh 
Government who approved a move to also ban smacking children in January 2020, which is 
expected to come into force in 2022 (Morris, 2020). Prior to this decision, a Welsh 
Government report found that 81% of parents (n=269) of children aged six or under 
disagreed that ‘it is sometimes necessary to smack a naughty child’ increasing from 71% in 
2015 (Welsh Government, 2019). When asked whether there should be a complete ban on 
smacking, 48% of parents agreed whilst 39% disagreed (Welsh Government, 2019).  
 
Parents in England and Northern Ireland continue to be allowed to physically punish or 
discipline their children as long as it is considered ‘reasonable punishment’ (Hamzelou, 2017). 
In 2007, a survey of 1,822 parents conducted by Ipsos MORI on behalf of the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families found that parental attitudes have changed over time with 
parents less likely to use smacking than previously, and younger parents more likely to have 
negative views towards smacking than older parents (Ipsos MORI, 2007). Over half (57%) of 
parents say they had smacked their child at some point and 52% thought that it was 
sometimes necessary to smack a ‘naughty’ child. The majority of parents (59%) agreed that 
the law should allow them to smack their children, in contrast to 33% disagreeing with this 
statement (Ipsos MORI, 2007). YouGov (2017) surveyed just over 4,000 UK adults in July 2017 
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and found that 59% of UK adults thought that smacking should not be banned, 22% thought 
it should be banned, and 19% did not know (YouGov, 2017).  
 
2.3.5. Summary 
The majority of studies to date have explored teachers, parents and pupils’ attitudes to 
various types of school punishment, physical punishments and school exclusions. There is 
little literature exploring public attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils and the severity 
of school punishments as proposed by this project. What the literature to date shows is that 
teachers, parents or the general public, generally support the use of stricter punishments for 
indiscipline. This is more apparent in South American states where religion, southern culture, 
rural states, political affiliation and higher income were found to be predictive of corporal 
punishment use, whilst higher education was found to be related to lower support. The use 
of physical punishments to discipline children continues to be debated in Britain. Scotland 
and Wales have banned smacking, whilst England continues to allow its usage. Whilst the 
majority of parents and children disagreed with corporal punishment use in schools, both 
groups were in agreement that teachers should be allowed to be tougher towards school 
indiscipline. Support for the use of school exclusions remains high across all groups surveyed, 
although questions did not differentiate between temporary and permanent exclusions. 
Harsher attitudes towards school pupils suggests that people desire tougher discipline 
measures when children break the rules.  
 
Chapter 2 commenced by reviewing the literature on punitive attitudes towards offenders 
most relevant to this project. Belief systems appear to be more relevant to understanding 
punitive attitudes towards offenders than socio-demographic factors and crime related 
factors. Beliefs that there has been a loss of discipline and respect in society, loss of social 
cohesion, moral decline, conservative beliefs, right-wing authoritarianism and economic 
beliefs emerge as relevant factors in understanding punitive attitudes towards offenders. 
Punitiveness towards lawbreakers suggests that people desire harsher responses to criminal 
rulebreaking. Chapter 2 then reviewed the literature on public attitudes towards welfare 
claimants. Whilst there is no literature exploring ‘punitiveness’ towards welfare claimants as 
proposed by this project, there is a body of empirical research which has sought to explore 
attitudes towards welfare and its claimants more generally. Conservative beliefs, beliefs 
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about welfare claimants and the value of welfare, and deservingness appear to be important 
factors in understanding attitudes towards welfare claimants. Harsher attitudes towards 
welfare claimants appears to be related to deservingness, fairness and stigmatising attitudes. 
Chapter 2 concluded by reviewing the literature most relevant to public attitudes towards 
school pupils. This group of rulebreakers has received the least amount of attention in 
empirical research in comparison to lawbreakers and welfare claimants. What the available 
literature does show is that people generally support the use of stricter punishments for 
indiscipline. However, this does not appear to extend to the use of physical punishments in 
Britain. Support for the use of exclusions appears high, but studies did not differentiate 
between temporary and permanent exclusions. Harsher attitudes towards school pupils 
suggests that people support tougher discipline measures for school indiscipline.   
 
Part 2 now turns the focus away from literature exploring attitudes towards lawbreakers, 
welfare claimants and school pupils to explore the long-term trajectories of punitiveness 
towards the three groups of rulebreakers. This takes the form of considering government 
policies, political attitudes and public sentiment by first exploring the long-term trajectories 
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Part 2 now considers the long-term trends in punitiveness towards the three different groups 
of rulebreakers through reviewing government policies, political attitudes, and public 
sentiment. This chapter begins this process by exploring the long-term trends towards 
lawbreakers. Chapter 3.2. then turns to welfare claimants, before Chapter 3.3. concludes this 
section by exploring the long-term trends towards school pupils.  
 
Political discourse and policies within the criminal justice system over the last forty years 
demonstrate an increasing trend of punitiveness (Newburn, 2007; Hay and Farrall, 2014). 
This ‘punitive turn’ is not exclusive to Britain but is also evident in many liberal democracies 
(Newburn, 2007: 425). ‘Law and order’, that is ‘the means by which governments seek to 
control crime and maintain public order through enforcement of the criminal law’ (Savage, 
1990:89), began its prominence within political discourse in the 1980s when the Conservative 
Party gained power (Reiner, 2000:73). Prior to this, law and order had not been a feature of 
election campaigns (Downes and Morgan, 1997). Whilst rhetoric towards crime was punitive 
at this time (Farrall et al., 2016), criminal justice legislation did not reflect this punitive 
approach (Hay and Farrall, 2014). It was subsequent criminal justice policies, which were 
implemented from the early 1990s that have resulted in the ‘tough on crime’ agenda being 
embedded in political thinking (Hay and Farrall, 2014:20). From the early 1990s, both the 
Conservative and Labour Parties made significant efforts to be seen to be ‘tough on crime’ 
(Newburn, 2007). This type of discourse endures and has been used by both the Labour Party 
and Conservative government whilst elected making frequent statements about being tough 
on crime (Newburn, 2007; Annison, 2018). An increase in punitive penal policies since the 
early 1990s has led to an increase in the use of punishment, in terms of imprisonment and in 
the community, with an escalation in crime-orientated legislation and the rise in the prison 
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population (Newburn, 2007). This trend of an increasing prison population has endured, and 
over the past 30 years it has risen by 82% in England and Wales (Prison Reform Trust, 2017) 
and 60% since 1990 in Scotland (Sturge, 2019). This chapter begins by considering the 
increase in prison population and recorded crime rates. Key policies attributing to an increase 
in punitiveness will then be reviewed before moving on to discuss trends in political discourse 
towards ‘law and order’. This chapter concludes by analysing trends in public attitudes 
towards lawbreakers using questions fielded by the British Social Attitudes survey.  
 
3.1.2. The Prison Population and Recorded Crime Rates 
The adult prison population in England and Wales quadrupled in size between 1900 and 
2018, with half of this increase occurring since 1990 (Sturge, 2019). In Scotland, the adult 
prison population almost doubled in size during the same period with a 60% rise since 1990 
(Sturge, 2019). By the early 1980s the prison population had reached 40,000 prisoners, this 
was the highest figures seen in England and Wales at the time and continued to rise to 
50,000 by the end of the decade (Newburn, 2007). During this period, the Conservative 
government introduced a range of measures to curtail overcrowding and limit the prison 
population by the introduction of time restrictions for cases brought to trial and advice to 
sentencers on restricting those remanded in custody (Newburn, 2007). These measures 
appeared to stabilise the prison population between 1987 until 1991, at which point it began 
to rise again (Newburn, 2007). Between 1993 and 2005 the prison population increased by 
69% in England and Wales (Newburn 2007) and in March 2020 stood at just under 84,000 
(Home Office, 2020). Scotland followed this trend with a prison population increase from just 
under 5,000 in 1980 to approximately 8,000 prisoners in 2010 (Scottish Government, 2011). 
In March 2020, the prison population in Scotland also remains at relatively high levels with 
just over 8,000 prisoners (Scottish Prison Service, 2020). 
 
From 1945 until the late 1970s, the post-war Keynesian democratic consensus of successive 
governments shared a commitment to low inflation, high employment and economic growth 
(Jackson, 2014). Broadly accepted shared goals of core entitlements to receive mainstream 
public services based on Keynesianism prevailed throughout this period (Downes and 
Morgan, 2012). The main political parties prioritised the rebuilding of the economy and 
constructing the welfare state and as such crime and the criminal justice system did not 
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feature in elections between 1945 and 1959 (Downes and Morgan, 2012). So broad was the 
agreement around law and order policy during this time, with the possible exception of 
support or opposition to capital punishment, that it was barely a political issue at all (Savage, 
1990). During the 1960s recorded crime rates had begun to rise and the topic began to 
feature in manifesto statements (Downes and Morgan, 2012). By the 1970s however the 
Conservative Party began to attribute the worsening crime figures to the Labour Party’s 
policies whilst in government (Downes and Morgan, 2012). By the mid-1970s, the rise of the 
prison population in England was causing concern amongst politicians (Cavadino and Dignan, 
2007). However, a broad liberal-progressive consensus prevailed with the main desire to 
reduce the prison population (Jennings et al., 2017a). This concern resulted in both the 
Conservative and Labour governments in the 1970s responding pragmatically by attempting 
to restrain the prison population through increasing the provision of non-custodial sentences, 
increasing the number of prisoners released on parole, and encouraging sentencers to use 
custody for shorter periods and less extensively (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). Whilst law and 
order received political prominence by Margaret Thatcher’s discourse during the 1979 
election campaign, it did not receive the same attention in legislation once she became Prime 
Minister (Farrall and Jennings, 2014). ‘Law and order’, however, was reflected in the 
discourse used by Margaret Thatcher towards the miners (Steber, 2017) and the police were 
given any resources necessary to maintain law and order (Wallington, 1985). The policy goal 
of keeping offenders (particularly young offenders) out of prison broadly prevailed until the 
early 1990s (Jennings et al., 2017b). Acts of Parliament between 1982 and 1991 had an 
approach that decreased punitiveness in some respects and increased punitiveness in others, 
for instance limiting the use of imprisonment but increasing post-prison release and 
community controls as seen in the 1982 Criminal Justice Act (Farrall et al., 2016). The 1980, 
1982 and 1988 Criminal Justice Acts attempted to restrict the use of imprisonment and 
created alternatives to custody (Farrall et al., 2016; Savage, 1990), whilst the 1985 
Prosecution of Offences Act sought to reduce the number of remand prisoners (Cavadino and 
Dignan, 2007). It was not until after the 1991 Criminal Justice Act that legislation took a 
punitive turn away from penal welfarism to favouring harsher sentences (Newburn, 2007; 
Farrall et al., 2016). Prominent legislative changes occurred in November 1990, when John 
Major became Prime Minister, and were largely due to the unexpected rise in crime in  
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1989-1992 (Farrall and Jennings, 2014). Additionally, the appointment of Michael Howard as 
Home Secretary in 1993, who held more punitive preferences, marked a break from the 
Home Office’s previous liberal approach to crime (Jennings et al., 2017a).  
 
Between 1980 and the early 1990s the recorded crime rate in Britain increased substantially, 
peaking at approximately 110 crimes per 1,000 head of population in 1992, and remained at 
historical high levels until the early 2000s when it started to decrease (Jennings et al., 
(2017a). Despite the fall in crime during this period the prison population remained at high 
levels (Home Office, 2019a). The recorded crime rate started to increase again from 2015/16, 
rising from approximately 3,840,000 recorded crimes to just over five million recorded crimes 
in 2018/19 (see Figure 3.2.) (Home Office, 2019b). The current prison population rate in 
England and Wales is 140 per 100,000 people (see Figure 3.1.) and 143 per 100,000 in 
Scotland in September 2018 (Walmsley, 2018). Jennings et al. (2017a) suggest that public 
punitiveness increased in tandem with crime concerns, encouraging politicians and policy 
makers to increase the incarceration rate. Moreover, the Government is currently planning to 
create 10,000 new prison places as part of its ‘Prison Estate Transformation Programme’ in 
response to projected rises in the prison population (Beard, 2019).  
 
Figure 3.1. shows the prison population since 1975 and key events that have occurred during 
that time. Figure 3.2. shows recorded crime rates during the same period. The figures show 
that as recorded crime rates reached a peak in 1992, the combination of Michael Howard 
becoming Home Secretary pursuing a prison works approach and the Criminal Justice Act 
1993, the prison population began to increase markedly. Subsequent Acts have assisted in 
sentencing more offenders to prison for longer periods of time. Despite the significant 
undulations of the recorded crime rate, this prison population has continued to rise and 









Figure 3.1. Adult Prison Population since 1975 in England and Wales 
 
Source: Cavadino and Dignan (2006); HM Prison and Probation Service (2019) 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Recorded Crime Rates 1975-2019 
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3.1.3. History of Responses to Lawbreakers: key policies relating to increased 
punitiveness 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1982 
The 1982 Act signalled a move away from the welfare approach of previous governments 
(Savage, 1990). Whilst the 1982 Act introduced limits to the use of imprisonment and 
decreases in the actual levels of imprisonment were observed, the Act also increased the use 
of post-prison release and community controls (Farrall et al., 2016). Concerns at this time 
about the number of young offenders in custody lead to the strengthening of non-custodial 
provisions for young offenders and limiting the use of custody by the 1982 Act (Farrall et al., 
2016). The Act aimed to reduce the number of juveniles in custody and asked sentencers to 
only impose a custodial sentence should alternatives be deemed inappropriate (Newburn, 
2003). However, the Home Secretary, Willie Whitelaw, adopted a ‘get tough’ stance in his 
House of Commons statements (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007:372) and referred to a ‘short, 
sharp, shock’ response to young offenders (Farrall et al., 2016). The Act also moved towards 
individual responsibility of the offenders and their parents away from a treatment approach 
(Farrall et al., 2016). Night Restriction Orders and the Charge and Control condition were 
introduced allowing sentencers more controlling powers (Burney, 1985). Smith (2003:8) 
suggests that these Orders heightened ‘the punitive aspects of intervention’.     
 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 
PACE was introduced to provide greater regulation to the police officer and arrestee 
interaction within police custody (Maguire, 1988) and is considered important in the 
protection of the rights of arrestees (Farrall et al., 2016). The Act proposed safeguarding 
measures for suspects during detention and introduced clear guidelines about the length of 
time suspects were able to be detained without charge (Skinns, 2010). Detainees were given 
statutory rights to access legal advice as soon as is practical following their request (Skinns, 
2010). PACE established the power of detention in police custody without charge for up to 24 
hours for non-serious offences and up to 96 hours for serious offences under exceptional 
circumstances (Savage, 1990). The length of time suspects could be held under exceptional 
circumstances without charge received criticism as this decision was left to police discretion 
(Maguire, 1988). However, the introduction of the timeframe aims to limit suspects spending 
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unnecessary time in police detention (Skinns, 2011). However, critics have argued that police 
practice and powers have been facilitated by PACE (Skinns, 2011). The Act created new 
national powers of stop and search and enabled police to search premises and conduct body 
searches (Savage, 1990). Whilst there are criticisms of PACE, it is still considered important in 
providing a legal framework (Skinns, 2011).  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 
The 1988 Act continued to attempt to strengthen the powers of law enforcement (Savage, 
1990). The Act gave the Attorney General the power to refer cases deemed to be overly 
lenient to the Court of Appeal to consider increasing the sentence if it so decides (Savage, 
1990). The Act also increased maximum sentences for cruelty to children, corruption and 
firearm offences whilst also limiting the powers of the courts to pass custodial sentences to 
young offenders (Savage, 1990).   
 
Whilst many of the reforms in the 1980s attempted to strengthen police powers and the 
prosecution process, community-based approaches to crime control were also a central 
feature of criminal justice policy throughout the 1980s (Savage, 1990). The 1988 Green 
Paper, Punishment, Custody and the Community, proposed the introduction of a community 
sentence whereby various conditions could be added to the Order should they be relevant to 
‘treating’ the offender and were aimed at limiting the numbers being imprisoned (Mair et al., 
2007:10). The Green Paper emphasised that community-based sanctions should not be seen 
as a ‘soft’ approach to crime and as such community disposals were to be onerous (Savage, 
1990). The subsequent 1990 White Paper, Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public: The 
Government’s Proposals for Legislation, continued to stress the appropriateness of 
punishment in the community (Savage, 1990) noting that prison ‘can be an expensive way of 
making bad people worse’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007:66). Thus, non-custodial measures 
were to take the form of punishment; focussing on punishing offenders rather than 
rehabilitation or reparation (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). 
  
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 
The 1991 Act followed the 1988 Green Paper and the 1990 White Paper, which both 
contained statements about the ineffectiveness of imprisonment (Cavadino and Dignan, 
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2007). The 1991 Act aimed to divert less serious offenders away from custodial sentences to 
serve their punishment in the community, whereas violent and sexual offenders were to be 
sentenced more harshly (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). Community sentences were made 
more onerous in order to encourage sentencers to only use custodial sentences in the more 
serious of cases (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). The 1991 Act also introduced suspended 
sentences allowing sentencers to delay the imposition of immediate custody if the threshold 
for custody had been met, but a suspension could be justified (Newburn, 2003). This strategy 
appeared to be effective following the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 in 
October 1992 with a decrease in the prison population from 45,835 in September 1992 to 
40,606 in December 1992 (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007).    
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1993 
There was a distinct change in penal policy between the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993; one that shifted from the idea that ‘imprisonment is not the most 
effective punishment for most crime’ to the one that advocated ‘prison works’ (Newburn, 
2003: 437). John Major (replacing Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1990) was now 
faced with economic challenges, a backlash from the judiciary and the media that the 1991 
Criminal Justice Act was soft, the public horror of the murder of two-year old James Bulger by 
two ten-year olds in February 1993 (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007), and the death by shooting 
of a 14 year old boy, Benji Stanley, in January 1993 (Jacobson and Hough, 2018). The murders 
received intense media coverage which portrayed crime as being out of control and the 1991 
Act criticised for being soft and ineffective (Jacobson and Hough, 2018).  The Conservative 
Party Manifesto for the 1992 General Election noted,  
 
‘ …the challenge for the 1990s is to step up the fight against lawlessness and violence, so 
that our citizens can live free from fear. We must continue to ensure that the sentence 
fits the crime - with long sentences for dangerous criminals, and fines and a tougher 
regime for punishment outside prison available as an alternative for less serious crime.’ 
(Conservative Party Manifesto, 1992).  
 
Michael Howard, a supporter of law and order rhetoric and ideology, was appointed Home 
Secretary in May 1993 and pursued a punitive and ‘prison works’ approach (Cavadino and 
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Dignan, 2007:67). At the Conservative Party Conference in October 1993, it became apparent 
that reducing the prison population was no longer the objective (Cavadino and Dignan, 
2007). Michael Howard claimed that ‘prison works’ through deterrence and public protection 
and stated that he did not ‘flinch’ from the fact that more people may go to prison as a result 
of the reforms (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007: 67). The law and order rhetoric had an almost 
immediate effect on the prison population with sentencers responding to the punitive 
discourse of the government at the time (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). The prison population 
rose from 44,566 in 1993 to 61,114 in 1997 when Labour were elected, despite the fact that 
the numbers of offenders before the courts had declined (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007).  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1993 saw the reversal of some of the key measures introduced by 
the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Newburn, 2007). Most notable was the criteria used to justify 
the use of custody and the role of previous convictions in the sentencing of offenders, which 
were now allowed to be taken into account by the courts (Newburn, 2007). Additionally, the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 introduced measures to increase the lengths of sentences and the 
use of imprisonment, which saw increases in levels of imprisonment for both adult and youth 
offenders (Newburn, 2007). Following the enactment of the 1993 Act, there was a sharp 
increase in the prison population (see Figure 3.1) (Newburn, 2007).  
 
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
The Act introduced changes to the use of bail, which prohibited its use for those charged with 
rape or attempted rape, attempted murder, murder, or manslaughter to anyone with such a 
previous offence (Ashworth, 1995). Changes in the laws of evidence resulted in attaining 
convictions more easily, erosion to the right to silence and increased periods of custody for 
young offenders were also introduced (Faulkner, 2001). The Act also increased the stop and 
search powers of the police and allowed juries to infer guilt from the silence of a suspect 
(Sanders et al., 2010). The Act reduced the age at which young offenders could be detained 
after charge from fifteen to twelve and allowed offenders aged between ten and fourteen to 
be given long term detentions for serious crimes (Ashworth, 1995). Additionally, courts were 





The Crime Sentences Act 1997 
The Crime Sentences Act 1997 introduced mandatory sentences and saw the reversal of 
earlier attempts to reduce the prison population (Faulkner, 2001:126). With the intention of 
increasing punishments and making sentences harsher, the 1997 Act made provisions for a 
‘three strikes and you’re out’ American-style sentence for repeat offenders for certain 
offence categories (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). The Act came into effect in 1999 under the 
Labour government and introduced a minimum three-year sentence for third time domestic 
burglary, a minimum seven-year prison sentence for third-time trafficking in Class A drugs, 
and an automatic life sentences for a second serious sexual or violent offence (Ministry of 
Justice, 2013).  
 
‘Tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ 
New Labour came to power led by Tony Blair in May 1997 (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). Blair 
made significant efforts to change Labour’s public image from one that was ‘soft on crime’ to 
one that was ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 
2007:68). This followed the success of Clinton’s ‘very tough on crime’ (quoted in Rentoul, 
1997:280) approach in the US (Beckett and Western, 2000). This slogan sought to continue to 
attach the Labour Party to its traditional view of the link between crime and social causes, 
but it was also designed to appeal to populist sentiments by portraying the impression that 
Labour would deal harshly with offenders (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). Blair highlighted 
personal responsibility and punishment but underplayed the links between crime and social 
and economic factors to reclaim the debates around crime (Driver and Martell, 1998, 2002). 
There was a shift towards a managerial, evidence-based approach to criminal justice, whilst 
also incorporating a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007:69). In 1997, 
when Labour was elected, 93,100 offenders were sentenced to immediate custody whilst 
140,000 were sentenced to community penalties (Windlesham, 2001). The following year 
saw an increase for both custody and community penalties with 100,600 offenders 
sentenced to immediate custody and 149,400 sentenced to community penalties 
(Windlesham, 2001). The average prison population reached 65,298 increasing 47 percent 
from 1993 (Windlesham, 2001). Primarily the increase in the imprisonment rate was due to 
an increase in the proportion of offenders sent to prison and increases in sentence lengths 
(Windlesham, 2001).  
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The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
New Labour prioritised reform of the English youth justice system in its first two years in 
office (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). The 1998 Act established the Youth Justice Board and 
Youth Offending Teams to manage young offenders (Byrne and Brooks, 2015). A key feature 
of New Labour’s policy was early intervention; this targeted those considered most at risk of 
offending, which widened the net and drew more young people into the criminal justice 
system than ever before (Byrne and Brooks, 2015). Both juvenile prison rates and remand 
rates escalated (Solomon and Allen, 2009; Farrall et al., 2016). Antisocial Behaviour Orders 
(ASBOs) were also introduced for young offenders by the 1998 Act (Farrall et al., 2016), which 
also blurred the boundaries of criminal and civil law (Crawford, 2003).  ASBOs are a civil order 
that can lead to a criminal conviction should the ASBO be breached (Newburn, 2007) aiming 
to stop the anti-social behaviour before it escalated and to tackle the root causes of their 
behaviour (Home Office, 2013).  
 
The 1998 Act also increased courts’ powers to extend the post-release supervision period of 
a custodial sentence for someone who had committed a sexual or violent offence in order to 
prevent reoffending and for the purposes of rehabilitation (Farrall et al., 2016). Home 
Detention Curfews were introduced in the Act and was New Labour’s one major contribution 
to restrain prison numbers (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). This led to a slight reduction in the 
prison population from 65,298 in 1998 to 64,602 in 2000, before continuing to rise again 
(Cavadino and Dignan, 2007).  
 
The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 
New Labour introduced, for the first time, legislation that linked the social security system, 
through the Child Support, Pensions, and Social Security Act (CSPSSA) 2000, and criminal law 
(Larkin, 2007). Section 53 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 legislated that 
should an offender breach a Community Order the Department for Work and Pensions 
should be notified (Larkin, 2007). Section 62 of the CSPSSA gave powers to the Department 
for Work and Pensions to withhold means-tested or contributory benefits for up to 26 weeks 
should a court deem that an offender had failed to comply with their community order, 
despite the reasons of the breach of the order not being related to the social security 
agreement (Larkin, 2007).  
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The Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 
The Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 extended the powers of ASBOs to constrain tenants, 
parents and groups gathering in specified areas (Burney, 2005). This enabled interventions to 
take place in private spaces as well public spaces (Crawford, 2003). The Anti-Social Behaviour 
Act was repealed by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014), which 
legislated for the ASBO to be replaced by the Criminal Behaviour Order and an injunction to 
prevent nuisance and annoyance. The ASBO was deemed to be failing as breach rates were 
high and the number being issued had been steadily decreasing since 2005 (Home Office, 
2013).  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
The Review of Criminal Courts in England and Wales under Lord Justice Auld and the Review 
of Sentencing Framework under John Halliday were set up by the then Home Secretary Jack 
Straw aiming to ‘rebalance’ the criminal justice system in favour of victims and witnesses 
(Newburn, 2007:442). The 2003 Act contained many of the recommendations from the 
reviews, such as the introduction of new sentences: ‘custody minus’, a suspended custodial 
sentence to be activated should the offender breach the community element of the 
sentence; intermittent custody, a custodial sentence served in short periods allowing 
offenders to continue to work; and, ‘custody plus’, a custodial sentence less than twelve 
months, which combined a custodial terms of between two weeks and three months and a 
licence period of at least six months (Newburn, 2007). The 2003 Act also introduced a new 
Community Order to replace all other existing community sentences and revived the 
Suspended Sentence Order, both attempting to provide robust alternatives to the use of 
short-term prison sentences (Jacobson and Hough, 2018). Whilst both these Orders were 
used extensively in the years following the 1993 Act the prison population continued to be 
unaffected and continued to rise (Jacobson and Hough, 2003). In addition to the increase in 
prison sentences, those sentenced to community disposals supervised by The Probation 
Service also saw a large increase by 30 percent between 1993 and 2003 (Newburn, 2007).  
  
The Coalition Government 
The 2010 Green Paper, Breaking the Cycle, published under the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government, combined the traditionally punitive phrases of ‘hard’, 
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‘challenging’ work in prisons, ‘tougher’ curfew requirements, more ‘demanding’ community 
payback schemes with intended restraint aiming to curb the number of young offenders in 
custody and the use of Indeterminate sentences for Public Protection (IPPs) (Downes and 
Morgan, 2012: 192).   
 
This period has not been characterised by numerous tough penal initiatives, but it has 
continued to observe the tough penal rhetoric used throughout the previous two decades 
(Jacobson and Hough, 2018). As Justice Secretary at the start of the coalition government in 
2010, Ken Clarke abolished IPPs, introduced by David Blunkett, blaming them for contributing 
to the significant rise in prison population since he was Home Secretary (Jacobson and 
Hough, 2018). Although, large numbers of prisoners continue to serve IPP sentences 
considered to be ‘grossly disproportionate’ (Jacobson and Hough, 2018:181). Ken Clarke was 
replaced by Chris Grayling in 2012 who refrained from making significant changes to the 
sentencing framework, but who adopted a much tougher tone to penal policy (Jacobson and 
Hough, 2018). The notable legislative changes Chris Grayling implemented include extending 
the minimum length of extended sentences for dangerous offenders through the Offender 
Rehabilitation Act 2014 and minimum sentences for a second offence involving an offensive 
weapon by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (Annison, 2018). Additionally, the 
Incentives and Earned Privileges (IEP) Scheme was toughened (Annison, 2018) and prisoners’ 
access to books was reduced before this decision was later reversed by Michael Gove on 
becoming Justice Secretary (Jacobson and Hough, 2018). Generally, however, Chris Grayling 
focussed his attentions on privatising elements of the probation and prison service (Jacobson 
and Hough, 2018). The prison population has remained at historical high levels despite 
recorded crime rates continuing to fall (Jacobson and Hough, 2018), although recorded crime 
rates have been rising again since 2015/16 (see Figures 3.1. and 3.2).  
 
3.1.4. Political Discourse: a trend of rising punitiveness 
Being ‘tough’ on crime was referred to by the Conservative Party in their 1964 election 
manifesto (Downes and Morgan, 2002), however it was during the 1979 election campaign 
that ‘law and order’ gained political prominence (Farrall and Jennings, 2016). Margaret 
Thatcher made reference to the country’s desire for ‘less tax and more law and order’ 
(Savage, 1990:89). In her final election broadcast in 1979, she referred to ‘feeling safe in the 
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streets’ (Riddell, 1985:193). Subsequently, in 1988 Thatcher blamed social workers for 
creating ‘a fog of excuses’ for offenders (Riddell, 1989:171). This marked the ramping up of a 
political discourse which continues today. This discourse continued with Tony Blair, leader of 
the Labour party, as Prime Minister emphasising the need to be ‘tough on crime and tough 
on the causes of crime’. Official crime statistics showed an increase of 3.8 percent in the 
number of police recorded crimes preceding the twelve months prior to March 2000 
(Windlesham, 2001). In a memorandum Blair sent to his policy advisers in March 2000, he 
wrote, ‘We should think now of an initiative…something tough, with immediate bite which 
sends a message through the system’ (Windlesham, 2001:276). At the Labour Party 
Conference, Blair affirmed, ‘By acknowledging duty of care, we earn the right to be tough on 
crime’ (Windlesham, 2001).  
This punitiveness has continued to be observed from 2010 onwards with governmental 
responses to crime in England and Wales centralising punishment, which emphasised a 
‘tough’ approach to crime, ‘tough punishments’, ‘tough discipline for prisoners’, and ‘tougher 
community sentences’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010:9). Despite this ubiquitous discourse, law 
and order issues barely featured in political television debates preceding the general election 
in 2010 (Downes and Morgan, 2012). Customary references were made to law and order in 
the manifestos, but it was not prominent throughout the election campaign (Downes and 
Morgan, 2012).  On appointment as Justice Secretary in 2010, Kenneth Clarke was clear in his 
intention to impede the populist discourse that had been prevalent since the early 1990s 
(Annison, 2018). This change was evidenced by some of the legislative changes made initially 
by the Coalition government, such as the abolition of the Imprisonment for Public Protection 
(IPP) sentences and limitations to custodial demand legislated for by the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Annison, 2018). However, the tone and 
policy emphasis were set to change again with a cabinet reshuffle in 2012, which replaced 
Ken Clarke with Chris Grayling, who was placed to ‘toughen up’ on crime (Annison, 
2018).’Tough’ rhetoric was a frequent occurrence (Annison, 2018). At the Conservative Party 
Conference in October 2012, Chris Grayling set out his intention to be a ‘tough Justice 
Secretary’ to ‘punish offenders properly’ (Grayling, 2012).     
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More recently, prior the 2019 general election, home secretary Priti Patel commented that 
she wanted criminals to ‘literally feel terror’ at the idea of breaking the law (BBC, 2019). The 
Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto (2019:18) stated,  
‘We will introduce tougher sentencing for the worst offenders and end automatic 
release from prisons for serious crimes. For child murderers there will be life 
imprisonment without parole’.  
Priti Patel also stated that her focus was on ‘restating our commitment to law and order’ 
(Gayle, 2019). In 2011, some forty years since the abolition of capital punishment, Priti Patel 
had commented on her support for the ‘reintroduction of capital punishment to serve as a 
deterrent’ (BBC, 2019). Capital punishment was abolished under the terms of the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965. Hanging was initially suspended for a five-year period 
and was voted on again in 1969 with 343 votes in favour of abolition (185 against) 
permanently abolishing the death penalty (BBC, 2005). The death penalty was retained for 
treason and piracy with violence until 1998, when it was abolished completely (BBC, 2005). 
Capital punishment continued to be debated in the House of Commons in the two decades 
following its abolition in 1969, with fourteen motions to restore capital punishment defeated 
with substantial majorities (Windlesham, 1993).  
In an article written in the Daily Mail by the Prime Minister Boris Johnson (Johnson, 2019) 
wrote, 
‘We need to come down hard on crime. That means coming down hard on criminals. As 
Home Secretary Priti Patel has rightly said, we need to reverse the balance of fear.’ 
He continued, 
‘…first of all exploding any sense that the law is weak, or that criminals can get away with 
it. When the police catch a violent criminal, it is vital they get the sentence they deserve.’ 
Johnson wrote these comments in the same article in which he detailed the government’s 
intention to expand the prison estate by 10,000 spaces and to increase police stop and search 
powers (Johnson, 2019). Johnson’s comments here are vague, allow his words to be 
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interpreted as people so wish and do not push back against the punitive rhetoric on crime. 
Lacey (2008:71) suggests that being ‘tough on crime’ is attractive to politicians as it allows 
them to appear to resolve crime through a straightforward ‘tough’ criminal policy (Lacey 
2008: 71). In contrast, the Labour party manifesto in 2019 did not reflect the same tone as that 
of the New Labour era under Tony Blair (Labour Party Manifesto, 2019). Instead it presented a 
holistic approach to responding to criminal behaviour and noted the spending cuts of the 
Conservative government as causing issues with policing and local communities (Labour Party 
Manifesto, 2019).   
 
3.1.5. Trends in Public Opinion Towards Lawbreakers 
The British Social Attitudes Survey has tracked attitudes towards lawbreakers since 1986, 
posing two questions: 
• People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
• For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. 
This section will analyse these questions to assess trends in public attitudes towards 
lawbreakers over time.  
 
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences 
In 1983, 73% of respondents were in agreement (32% strongly agreed and 43% agreed) that 
people who break the law should be given stiffer sentences, reducing to 66% in agreement 
(20% strongly agreed and 46% agreed) in 2018 (Figure 3.3.) Disagreement with this 
statement has remained relatively stable over time, and it is the neither agree nor disagree 
category that has increased as those who agree have decreased (Figure 3.3.). Jennings et al. 
(2017a) point to the murder of two-year old James Bulger in February 1993 by two 10-year 
old boys and the subsequent extensive media coverage, which led to a moral panic about 
child delinquency and wider concerns about the loss of traditional values, for the increase in 
strong support of the death penalty at that time (see Figure 3.5.). Public concern rose 
sharply, as did the prison population at a time when recorded crime rates were starting to fall 
(Green, 2008). This is also seen in response to a sharp increase in support for stiffer 
sentences for lawbreakers in 1993, as shown in Figure 3.3. (The question was not asked in 
1992). Additionally, there were also concerns about crime at this time with recorded crime 
rates reaching a peak in 1992/1993 (see Figure 3.2.).   
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Figure 3.3. Public attitudes: Support for stiffer sentences 
 
Source: BSAS Data 1986 – 2018  
 
Looking at this question in more detail, Figure 3.4. below uses conditional formatting to 
colour code the mean score per age for each year of interview between 1986 and 2018. The 
more punitive scores are redder, yellow shows middle values and greener colours show less 
punitive responses. Although it is worth highlighting that the greener shades do not mean 
that these scores are necessarily lenient (in disagreement) responses, but that they are less 
punitive in comparison to the other scores. The highest value (least punitive mean score) is 
2.87 and the lowest value (the most punitive mean score) is 1.20. These scores range from 1 
(Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree).  This analysis appears to show that until 1991 
younger age groups were less punitive than older age groups illustrated by the green and 
yellow for younger age groups, whist higher age shows more red shading illustrating more 
punitive responses (Figure 3.4.). However, over time younger age groups appear to have 
become more punitive than in the 1980s with the distribution of red (more punitive 
attitudes) being more evenly spread across the ages, although older people do still appear to 
be more punitive (shown by more prevalent red shading in the higher age groups). From 
2013 onwards all ages appear to have become less punitive, shown by the increasing range of 
green shading for all age groups, but especially amongst the youngest. As noted in relation to 
Figure 3.3. above, there is also an increase in support for stiffer sentences in 1993 seen by 
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       Figure 3.4. Conditional Formatting: Support for stiffer sentences, 1983 to 2018 by age 
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For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence 
Support for the death penalty has reduced more substantially over time than support for 
stiffer sentences. In 1986, 75% were in agreement (33% strongly agreed and 41% agreed) 
that for some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence compared to 46% in 
agreement (21% strongly agreed and 25% agreed) in 2018 (BSA, 2019). Unlike support for 
stiffer sentences, disagreement with this statement has increased more substantially (by 
20%) than those who neither agree nor disagree (increase of around 10%). In 1986, 19% 
disagreed with this statement (10% disagreed and 9% strongly disagreed), whilst in 2018 39% 
were in disagreement (20% disagreed and 19% strongly disagreed) (Figure 3.5.). 
 
Figure 3.5. Public attitudes: Support for the death penalty 
 
Source: BSAS 1986 - 2018 
 
By 1991, those who strongly agreed that the death penalty is appropriate for some crimes 
had decreased to 25 percent from 41 percent in 1986, followed by a sharp increase in 1993 
to 45 percent (The question was not asked in 1992). As noted previously, this points to the 
effects of the murder of James Bulger in 1993 (Jennings et al., 2017a) and to the concerns 
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Figure 3.6. Conditional Formatting: Support for the death penalty, 1986 to 2018 by age 
 
Source: British Social Attitudes 1986 - 2018 
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Figure 3.6. again uses conditional formatting to colour code the mean score per age for each 
year of interview between 1986 and 2018 in response to support for the death penalty. The 
more punitive scores shown as red, yellow showing middle values and green shows less 
punitive responses. Again, the greener shades do not mean that these scores are necessarily 
lenient (in disagreement) responses, but that they are less punitive in comparison to the 
other mean scores. These scores ranged from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). The 
highest value (least punitive mean score) is 4.00 and the lowest value (the most punitive 
mean score) is 1.17. Whilst older age groups appear to be generally more punitive, until 1991 
support for the death penalty appears to be prevalent across all ages. Post 1993, punitive 
sentiment appears to generally increase with age, although over time support for the death 
penalty appears to have decreased for all age groups. This is particularly prevalent since 
2013, shown by the influx of green colours for all age groups, with the exception of the very 
old.   
 
3.1.6. Summary 
This chapter began with reviewing the trends in the prison population over time and 
governmental responses to it. In the 1970s, the prison population began to cause concerns. 
Despite this concern, there was an attempt to restrain the prison population through 
progressive measures. This approach generally prevailed until the early 1990s, when 
legislation took a punitive turn. At this time the prison population began to increase and 
remains at high levels today. Trends in punitive discourse by prominent figures were then 
considered. Punitive discourse was ramped up in the 1979 election campaign, despite 
subsequent legislation not employing the same tone. This discourse appears to have set the 
trend for subsequent political leaders to continue with a tough on crime discourse, which 
endures today. This punitiveness is channelled through policies, which have resulted in more 
punishment and stricter sanctions. Finally, trends in public attitudes towards lawbreakers 
using British Social Attitudes survey questions dating back to the early 1980s were presented. 
Analysis shows that support for stiffer sentences for lawbreakers remains high, although this 
has reduced substantially in recent years. Younger age groups appeared to be more punitive 
than they were in the late 1980s until around 2016, when punitive attitudes began to 
decrease. Whilst support for the death penalty appears to have decreased for all age groups 
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over time. The next subchapter will explore the long-term trajectories towards rulebreakers 
































Chapter 3.2. The long-term trajectories of punitiveness towards rulebreakers in the 
welfare system: Government policies, political discourse, and public sentiment 
 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The harsh treatment of economically disadvantaged people has a lengthy history in Britain 
(Golding and Middleton, 1982). This can be traced back to 14th century laws aimed at 
punishing undeserving vagrants, the 16th century branding of those deemed as the 
‘undeserving poor’ and the workhouses of the 19th century (Baumberg et al., 2012; Golding 
and Middleton, 1982). Dealing with economically disadvantaged people has always been a 
core issue for governments, and before them, the church and feudal authorities (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982). Punishment, in various forms, has been intrinsic to how authority has 
responded to the unemployed since the early sixteenth century (Chambliss, 1964). The 
division established in current social policy between the ‘undeserving’ and ‘deserving’ poor 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2013) can be traced back to the early vagrancy acts (Golding and Middleton, 
1982:9). This division also has a well-established history in political discourse, which became 
more prominent in the 1980s (Hill and Walker, 2014; Andrews and Jacob, 1990). Throughout 
the majority of the 20th century, social policy emphasized protecting working-class families 
(Deeming, 2015). Welfare reforms implemented by the Labour government following the 
Beveridge Report were underpinned by Keynesian principles. Policies aimed to manage the 
economy through enabling full employment, relying on revenues from income taxation and 
national insurance contributions largely financed by the working population (Deeming, 2015). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a shift away from the Keynesian Welfare State to 
placing the market before state and society (Deeming, 2015). Policies moved away from 
protecting incomes in favour of welfare conditionality and promoting employability and 
readiness for work (Deeming, 2015). Trends in public attitudes, measured by the British Social 
Attitudes Survey (BSAS) since the early 1980s, also appear to have hardened over time with 
the general public being less supportive of welfare claimants than they were in the 1980s, 
although this trend seems to have shifted in the last few years. This chapter considers 
historical and contemporary responses to the unemployed by reviewing government policies, 
political discourse and trends in public attitudes since the 1980s, suggesting that these areas 
have become increasingly more punitive towards welfare claimants over time.     
   
80 
 
3.2.2. History of Responses to the Disadvantaged: A Summary 
The 16th Century  
Golding and Middleton (1982:9) suggest that the contemporary notion that criminality is 
‘inherent in having no evident employment’ originated in the vagrancy laws of the early 
sixteenth century. This period also saw the introduction of increased punishments for certain 
behaviours whereby whippings, pillorying and execution became embedded in social policy 
(Golding and Middleton, 1982).  
 
The 1530 Vagabonds Act introduced the punishment of being ‘tied to the end of a cart naked, 
and to be beaten with whips…till his body be bloody by reason of such whippings’ should a 
person be able to work, but is found ‘idle’, begging or homeless, and ‘can given no reckoning 
how he lawfully gets his money’ (Chambliss, 1964:71). The 1530 Act also introduced 
legislation suggesting deceit and unemployment and homelessness were connected stating 
‘idle persons’ using ‘subtle crafty and unlawful games’ is punishable by a two-day whipping 
tied to a cart naked, in the nearest market town (Chambliss, 1964:72). Five years later, the 
punishment of execution was introduced for the crime of vagrancy (Chambliss, 1964). These 
types of physical punishments continued until they were abolished in the 19th Century 
(Lambert, 2016). The 1530 Act also embedded the idea of ‘wilful poverty’ in legislation and 
was to set the scene for many centuries to come (Golding and Middleton, 1982:9). The 
Vagabonds Act 1547 punished homelessness and begging by the branding of a ‘V’ (vagabond) 
on the person’s chest with a hot iron followed by two years of slavery to the person who 
found him (Chambliss, 1964). If the person subsequently ran away, they were branded with a 
letter ‘S’ (slave) on their forehead and enslaved forever (Chambliss, 1964). Legislation in 1553 
further distinguished between different forms of poverty by introducing the categories of the 
‘impotent’ (sick, aged, orphans), ‘casualties’ (war-wounded) and the ‘thriftless’ (homeless 
and the ‘idle’) (Golding and Middleton, 1982:10).  
 
The Poor Law 1597, amended in 1601, established the first mandatory system of publicly 
financed poor relief in England and Wales (Brundage, 2002). The Poor Law 1601 asserted the 
need for housing for both ‘poor impotent people’ and the able-bodied unemployed, which 
lead to the later development of poorhouses and workhouses in the seventeenth century 
(Brundage, 2002:11). The Poor Laws established the dual task of assisting the ‘deserving’ 
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disabled poor and forcing the able-bodied to seek work (Lindert, 1994). Shelter and 
sustenance were offered by parish workhouses to those deemed deserving, whilst the able 
bodied were subject to a ‘punishing regime’ (Lindert, 1994:381). The Poor Law Act 1601 
consolidated the aims of ‘work discipline, deterrence and classification’ formed during this 
period (Golding and Middleton, 1982:11) and continue to be evident in social policy 
regarding the unemployed. 
 
1700s – 1800s 
The Workhouse Test Act 1723 legislated for local parishes to build workhouses and to deny 
further sustenance should unemployed people refuse to enter (Brundage, 2002). The 
Gilbert’s Act 1782 allowed parishes to build separate houses to care for the elderly and 
children, and to provide support to the able-bodied poor outside the workhouse (Daunton, 
1995). By 1802, 3,765 parishes in England and Wales (excluding London) used workhouses to 
accommodate approximately 83,000 relief recipients (Daunton, 1995). Members of the Poor 
Law Commission, whose report lead to the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834, asserted that 
the current system encouraged laziness and lead to ‘a universal system of pauperism’ (Harris, 
2003:222). 
 
The regulation of begging and rough sleeping was a primary concern of the 1824 Vagrancy 
Act (sections 3 and 4) (Lawrence, 2017). Should a person be found begging or rough sleeping 
without visible means of subsistence they could be arrested and charged (Lawrence, 2017). 
These elements of the 1824 Act continue to be in use today (in an amended form) in England 
and Wales, having been repealed in Scotland and Northern Ireland, demonstrating a 
prevailing negative attitude and response to disadvantaged groups of people (Waugh and 
Pidd, 2014). A freedom of information request shows that in 2013-14, 2,771 cases were 
brought before the magistrates’ court under section 3 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 (Waugh and 
Pidd, 2014). Whilst prosecutions have more than halved since 2014, 1,320 people were 
prosecuted under the Vagrancy Act in 2018 (Downie, 2019). Section 3 and 4 of the 1824 Act 






Table 3.1. The Vagrancy Act 1824 
The Vagrancy Act 1824 How can it be used to tackle rough sleeping 
and associated activity 
Penalty/Sanction 
Section 4 Prohibits ‘wandering abroad and lodging in 
any barn or outhouse, or in any deserted or 
unoccupied building, or in the open air, or 
under a tent, or in any cart or wagon, and not 
giving a good account of himself’. 
Arrest/Maximum 
penalty - fine 
 People can be arrested if there is a shelter 
nearby that can be accessed or if they have 
been offered a shelter and still sleep on the 
street. 
Arrest/Maximum 
penalty - fine 
Section 3 Begging and persistent begging are prohibited 
through the Act: ‘Every person wandering 
abroad, or placing himself or herself in any 
public place, street, highway, court, or 
passage, to beg or gather alms’. 
Arrest/Maximum 
penalty - fine 
Source: Adapted from Sanders and Albanese (2017:4) 
 
The Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 
The 1834 Act placed the workhouse at the centre of the response to the poor, intending for a 
harsh environment to deter people from seeking relief, and should they do so, force them to 
seek employment in the open labour market as soon as possible (Gregory, 2008). Stigma was 
also central to the policy, engendering the belief that poverty was a choice, predominantly 
self-inflicted, and reflected a failing moral character (Gregory, 2008). This belief resulted in 
only those deemed as ‘impotent’ truly deserving of assistance outside of the workhouse 
(Gregory, 2008).  The 1834 Act also aimed to incentivise people to find work by establishing 
Poor Relief to be set at an earnings level lower than those of industrial workers in the lowest 
class (Timmins, 2017). Attitudes towards poverty at this time that suggest the individual was 
at fault for their circumstances and as such should be punished are still evident today 
(Timmins, 2017). The 1834 Act did not apply to Scotland (Paterson, 1976). Under the Act of 
Union in 1707 Scotland retained its separate judicial system, requiring separate clauses or 
separate Scottish Acts to apply legal and/or administrative procedures (Paterson, 1976). 
Neither action was taken in 1834 (Paterson, 1976). An inquiry into the relief system in 
Scotland led to a Royal Commission report in 1844, which criticized the prevailing relief 
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system in Scotland for being irregularly distributed and inadequate in amount (Paterson, 
1976). The 1845 Poor Law Scotland Act was the result of the Royal Commission report which 
gave powers to individual parishes responsible for the poor to decide how they both financed 
and managed the disadvantaged (Paterson, 1976). The Act specified that adequate and 
sufficient poor relief was to be provided for ‘paupers’, but lack of a definition for this term 
resulted in previous criteria being applied (Paterson, 1976). This Act provided improved relief 
introducing a local rating system provided on a more regular basis for the poor and their 
families (Paterson, 1976).  
 
Further punitive responses towards the poor continued throughout the 18th Century 
(Brundage, 2002). The Outdoor Relief Prohibitory Order 1844 stipulated that the able-bodied 
were not to receive outdoor relief unless some work had been carried out (Brundage, 2002). 
Additionally, a minimum of one-third of this relief would be paid via means such as bread or 
food tickets (Brundage, 2002). Relief was generally viewed by those in power as needing to 
be curtailed for both the ‘moral health’ and ‘fiscal integrity’ of communities (Brundage, 
2002). The stigmatization of relief was deemed central to this end (Brundage, 2002). The 
economic crisis of the 1860s lead to the Union Chargeability Act (1865), which improved 
finances allowing more modern workhouses to be built and more care for those deemed as 
needy, such as the elderly (Crocker, 1987). In 1870, the central Poor Law authority 
announced a policy to be strictly enforced, which recommended suspending outdoor relief to 
the able-bodied marking a change in Poor Law practice (Crocker, 1987).  
 
1900 to World War II 
The National Insurance Act 1911 is estimated to have reduced the number of those 
previously deemed as ‘paupers’ from 916,377 in 1910 to 748,019 in 1913 allowing for 
financial support through sickness benefits and pensions (Brundage, 2002:143). However, the 
majority of the disadvantaged remained outside its assistance, and those in the contributing 
lower classes paid effectively higher taxes than those in the middle class (Brundage, 2002). 
The Relief Regulation Order 1911 continued to prohibit outdoor relief to the able-bodied 
(Brundage, 2002). Despite this reform, in 1912 the number of workhouse residents had 
reached an all-time high of 280,000, which dropped sharply with the onset of World War 1, 
to rise again following the end of the war (Brundage, 2002). By 1926, the number of those 
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receiving poor relief had increased to 2.5 million (Brundage, 2002). Increasing unemployment 
followed by The Great Depression starting in 1929 lead to insurance benefits being cut and  
the introduction of a strict household means-tested benefit (Timmins, 2017). Unemployment 
became the central concern during the inter-war years (Timmins, 2017).  
 
World War II to 1979  
In 1942, the wartime coalition government published the ‘Social Insurance and Allied 
Services’ report, written by Sir William Beveridge, an economist and expert on 
unemployment issues (National Archives, 2018). This document formed the basis of the UK’s 
welfare state (Buchanan, 2017), implementing a ‘cradle to grave’ national insurance system 
of weekly contributions (Holborn, 2017). This system aimed to place the state in a 
responsible role ensuring that the poor conditions experienced during the post-war 
depression would be avoided in the future (Holborn, 2017). Welfare reforms implemented by 
the Labour government following the Beveridge Report included family allowances (1945), 
the scheme for social security insurance (1946) and assistance (1948) aiming to protect 
workers from the risks of unemployment, and the National Health Service (1946) (Deeming, 
2015). These reforms were underpinned by Keynesian principles for the government to 
manage the economy effectively through policy enabling full employment (Deeming, 2015). 
Thus, the Keynesian Welfare State was to provide security, which relied on revenues from 
income taxation and national insurance contributions largely financed by the working 
population (Deeming, 2015). The Beveridgean welfare state therefore was entirely 
dependent upon the unemployed actively seeking and returning to work (Deeming, 2015). 
The Beveridge social security system also aimed to encourage work and reduce the view that 
welfare benefits were ‘easy handouts’ (Hill and Walker, 2014). By introducing entitlements to 
benefits based on claimants’ work records, the Beveridge system continued to make the 
distinction between the ‘undeserving’ and ‘deserving’ poor (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). By the late 
1960s however, core debates that endure today about the affordability and the effect of the 
welfare state had become established (Timmins, 2017). Poor economic growth, a growing 
population, an anti-personal taxation stance, an increasing expenditure and rising 





Welfare Changes in the 1980s 
A political backlash emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s against state intervention in 
the market with a shift away from the Keynesian Welfare State to placing the market before 
state and society (Deeming, 2015). This ideological perspective of neo-liberalism aimed to 
reduce the role of the state, promote individual responsibility and increase the freedom of 
the market (Walker, 2014). From the 1980s onwards, the neo-liberal turn aimed to place 
greater emphasis on individuals, which focussed on changing the behaviour of the 
unemployed (Jeffery et al., 2018). Neo-liberalism was embraced by many western 
democracies, particularly the USA and UK, emerging from the economic situation in the 
1970s of high unemployment, high inflation and slow economic growth (Harvey, 2005). The 
receipt of social security in Britain has almost always been dependent upon some sort of 
‘socially acceptable’ behaviour (Larkin, 2007:299). Being involuntary unemployed and 
available for work has always been a condition of receiving benefits, however, the extent of 
conditionality accompanied with the severity of sanctions for non-compliance have increased 
significantly since the 1980s (Watts et al., 2014.; Deeming, 2015). Between 1979 and 1997 
the Conservative government undertook a series of welfare reviews, which led to the 
implementation of a ‘stricter benefit regime’ from the late 1980s (Watts et al., 2014). The 
maximum penalty introduced in 1911 for non-compliance was six weeks, which lasted until 
1986 when it was increased initially to 13 weeks, and subsequently 26 weeks in 1988 
(Fletcher and Wright, 2017). Policies moved away from protecting incomes in favour of 
welfare conditionality and activation attempting to enforce work for all (Deeming, 2015). 
New training programmes and strategies were devised to increase job-readiness to gain 
employment and to promote employability (Deeming, 2015). This approach was also 
accompanied by the welfare goal of reducing unemployment and tackling the wider culture 
problem of ‘worklessness’ (Deeming, 2015:864).  
 
Social Security Act 1980 
The Social Security Act (No. 1) 1980 made changes to uprating obligations and the 
supplementary benefit scheme (Mesher, 1981). The obligation for uprating longer-term 
benefits in line with earnings or prices, whichever was better, was removed and were now 
only increased in line with prices (Mesher, 1981). The Social Security Act 1980 (No.2) 
implemented cuts to benefits in combination with incentives to work (Mesher, 1981). The 
86 
 
Social Security Act (No.2, Section 1) changed the uprating obligations further; short-term 
benefits (for example, sickness and unemployment) and long-term disability benefit could 
now be uprated up to 5 percentage points less than was otherwise required (Mesher, 1981). 
Consequently, in 1980 when inflation was estimated at 16.5%, uprating was at 11.5% 
indicating a clear cut to these benefits (Mesher, 1981). The Act also increased the number of 
incapacitated days to four before entitlements to sickness benefit could be gained (Mesher, 
1981).  
 
The Social Security Acts of 1986, 1988 and 1989 
A series of reviews of social security provision were overseen between 1984 and 1986 by the 
then Secretary for State for Social Services, Rt Hon Sir Norman Fowler MP (Select Committee, 
1997). Many changes contained in the Social Security Act 1986 were influenced by the Fowler 
Reviews such as the replacement of Supplementary Benefit by Income Support, the 
introduction of the Social Fund, alignment of the rules across means tested benefits, and 
Housing Benefit reforms (Select Committee, 1997). The 1986 Act made significant changes to 
means-tested benefits aiming to target those in ‘genuine need’, to control spending, to 
provide a simpler structure, to target benefits towards families with children and to improve 
incentives to work (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1994). The main changes also included a 
more generous Family Credit replacing Family Income Supplement for low waged working 
families and students aged 16 to 18 loosing benefit entitlements altogether (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 1994). Students were also excluded from claiming benefits during 
short holidays (National Archives, 2012). Income Support, compared to Supplementary 
Benefits, gave higher levels of support to older people, sick people and children, but reduced 
support to unemployed people (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1994). Those without children 
and the unemployed lost the most from the changes (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1994). 
The Social Security Act 1988 aimed to reduce the overall costs of social security (Farrall and 
Jennings, 2014). Whilst the 1989 Social Security Act aimed to incorporate a more robust 
testing system for those ‘actively seeking work’ (Atkinson and Lupton, 1990).    
 
Jobseekers Act 1995 
The 1995 Act introduced Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), which has been described as ‘a defining 
moment in welfare state history’ (Timmins, 2017:528). The unemployed were now 
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‘jobseekers’ rather than unemployed and were required to sign a ‘jobseekers agreement’ 
outlining what they would do to seek work (Timmins, 2017). The monitoring of job-seeking 
behaviour of unemployed recipients was intensified through JSA (Watts et al., 2014). 
Claimants were expected to demonstrate their work seeking activity from phone calls to job 
applications, and should they fail to do so they would lose their benefits (Timmins, 2017). 
Eligibility criteria to claim unemployment benefits were made tighter and a system of rules 
and penalties were introduced (Fletcher and Wright, 2017). The JSA monitoring and sanctions 
introduced by the Conservative government were continued by the 1997 Labour government 
(Watts et al., 2014).  
  
Labour Government 1997 - 2010 
The New Labour government accepted the reforms of the previous Conservative government 
and subsequently intensified ‘responsibilisation’ through further legislation (Larkin, 
2007:300). It has always been seen as the responsibility of unemployed claimants to actively 
seek work; however, this intensified and extended to other groups during the late 1990s 
(Hills, 2001). Contractualism, that is work-related benefits are received upon meeting certain 
responsibilities and obligations, is criticized for being ineffective in terms of employment 
prospects but also undermine the status of the unemployed (Sage, 2012). The ‘New Deal’ 
policies, introduced by Labour in 1998, departed from the traditional role of social security 
redistributing provisions to support those without work and emphasized labour market 
participation and mandatory work-related activities (Deeming, 2015).   
 
New Labour’s ‘New Deal’ programmes aimed to increase long-term employability for young 
people, lone parents and disabled people and consisted of mandatory advice, employment, 
and training programmes (Finn, 2000). Extensions of New Labour’s ‘New Deal’ programmes 
included sanctions for non-compliance, which extended the responsibilities for benefit 
claimants (Hills, 2001). If a young person rejected a New Deal employment option without a 
good reason they were subjected to sanctions (Finn, 2000). A first refusal resulted in a  
two-week benefit sanction, a second refusal resulted in a four-week sanction and a third 
refusal could result in a loss of benefit for up to six months (Finn, 2000). In 2001, lone parents 
on Income Support were expected to attend compulsory work-focused interviews (Watts et 
al., 2014). Under the original ‘New Deal for Lone Parents’ programme it was voluntary to 
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attend advice interviews (Hills, 2001). However, in 2001 this interview became compulsory 
for lone parents with children over five years old, with sanctions cut by around £10 per week 
if they failed to attend, although it was not compulsory to take a job (Hills, 2001). Jobcentre 
Plus, which replaced Jobseeker’s Allowance announced prior to the 2001 election, 
demonstrated the trend of Blair’s government to continue to increase the responsibilities of 
the unemployed and inactive benefit claimants by providing a work-focussed response to all 
benefits (Brewer et al., 2002). Working Families Tax Credits were also introduced in 2003 
denoting the very low wages of some people, such that they can claim their tax back to have 
an effective living wage for a family (Brewer, 2003).  
 
New Labour introduced, for the first time, legislation that linked the social security system 
and criminal law (Larkin 2007). Section 62 of the Child Support, Pensions, and Social Security 
Act (CSPSSA) 2000 gave powers to the Department for Work and Pensions through the 
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 to withhold means-tested or contributory 
benefits for up to 26 weeks should a court deem that an offender had failed to comply with 
their community order, despite the reasons of the breach of the order being unrelated to the 
social security agreement (Larkin, 2007). Larkin (2007) suggests that this ‘dual punishment’ 
targets those members of society who are most in need of state assistance in the first 
instance and may result in further offending. The New Labour government also continued to 
implement conditions and measures to monitor welfare recipients (Watts et al., 2014).  
 
The 2006 Green Paper, A New Deal for Welfare: empowering people to work, noted that the 
'existing system encouraged the poverty trap of welfare dependency' and focused on 
Incapacity Benefit claimants, older people and lone parents (Cole, 2015). In 2007, Lord Freud 
produced an independent report of the welfare-to-work programme and placed increased 
responsibility on claimants to find work underpinned by conditionality and sanctions (Cole, 
2015). This was framed in the 2008 White Paper, Raising Expectations and Increasing 
Support: reforming welfare for the future (Cole, 2015). New Labour also retained the 
Jobseekers’ Act 1995, which introduced the ‘jobseeker’s agreement’ requiring those in 
receipt of JSA to demonstrate taking appropriate steps to seek paid employment and act 
upon any reasonable direction made by the Jobcentre (Larkin, 2007). The Jobseekers’ Act 
1995 also provides a set of sanctions for those deemed to have breached their agreement 
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(Larkin, 2007). In 2oo8, Lone Parent Obligations were implemented, which generally treats 
lone parents deemed able to work the same as JSA claimants, with some flexibility 
recognising the responsibilities of caring for a child (Watts et al., 2014). The Welfare Reform 
Act 2007 introduced Employment Support Allowance (ESA) replacing Incapacity Benefit and 
Income Support (only for sick and disabled people) in 2008, which embraced conditionality 
and sanctions for those assessed as capable of work-related activities (Welfare Reform Act, 
2007; Watts et al., 2014).  
 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, 2010 - 2015  
Reform of the welfare state, and the concern to reduce public spending on certain welfare 
benefits, was central to the Coalition government’s programme from 2010 onwards (Cole, 
2015). These welfare reforms expanded and intensified behavioural conditionality (Jeffery et 
al., 2018). Jeffery et al. (2018:798) argue that these reforms ‘represent a ratcheting-up of the 
level of punitiveness’. Deeming (2015:864) also describes the coalition government’s ‘Work 
Programme’ as ‘punitive’.  The coalition government’s focus on overhauling the welfare 
system can be traced back to reports and reviews between 2006 and 2008 of the New Labour 
government (Cole, 2015). The Coalition government published the White Paper, Universal 
Credit: welfare that works, which set out their 'commitment to overhaul the benefit system 
to promote work and personal responsibility' (Cole, 2015).  
 
The Intensification in the Use of Sanctions 
In 2008, Chris Grayling, the Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary, and David Cameron, 
Leader of the Conservative Party, announced the Conservative Party’s welfare policy 
(Haddon, 2012). The focus of the policy was placed on expanding payment by results for 
private and voluntary sector welfare-to-work programmes, increasing conditionality for 
benefits, and more rigorous claimant assessments (Haddon, 2012). The Coalition Agreement 
in 2010 between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats committed to invest in 
the simplification of the benefits system ‘in order to improve incentives to work’ (DWP, 
2010:6). At that time, a wide range of benefits were delivered by different departments and 
the new system intended to integrate these together (DWP, 2010). Income Support, 
Jobseekers Allowance and Employment Support Allowance were delivered through Jobcentre 
Plus; Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit were delivered by Local Authorities; Disability 
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Living Allowance and Carer’s Allowance by the Pension, Disability and Carers Service; and, 
Working Tax Credit, supporting certain low-paid workers and makes provision for childcare, 
were paid by HM Revenue & Customs (DWP, 2010). In 2010, Iain Duncan Smith, the Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions, announced the introduction of Universal Credit (UC) under 
the Coalition government highlighting the need to reform the welfare system as previous 
governments had, 
 
‘stood by as economic growth bypassed the worst off and welfare dependency took 
root in communities up and down the country, breeding hopelessness and 
intergenerational poverty’ (Duncan Smith, Gov.uk, 2010:1).  
 
Duncan Smith also noted that ‘we are developing sanctions for those who refuse to play by 
the rules’ (DWP, 2010). UC, legislated for in The Welfare Reform Act 2012, was first 
introduced in the North West of England in 2013, and gradually expanded nationally from 
2014 onwards (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015). UC was introduced as an ‘integrated 
working-age credit’ providing ‘a basic allowance with additional elements for children, 
disability, housing and caring’ aiming to support those in and out of work (DWP, 2010:3). 
Those who are deemed ‘work shy’ or lack adequate ‘work ethic’ now face ‘Mandatory Work 
Activity’ (Deeming, 2015).  
 
Since 1996, welfare reform has been pursued by all three major political parties (Fletcher and 
Wright, 2017). Welfare conditionality has intensified over time taking a more punitive turn in 
2012 with the introduction of harsh sanctions and minimal mandatory support (Fletcher and 
Wright, 2017). Conditionality is defined in the Universal Credit White Paper 2010 (DWP, 
2010:24) as, 
 
‘Individuals who are able to look for or prepare for work should be required to do so as 
a condition of receiving benefit, and those who fail to meet their responsibilities should 
face a financial sanction.’ 
 
Conditionality, supported by sanctions, has featured in the British welfare system since the 
late 1980s (Reeve, 2017). In 2010, the Coalition government implemented plans set in 
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motion by the previous Labour government for welfare system reform placing conditionality 
and individual responsibility at its centre (Reeve, 2017). The Coalition government increased 
conditionality and sanctions through the use of fixed length sanctions, varied length 
sanctions and entitlement sanctions (Watts et al., 2014). Eligibility for state support requires 
claimants to comply with certain forms of conditions, which require them to behave in a 
certain way in order to receive welfare goods (Watts et al., 2014; Reeve, 2017). Behavioural 
conditions are integral to Universal Credit and are generally enforced through the use of 
sanctions that may reduce, suspend or cease access to benefits (Watts et al., 2014).  
 
In 2012, the maximum sanction increased to the complete withdrawal of benefits for three 
years for ‘high level non-compliance’, and the ‘Work-Related Activity Group’ (WRAG) of 
Employment Support Allowance (ESA) claimants faced an open-ended sanction of complete 
loss of benefits (Watts et al., 2014). The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
acknowledges the central role that conditionality plays in the current welfare system, noting 
that UC intends to provide a ‘clear financial incentive…backed up by a strong system of 
conditionality’ with unemployed people required ‘to take all reasonable steps to find and 
move into employment’ (DWP, 2010:4). ‘Strengthened conditionality’ supports a system of 
financial sanctions generating ‘greater incentives for people to meet their responsibilities’ 
(DWP, 2010:4). The ‘full service’ rollout of UC, which involves transferring those receiving 
existing benefits onto UC, was expected to be complete by the end of 2018 (Webster, 2017).  
 
Universal Credit Conditions and Requirements 
The core structure of UC consists of ‘Responsibilities’, ‘Commitments’, ‘Sanctions’, ‘Fulltime 
Work Search’, ‘Conditionality’ and ‘Opening up work and Taper’ (DWP, 2018a). Recipient’s 
responsibilities entail completing work-search activities for up to 35 hours per week, 
completing a bespoke Commitment with a work coach, paying their own rent, financial 
management and budgeting, and if a claimant is working part-time and able to earn more 
than they are expected to seek additional work and increase their earnings. As noted in the 
Universal Credit White Paper 2010 (DWP, 2010:24) ‘requirements will be placed on some 





The claimant Commitment should be devised with the work coach which states what the 
claimant has agreed to do in preparation of work, in seeking work, or in order to increase 
earnings (DWP, 2010). Claimants can be sanctioned if they fail to meet one or more of the 
responsibilities stated in their commitment; this can result in UC payments being reduced for 
a set period, increasing the more times that requirements are not met (DWP, 2010). The 
Commitment, an increase in terms of conditionality on the Job Seeker’s Agreement 
introduced in 1995, includes details of the claimant’s work availability and work-seeking 
activity (Jeffery et al, 2018).  
 
A claimant is allocated to one of the following four conditionality groups dependent on the 
circumstances and capabilities of the claimant: All work-related requirements where 
claimants are to take all reasonable action to prepare for, secure, be available for work or for 
better paid work; Work-focused-interview and work-preparation requirements only where 
claimants are expected to undertake actions to increase likelihood of obtaining paid work, 
more paid work or better paid work, prepare for work and partake in work focused 
interviews; Work focused Interviews requirements only in which claimants are expected to 
start work in the future, attend periodic interviews at the Job Centre to plan for work; or the 
No work-related activity requirement (DWP, 2018a). Once a claimant is allocated to one of 
the conditionality groups, they are allocated to one of six Labour Market Regimes: Intensive 
Work Search Regime is for claimants who are not working and those working but earning very 
low amounts who are expected to take intensive action to secure work or work more; Light 
Touch Regime apply to those earning but assessed as needing to earn more; Work 
Preparation Regime concerns those who are expected to work in the future but not currently; 
Work-Focused Interviews apply to those  expected to work in the future but are currently 
carers; No Work-Related Requirements Regime apply to those not expected to work at 
present, such as those who are too sick, responsible carer or have children under 1; and the 
Working Enough Regime (Data Parliament, 2017).  
 
Benefit claimants can be subject to four sanction levels should they ‘fail to meet their 
responsibilities’ ranging from Lowest Level to Higher Level (DWP, 2010:24). Until November 
2019, the ‘Higher Level’ sanctioned recipients for three months for their first sanction 
escalating to three years by their third sanction (DWP, 2018a). In November 2019, the 
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Department for Work and Pensions reduced the length of higher-level sanctions amending 
the Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996, the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 and the 
Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 2013 to a maximum length of 182 days or 26 weeks 
(DWP, 2019). The DWP (2019) acknowledged that the significant negative consequences of 
disengagement from employment support and increased financial hardship for claimants 
subject to three-year sanctions outweighed any the potential incentives (DWP, 2019). 
However, Webster (2019) notes that this change will only affect a very small number of 
claimants as the number of claimants receiving higher-level sanctions is possibly in the 
hundreds. Whereas those having their benefits removed for longer than six months is much 
larger as some sanctions apply until compliance and are subsequently followed by a fixed 
period sanction (Webster, 2019). There were 26,574 UC claimants affected by these long 
sanctions between November 2016 and August 2019, 6,197 for JSA over six years from April 
2013 to March 2019, and 6,740 for ESA from June 2013 to March 2019 (Webster, 2019). 
‘Medium level’ sanctions range from 28 days to three months, ‘Low Level’ sanctions can last 
until the claimant does the sanctioned activity or time-limited sanctions range from seven 
days to 28 days, and the ‘Lowest Level’ sanction last until the claimant takes part in the 
sanctionable activity (DWP, 2018a). Sanctions can be implemented for a failure to comply 
with their ‘responsibilities’ ranging from a failure to apply for a particular job when told to do 
so, refusal of a job offer, a failure to take all reasonable actions to find paid work/increase 
earnings or a failure to be available for work or attend interviews (DWP, 2018a). On receiving 
a sanction, recipients are eligible to apply for a hardship grant should they be unable to pay 
for rent, heating, food and/or hygiene on condition that they carry out the activity for which 
they have been sanctioned (DWP, 2018a). Additionally, they must prove they have done 
everything reasonable to look for work in the seven days preceding the sanction and show 
that they have tried to find money from somewhere else first (DWP, 2018a). Hardship grants 
are repaid through UC payments resulting in lower UC payments until the hardship payment 
is repaid (DWP, 2018a).  
 
In July 2019, 1.9 million claimants were exposed to the risk of sanctions split between 
Universal Credit, Jobseekers Allowance, Employment Support Allowance and Income Support 
(Webster, 2019). The severity of the benefit sanctions regime increased significantly under 
the Coalition government (Webster, 2014). In the twelve months to July 2019 there were a 
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total of 210,000 sanctions (before challenges) on all benefits comprising of 195,000 UC 
sanctions, 9,000 JSA sanctions, 8,000 ESA sanctions and 5,700 IS sanctions, with UC sanctions 
accounting for 92.5% of all sanctions (Webster, 2019). This is greatly reduced from the peak 
of 1,113,000 sanctions (before challenges) reached in 2013 (Webster, 2019). Homeless Link, 
a national charity in England, indicates that benefit sanctions and subsequent financial 
hardship has resulted in some individuals using food banks more frequently, which may have 
also increased begging (Waugh and Pidd, 2014). Wickham et al. (2020) examined the impact 
of Universal Credit on 52,187 individuals of working age (16-64 years old) in England, 
Scotland and Wales between 2009 and 2018 using longitudinal survey data from the 
Understanding Society UK Longitudinal Household Panel Study. They found that psychological 
distress increased following the introduction of Universal Credit by 6·57 percentage points 
relative to the comparison group. Food bank use has grown dramatically over the past fifteen 
years (Trussell Trust, 2020). In 2005/6 around 3,000 people received three-day emergency 
food supplies, by 2010/11 this had risen to just over 61,000, by 2013-14 around 900,000 
people received food, which peaked at 1,583,668 people in 2018/19 (Trussell Trust, 2020). A 
2017 report found that the main drivers for food bank use to be benefit delays (2 in 5 people 
awaiting a payment and around a third of delays were for Employment Support Allowance 
recipients), sharp rises in housing costs or food expenses, and low income or loss of income 
(Loopstra and Lalor, 2017).   
 
The Work and Pensions Committee (2018:3) noted that the Welfare Reform Act 2012 ‘have 
made sanctions longer, more severe and applicable to more people than ever before’. For 
some people, the current welfare system dominated by conditionality and sanctions, has 
resulted in increased poverty, destitution and ‘survival crime’ (Welfare Conditionality Project, 
2018:18). Some claimants, particularly those with additional vulnerabilities, such as drug and 
alcohol dependencies and homelessness, withdraw from the welfare system all together 
(Welfare Conditionality Project, 2018). A five-year study followed 481 social security 
recipients over a two-year period in England and Scotland found that there was little 
evidence that welfare conditionality increased motivation to prepare for or enter paid 
employment (Welfare Conditionality Project, 2018). Some recipients became destitute, 
resorted to survival crime and experienced ill health, and sanctions frequently resulted in 
negative personal, financial and health consequences (Welfare Conditionality Project, 2018).  
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Conditionality and Criminalisation 
Fletcher and Wright (2017:3) draw on Wacquant’s (2009) observations of the American 
welfare system and its emergence of a neo-liberal state that prioritises corporations and the 
wealthy and is coercive and authoritarian towards those in poverty. Wacquant (2009) argues 
that welfare policies are ‘informed by the same behaviourist philosophy’ as penal policy 
incorporating ‘deterrence, surveillance and graduated sanctions in order to modify 
behaviour’ (Fletcher and Wright, 2017:4). Fletcher and Wright suggest that Wacquant’s 
(2009) argument that supervision and correction within the US welfare system criminalises 
claimants also applies to the British system with the introduction of the UC Claimant 
Commitment, coercive self-help, the lack of support, and the Universal Jobmatch System. 
Additionally, they argue that ‘coercive behaviouralism’ in Britain can be traced back to the 
high levels of unemployment in the 1980s leading the Conservative government reviewing 
the welfare system and implementing a more punitive benefit regime (p5). The JSA 
Agreement introduced ‘behavioural conditionality’ whereby claimants had to negotiate a 
mandatory back-to-work plan with an advisor, along with completing mandatory Jobsearch 
activities and diaries documenting all jobsearch activities (Fletcher and Wright, 2017:5). 
Fletcher and Wright suggest that since the introduction of JSA the ‘surveillance and 
correction’ of benefit claimants has increased significantly (p8). The Claimant Commitment, 
replacing JSA Agreements in 2013-14 for out-of-work UC, JSA and ESA-WRAG claimants, 
expects claimants to document back to work plans, which can be used to sanction claimants 
should they not comply with any elements of the plan (Fletcher and Wright, 2017). 
‘Discretionary authority’ by the work advisor allows for ‘variable coercion’ due to the 
claimant being instructed or sanctioned by the advisor (Fletcher and Wright, 2017:9).  The 
Universal Jobmatch System allows work coaches to monitor online activity, such as what jobs 
they have applied for, and can sanction claimants as a result of information obtained via this 
surveillance (Fletcher and Wright, 2017). Fletcher and Wright also argue that deterrence is 
evident in Discretionary Mandatory Work Activity, introduced in 2011 and part of UC, on the 
basis of ‘a month’s full time activity can be a real deterrent for some people who are either 
not trying or who are gaming the system’ (Grayling quoted in Fletcher and Wright, 2017). 
There are also noticeable parallels between the use of ‘requirements’ for both offenders 
(NOMS, 2015) and UC claimants (DWP, 2018a). Offenders are sentenced to a range of 
‘requirements’ dependent on their identified criminogenic needs (NOMS, 2015), whilst UC 
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claimants are allocated to ‘requirement groups’ dependent on their circumstances (DWP, 
2018a). Failure to comply with the requirements in both cases results in breach action being 
taken (NOMS, 2015) or sanctioning (DWP, 2018a). Additionally, both systems contain specific 
frameworks; under UC, a claimant is allocated to a Labour Market Regime whereby claimants 
are expected to meet certain responsibilities (Data Parliament, 2017), whilst a tiering 
framework is applied to offenders dependent on their risk level (National Probation Service, 
n.d.). Fraser (1989:45) points to Foucault’s observation of ‘normalising-disciplinary power’, 
which ‘operates quietly’ but ‘continuously, penetratingly and ubiquitously’ and is ‘dispersed 
throughout the entire social body’.  
 
3.2.3. Political Discourse  
From the mid-1970s, the term ‘scrounger’ grew to symbolize moral degeneration (Mesher, 
1981). Hill and Walker (2014:97) argue that between 1979 and 1991, the Conservative 
government expanded this division through a ‘rhetorical onslaught’ aimed at welfare 
recipients accompanied with increasingly intensive measures enacted in the welfare system. 
Rhetoric sustained towards welfare and its recipients throughout this period consisted of 
arguments that poverty was not problematic, and that people must take more responsibility 
to help themselves (Hill and Walker, 2014). 
  
The discourse used by the Conservative government in the 1980s has similarities with the 
social values expressed in Victorian Poor Law, which strongly supported personal 
responsibility (Andrews and Jacob, 1990). On coming into office, the 1979 Conservative 
government had clear intentions to reduce public expenditure and state intervention 
(Andrews and Jacob, 1990), 
 
‘I came to office with one deliberate intent: to change Britain from a dependent to a 
self-reliant society; from a give-it-to-me nation; a get-up-and-go instead of a sit-back-
and-wait-for-it Britain’.  (Margaret Thatcher, speech to the Small Businesses Bureau, 
1984, in Andrews and Jacob, 1990:3). 
 
‘Welfare benefits, distributed with little or no consideration of their effects on 
behaviour, encouraged illegitimacy, facilitated the breakdown of families, and 
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replaced incentives favouring work and self-reliance with perverse encouragement 
for idleness and cheating’ (Margaret Thatcher in Woman’s Own, 31 October 1987, in 
Hill and Walker, 2014:97)  
 
The Conservative government of the 1980s blamed welfare for encouraging idleness and 
discouraging private savings and thrift (Andrews and Jacob, 1990). This attitude was 
emphasized in the 1979 Conservative manifesto with phrases such as ‘restoring the will to 
work’, ‘restore incentives so that hard work pays’, ‘concentrating welfare services…on those 
in real need’ and ‘act more vigorously against fraud and abuse’ (Conservative Party 
Manifesto, 1979). As unemployment rose from 1.5 to 3 million during the first two years of 
the Conservative government’s period in office so did the hostility towards ‘scroungers’ and 
‘handouts’ (Andrews and Jacob, 1990:5). Phrases such as ‘in genuine need’ were common, as 
was the idea that the explanation for unemployment was individualistic (Walker, 1993, in Hill 
and Walker, 2014:93). Unfavourable statements directed towards welfare and its recipients, 
such as the idea that welfare was ‘encouragement for idleness and cheating’ maintained 
hostility towards welfare (Hill and Walker,2014:97). 
 
This type of discourse did not end with a change of Government, however. On becoming 
Prime Minister in 1997 Tony Blair, the leader of the Labour Party, declared that the welfare 
state was ‘associated with fraud, abuse, laziness, a dependency culture, and social 
irresponsibility encouraged by welfare dependency’ (Bove, 2014: 114). In 2000, following the 
1998 Green Paper, Beating Fraud Is Everyone’s Business, a national campaign against benefit 
fraud was launched, ‘Targeting Benefit Fraud: Everyone’s Business’, using television and 
posters to promote this message (Bove, 2014). At the time the campaign was the most 
expensive campaign ever costing £4.8 million in its first phase and £27.3 million between 
2006 and 2009 (Bove, 2014). It appeared on television, in newspapers, posters, radio and 
ATM screens as well as appearing in Spain, the Costa del Sol and the Canary Islands with 
whistle blowers’ hotlines being opened (Bove, 2014). 
 
In reference to Labour’s New Deal policies, Tony Blair pronounced in 1999 that welfare 
should be ‘a hand up, not a hand out’ (Green, 2014). Blair (1997) commented that ‘Behind 
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the statistics lie households where three generations have never had a job’. New Labour’s 
HM Treasury Pre-budget Report (2002 in MacDonald et al., 2014) noted that, 
 
‘Rising concentrations of worklessness…is no longer the exception, but the norm. 
Households that have experienced generations of unemployment often develop a 
cultural expectation of worklessness’.  
 
More recently in 2011, Iain Duncan Smith (previous UK Minister for Work and Pensions) 
asserted that young people are not interested in working due to seeing ‘their parents, their 
neighbours and their entire community sit on benefits for life’ (MacDonald et al., 2014:3). 
Chris Grayling, as Minister for Work and Pensions, also noted in 2011 that ‘there are four 
generations of families where no-one has ever had a job’ (MacDonald, 2013:200). Universal 
Credit’s aim to reform welfare also noted the problem of ‘children growing up in homes 
where no one works’ and worklessness is repeated ‘through the generations’ (DWP, 2010:3, 
in MacDonald, 2014:3). Despite these claims, the idea of intergenerational worklessness was 
dismissed by MacDonald et al. (2014:2; MacDonald, 2013) who failed to locate families 
‘where no-one in three generations has ever worked’. When Iain Duncan Smith was asked to 
justify his references to intergenerational worklessness, he conceded that his remarks were 
based on personal observations due to statistical information not being available (Macmillan, 
2013).    
 
This discourse continues to be entrenched in modern day politics, with repeated distinctions 
made between ‘stivers and shirkers’ in ministerial statements (Taylor-Gooby, 2013). ‘Work-
based welfare’ became a dominant discourse under David Cameron’s government (Hill and 
Walker, 2014:94). The Conservative’s political slogan at the 2013 Party Conference, under 
Cameron, was ‘For hardworking people’ (Landale, 2013).  The Coalition government tended 
to blame the individual, their behaviour and pathology for being ‘shirkers’ and ‘lazy’ (Pantazis, 
2016). Whilst the structural deficiencies of the benefit systems itself was blamed for 
encouraging dependency, this was accompanied by media articles often focusing on benefit 





3.2.4. Trends in Public Attitudes Towards Welfare Recipients 
Until 2014, attitudes towards benefit recipients were possibly at their most punitive ever 
(McKay, 2014), however, recent British Social Attitudes data shows attitudes are softening 
(BSAS, 2019; Harding, 2017). Baumberg (2012) argues that attitudes change through an 
interplay between perceptions of welfare deservingness, institutions, credible and persuasive 
discourse, and have a temporal dimension. The British Social Attitudes Survey has been 
tracking and assessing attitudes to the welfare state and its recipients since 1983 with 
increasing negative responses identified over the decades (Baumberg et al., 2012). This 
section will present the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) questions most relevant to 
exploring the attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants to analyse trends towards 
welfare claimants over time.  
 
Firstly, general opinions about the value of benefits for unemployed people have changed 
markedly since the early 1980s (Figure 3.7). When the British Social Attitudes Survey first 
explored attitudes towards the value of unemployment benefits in 1983, 49% thought that 
benefits were too low and caused hardship compared to 37% believing that they were too 
high and discouraged people from finding a job. As shown by Figure 3.7. below, attitudes 
started to change around 1997, and from 2001 onwards those who believe benefits are too 
high has remained the most dominant response. Notably however, those who believe that 
benefits are too high and discourage people from finding a job has decreased by 20 percent 














Figure 3.7. Public attitudes: Value of benefits 1983 – 2018. 
 
Source: BSAS 1983-2018.  
 
Analysis of the 2016 British Social Attitudes survey found that the British public believe tax 
avoidance is not unusual (de Vries and Reeves, 2017). Approximately a third of taxpayers are 
assumed to have exploited a tax loophole (de Vries and Reeves, 2017). In terms of legally 
avoiding paying tax, 48% of people believed that it is ‘usually or always wrong’, whereas more 
than 60% of people believe that it is ‘usually or always wrong’ for benefit recipients to use 
legal loopholes to claim more benefits (de Vries and Reeves, 2017). De Vries and Reeves 
(2017) argue that this discrepancy can be observed in the priorities of successive 
Conservative-led governments who have built their argument for austerity with entrenched 
negative attitudes towards benefit recipients. As Prime Minister and Chancellor, both David 
Cameron and George Osbourne repeatedly framed ‘hardworking people’ and benefit 
claimants in opposition to each other whilst promoting spending cuts (de Vries and Reeves, 
2017). Whilst there has been some discussion regarding addressing tax avoidance by the 
wealthy, little has been achieved, whereas changes to welfare legislation changes have been 
both fast and significant (de Vries and Reeves, 2017).  
 
Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another 
When the British Social Attitudes Survey first explored attitudes towards ‘most people on the 
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in agreement, as shown in Figure 3.8. below. In 1996, this attitude started to shift with 35% in 
agreement that most people are fiddling the dole compared to 32% in disagreement. This 
trend endured until 2015 when those in disagreement (34%) outweighed those who agreed 
for the first time since 1995. Since 2015 those in disagreement with this statement have 
continued to outweigh those in agreement.  
 
 Figure 3.8. Public Attitudes: Fiddling the dole 1987 – 2018.  
 
Source: BSAS 1987-2018 
 
Figure 3.9. explores responses to ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’ 
by using conditional formatting. This analyses the data in more detail showing trends in 
attitudes by age over time. The colours depict the mean for each age and year, with red 
being the most punitive responses, green the least punitive and yellow showing middle 
values. Importantly, green does not necessarily mean those in disagreement, but rather less 
punitive responses compared to the other values. The highest value (least punitive mean 
score) is 3.80 and the lowest value (the most punitive mean score) is 2. These scores range 
from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). The table shows that until the mid-1990s, 
punitive attitudes generally increased with age. From the mid-1990s onwards, it appears to 
be the mid-age groups, those in their mid-40s, who appear to hold less punitive views than 
both younger and older age groups, shown by the green and yellow shading. Additionally, 
younger age groups appear to have become more likely to believe that people on benefits 
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increase in redder shading. Although, punitive views towards those who are believed to be 
‘fiddling’ appear to have lessened for most age groups in recent years as shown by the 
increase in green shades.   
 
Figure 3.9. Conditional Formatting: Most people on the dole are fiddling, 1987 to 2018 by age 
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Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help 
The British Social Attitudes Survey has tracked responses to ‘Many people who get social 
security don’t really deserve any help’ since 1987. In 2012, Turn2Us, a national charity aiming 
to help people in financial hardship access welfare benefits, alternative financial support, and 
support services, commissioned research to assess the impact of stigma and other social 
influences on applying for benefits (Baumberg et al., 2012). The research used data from an 
original Ipsos MORI survey, focus groups with claimants and non-claimants, re-analysis of 
existing survey data and analysis of national newspaper articles about benefits from 1995 to 
2011. They found that benefits stigma, that is claiming benefits leads to embarrassment and 
shame and results in a lower social status, is driven primarily by whether claimants are seen 
as ‘undeserving’ (Baumberg et al., 2012:3). People viewed claimants as ‘deserving’ if need 
was evident along with claimants showing a level of personal responsibility for their own 
situation (Baumberg et al., 2012:3). Baumberg et al. (2012) suggest that political attitudes, 
possibly linked to media coverage, influence whether people are viewed as deserving or 
undeserving. The study found that the public viewed claimants as less deserving than they 
did 20 years previously, and the public are more likely to say that claimants don’t deserve 
help and that people in need are lazy. McKay (2014) suggests that the UK is significantly more 
hostile to benefit recipients than many other European country. The European Social Survey 
in 2008 asked people from 29 countries whether they agreed or disagreed that social benefits 
and services make people lazy. The UK, closely followed by Ireland, had the most negative 
attitudes with over 60% of respondents believing that benefits make people lazy (McKay, 
2014).  
 
Figure 3.10. below shows a very similar trend to the question analysed in Figure 3.8. When 
the question was first posed in 1987, the majority were in disagreement (45%) that ‘many 
people who get social security don’t really deserve any help’ compared to those in 
agreement (31%). This remained the case, albeit with a decreasing amount of support, until 
2002, when those believing that those who receive social security are undeserving became 
the dominant response (37% in agreement compared to 32% in disagreement). This generally 
remained the case, except for a brief attitudinal shift in 2006, until 2015 when those in 




Figure 3.10. Public attitudes: Social security claimants don’t deserve help 1987 – 2018. 
  
Source: BSAS 1987-2018 
 
Again, Figure 3.11. uses conditional formatting to analyse attitudinal trends in age over time 
towards those believing that social security claimants don’t deserve any help. The highest 
value (least punitive mean score) is 3.91 and the lowest value (the most punitive mean score) 
is 2. These scores range from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). Until the mid-1990s, 
attitudes towards welfare claimants hardened with age, with the youngest age groups being 
more lenient than the older age groups. Attitudes began to shift in the early 2000s with the 
youngest and oldest ages appear to hold more punitive views than those in their mid-40s, 
although this is less pronounced than for ‘fiddling’ the dole (see Figure 3.9.). Again, punitive 
attitudes have decreased over recent years, as shown by influx of greener shades over most 
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   Figure 3.11. Conditional Formatting: Many people who get social security don't really deserve   
   help, 1987 to 2018 by age 
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This chapter began by reviewing the history of responses to disadvantaged people. 
Contemporary responses show an increase over time in legislation that has increased 
conditionality, responsibility and sanctions for benefit recipients. These sanctions have 
resulted in negative outcomes for some claimants increasing financial difficulties, hardship 
and resorting to ‘survival crime’. The chapter then sought to explore political discourse 
towards welfare claimants over time, which shows that since the early 1980s negative 
descriptors and depictions of welfare claimants have become embedded in modern day 
politics, regardless of the party in government. Finally, trends in public attitudes were 
presented drawing on British Social Attitudes survey data from the 1980s.This generally shows 
a hardening of attitudes over time, although in the last few years these attitudes have started 
to soften. It appears that over time, it is the younger and older age groups that are less 
supportive of welfare claimants, with those around their mid-40s holding less punitive views. 
Punitiveness towards welfare claimants has been channelled through policies, which have 
increased the use of sanctions for those who break the rules. This punitiveness is also 
apparent in public attitudes towards welfare claimants suggesting that politics and policy may 
influence how the public form their attitudes. While there are long-term repeated measures 
of social attitudes towards those who claim welfare support, there are no survey questions 
currently that measure punitiveness as proposed by this study. The next subchapter will now 














Chapter 3.3. The long-term trajectories of punitiveness towards rulebreakers in the 
education system: Government policies, political discourse, and public sentiment  
 
3.3.1. Introduction  
Concerns about ‘standards’, ‘accountability’ and ‘control of education’ became important 
political issues in the 1970s given prominence by circumstances in the William Tyndale Junior 
and Infant School in North London between 1973 and 1975 (Demaine, 2002:7). The school 
was criticized for its progressive didactic approach giving pupils the freedom to choose when 
to work and play and was accused of denying its pupils academic progress (Davis, 2002). The 
coverage of the events at William Tyndale School gave rise to concerns that the government 
had lost control of education (Demaine, 2002). James Callaghan’s speech as Prime Minister at 
Ruskin College in 1976 (see Callaghan, 1977:11) called for a discussion about ‘the purpose’ 
and ‘standards’ of education in public schools and has been cited as setting the context for 
subsequent reforms (Demaine, 2002; Gibb, 2016).  Whilst the central government had 
ultimate control over education, the Education Act (1944) had given Local Education 
Authorities much of the responsibility for managing schools (Demaine, 2002). The Taylor 
Report, A New Partnership for Our Schools (1977) commissioned by the Labour Party, sought 
to increase the means by which schools could be made accountable for their actions and set 
the context for subsequent reforms made by the Conservative Party when they arrived in 
office (Demaine, 2002). Since the 1980s, the education system been criticised by government 
for a range of social problems (Dorey, 2014). Government discourse, commencing in the 
early 1980s, has consistently focused on the failings of education, which has enabled 
extensive policy reforms driven by market principles to be implemented (Dorey, 2014). This 
chapter reviews political discourse, government policies, and trends in public attitudes since 
the 1980s, arguing that over time each of these areas has become increasingly punitive 
towards rulebreaking school pupils.  
 
3.3.2. The Corporal Punishment Debate 
Since the 1980s, the education system has been criticised by government for a range of social 
problems, such as anti-social behaviour, excessive liberalness and growing truancy, which has 
involved a political rhetoric of teachers ‘failing pupils’ by being incapable of maintaining 
classroom discipline (Dorey, 2014:109). Government discourse, which commenced during the 
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1980s, focused on the failings of education enabling the implementation of extensive policy 
reforms driven by market principles and managerial authority over professionals (Dorey, 
2014). Since the 1980s, teacher’s authority has been frequently undermined by politicians 
who have often commented that bad behaviour is the fault of poor teaching skills (Dorey, 
2014). Dunn (2007) notes that during New Labour’s second term ‘anti-social behaviour’ was 
imported from the criminal justice system in educational discourses.  
 
Punishment is a central strategy commonly used for disciplining school pupils’ poor 
behaviour in the British education system (Gov.uk, 2018) evident throughout history  
(Parker-Jenkins, 1999). Government discourse placing emphasis on punishment and discipline 
is commonplace (Gov.uk, 2018; Conservative Manifesto, 2010). Corporal punishment, ‘the 
intentional application of physical pain as a method of changing behaviour’ (Greydanus et al., 
2003:385), has a long history dating back to ancient civilizations in Rome where prisoners and 
slaves were flogged (Garrisi, 2015). Physical punishments in the UK, such as flogging, were 
used for hundreds of years to punish criminals, soldiers and children (Lambert, 2016; 
Middleton, 2008). Flogging was legalized by the Mutiny Act 1689 as a form of military 
punishment in the 17th Century, and ‘whippings’ and ‘a thousand lashes’ were common 
punishments throughout the 17th and 18th Century (Garrisi, 2015). However, these types of 
physical punishments were abolished for all members of society in the 19th Century, apart 
from for school children (Lambert, 2016).  
 
Historically, the physical punishment of children by their parents was a disciplinary tool 
transferred to teachers in both private and state education (Parker-Jenkins, 1999). Corporal 
punishment was a key punishment used to regulate pupil behaviour, which could involve 
‘hitting, spanking, shoving’ and the use of objects, such as, belts and sticks (Greydanus et al., 
2003:385). Corporal punishment had a lengthy history as a much-valued element of the 
educational process encouraging children to behave at school and motivate them in their 
studies (Middleton, 2008). Whilst children in England and Wales were generally punished 
with a cane or belt, in Scotland the tawse, a leather whip with the end split into two tails, was 
used to physically punish children (Middleton, 2008). The use of corporal punishment in 
schools was challenged in 1982 when two Scottish mothers took their case to the European 
Court of Human Rights (see Campbell and Cosans v. The United Kingdom (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 
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293), which supported their view that ‘beating children against a parent’s wishes was a 
violation of their human rights (Bainham, 1999). This case lay the foundations for the change 
in law in the UK (Gould, 2007) whereby corporal punishment was legislated against in 1987 
(see Education Act, 1986).  
 
The Conservative government responded to the judgement by the European Court of Human 
Rights by proposing the Education (Corporal Punishment) Bill 1985, which would allow pupils 
to be the subject of corporal punishment if parents agreed to it (HC Deb 28 January 1985). 
The Conservative government’s Secretary of State for Education and Science, Sir Keith 
Joseph, opposed ‘forcing abolition’ of corporal punishment in schools, and cited a newspaper 
poll in England and Wales of teachers where more than half were in favour of its retention 
(HC Deb 28 January 1985). The Conservative government’s argument also highlighted the 
European Court of Human Right’s judgement that the issue at hand was not the banning of 
corporal punishment, but the parental right to exempt their child from such punishment (HC 
Deb 28 January 1985). Despite these protests, this proposed Bill was not supported in 
Parliament in 1985 with 298 votes against it (168 in favour) (HC Deb 28 January 1985). In July 
1986, corporal punishment in state schools was voted against in Parliament with a vote of 
231 (230 in favour) and was legislated against in the UK in 1986 (see Education Act, 1986) 
(Gould, 2007) with the use of corporal punishment in state schools becoming illegal in 1987 
(Institute of Education, 1989). 
 
The idea of the power to physically punish school children for misbehaviour was not 
forgotten, however. The fear of violence of young people, which was prominent following the 
murder of two-year-old James Bulger by two ten-year olds, re-emerged in 1997 with the 
murder of Headteacher Phillip Lawrence by a school pupil (Reed, 2003). The matter of 
corporal punishment subsequently arose again in the Houses of Parliament in January 1997 
with a proposed amendment (Clause 5) to the Education Bill: ‘Corporal Punishment Lawful 
with Parental Consent’ (HC Deb 28 January 1997). Clause 5 was a proposal to provide an 
alternative to a fixed term school exclusion, giving the parent a choice of opting for corporal 
punishment instead of the exclusion (HC Deb 28 January 1997). Mr James Pawsey, a 
Conservative MP, reported a headmaster’s belief that having caned ‘young thugs at the right 
time’ he had saved ‘four or five of them from a life of crime’ (HC Deb 28 January 1997). Mr 
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Pawsey also emphasized the need for ‘reasonable punishment’ to control the ‘degree of 
disruption that is taking place’ in schools (HC Deb 28 January 1997). Conservative MP, John 
Carlisle, added to the debate suggesting that ‘a short, sharp shock type of treatment’ is 
needed and ‘punishment requires physical pain’ (HC Deb 28 January 1997). Once again, 
despite these protests, the amendment was voted against by 376 (101 in favour) (HC Deb 28 
January 1997).  
 
The right of professionals to physically restrain ‘problematic’ children is however still 
prevalent in Youth Offender Institutions (YOI) (Allison and Hattenstone, 2016). In 2015, there 
were approximately 850 children (under 18s) in custody in England and Wales with 429 
injuries occurring as a result of restraint (Allison and Hattenstone, 2016). A Ministry of Justice 
report in 2016 found that some authorized restraint techniques had the potential to kill or 
disable children (Allison and Hattenstone, 2016). The Youth Detention: Solitary confinement 
and restraint report, commissioned by the House of Commons and undertaken by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights in 2018, recommended that the ‘pain-induced’ restraints that 
continue to be permissible in YOIs should be prohibited (House of Commons, 2019a). The 
Government Response stated its intention to review and monitor the levels of restraint used 
in YOIs, upskill staff and noted that it should be used only in exceptional circumstances 
(House of Commons, 2019b).     
 
3.3.3. History of Responses to Rulebreaking School Children: key education policies  
The reform of secondary education moved towards the top of the Conservative’s policy 
agenda during the mid-to late 1980s (Dorey, 2014). Since the late 1980s, secondary 
education has experienced ongoing neo-liberal reforms aiming to improve inefficient public 
services (Dorey, 2014). This neo-liberal stance was initially advocated by the New Right and 
subsequently embraced by New Labour (Dorey, 2014). The market principles of the private 
sector have been instilled into the education system giving choice to parents and increasing 
competition between schools based on exam results (Dorey, 2014). The education system in 
Scotland differs from that in England and Wales with the Scottish Government having full 
political responsibility for Scottish education (Tes, 2019) since devolution in 1999 (Cairney, 
2011). Education policy in Scotland in the 1980s introduced reforms to the curriculum and 
assessment in state schools, which resulted in performance management and continue to 
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influence current debates in educational policy today (Arnott, 2011). These Acts and reforms 
introduced national testing, market principles, target setting and parental choice to the 
educational system in Scotland (Croxford and Cowie, 2005). The following section will provide 
an overview of key education policies relevant to school indiscipline, in addition to outlining 
some consequences of certain policies for those pupils who break school rules.    
  
The Education Act 1980 
The Conservative Party’s first response to the Taylor Report, A New Partnership for Our 
Schools (1977) commissioned by the Labour Party, was the Education Act 1980. The 1980 Act 
implemented changes to the governance of schools following the recommendations of the 
Report (Poster et al., 1999; Demaine, 2002) aiming to give parents the rights to choose their 
children’s schools (Stillman, 1986). However, education was not yet a priority for the 
Conservative government and it was subsequent policy reforms that had a more substantial 
impact (Dorey, 2014). 
 
The Education (Scotland) Act 1981 
The Education (Scotland) Act 1981 introduced parental choice into the education system 
giving parents the right to request that their child attend a particular school (Arnott, 2011).     
 
The Education Act 1986 
Children have always been removed from school for poor behaviour, either temporarily or 
permanently, however, when ‘exclusion’ was introduced in the Education (No 2) Act 1986, it 
became the focus of professionals, researchers and policy makers as a key indicator of 
educational and social problems (Berridge et al., 2001:2). The 1986 Act introduced 
permanent, fixed-term and indefinite exclusion, the latter being abolished by the Education 
Act 1993 (Berridge et al., 2001). Indefinite exclusion was often criticized as leaving many 
children without an adequate education whereby school children often received only the 
minimum three hours home tuition per week (Gordon, 2001). Temporary exclusions, 
otherwise referred to as suspensions, allow the exclusion of a pupil for a specific period, 
whilst permanent exclusion, also known as expulsions, bar pupils from school and removes 




The Education Reform Act 1988 
Education policies by Conservative Administrations prior to the 1988 Act were 
‘incrementalist’ (McVicar, 1990:133). The 1988 Education Reform Act radically transformed 
education in the UK (Hay and Farrall, 2014; McVicar, 1990). Education policy departed from 
the previous bipartisan approach, and introduced ‘hard right’ thinking, which dominated the 
Conservatives’ approach to schooling (Hay and Farrall, 2014:18). In England and Wales, the 
main provisions of the 1988 Act were grounded in neo-liberalism promoting the 
‘marketisation of education’ (Dorey, 2014:113). The 1988 Act enacted the transfer of school 
management from local education authorities to school governing bodies, established the 
National Curriculum and allowed parents to choose which school to send their child to 
through open enrolment (Dorey, 2014). The establishment of the National Curriculum 
allowed for comparisons and competition between schools, which was subsequently 
consolidated by John Major’s Conservative administration through the establishment of the 
Office of Standards in Education (Ofsted) and league tables (Dorey, 2014). Ofsted was 
enacted in the 1992 Education (Schools) Act by John Major’s government to externally audit 
schools and teachers (Dorey, 2014). The Education Reform Act 1992 introduced league 
tables, which encouraged schools to exclude disruptive pupils resulting in a sharp increase in 
school exclusions during the subsequent decade (Farrall and Hay, 2014).  
 
The Schools Board (Scotland) Act 1988; The Self-Governing Schools etc (Scotland) Act 1989 
Education policy in Scotland became more notable following the 1987 General Election, 
which introduced ‘competitive individualism’ into the education system (Arnott, 2011: 194). 
The Schools Board (Scotland) Act 1988 increased parental powers over teachers and 
education authorities. The Self-Governing Schools etc (Scotland) Act 1989 introduced 
competition into the state sector, giving schools the choice to adopt self-governing status or 
to opt out of local authority control (Arnott, 2011). The intention was that schools would be 
influenced by market forces through parents moving away from the established 
comprehensive system towards a more selective system (Arnott, 2011). The 1989 Act also 
allowed private companies to manage Further Education colleges and introduced testing in 
primary schools (Arnott, 2011). However, the 1988 and 1989 Acts mostly failed to gain 
parents’ support (Arnott, 2011). Parents seemed to welcome the introduction of school 
boards but seemed unwilling to challenge the role of professionals in teaching their children 
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(Arnott, 2011). The compulsory testing of primary school children was also met with 
significant resistance and criticism from parents, educational professionals and local 
authorities (Arnott, 2011). Some local authorities allowed parents to withdraw their children 
from testing, which resulted in only 30% of pupils tested in the first year of compulsory 
testing (Arnott, 2011).  
 
The Education Act 1993 
The White Paper, Choice and Diversity: A New Framework for Schools, formed the basis of the 
1993 Education Act under Prime Minister, John Major (Dorey, 2014). The 1993 Act 
established ‘Education Associations’ to investigate ‘failing’ schools with the power to 
determine the future management of the school including whether it could be closed (Dorey, 
2014). The 1993 Act consolidated the objectives of the former Education Act increasing 
parental choice, promoting inter-school competition, raising academic standards, reducing 
the role of local education authorities and increasing the managerialism in secondary 
education in Britain (Dorey, 2014). Thus, deepening the neo-liberal ideals of marketisation 
and managerialism in school (Dorey, 2014). The 1993 Act also introduced a limit of 15 days at 
any one time for fixed term exclusions (Berridge et al., 2001). 
 
Education Policies under New Labour 1997 - 2010 
In contrast to the previous Conservative government, New Labour dramatically increased 
investment in schools, particularly for teachers’ pay, teaching assistants, training and ICT 
infrastructure (Whitty, 2009). However, New Labour also retained and expanded neo-liberal 
education policies (Whitty, 2009), promoting market principles, individual choice, 
competition (Lupton and Obolenskaya, 2013), incentives, performance indicators, results and 
targets (Dorey, 2014).   
 
One of New Labour’s early education targets was to reduce the number of school exclusions 
that had risen markedly under the previous Conservative government (Lupton and 
Obolenskaya, 2013). A substantial decrease in the number of permanent exclusions was 
evident throughout New Labour’s period in office (Ogg and Kaill, 2000), decreasing from just 
over 12,000 permanent exclusions in 1997/98 to just under 6,000 by 2009/10 (Daniels et al., 
2003; DfE, 2011), although this decrease was not linear (see Figure 3.3.1.). Instead, schools 
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were encouraged to use Pupil Referral Units (introduced by The Education Act 1996), 
alternative provision, and set up internal exclusion units (Ogg and Kaill, 2000). The 
subsequent negative repercussions of this increase in use of alternative educational provision 
is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.4.    
 
The Education Act 1997 
Following concerns about violence amongst young people (Reed, 2003) and the attempts by 
some MPs to reintroduce corporal punishment in school (HC Deb 28 January 1997), New 
Labour enacted the Conservative’s 1997 Education Act, which introduced measures to target 
these concerns (Reed, 2003). Some of these measures included increasing the length of a 
temporary exclusion to 45 days, allowing school detentions without parental consent and 
giving teachers the right to physical restrain pupils in certain circumstances (Reed, 2003).  
 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998  
The main aim of the 1998 Act was to ‘prevent offending by children’ (Riley, 2007:225) and 
established the Youth Justice Board and Youth Offending Teams to manage young offenders 
(Byrne and Brooks, 2015). The 1998 Act introduced ‘anti-social behaviour’ into legislation, 
defined as ‘a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one 
or more persons not of the same household as himself’ (Riley, 2007:221). The 1998 Act also 
introduced parenting orders placing the emphasis on parents to control their child’s 
behaviour and were managed by the Youth Offending Team (Riley, 2007).  
 
The Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 
The 2003 Act amended the availability of flexibility of parenting orders, placing greater 
emphasis on the responsibility on parents for their child’s behaviour (Riley, 2007). Section 19 
of the 2003 Act, the LEA or governing body were permitted to initiate a parenting contract 
with a parent of a pupil who was excluded temporarily, permanently, on disciplinary grounds 
or for truancy (Riley, 2007). This contract was managed by the Youth Offending Team (Riley, 
2007). A parenting contract was introduced to instruct parents to attend counselling to help 
them to manage their child’s behaviour or to instruct them to control their child’s behaviour 




3.3.4. Trends in the Number of Exclusions 
During the general election in 2010, the Conservative government pledged to raise standards 
in schools by giving ‘heads and teachers tough new powers of discipline’ (Conservative 
Manifesto, 2010:51). Each school should have a transparent school behaviour policy detailing 
the rules of conduct for pupils (Gov.uk, 2018). Government guidance for discipline measures 
states that ‘schools can punish pupils if they behave badly’, which may include being told off, 
removal from the classroom or detentions (schools are not obligated to give notice to 
parents or inform them why a detention is administered) (Gov.uk, 2018). Exclusions signify 
the end of the disciplinary process by removing the child from the school. The guidance 
specifies that schools are allowed to exclude pupils if they misbehave inside or outside of 
school. For the first five days of an exclusion parents may be prosecuted if their child is found 
in a public place during the normal school hours without good reason. The guidance also 
highlights that permanent exclusions should be used as a last resort.  
 
Exclusion, defined as ‘the expulsion or suspension of a student from school’ (Gordon 
2001:70), was introduced by the Education Acts 1986 (no.2) and more recently governed by 
the Education Act 2002 in England and Wales (with the exception of independent schools or 
sixth form colleges), as amended by the Education Act 2011 (DfE, 2017a). School exclusions in 
Scotland are governed by the Schools General (Scotland) Regulations 1975, the Schools 
General (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1982 with the power to exclude a pupil resting 
with the local authority (Scottish Government, 2017b. Section 52(4) of the Education Act 
2002 governs those making decisions about school exclusions and is based on the following 
legal framework:  
 
• A fixed period exclusion where the pupil is temporarily removed from school for a 
maximum of 45 days per school year (even if they have moved schools); and, 
• Permanent exclusion where the pupil is removed from school on a permanent basis 
(expelled). 
 
Statutory guidance released in 2012 (DfE, 2012:6) states that the use of exclusions should be 
limited to a serious breach, or persistent breaches, of the schools behaviour policy, and, 
where allowing the pupil to remain in a school would seriously harm the education or welfare 
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of the pupil or others in the school. Following the decision to temporarily or permanently 
exclude a child there are a number of options available to the headteacher and governing 
body via official and unofficial exclusions (Gill et al., 2017). Official exclusions can include 
both non-permanent and permanent exclusions and are recorded with local or central 
government, whereas unofficial exclusions are not recorded in the national data as exclusions 
(Gill et al., 2017). Unofficial exclusions include managed moves to another school, a move 
into off-site alternative provision, or illegal exclusions (encouraging parents to home school 
their child or to move their child independently to another school) (Gill et al., 2017). More 
recently, there has been some movement towards restorative justice in some schools to deal 
with indiscipline (HCRP, 2019). Restorative justice has resulted in a substantial reduction 
(80%) in school exclusions across the city of Hull (HCRP, 2019).  
 
There are considerable differences between the rate of school exclusions across the four 
jurisdictions of the UK with the majority of permanent exclusions occurring in England 
(McCluskey et al., 2019). McCluskey et al. (2019) suggest that the tone of government 
documents is more punitive in England focusing on punishments, the use of isolation and 
seclusion, and powers to search without consent. In contrast, the tone of the equivalent 
guidance in Scotland, and to a lesser extent in the Welsh guidance, focusses on early 
intervention to reduce the need for exclusion (McCluskey et al., 2019). The Scottish and 
Welsh guidance sets out a framework of staged intervention and multi-agency partnerships 
and is founded on the principle of prevention (McCluskey et al., 2019).      
 
England 
The introduction of league tables by the Education Reform Act 1992 was followed by a sharp 
increase in school exclusions (Figure 3.12.) (Farrall and Hay, 2014). Recorded permanent 
exclusions quadrupled from 2,900 in 1990-91, when recording of exclusions started, to a 
peak of 12,665 in 1996-97, with small yearly reductions between 1997-2000 (Daniels et al., 
2003). This reduction may be due to some headteachers using means of unofficial exclusions 
to attempt to meet national targets and avoid financial penalties (Daniels et al., 2003). 
Permanent exclusion figures continue to be problematic and have increased by 40% over the 
past 3 years reaching 6,685 exclusions in 2016 (Gill et al., 2017). This figure equates to 35 
exclusions per day of the most disadvantaged children in society (Gill et al., 2017). In 2016/17 
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the excluded number of school children equated to approximately .10% of the total school 
population (DfE, 2018). 
 
Figure 3.12. Permanent Exclusions in England 1990/91 to 2016/17 
 
Source: Daniels et al. (2003); DfE (2011); DfE (2018) 
 
However, Gill et al. (2017) suggest that 2017 Census data shows that the official figures are 
hugely underestimated with approximately 48,000 children being removed from mainstream 
schools, equating to 1 in 200 children (Gill et al., 2017). This figure comprises of the following: 
• 15,669 pupils were registered in Pupil Referral Units (PRUs). 
• 10,152 pupils had dual registration in PRUs and mainstream education. 
• 22,212 pupils were registered in Alternative Provisions paid for by the local authority 
(non-maintained provision, such as, one-to-one tutoring and hospital schools (Gill et 
al., 2017). 
 
Attendance at PRUs was not intended to be permanent, however, many pupils spend 
significant parts of their school lives in PRUs (Sheehy, 2015). Between 1999 and 2009 the 
number of pupils who attended PRUs doubled to 15,370, spread across 450 PRUs, becoming 
the most common form of alternative provision (Sheehy, 2015). Encouraging parents to 
choose to home school their children or managing moves between schools are also a means 
of excluding pupils from schools but are not shown in the official figures (Weale, 2017). The 










































































































































provision (Gill et al., 2017). In 2011/12, approximately 15,000 children were home-schooled 
doubling by 2016/17 to approximately 30,000 (Gill et al., 2017). 
 
‘Off-rolling’ has been the focus of growing concerns in recent years (Hutchinson and  
Crenna-Jennings, 2019). Off-rolling is defined by Ofsted as, 
 
‘the practice of removing a pupil from the school roll without formal, permanent 
exclusion or by encouraging a parent to remove a child from the school roll, when the 
removal is primarily in the interest of the school rather than in the best interest of the 
pupil.’ (Hutchinson and Crenna-Jennings, 2019:6). 
 
Possible motivations for such practices have been noted as improving exams results by 
removing certain pupils from school rolls so that their results are not included in the school’s 
GCSE results, and managing financial pressures (Hutchinson and Crenna-Jennings, 2019). In 
contrast to formal school exclusions, schools are not required to record the reasons why a 
pupil is removed from a school roll making it difficult to ascertain the reason why removals 
have taken place (Hutchinson and Crenna-Jennings, 2019). Hutchinson and Crenna-Jennings 
(2019) analysed exits from secondary schools using longitudinal data on three different 
cohorts of approximately 600,000 pupils taking their GCSEs in 2011, 2014 and 2017. They 
found that unexplained exits accounted for 47,225 exits in 2011, 49,051 in 2014 and 55,309 
in 2017 accounting for 7.8 per cent of pupils in the 2011 cohort, 7.2 percent in the 2014 
cohort and 8.1 per cent in the 2017 cohort. Hutchinson and  
Crenna-Jennings’ (2019) analysis suggests that pupils most likely to experience ‘unexplained 
moves’, that is those circumstances in which removals are not consistently recorded or 
regulated, are those pupils who have a high number of authorized absences. One in three 
were in contact with the social care system, one in three had experienced an official 
permanent exclusion, one in five had experienced a non-permanent exclusion, one in seven 
were eligible for free school meals, one in eight from black ethnic backgrounds, and one in 
eight were in the lowest prior attainment quartile.  
 
The Timpson Review found that a minority of schools were using off-rolling, which can lead to 
children leaving education altogether and exposed to potential safeguarding risks (Timpson, 
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2019). The review found that Bangladeshi and Indian children are around half as likely to be 
excluded as White British children, whilst Black Caribbean and Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean pupils are more likely to experience exclusion. Seventy-eight percent of 
permanent exclusions were issues to pupils who either had SEN, were classified in need or 
were eligible for free school meals, with 11% of permanent exclusions issues to pupils who 
had all three characteristics. The Timpson Review notes a potential driver for off-rolling may 
be the incentivization driven by the current performance and funding system, which does not 
reward schools for taking responsibility for complex needs of school pupils.  
 
Wales and Scotland 
The percentage of school exclusions in Wales from all schools in 2016/17 equated to .4% of 
the school population (Welsh Government, 2018). Whilst the numbers of permanently 
excluded children is relatively low, there has been a notable increase in the last five years 
(Figure 3.13.) (McCluskey et al., 2019).   
 
Figure 3.13. Permanent exclusions in Wales 2012/13 to 2016/17 
 
Source: Welsh Government (2018) 
 
Permanent exclusions in Scotland are referred to as ‘removal from register’ with the pupil 
being educated at another school or by some other form of provision (National Statistics, 
2016). The local authority has the power to exclude pupils in Scotland (Scottish Government, 
2011) and are allowed to reach an agreement with parents to remove their child from a 
school without using the formal procedure of removal from register (National Statistics, 















2016/2017 (National Statistics, 2016). The decline in school exclusions is attributed to the 
Included, Engaged and Involved Guidance, a policy aligning with a national, long-term 
strategy on prevention and early intervention (Figure 3.14.) (Scottish Government, 2017b). 
The policy aims to assist staff to build positive relationships with school pupils and those at 
risk of exclusion (McClusky et al., 2019).  
 
Figure 3.14. Permanent Exclusions in Scotland 2002/03 to 2016/17 
 
Source: Scottish Government (2018) 
 
Reasons for Exclusions in Britain 
Whilst classifying behaviour is difficult and achieving consistency between teachers and 
schools cannot be guaranteed, Figure 3.15. and Figure 3.16. below give an indication of the 
types of behaviour that lead to exclusions (Berridge, 2001). Different terms are used to 
classify those pupils who are excluded from school on a temporary basis for challenging 
behaviours across UK jurisdictions; ‘fixed period’ is used in England, ‘fixed term’ in Wales, and 
‘temporary exclusion’ in Scotland, although they all refer to the response of schools to 
challenging behaviour by removing a child from school for a period of time (McCluskey et al., 
2019). The data in Scotland is recorded differently to England and Wales with Scottish 
categories being more expansive than in England and Wales. An attempt has been made to 
reduce these categories to align somewhat with those in England and Wales for the purposes 
of presenting the data in both systems. There were 339,360 non-permanent exclusions in 
England and Wales in 2016/17 and 29,473 non-permanent exclusions in Scotland, and 6,685 
permanent exclusions in England and Wales and 4 ‘removals from the register’ or permanent 












Figure 3.15. Reasons for permanent and non-permanent exclusions in state-funded 
primary and secondary schools 2016 to 2017 – England and Wales 
 
  Source: DfE (2017b) 
 
Figure 3.16. Reasons for temporary exclusions in state-funded primary and secondary 
state schools 2016 to 2017 –  Scotland                             
 
Source: Scottish Government (2017a) 
 
Who are the permanently excluded children? 
Government official figures (DfE, 2017b) show that from 6,685 permanent exclusions in 
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increasing as children got older (reaching 620 at age 11). This figure increases significantly at 
age 12 (in secondary school) with 1,010 pupils permanently excluded and continues to rise 
significantly to 1,425 at age 13 and 1,715 at age 14, decreasing to 680 by age 15 with the 
majority (78%) being males (DfE, 2017b). Most pupils in PRUs are White British (70%), 
however, certain ethnic groups are disproportionately represented in these populations as 
outlined by Gill et al. (2017): 
 
• Black Caribbean pupils are educated in PRUs at nearly four times (3.9) the rate 
expected based on the proportion they make of the national pupil population. 
• Mixed ethnicity Black Caribbean and white pupils are also more than twice as likely 
(2.5) to be educated in a PRU. 
• Gypsy Roma heritage pupils appear in PRU populations at almost three times the 
expected rate (3.2). 
• Irish traveller heritage pupils at seventeen times the rate (16.5). 
 
 Excluding children has the potential to displace them from school into chaotic homes or risky 
neighbourhoods where they are more likely to become involved in crime, worsen their 
academic chances and reduce their employment prospects (Evans, 2010; Berridge et al., 
2001). Pupils excluded from schools are some of the most vulnerable children in society, 
being twice as likely to be in state care, four times as likely to have grown up in poverty, 
seven times more likely to have a special educational need and ten times more likely to 
experience a mental health problem (Gill et al., 2017). Risk factors include experience of 
poverty (4 times more likely to be excluded), unsafe family environment (3 times more likely 
to be excluded), special educational needs (7 times more likely to be excluded) and low prior 
attainment (15 times more likely to be excluded) (Gill et al., 2017). Adopted children are also 
more likely to be excluded than their peers (Adoption UK, 2017). Adoption UK (2017) 
surveyed 2,084 adopted children and found that nearly half of the children have special 
educational needs and disabilities (SEND) and were permanently excluded at a rate just over 
20 times that of the general pupil population. Additionally, they were five times more likely to 
receive a non-permanent exclusion than the general pupil population, and they are more 
likely to be excluded at younger ages differing from the national trend (Adoption UK, 2017).  
123 
 
What happens to excluded children? 
In the 2015/6 academic year in England, 5,510 (3.3%) of pupils received a permanent 
exclusion after being excluded for a non-permanent exclusion during the same academic year 
(DfE, 2017b). Negative outcomes such as unemployment, significant mental health problems 
and prison are more likely to be future experiences of excluded children (Gill et al., 2017). 
The National Education Union (NEU) has recently described increasing strict behaviour 
policies in England as ‘inhumane’ and ‘damaging to pupil mental health’ (Weale, 2019). The 
economic cost to society is also significant with each cohort of excluded children estimating 
to cost the state an extra £2.1 billion (of a 6,685 cohort) in health, benefits, criminal justice 
and education costs, or £370,000 per excluded child per lifetime (Gill et al., 2017). Outcomes 
for excluded pupils are poor with 1% of excluded children attaining the benchmark of the five 
good GCSEs required in order to access post-16 training and apprenticeships (Weale, 2017). 
Over half of those who spend time in prison have been excluded from school during their 
education (Weale, 2017).  
 
Table 3.2. The destination and costs of alternative provision for excluded pupils in England 
and Wales 
Costs of alternative 
education provision  
Cost per annum (£) 
 
Percentage of excluded 
children 
Pupil Referral Unit 14,664  57% 
College  2,623 7% 
Special school  26,225 2% 
Other  5,245 7% 
Mainstream school 4,355 15% 
Home/Alternative Education 24,996  6% 
No education  - 6% 
Source: Brookes et al. (2007:8) 
 
Amid increasing concerns regarding the number of children excluded from schools and the 
subsequent provision made accessible to them, a 2003 study conducted by Daniels et al. 
(2003) tracked 193 permanently excluded children in years 9 to 11 (ages 13 to 16) from 10 
Local Educations Authorities (LEA) (Daniels et al., 2003). The study found that approximately 
50% of children were engaged in education, training or employment 24 months after their 
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permanent exclusion. Important factors identified in order for these outcomes to be 
achieved were noted as the young person’s belief in their own abilities, ongoing support from 
skilled support staff following the exclusion, supportive family and friends who helped 
reintegrate the young person into the local community, and a feeling that the exclusion was 
unjust. 
 
Negative outcomes were linked to young peoples’ refusal to engage with services  
post-exclusion. Prior to their exclusions about 40% of the pupils were reported to have 
offended, approximately half had identified a SEN (most commonly emotional and 
behavioural difficulties with some learning difficulties), and permanent exclusion usually 
followed a long history of behavioural challenges at school. The study also found that those 
who offended prior to exclusion (2 in 5) also continued to offend post-exclusion, based on 
information from accounts from young people, parents and staff.   
 
The study found that LEA support and intervention was received by 144 out of 167 pupils. 
Following permanent exclusions, the study found that it took LEAs on average 3 months to 
find a first substantial alternative placement including PRUs (56%), attendance at another 
mainstream school (14.5%), and further education and alternative education programmes 
(6.5%). Two years following exclusion, the study continued to have contact with 73% of the 
sample and found,  
 
• Approximately 50% were engaged in education, training or employment. 
• As pupils neared school leaving age, engagement in all types of provision dropped. 
• Half viewed their exclusions as detrimental, and only 19% saw it as a positive event. 
• Those pupils who had received a higher number of non-permanent exclusions prior to 
permanent exclusion were more likely to be disengaged two years after exclusion. 
• Only 26 pupils (data from 91 pupils) were known to have passed one GCSE; one or 
more GCSE grade A-C were obtained by 17 pupils; those returning to mainstream 





After two years contact had been lost with 52 of the young people. From the remaining 141 
young people 24% were in Further Education, 12% in substantial employment, 11% in PRUs, 
11% in mainstream schools and 28% had no involvement with education, training or 
employment. The study found that 24 months post-exclusion 55% of the young people, 
where data was available, had definitely or were believed to have offended compared to 
approximately 40% reported to have offender prior to the exclusion. Most of those who had 
offended prior to exclusion continued to do so following their exclusion, and nearly one third 
were thought to have started offending post-exclusion.  
 
Berridge (2001) conducted a study to explore the extent permanent exclusions from school 
had an independent effect on the offending careers of 343 young people in six local 
authorities in England. The study analysed data from school and offending official records, 
along with interviews with 28 young people and a small group of parents. The study was 
retrospective with exclusions occurring between 1988 and 1998. The police held complete 
records for 263 of the young people and found the following: 
 
• 85 had no prior or post exclusion offending. 
• 117 had no prior offending but began offending post exclusion. 
• 47 offended prior and post exclusion. 
• 14 offended before but not after exclusion. 
• 13 started offending the same month they were permanently excluded. 
• At the point of interview, seven of the 28 interviewees were working; this tended to 
be short-term, poorly paid jobs with few prospects.  
• Five were attending FE college.  
• Twelve were unemployed. 
   
The study found that the young people suffered social and educational disadvantages, 
including sexual abuse, parental violence and homelessness. Additionally, they found that 
18% had been in the care of by local authorities, 47 % were entitled to free school meals, 
45% were known to Social Services, 20% were known to Youth Offending Teams, 8 of the 28 
interviewees had spent time in Young Offender Institutions or adult prisons, 44% had been 
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assessed for Special Educational Needs and 19% had a Statement of Special Educational 
Needs. Little difference was found between young people from ethnic minority background 
and those from a white background, with 62% of the former and 67% of the latter having 
offended at some point in their lives.  
 
3.3.5. Trends in Public Sentiment Towards School Pupils 
The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) has been tracking and assessing attitudes towards 
school children since 1986. When asked how much respondents agree or disagree with 
‘Schools should teach children to obey authority’ and ‘Young people today do not have 
enough respect for traditional values’ public support for both statements has remained 
consistently high over time. In 1986, 83% were in agreement that schools should teach 
children to obey authority (Figure 3.17.). Those in agreement remained largely stable over 
time until 2013 when the number in agreement started to decrease to 71% in 2018. Those 
that agree with the statement has remained at around 50% and it is the strongly agree 
category that has reduced from 32% in 1986 to 19% in 2018. There is a spike in those who 
are in agreement with the statement in 1993; it is likely that this is in a response to the 
murder of James Bulger in early 1993 as noted in Chapter 3.1 and the spike in attitudes 
towards offenders at this time (Jennings et al., 2017a). This spike in agreement is also seen in 
Figure 3.19. below in responses to young people today don’t have enough respect for 















Figure 3.17. Public attitudes: Teach children to obey authority, 1986 - 2018 
 
Source: BSAS 1986 to 2020 
 
Figure 3.18. below uses conditional formatting to analyse responses to ‘Schools should teach 
children to obey authority’ in more detail using the mean score per age for each year of the 
survey. The redder shades show more punitive responses, yellow shows medium scores and 
greener shades show less punitive responses. The green scores do not necessarily mean that 
these responses are lenient but rather that they are less punitive compared to the other 
scores. The highest value (least punitive mean score) is 2.84 and the lowest value (the most 
punitive mean score) is 1.13. These scores range from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly 
disagree). Until 1991 support for children obeying authority appears to increase with age, 
with the youngest age groups being lest supportive of this statement, shown by the green 
colours for the younger ages growing redder with age. This starts to change in 1993 and 
subsequent young people appear to have become more punitive (shown by the redder 
shadings) compared to earlier years. Older ages continue to be more punitive than younger 
ages shown by the greater dispersion of redder colours. In recent years, attitudes appear to 








































































































































Schools should teach children to obey authority
Agree/Strongly agree Disagree/Strongly disagree
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Figure 3.18. Conditional Formatting: Schools should teach children to obey authority, 1986 to 
2018 by age   
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Figure 3.19.  Public attitudes: Young people lack respect for traditional values, 1986 to 2020 
 
Source: BSAS 1986 to 2020 
 
Figure 3.19. also shows a high level of support for Young People today don't have enough 
respect for traditional values. In 1986, 67% were in agreement with the statement (25% 
agreed, 42% agreed). Following the same trend as Schools should teach children to obey 
authority, the agree category has remained largely stable over time and it is the strongly 
agree category which has reduced from 25% in 1986 to 14% in 2018 where 57% were in 
agreement with the statement. In contrast to the previous statement, support for the belief 
that young people do not have enough respect for traditional values reached a peak of 78% 
in agreement in 2007, which had been steadily increasing since 1994. This may have been 
due to the growing concerns around young people’s behaviour since the early 1990s (Reed, 
2003; HC Deb 28 January 1997).   
 
Figure 3.20. below uses conditional formatting to analyse responses to Young People today 
don't have enough respect for traditional values in more detail using the mean score per age 
for each year of the survey. As noted previously, the redder shades show more punitive 
responses, yellow shows medium scores and greener shades show less punitive responses. 
Green does not necessarily mean that these responses are lenient but rather that they are 
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Figure 3.20. Conditional Formatting: Young people today don't have enough respect for 
traditional values, 1986 to 2018 by age  
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These scores range from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree). The highest value (least 
punitive mean score) is 3.73 and the lowest value (the most punitive mean score) is 1.20.  
Figure 3.20. generally shows attitudes growing more punitive as people age, shown by the 
lines tracking ages over time. Between around 2004 onwards, younger ages also appear to 
have become more punitive shown by the increasing spread of redder colours in the younger 
age groups. Attitudes appear to have begun to soften over the last few years for all but the 
oldest age groups.  
 
3.3.6. Summary 
This chapter set out to explore government policies, political attitudes and trends in public 
attitudes since the 1980s. Since the early 1980s the education system has been blamed for a 
range of social problems with teachers being criticised for being unable to maintain 
discipline. Since this period, legislation has been enacted based on neo-liberal principles of 
competition and marketisation. The introduction of league tables and the national curriculum 
led to an increase in the number of school exclusions. Research shows that those excluded 
from school are much more likely to end up in the criminal justice system. Increasing concern 
about young people has been reflected in punitive policies, which have resulted in an 
increase in the use of punishments and exclusions, particularly in England. This punitiveness 
is also apparent in public attitudes towards school children. Exploring relevant BSAS survey 
questions since the 1980s, we observe that support for children obeying authority and the 
belief that young people do not respect traditional values enough remains generally high 
over time. What has changed however, is the age of those supportive of such beliefs; 
younger age groups, which were relatively less supportive of such beliefs when the questions 
were first fielded, appear to have become more supportive of such beliefs overtime. 
However, older ages continue to be more punitive than younger age groups with attitudes 
softening for all ages groups in recent years.  Additionally, support for such beliefs have been 
declining in recent years. While there are long-term repeated measures of social attitudes 
towards young people, there are no survey questions currently that measure punitiveness as 







Part Three: Researching Punitiveness 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter 4.1. The Role of Cognitive Interviewing: a literature review 
 
4.1.1. Introduction 
Part Two explored trends in punitiveness towards the three different groups of rulebreakers. 
This was done in three ways: firstly, the history of government policies relevant to a more 
punitive approach to rulebreakers was presented; secondly, political discourse towards 
rulebreakers was considered; thirdly, trends in public attitudes were analysed. In relation to 
criminal rulebreakers, concerns about an increasing prison population in the 1970s was 
accompanied by increasingly punitive measures to control it. Legislation took a punitive turn 
in the early 1990s contributing to a sharp increase in the prison population, which remains at 
high levels today. Law and order discourse was ramped up by Margaret Thatcher in her 
election campaign in 1979 and appears to have set the trend for subsequent political leaders 
to continue with a tough on crime discourse, which endures today. Finally, trends in public 
attitudes towards lawbreakers dating back to the early 1980s shows that support for stiffer 
sentences for lawbreakers remains high, whilst support for the death penalty appears to have 
decreased. Government policies towards welfare claimants have increased conditionality, 
responsibility and sanctions over time. These sanctions have resulted in negative outcomes 
for some claimants increasing financial difficulties, hardship and ‘survival crime’. Political 
discourse towards welfare claimants since the early 1980s suggests that negative descriptors 
and depictions of welfare claimants have become embedded in modern day politics, 
regardless of the party in government. Public attitudes towards welfare generally shows a 
hardening of attitudes since the 1980s, although in the last few years these attitudes have 
started to soften. It appears to be the younger and older age groups that are less supportive 
of welfare claimants, with those around their mid-40s holding less punitive views.  Lastly, 
legislation has been enacted based on neo-liberal principles of competition and 
marketisation in the education system. The introduction of league tables and the national 
curriculum led to an increase in the number of school exclusions with those excluded from 
school much more likely to end up in the criminal justice system. Public attitudes supportive 
of children obeying authority and respecting traditional values has generally remained high 
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over time. What has changed however, is the age of those supportive of such beliefs; 
younger age groups appear to have become more supportive of such beliefs overtime. 
Although, this appears to have softened for all ages in recent years.   
 
As noted at the beginning of this thesis, this study will use the BSAS survey questions to 
examine punitiveness towards law breakers, namely, People who break the law should be 
given stiffer sentences, and For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate 
sentence. While there are long-term repeated measures of social attitudes towards young 
people and welfare claimants, there are no survey questions currently that measure 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants as proposed by this 
study. As such, the focus of this thesis now turns to the development of survey questions to 
explore public punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants.  
 
This chapter will present a literature review of cognitive interviewing. Firstly, cognitive 
interviewing will be defined and outlined, before progressing to discuss the value of using 
cognitive interviewing in the design of new survey questions. The chapter will then detail the 
two main cognitive interviewing paradigms before presenting a discussion of some of the 
limitations of cognitive interviewing. The chapter will conclude by outlining some of the 
challenges of conducting web-based surveys relevant to this project.    
   
4.1.2. How Can Cognitive Interviewing Help Develop Survey Questions?  
 
‘Survey research rests on the age-old practice of finding things out by asking people 
questions’ (Tourangeau et al., 2000:1) 
 
A survey aims to systematically collect data asking questions by using a standardized 
questionnaire to quantitatively analyze the population of interest (Groves et al., 2009; 
Callegaro et al., 2015). Numerous factors influence the accuracy of the data collected by a 
survey including how well the sample represents the target population, how data is collected 
and how the data is processed through editing and coding (Collins, 2015a). Additionally, there 
is a danger of using the results of survey data to present public opinions as conclusive 
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(Bishop, 2004) reducing complex attitudes into single responses and measures (Dommett and 
Pearce, 2019) and neglecting the prospect that people’s opinions may not be stable and  
well-informed (Zaller and Feldman, 1992).  
 
Surveys are frequently carried out assuming that respondents fully understand the questions 
as intended by the researchers, and as such, it is also assumed that respondents are able to 
answer these questions appropriately (Conrad and Blair, 2009). However, different words 
vary in meaning between people, which impacts on how questions are answered (Farrall et 
al., 1997). Additionally, discrepancies can arise between the respondents’ and the 
interviewers’ interpretations of the questions (Priede and Farrall, 2010). Surveys attempt to 
access accurate answers, facts and opinions, however the generation of answers and 
accessing these answers is complex (Tourangeau et al., 2000). Errors can arise during the 
data collection process when asking people questions, therefore standardising tools and 
procedures relating to the questionnaire during this process allows differences between 
participants to be observed more accurately (Collins, 2015a). Standardisation, in the design 
and administration of the questionnaire, does not necessarily result in reliable, unbiased and 
valid data, however (Fowler, 1995). Respondents may not understand the question being 
asked or may not understand in the way intended by the researcher (Collins, 2015a). This 
section will outline the processes undertaken in the design of the new survey questions for 
this study in attempting to reduce the potential effects of some of these issues.   
 
Tourangeau et al. (2000) suggest that seeking accuracy in attitude questions is inherently 
more complex than with factual questions. Attitudes involve ‘existing evaluations, vague 
impressions, general values, and relevant feelings and beliefs’, and when a subject is 
considered, parts, or all, of these aspects are accessed (Tourangeau et al., 2000:194-5). On 
consideration of a particular topic, answers consist of simply reiterating an existing 
evaluation, updating it, extending it or making a new judgement (Tourangeau et al., 2000). 
Dependent on the context, the information processed can be linked to motivations and 
strategic decisions, for example, the desire to reach defensible conclusions (Tourangeau et 
al., 2000). Judgements can be made through the existence of consistent beliefs regarding a 




Tourangeau et al. (2000) suggests that response effects, that is the differences in survey 
outcomes, can derive from numerous aspects throughout the survey process, such as the 
order of questions, understanding the question, recalling relevant information, providing an 
answer, or a range of other cognitive processes (Tourangeau et al., 2000). Tourangeau et al.'s 
(2000:8) Model of the Response Process details four main components generally present in 
responding to a question:  
 
• Comprehension – identification of what the question is asking.  
• Retrieval – recall of pertinent information from the long-term memory.  
• Judgement – assessment of information retrieved, gap-filling, and reconstruction of 
information in order to present an appropriate response.  
• Response – consists of two processes: the selection of an answer on a scale, and the 
presentation of an answer which may be edited for reasons of acceptability or 
consistency, for instance.   
 
As such, Tourangeau et al. (2000) propose that deficits in any of these four components can 
result in response errors, such as, misinterpreting the question or forgetting pertinent 
information. Pre-testing draft questions then is required to attempt to mitigate these errors 
(Tourangeau et al., 2000).  
 
Pre-testing methods can be used to highlight problems in respondents’ interpretations and 
responses, enabling potential solutions to be explored (Conrad and Blair, 2009). Pre-testing is 
based on assumptions that problems with questions will be identified by the answers 
provided, for instance, ‘don’t knows’, or by visible cues, such as, hesitation (Presser et al., 
2004). However, it may be that the techniques used do not necessarily elicit problems; a 
respondent may misunderstand a question without this being apparent (Presser et al., 2004). 
Nonetheless, the priority of pre-testing is to try to identify problems that if left undetected 
would increase measurement error (Blair and Conrad, 2011). Blair and Conrad (2011) suggest 
that individual problems impacting on measurement error derive from problem prevalence 




Defining Cognitive Interviewing 
Cognitive Interviewing (CI) is a pre-testing method available to test survey questions (Presser 
et al., 2004). This technique has become increasingly important in the design and testing of 
survey questions (Willis, 2005). CI emerged in the 1980s from The Cognitive Aspects of 
Survey Methodology (CASM) movement (Collins, 2015) and is rooted in the psychology of 
thought processes of comprehension, recall and judgement, model development and 
laboratory testing (Schwarz, 2007:277). CASM highlighted the importance of validity in survey 
research seeking to understand respondents’ thought processes in determining potential 
sources of error in surveys and question design (Schwarz, 2007; Miller et al., 2014). CI 
emerged as a method for ‘identifying and correcting problems with survey questions’ (Beatty 
and Willis, 2007:287).  
 
CI aims to test survey questions with participants through a range of techniques, which are 
then analysed to identify problems in order to reduce measurement errors which would 
otherwise affect the findings (Conrad and Blair, 2009; Presser et al., 2004). CI has become 
one of the more frequently used pre-testing methods (Beatty and Willis, 2007).   
 
Beatty and Willis (2007: 287) define CI as, 
 
‘the administration of draft survey questions while collecting additional verbal 
information about the survey responses, which is used to evaluate the quality of the 
response or to help determine whether the question is generating the information that 
its author intends’.   
 
Essentially, the aim of cognitive interviewing is to evaluate the effectiveness of survey 
questions in achieving their intended objectives through retrieving information from 
participants (Beatty and Willis, 2007). CI techniques examine how the participant 
understands, interprets, mentally processes, and responds to the material presented, with an 
emphasis on identifying issues with the question which may be problematic and potentially 
breakdown this process (Willis, 2004; Presser et al., 2004). However, despite this general 
definition there are variations in the implementation of almost every aspect of CI, such as, 
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how thought processes of participants are accessed and interpreted, the role and impact of 
interviewers, and the subsequent analysis (Beatty and Willis, 2007; Blair and Conrad, 2011). 
 
Cognitive Interviewing Paradigms 
Two main paradigms of CI have emerged differing theoretically and methodologically (Farrall, 
2017). Thinking-aloud is the original form of cognitive interviewing, whilst Probing developed 
at a later date (Beatty and Willis, 2007). In the thinking-aloud paradigm the interviewer’s role 
is to facilitate the verbal information provided by participants in order to understand their 
thought processes with minimal intervention. The probing paradigm requires the interviewer 
to play a more verbally active role guiding and questioning throughout the process in order 
to understand the responses (Beatty and Willis, 2007). During thinking-aloud interviews, the 
interviewer may encourage the participant to explain what they are thinking and why they 
are answering the question in a particular way, for example, ‘Tell me what you are 
thinking...?’ (Beatty and Willis, 2007:289). Probing entails the interviewer’s questioning 
technique to be more intensive with such follow up probes as, ‘Can you tell me in your own 
words what that question was asking?’ (Beatty and Willis, 2007:290).   
 
Thinking-aloud is a standardised procedure with a reduced interviewer bias due to  
the interviewer being less directive; however, this process may be harder work for 
participants, and may produce an excess of information that is not relevant due to 
participants’ verbalisations being less focussed (Beatty and Willis, 2007; Willis and Artino, 
2013). Additionally, encouraging respondents to provide verbal information when the 
information requested is not being accessed may result in more ambiguous reports or 
changing the thought process leading to ‘reactivity’ effects (Conrad and Blair, 2009:34). The 
advantages of thinking aloud are that it is easy to train respondents and collect data at the 
time the question is answered, which is initiated by the respondent rather than the 
interviewer (D’Ardenne, 2015b). Conversely, some respondents may find thinking aloud hard 
and the data may vary in quality between respondents (D’Ardenne, 2015b). The thinking 
aloud technique may interfere with the thought processes at the time of answering, and 
respondents may edit and refine their answers prior to speaking leading to undetected 
problems (D’Ardenne, 2015b). D’Ardenne (2015b) suggests taking into account certain 
factors in order to determine whether thinking aloud is appropriate: will respondents feel 
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comfortable divulging their thoughts about the topic at hand? Will the process of thinking 
aloud interfere too much and impede respondents from answering the questions properly? 
  
Alternatively, verbal probing allows more focus and less interference during the actual 
response process but requires more consideration from the interviewer in order to mitigate 
response effects (Beatty and Willis, 2007; Willis and Artino, 2013). The creation of bias in 
respondent’s behaviour may occur from the cognitive demands placed on them during 
probing and explanation of answers, which may result in respondents thinking more carefully 
about their answers than they would do otherwise (Willis and Artino, 2013). However, whilst 
thinking aloud may present the best bias-free approach, this may not necessarily result in the 
most useful style of interview in terms of identifying respondent comprehension of specific 
concepts (Farrall, 2017). Additionally, interviewers’ contributions shape CI results, therefore 
interviewers should receive training to increase skills to recognise probes’ impacts and 
when/how best to deploy them (Beatty, 2004 in Presser et al., 2004). 
 
Probing 
Willis (2005:87) presents a ‘standard model of probing’: 
• Review questions and identify potential problems. 
• Probe planning pre-interview to investigate potential problems. 
• Administration of probes as planned. 
 
Despite this seemingly straightforward model, probing is inherently more complex (Willis, 
2005). Beatty and Willis (2007:300) highlight four main probing techniques: 
• Anticipated probes – scripted or pre-determined probes in expectation of a 
problem with a question. 
• Spontaneous probes – flexible and unplanned allowing the interviewer to use 
intuition rather than responding to participant behaviour. 
• Conditional probes – pre-determined and administered if participant behaviour 
indicates an issue with the question, i.e. hesitation. 
• Emergent probes – unscripted, flexible and responsive to participant responses. 
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Probes can be ‘concurrent’, following each question, enabling participants to recall 
pertinent information, or ‘retrospective’, at the end of the survey, alleviating the 
potential effects of accumulative probing (Willis, 2005:53). Concurrent probing allows 
respondents’ thoughts to be accessed whilst they are answering the questions enabling 
information to be accessed in real time, however, this process may in turn influence 
subsequent responses (DeMaio et al., 1998). Retrospective probing is undertaken once 
the interview is complete, therefore replicating similar conditions to the live survey, 
which influences the responses less, but may not allow the interviewer to access 
respondents thinking at the time of answering (DeMaio et al., 1998). 
 
Table 4.1. Model of Verbal Probing in Cognitive Interviews 
 Proactive Administration 
(initiated by the 
interviewer/researcher) 
Reactive Administration 
(triggered by subject behaviour) 
Standardized 
Construction 














Source: (Willis 2005:88) 
 
Willis (2005:88) divides the four main probing techniques above into two categories as shown 
in Table 4.1 above: 
• Proactive Probing - an investigative interviewer using anticipated and 
spontaneous probes.   
• Reactive Probing - an interviewer being responsive to a trigger during the 
interview by verbal information or behaviour of the respondent using conditional 
and emergent probing techniques.  
 
Priede et al. (2014:560) specifically examined concurrent probing using an investigative 
interviewer (proactive probing) approach whereby the researcher is allowed to adapt probes 
and develop probes throughout the interview. They found that scripted conditional probes 
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were of most value in terms of useful data; spontaneous probes were of least value in this 
respect; emergent probes and ‘functional remarks’ (remarks to encourage respondent to 
keep talking) were found to be as useful as scripted anticipated probes. They concluded that 
interviewers should use anticipated and spontaneous probes to search for problems, and 
conditional and emergent probes to attempt to uncover problems and seek solutions. 
Ericsson and Simon (1980) suggest that specific probes should be used in order to reduce the 
respondent using inferential processes to fill the gaps in memory/information which result 
from the use of general probes. Willis (2005) also encourages careful consideration regarding 
the suitability and appropriateness of probes in order to reduce the possibility of encouraging 
respondents to invent problems, and/or, researchers inventing problems. Garas et al. 
(2003:45) distinguish between ‘evidence-based’ probes, detection of a problem through 
respondent’s verbal/behavioural response, and ‘context free’ probes, no detection of a 
problem but researcher judges that a particular word/question may be problematic. They 
suggest that discussions in CI interviews regarding potential problems may detect actual 
problems or the respondent’s acceptance of the interviewer’s hypothesis of potential 
problems. Thus, context free probing may result in an interviewer effect on respondent 
behaviour, for example, the inference of a problem if probed by the interviewer. 
Consequently, Garas et al. (2003) suggest that question revisions may be more reliable 
should there be actual evidence of problems from respondents or if there is an agreement by 
numerous assessors of the verbal reports of a problem being present.  
 
Conrad and Blair’s (2009) study explored the use of conditional probes compared to 
discretionary probes; the former only used in response to the respondent’s explicit 
information, the latter used whenever the interviewer felt it was appropriate. In addition to 
this, they also explored the ways verbal reports were interpreted by different judges, in 
anticipation that different judges elicit different meaning from verbal reports. Their concern 
was that the use of discretionary probes may detect problems that are not actual problems, 
and that different problems may be identified dependent on who is analysing and 
interpreting the information. Conditional probes were found to detect fewer potential 
problems with higher reliability across judges compared to discretionary probes; and, 
differences in reliability were linked to the types of probes administered. Conrad and Blair 
concluded that discretionary probes result in a higher amount of problems and thus more 
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false alarms, whereas conditional probing resulted in fewer false alarms but fewer actual 
problems. They suggest that using context-based probes may result in increased reliability 
and validity, however, this would reduce the ability of experienced cognitive interviewers to 
detect problems when no problem was indicated. They propose that the challenge of 
developing a CI procedure is to maximise problem detection whilst minimising error integral 
to CI.      
 
In determining the techniques to be used, Beatty and Willis (2007) suggest that  
consideration should be given during the course of the research design to the most 
appropriate and suitable techniques to meet the requirements, as best as possible, of the 
research project, interviewers and respondents in order to meet the intended objectives. 
Despite there being various discussions of the advantages of one paradigm compared to the 
other, there have been few studies that have examined and compared these differences in 
practice (Priede and Farrall, 2010). Priede and Farrall (2010) conducted a comparison study 
of thinking aloud and probing as part of a wider project examining public confidence in 
justice. Their findings suggest that there is no major difference between thinking aloud and 
probing. Thinking-aloud enabled a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes involved 
in the retrieval of information than probing, whereas probing allowed for specific concepts to 
be explored. Priede and Farrall suggested the use of both techniques when piloting survey 
questions may be appropriate, either as separate interviews or within the same interview, 
taking into account the appropriateness of each technique in relation to the survey content.   
In the case of thinking-aloud and probing being used in the same question, D’Ardenne 
(2015b) encourages the use of think-aloud prior to any probing in order to reduce the 
interviewer effect of probing on the respondent’s answer.  
 
Sample Size 
Researchers should consider the sample population most relevant to the study, those for 
whom the questions are designed, and target this group (Beatty and Willis, 2007; Collins and 
Gray, 2015). In terms of sample size, varying suggestions exist. Collins and Gray (2015) 
suggest that ideally no limit would be specified on sample size and interviewing would 
continue until no new problems were identified. However, practicalities and time constraints 
will usually hinder this process (Collins and Gray, 2015; Willis, 2005). Willis (2005) proposes 
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that 12-15 interviews are usually sufficient to detect significant problems, and as more 
interviews are conducted the useful returns diminish significantly. Willis (2005) advises that 
should serious problems be identified after just a few interviews then these should be 
rectified prior to further testing. Willis (2005) also notes that sample size is dependent on 
how many rounds of interviews are to be carried out. Willis suggests that three rounds of 
nine interviews is preferable to one round of twenty seven interviews, enabling amendments 
to be made between the rounds. Beatty and Willis (2007) suggest that typical sample sizes 
generally used in cognitive interviews are most likely insufficient in terms of comprehensively 
providing a true insight into the questionnaire’s performance. Blair and Conrad (2011) 
conducted a study examining sample size and problem identification undertaking 90 
interviews. They found that as the sample size increased so did the identification of 
problems: a sample size of five detected less than a quarter of the eventual 210 problems 
identified; a third of problems were detected in 10 interviews; half in 20 interviews, and 50 
interviews resulted in 80 percent of the problems detected. Thus, they concluded that a 
small sample size may miss a significant percentage of problems.  
 
Outcome Measures 
Collins (2015a) suggests a number of issues to consider whilst using CI to pre-test questions: 
• The format of the available responses – are respondents able to provide an answer 
from the available list/choices. 
• Asking why a particular answer was chosen.  
• Check if an answer is missing from the list which would have enabled respondent to 
answer question more easily/accurately. 
 
Collins (2015a) highlights the importance of being clear as a researcher about the 
measurement objectives in order to be able to assess if the CI pre-test has achieved its aims: 
• What are the areas to be explored?  
• Be clear about the intended meaning of questions.  




CI is often used to assist researchers in developing ‘measurably better survey questions’, 
however this is difficult to determine (Beatty and Willis, 2007:304). CI is also viewed as being 
able to provide insights into the impacts of certain questionnaire design decisions, which are 
also difficult to assess (Beatty and Willis, 2007). Perhaps the most suitable way to think of CI 
is its assistance to researchers in finding the advantages and disadvantages of question 
construction in a particular way (Beatty and Willis, 2007). 
 
4.1.3. Limitations of the Cognitive Interviewing Technique 
Tourangeau et al. (2000:334) note that although CI may diagnose a problem with a survey, CI 
does not necessarily ‘point to a cure’. Conrad and Blair (2009) propose that despite CI 
intending to reduce measurement errors, the practice can in turn generate its own 
measurement errors. The identification of problems that are not actual problems may occur 
or different problems being identified dependent on who is analysing the data, which may 
result in reduced reliability and validity than intended or desired (Conrad or Blair, 2009). They 
suggest that these measurement errors may derive from the following: 
• Differing elicitation techniques used to obtain verbal reports leading to a variance in 
quality. 
• Varying interpretation techniques between assessors leading to different meanings 
being attached to reports.  
 
 The aim for researchers is to use CI procedures that increase the ability to detect problems, 
but also reduce errors intrinsic to CI (Conrad and Blair, 2009). Beatty and Willis (2007) 
suggest that variations in practice result in an unclear understanding of what cognitive 
interviews actually are. Beatty and Willis (2007) note that being explicit about which 
elements of cognitive interviewing produces useful results and being clear about what was 
carried out in cognitive interviews would increase methodological knowledge and 
understanding in this area. They suggest that CI practitioners should agree on a framework 
for CI testing reports, such as number of interviews, interviewees, and rounds of interviews, 
the amount of think aloud and probing techniques used, and the nature of the probing, for 
instance. This framework will enable the sharing of information and documentation of 
procedures undertaken in projects in order to develop best practice (Beatty and Willis, 2007). 
Additionally, there has been little consensus historically regarding the analysis of CI verbal 
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reports, which use a variety of procedures to determine whether questions have proved 
problematic for respondents (Blair and Brick, 2010). Consequently, documentation of analysis 
decisions will ensure transparency, allow scrutiny, and promote credibility (Collins, 2015a). 
Closer attention to the systematic processes involved in CI will result in a method that is 
‘coherent’, ‘defensible’ and replicable (Willis, 2014:8).      
 
Collins (2003; 2015a) suggests that CI has the following limitations: 
• It is qualitive, therefore not possible to measure its impact. 
• Not possible to give quantitative evidence that the question revision is improved 
following CI. 
• Not all thought processes can be verbalised. 
• Not everyone is able to verbalise their thoughts processes, therefore it discriminates 
against those who cannot and may deter them from engaging with it. 
• It is non-standardised. 
• Interviewer impact on process (rapport, interrupting process impacting on 
respondent behaviour, how questions are asked). 
• Focusses on the question and answer process and does not take into account the flow 
of the survey or length impact. 
 
The Challenges of Conducting Web-based Surveys 
Willis (2005) suggests that whilst probing paradigms appear to be frequently used in 
interviewer-administered surveys, the think-aloud paradigm may be more appropriate for 
web-based surveys due to the navigation and creative issues concerning these types of 
surveys. The challenges of web-based surveys are not constrained to words and questions, 
but extend to the mode of delivery, layout, design, structure, architecture, and the hardware 
and software used (Presser et al., 2004). Presser et al. (2004) insist that all these aspects 
need to be tested in order to allow for an understanding of their impacts on potential errors 
in the data. Additionally, Presser et al. (2004) suggest that following revisions, further testing 
should be carried out in order to determine if the revisions have indeed resolved the issues 
detected. If possible, it is advisable to test whether the layout and design of the survey 
impacts on the response process of comprehension, retrieval, judgement and response 
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(Collins, 2015a). Collins (2015a) suggests that web-based surveys involve additional aspects 
that may interfere with the response process, such as respondent-internet device 
interaction, navigation, error messages, and following instructions. Consequently, an 
assessment of the usability of the survey in this context may be of benefit in order to try to 
replicate the intended data collection instrument (Collins, 2015a).  
 
4.1.4. Summary 
This chapter has aimed to present a discussion of some of the potential issues in using survey 
research to explore public attitudes. Cognitive interviewing has been introduced as a means 
to pre-test survey questions and attempt to mitigate some of the potential issues arising 
from survey research. A review of cognitive interviewing literature has outlined the value of 
cognitive interviewing in assisting the survey design process, the two main cognitive 
interviewing paradigms of thinking aloud and verbal probing presenting their respective 
strengths and limitations, and the limitations of cognitive interviewing more generally. This 
chapter concludes by a discussion of some of the challenges of conducting web-based 
surveys. Essentially, it is important to draw out what people understand in relation to the 
newly designed questions; do people interpret the words and sentiments as intended? 
Cognitive interviewing not only provides the opportunity to test and reflect on this aim but 
also provides important qualitative data about how people interpret the questions. The 
relevance of how these issues relate specifically to this project will be noted throughout the 
next subchapter as attention is now turned to the design process of questions for this study 













Chapter 4.2. Using cognitive interviewing techniques to explore contemporary 
attitudes towards ‘rulebreakers’ 
 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4.1. presented a discussion of some of the strengths and challenges of using survey 
research to explore attitudes. A review of cognitive interviewing literature was presented 
highlighting some of the strengths and limitations of using this method in the design process 
of survey questions. Additionally, a discussion on some of the challenges of conducting web-
based surveys was presented. This chapter aims to present the process involved in 
developing the research questions for this project reflecting throughout on issues raised in 
Chapter 4.1. This chapter commences by discussing the ethical considerations involved in 
undertaking cognitive interviews. The chapter then outlines the design process by presenting 
the questions designed to measure public attitudes towards rulebreakers. The cognitive 
interviewing process will then be presented; this involves details of the fieldwork, data 
management and the subsequent analysis. The chapter concludes by presenting the finalised 
battery of questions designed to measure punitiveness towards rulebreakers.     
 
4.2.2. Ethical Considerations  
Any research project should place ethical considerations at the heart of the design process 
considering how informed consent will be gained, how to minimise participant burden, how 
to maintain participant confidentiality, and interviewer safety (D’Ardenne, 2015a). An ethics 
application (Appendix A) was approved detailing the nature of the cognitive interviews, in 
that they would be face to face interviews conducted in participants’ homes by a lone 
researcher. Potential risks were managed by training in good fieldwork practices and 
informing the main supervisor of the time and location of where the interviews would be 
conducted. Additionally, the main supervisor was informed of the interviews’ completion.  
 
Very little harm was foreseen to participants as the nature of the interviews were to ask 
participants questions on their attitudes towards certain types of institutional punishments in 
order to test the survey questions. However, there was potential that some participants may 
have been excluded from school or in receipt of benefits and may have felt uncomfortable 
answering the questions. It was made clear to the participants that there were no direct 
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questions about their experiences, no personal information would be sought, and that the 
interviews were to understand how they interpreted the questions. The University’s Research 
Ethics Policy uses the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) definition of personal data:  
 
‘‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural  
(living) person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a 
name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more 
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person’ (The University of Sheffield, 2020) 
 
Consideration of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been given throughout 
the project. Participants were advised that should they disclose any personal information 
during the interviews then that information would be redacted when the interviews were 
transcribed. No personal information was collected regarding names and addresses, except 
for the arranging of the interviews in a few cases, and such data was destroyed after the 
fieldwork was completed. Additionally, when transcribed, any identifying data (such as names 
of third parties or particular places) was redacted. The only information collected from the 
participants was demographic factors, such as age and gender, in order to undertake basic 
analyses to review ease of question interpretation across different groups of people. 
Participants answered the questions anonymously on a tablet and had the option of not 
disclosing their demographic information should they prefer not to.  
 
Potential participants should be given sufficient information to make a fully informed choice 
about whether they wish to take part (D’Ardenne, 2015a). Access was gained to participants 
through door knocking in a range of neighbourhoods to try to obtain a representative 
sample. Prospective participants were provided with a brief verbal introduction about the 
study detailing an accurate description of the purpose of the study, what their involvement 
would entail, who was conducting the research, the subject matter, length of interview and 
how the information collected would be used (D’Ardenne, 2015a). Additionally, it was 
stressed that taking part was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving any reason for doing so (D’Ardenne, 2015a). Once a person agreed to 
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take part in the study, they were provided with an information sheet providing details of the 
study and the contact details of the research team (Appendix B); this gave participants the 
opportunity to ask further questions or withdraw from the study at a later date should they 
wish to do so (D’Ardenne, 2015a). Participants were then provided with a consent form 
(Appendix C). Additionally, in an attempt to incentivise interviews with those aged between 
16 and 24 years old, a £10 high street voucher was offered as this age group is particularly 
difficult to interview. Again, it was made clear to this group that they were not obliged to 
take part and could withdraw at any time (D’Ardenne, 2015a).  
 
4.2.3. Question Design 
Four new questions were designed aiming to measure the prevalence of punitive attitudes 
towards rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants (see Q1, Q2, Q5, Q6 in Figure 4.2). 
Two additional questions will also be used to measure punitive attitudes towards 
lawbreakers, these are: 
• People who break the law should face stiffer sentences. 
• There are some offences for which only the death penalty is appropriate. 
 
However, these are well tested questions used by the British Social Attitudes Survey since 
1986 with considerable national usage, and as such, they were not tested in the cognitive 
interviews. Additionally, two further questions (Q3 and Q4) were also designed from an 
identified gap in existing survey questions in relation to beliefs about school punishments 
aiming to explore beliefs relating to authoritarianism, discipline, and social control. These two 
questions were subsequently used to measure neo-conservative values. The theoretical and 
empirical construction of this variable is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.    
 
The design process began with literature reviews of attitudes towards school pupils and 
welfare claimants, along with reviews of previous and current political policies in education 
and welfare that respond to rulebreaking behaviours. The literature reviews also entailed 
analysis of political discourse, relevant surveys that have been undertaken, and a 
presentation of trends in data over the past four decades. During the literature reviews, 
embryonic survey questions were drawn up, amended and adapted as the literature reviews, 
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and knowledge, expanded. This process culminated in the design of six new survey questions 
(Table 4.2.). 
 
Table 4.2. Final Survey Questions 
Item No Item Wording 
Q1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments. 
Q2 School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded. 
Q3 Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behaviour.  
Q4 School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour. 
Q5 Welfare benefit recipients who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer 
penalties. 
Q6 Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped.  
 
The Measurement Aims of the Cognitive Interviews 
The aim of cognitive interviews (CI) is to assess whether designed questions are working in 
the way intended (Collins, 2015a). The overall aim of the battery of questions in the eventual 
survey is to assess the prevalence of punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers in contemporary 
British society and how these relate to political attitudes.  
 
The specific aims of the cognitive interviews were: to assess whether participants understood 
the key terms in the questions in a consistent way; what do these terms bring to participants’ 
minds when they are answering the questions? What are the factors that influence how 
participants respond? Are participants able to answer sufficiently accurately and reliably to 
meet the measurement aims of the survey? (Collins, 2015a). Despite Willis’s (2005) 
suggestion that thinking aloud may be more suitable to web-based surveys due to the 
potential for navigation issues to arise, verbal probing was assessed as the most suitable 
technique to meet the CI aims in this instance. Through reflection on the literature review, it 
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was assessed that verbal probing would be the most suitable technique to meet the 
measurement aims, as the interviews intended to explore comprehension of specific terms 
(Priede and Farrall, 2010; Farrall, 2017). The cognitive interview participants were members 
of the general public recruited through door knocking on randomly selected doors and asked 
to take part in the interviews. As thinking aloud may be harder work for participants and 
requires some training (Beatty and Willis, 2007; Willis and Artino, 2013) it was assessed as 
unsuitable due to the extra burden this may place on participants. Additionally, verbal 
probing requires no participant training and results in less interviewer interference during the 
response process (Beatty and Willis; Willis and Artino, 2007). The usability of the survey in an 
online context was assessed through interviewer observation during the interviews whilst 
participants used a tablet; this was used to replicate the intended data collection device 
(Collins, 2015a).  
 
4.2.4. Cognitive Interviewing Fieldwork 
The first round of cognitive interviews was undertaken between 10th and 15th May 2018 
aiming to evaluate how the target audience understood, processed and responded to the 
designed questions (Willis, 2005). A total of twelve participants (Table 4.3.) were recruited 
directly by knocking on randomly selected doors in two areas in Northern England to take 
part in face-to-face interviews. An urban and suburban area were chosen with the goal of 
recruiting a variety of participants to capture varying responses (Collins and Gray, 2015). The 
areas were chosen due to their geographical differences as well as their social and economic 
differences detailed as follows from UK Census Data (2018). Area A, the urban location, is 
ethnically more diverse than Area B with a BAME population of approximately 25% in 
comparison to Area B’s BAME population of approximately 1%. Area A has an economically 
active population of approximately 50% and an economically inactive population of 
approximately 13%, in contrast to the economically active and inactive populations of Area B 
of 68% and 3% respectively. In terms of property ownership, approximately 40% of people in 
Area A either own or mortgage their property and approximately 45% rent their homes 
through social housing. In Area B approximately 75% of people own or mortgage their homes 
with approximately 10% renting through social housing. In terms of migration, 88% of 
residents in Area A and 97% in Area B were born in the UK; approximately 3% have resided in 
the UK in the last 5 years in Area A and approximately 0.5% in Area B; and, 10% of residents 
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in Area A have resided in the UK for five years and over, compared to 2.5% in Area B. The 
median income for Area A is approximately £16,000 compared to approximately £23,000 in 
Area B (ONS, 2016). Area A is amongst the 10% most deprived neighbourhoods in the 
country compared to Area B which is amongst the 20% least deprived neighbourhoods 
according to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2015). There were seven females and five males ranging from 18 to 85 years 
old with two participants describing themselves as Asian or Asian British, and the remaining 
as White British.  
 
Table 4.3. Summary of Participants  
Subject ID Age Gender Ethnicity 
R1 35 to 44 Male Asian or Asian British - Pakistani 
R2 25 to 34 Female Asian or Asian British - Pakistani 
R3 45 to 54 Male White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R4 65 to 74 Male White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R5 75+ Female White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R6 18 to 24 Female White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R7 75+ Male White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R8 35 to 44 Female White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R9 75+ Female White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R10 18 to 24 Male White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R11 35 to 44 Female White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
R12 45 to 54 Female White - English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British 
 
Interviews were carried out in participants’ homes and comprised of two stages. In stage one, 
participants were provided with a tablet on which to complete the survey to simulate, as 
much as possible, the eventual online survey (DeMaio et al, 1998; Gray, 2015). Following 
completion of the survey, stage two involved interviewing participants via a series of 
questions about their interpretation of the statements using the verbal probing technique 
(Willis, 2005). Verbal probing was chosen as the technique allows for exploration of specific 
words and concepts (Priede and Farrall, 2010). The interviews lasted between six and thirty-
two minutes.     
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Cognitive Interview Script 
The cognitive interview script (Table 4.4.) was devised prior to the CIs (Willis, 2005). This 
comprised of eleven anticipated probes developed to address the specific aims of the 
interviews as noted above. Fundamentally, the CI aims were to explore if certain words or 
terms were universally understood (Willis, 2005). In addition to the anticipated probes, 
emergent probes were also used to explore potential issues raised by participants (Beatty 
and Willis, 2007). Emergent probes are unscripted, flexible and reactive allowing the 
interviewer to be responsive to something a participant says which may indicate a problem 
(Beatty and Willis, 2007). Emergent probes are variable due to their application being based 
on each participant’s response.   
 
Table 4.4. Cognitive Interview Schedule  
Question Probes 
Q1 Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments. 
What did you understand by the term ‘unruly’? 
Q2 School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently 
excluded. 
What did you understand by the term ‘permanently excluded’? 
Q3 Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behaviour. 
What did you understand by the term ‘caning’? 
Q1, Q2, & 
Q4 
Some of the questions used terms like ‘unruly’, bad behaviour’ and 
‘disruptive behaviour’? Which of these terms do you prefer? 
Q5 Welfare benefit recipients who repeatedly cheat the system should face 
stiffer penalties. 
What did you understand by the term ‘welfare benefit recipients’? 
Q6 Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their 
payments permanently stopped.  





How did you find answering these questions? Enjoyable? Thought 
provoking? Interesting? 
Were they easy or difficult to answer? Why? 




Data Management and Analysis  
Analysis was undertaken based on the ‘Framework’ approach favoured in Collins (2015b:143) 
using Excel. The Framework analytical approach was developed by Ritchie and Spencer 
(1994) in conducting applied qualitative research seeking to identify attitudes and 
experiences, examine the factors that underlie such attitudes and experiences, appraise the 
effectiveness of what exists, and to identify new theories, plans and actions (Ritchie and 
Spencer, 1994). Framework is ‘systematic and disciplined’, whilst also relying on the creativity 
and ‘conceptual abilities of the analyst to determine meaning, salience and connections’ 
(Ritchie and Spencer, 1994:177). This approach incorporates the orderly storage of raw data 
and the systematic process of reducing, classifying and ordering the cognitive data to 
facilitate subsequent analysis (D’Ardenne and Collins, 2015; Ritchie and Spencer, 1994).  
 
The raw data comprised of the interview recordings, interview transcripts and completed test 
questionnaires. An interview summaries template was used to systematically reduce and 
organise the data (Figure 4.2.) (D’Ardenne and Collins, 2015:147). Each transcribed interview 
was reduced onto the template, which ensures that relevant data for each interview is 
collated in a single document and that the all interview findings are consistently written up 
(D’Ardenne and Collins, 2015).  
 
Once an interview summaries template had been completed for each interview, the data for 
each question was amalgamated into Framework Matrices in Excel using the subheadings 
used in the Interview Summaries Template column headings (Figure 4.1.). Primarily, the 
process of populating the matrices from the templates allows for a further opportunity to 
collate and reduce data from multiple interviews into a coherent document from which 
analysis can be undertaken (D’Ardenne and Collins, 2015). Additionally, this process also 
allows for checking if any information is missing in order to achieve the research aims 
(D’Ardenne and Collins, 2015).  
 
4.2.5. The Analysis Process 
The formal analysis phase comprised of two parts; firstly, the identification and classification 
of problems and the circumstances in which they occur, together with understanding how 
the questions are being interpreted and answers formulated (Collins, 2015b); secondly, 
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identifying why problems occur and the possible explanations for these allowing 
consideration of potential resolution or amelioration of the problem (Collins, 2015b). This 
section analyses the responses from the cognitive interviews for the purposes of the question 
design. However, interesting findings emerged throughout the cognitive interviews 
illustrating attitudes towards both rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants. 
Discussions in relation to these attitudes will appear in relevant subsequent chapters for each 
rulebreaker (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7); these subsequent discussions allow the themes 
evident throughout the cognitive interviews to be placed into context alongside the 
quantitative findings.     
 
     Figure 4.1. Interview Summaries Template  
1. Respondent background 
1.1 Respondent ID: 
1.2 Sex:  
1.3 Age Group: 
1.4 Working Status: 
1.5 General comments on interview:  
 
2. Findings on Question:  
2.1. Survey answer:  
2.2. Observations/think aloud findings:  
2.3. Findings from probes:  
2.4. Findings from general probes: 
2.5. Other findings/comments on Question 






Table 4.5.  Framework Matrix 
Finding on Q1: Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments 






4. 2.2. Observation/think 
aloud findings 
2.3. Findings 






      
      
      
Source: D’Ardenne and Collins (2015:153) 
 
The CI results below present the amalgamation of answers for each question which allows 
qualitative and quantitative analysis; the former allows analysis of what the problems were 
and whether they were similar across interviews; the latter can show how sever the problem 
is by the frequency of which the problem(s) occurred (Willis, 2005). The following section 
consists of analysing responses in relation to the measurement aims. A colour coding scheme 
has been used in the analysis to highlight responses relevant to the CI aims: do participants 
understand key terms in the questions in a consistent way? (Comprehension problem); What 
do these terms bring to participants’ minds when they are answering the questions? 
(Interpretation); What are the factors that influence how participants respond? Are 
participants able to answer sufficiently accurately and reliably to meet the measurement 
aims of the survey? Analysis also involves combining participant verbal responses to probes 
with the survey data and response times (Collins, 2015b). Question timings were analysed to 
see if particular questions posed problems identified by respondents taking more time to 
answer certain questions. Table 4.6. shows an overview of the results.  
 
Cognitive Interview Analysis: Round One Analysis  
Question 1: Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments. What did you 
understand by the term ‘unruly’?  
(R=Respondent) (Colour code: Red=comprehension problem; Blue=interpretation)  
Unruly appeared to be problematic for some participants. R6 responded, ‘Mmm…what does 
unruly mean?....I’m guessing it’s like more like naughtier… But I wasn’t sure’. Other 
participant responses could indicate that the word is problematic: R1 (‘It’s quite an open-
ended word isn’t it that?); R2 (‘Rulings?’); R8 (‘I presumed’); R10 (‘is that right?’).  
156 
 
Participants interpreted unruly as: misbehave (R1, R3, R7), disruptive (R2, R5, R8, R11, R12), 
naughtier children (R4, R6), without boundaries at home (R6), badly behaved (R8), not 
following the rules (R9, R10). Unruly also brought out the idea of persistence of inappropriate 
behaviours in participants’ interpretations of the word: R7 (‘a lot’), R8 (‘always, they just carry 
on doing it’), R12 (‘constant confrontations’). Analysis of response times shows that the 
average amount of time it took respondents to answer Q1 was 19 seconds, with this question 
being one of five participants’ slowest responses and no participant’s fastest response time. 
This may be due to the issue raised with understanding the term unruly, but also the 
complexity of the question involving ‘tougher punishments’ as discussed below. Three 
participants strongly agreed with the statement, four agreed, three disagreed and two 
strongly disagreed.  On analysis, participant feedback indicates that consideration should be 
given to amending ‘unruly’ due to some uncertainty expressed. Analysis of feedback suggests 
that this could be replaced with ‘disruptive’ as five participants used this word to describe 
what they thought unruly meant (although this may be influenced by the other question). 
This question will be re-tested in Round 2 cognitive interviews.  
 
‘Tougher Punishments’ 
Some respondents made insightful comments into their thoughts on ‘tougher punishments’ 
whilst completing the survey. R2 commented, ‘They just deserve tough punishment 
sometimes I think', and R5 stated, ‘No, I’m not into punishing kids…not punished like hit, 
corporal thing…I don’t believe in that.’ When probed on this term, participants tended to 
refer to the current punishments in schools. Despite the ambiguity of what ‘tougher 
punishments’ means to respondents, they generally appeared able to respond to the 
sentiment of the term. Only R5 referred to ‘tougher punishments’ in relation to physical 
punishments. No changes to the term ‘tougher punishments’ is deemed necessary as it is the 
punitive sentiment of the concept that is being measured rather than the exact meaning of 







Question 2: School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded. 
What did you understand by the term ‘permanently excluded’?  
(Red=comprehension problem; Blue=interpretation) 
Responses indicate that participants understood the term permanently excluded, with the 
majority of responses including terms such as ‘not allowed back in school’ and ‘banned’. Only 
R2 elaborated when probed that the term might mean ‘being permanently schooled 
elsewhere in the school’. Three participants strongly agreed with the statement, two agreed, 
six disagreed and one strongly disagreed.  On average, Q2 took the longest time for 
participants to answer with an average of 23 seconds with this question being one of five 
participants slowest response times and one participant’s fastest time. The two slowest 
response times were by participants making comments about the question to the interview 
whilst responding. On analysis, respondents showed an understanding of the term, therefore 
no amendment is deemed necessary to the question.  
 
Question 3: What did you understand by the word ‘caning’?  
(Red=comprehension problem; Blue=interpretation) 
Participants generally understood the term and interpreted it as being ‘hit with a stick’ (R1, 
R2, R5, R6). It was also clear that the word ‘cane’ is still a ubiquitous word to participants with 
R3, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11 and R12 all using it to describe their interpretation of the meaning. 
The context of their answers which used the word cane demonstrates an understanding of 
what the cane was and was used for (R3: ‘punishment’, ‘get him with it’; R7: ‘on your hand, 
wrap you with it’; R8: ‘a wrap over the knuckles with the old cane’; R9: ‘battering them with 
it’; R10: ‘hit on the hand’; R11: ‘hit across the palms’; R12: ‘smacked with the cane’). Two 
participants questioned the term ‘caning’ initially: R1 ‘Caning? Is that like a whip…like a 
stick?’, and R6 ‘I’ve no idea. Caning like with a stick?’. One participant strongly agreed with 
the statement, four agreed, four disagreed and three strongly disagreed. On analysis, caning 
appeared to be understood by participants and therefore no adjustment to the term or 
statement is deemed to be needed. An average response time for Q3 was 12 seconds with it 
being one of two participants fastest response time at 5 and 6 seconds, and one person’s 




Question 4: School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour. Some 
of the questions used terms like ‘unruly’, ‘bad behaviour’ and ‘disruptive behaviour’. Which of 
these terms did you prefer?  
(Red=comprehension problem; Blue=interpretation; Green=respondent’s preference) 
There did not appear to be an obvious preference to any of the terms. R1, and R3 preferred 
badly behaved; R2, R7, R12 preferred disruptive; R6 preferred either badly behaved or 
disruptive; and, R4 and R10 preferred unruly. However, R5, R8, R9, R11 noted that the terms 
all have the same meaning or indicated no preference.  
 
Disruptive behaviour was interpreted by some respondents as meaning persistent behaviours 
interfering with other pupils learning: ‘small kind of behaviour, the little chitty chat’ (R2); 
‘concerning everybody else as well because it would be disrupting their learning’ (R6); 
‘bringing other people that are in the class to do the same as them’ (R7); ‘when the child is 
acting out’ and ‘it’s constant’ (R8); ‘spoil for everyone around’, ‘wrecking it for other people 
as well as themselves’ (R9); ‘annoying other students’ (R10); ‘disrupting the class…being 
annoying’ (R12). 
 
Bad behaviour was interpreted by some respondents as referring to a person being bad 
rather than the behaviour and as such did not like the term: ‘nastier with the teacher’ (R5); 
‘being a bad person in general’ (R10); ‘something that you do because you are a nasty 
person’ (R12). R1 and R3 preferred bad behaviour as ‘it’s probably more appropriate for 
today…generally not behaving in the right manner’ (R1); ‘they know what they are doing’ 
(R3). R6 preferred bad behaviour or disruptive behaviour, noting that bad behaviour is ‘just 
not behaving how they should’ and it ‘could just be that it affects you’. R9 interpreted bad 
behaviour as ‘more subtle’ and ‘orchestrating but not necessarily on the front line’. 
 
Unruly was interpreted as: ‘just a bit giddy’ (R3); ‘talking when you shouldn’t be talking’ (R5); 
‘rude towards the teacher and other staff and other pupils’ (R8); ‘not sticking to the 
rules…playing about in a daft manner’ (R9); R10 noted that he felt that unruly was not as bad 
in behaviour terms as the other two terms; R12 felt that unruly was in the middle of bad 




Probe 4 allowed participant to reflect on their interpretations of each term. Responses were 
elicited detailing the differences between the terms and in some cases lead to participants 
ordering the terms on a behaviour spectrum. Unruly was only preferred by two participants, 
which in addition to the previous analysis of unruly in Q1, would further suggest that this 
word may need amending. A decision was made to keep the original question wording for Q3 
and Q4 as the terms assessed what was intended. Five participants strongly agreed with the 
statement, five agreed, one disagreed and one strongly disagreed. In terms of response 
times, Q4 was one of five respondents fastest response times and one of two respondents’ 
slowest times, with an average time of 16.5 seconds, ranging from 3 to 40 seconds. The 
slowest response times (R9 and R12) reflect the deliberations of the complexity of the 
question rather than the question presenting as problematic. R9 and R12 were also the only 
two participants who strongly disagreed/disagreed respectively with this statement.   
 
Question 5: Welfare benefit recipients who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer 
penalties. What did you understand by the term ‘welfare benefit recipients’?  
(Red=comprehension problem; Blue=interpretation) 
Participants’ interpretations of the term ‘welfare benefit recipients’ were quite diverse with 
only R10 unsure what welfare was, stating ‘I was thinking that welfare is similar to a 
charity…not from the government.’ This may be due to R10 being young and perhaps having 
no personal knowledge and experience of the benefit system. Seven participants strongly 
agreed with the statement, four agreed and one disagreed. Q5 gave the quickest average 
response time of 11 seconds with it being one of four participants quickest response time 
and one participant’s slowest time. On analysis, respondents generally understood the term, 
therefore no amendment is deemed necessary. 
 
Qualitative analysis suggests that referring to welfare benefit recipients divides responses 
into two categories; those who expressed a generic interpretation of the term, and those 
who specified specific groups, namely the unemployed and migrants. The former involved 
responses such as ‘underprivileged who claim benefits’ (R1), ‘claim public funds…working 
class credit’ (R2), ‘unemployed, old age pensioners, people with learning or physical 
disabilities’ (R9), ‘any money that somebody gets from the government to help them out’ 
(R11), ‘unemployment support allowance, single parent, somebody who is on disability living 
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allowance’ (R12). The latter group responded in the following ways, with some making a 
connection to immigration: ‘them that don’t work’ (R3), ‘Immigrants…they come in, get 
everything out of the system, and put nothing in’ (R4), ‘All people, not just all foreigners that 
are here’ (R5), ‘people who don’t tend to get jobs because they don’t look for them and get 
quite a lot of benefits’ (R6), ‘Scroungers…anyone who is scrounging…coloured or white’ (R7), 
‘…the ones that are just doing it to get everything they can so they don’t have to go to work’ 
(R8). This analysis indicates that there are commonalities between participant responses and 
recent observations in literature and research (discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). 
 
Question 6: Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped. Can you explain your answer to this question?  
Analysis suggests that participants interpreted the question as intended, therefore it is 
assessed that no amendment to the question wording is needed. Probing was used to assess 
whether participants had considered the permanency element of the question, which 
answers indicate they had. Those who strongly agreed continued to assert that those who 
cheat should permanently be withdrawn money, for example, ‘We go to work, you go to 
work…don’t give them nowt, just stop it’ (R3), ‘if nothing happens to them, they just carry on 
doing it. They should stop all their money and not give them anything’ (R4), and ‘if they are 
swinging the lead you can’t have your benefits. They don’t get no more’ (R8). In contrast, the 
majority of those who agreed tended to soften their response when probed on permanency, 
for example, ‘Maybe that’s a bit strict…I think that is a bit too harsh. I’m in two minds about 
that then really’ (R2), and, ‘they should be stopped to some degree…but mostly people are 
trying to get benefits because they are really needy, so I don’t think they should be 
permanently stopped’ (R5). Three participants strongly agreed with the statement, six 
agreed, two disagreed and one strongly disagreed. Analysis of response times shows that the 
average response time for Q6 was 14 seconds, with this question being three participant’s 
slowest response time and three participants’ fastest response time.  
 
General Probes 
Participants reported generally finding the questions easy to understand and straightforward. 
Some participants referred to the complexity of the questions and the difficulty in answering 
with limited information. Analysis indicates that revising the answer categories to include a 
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mid-point is required. Participants highlighted the complexities of some questions made 
them weigh up the agree or disagree category forcing them to provide an answer but left 
them feeling unsatisfied with the response they gave. These participants noted that a  
mid-point would have allowed them to answer more accurately. Additionally, observations of 
any navigation issues suggested that the majority of participants were familiar with using 
such a device and as such no problems were encountered. The only participant who reported 
feeling unconfident using the tablet was one participant in the 75+ age group who had no 
previous experience of using this technology. In the eventual survey, this age group will be 
targeted through face-to-face interviews by the survey company should the group be  
under-represented through the web-based survey. 
 
Recommendations 
The aims of the CI interviews were to assess whether participants understand key terms in a 
consistent way? What do these terms bring to participants’ minds when they are answering 
the questions? What are the factors that influence how participants respond? Are 
participants able to answer sufficiently accurately and reliably to meet the measurement 




‘Unruly’ used in question 1 was a term that some participants appeared unfamiliar with. As a 
result, ‘unruly’ was replaced with ‘disruptive’ in round two of cognitive interviews. Five 
participants used disruptive to describe unruly, which suggests that this is a common word 
that participants understand. This question was amended to ‘Disruptive school children 
should receive tougher punishments’ and re-tested in round two of cognitive interviews.  
 
2. ‘Cheat the system’ 
Consideration was given to whether ‘cheat the system’ was too provocative. This concern is 
raised by how punitive responses were to welfare claimants both in their answers and the 
verbal responses to probes. In round two, Q5 and Q6 were re-tested with a mid-point 





As noted in the previous section, it was assessed that a mid-point was required. This was 
tested in round two.   
 
Comparison of attitudes towards children and welfare claimants 
Analysis indicates that introducing permanency to punishment (permanent 
exclusion/permanently stopping payments) reduced participants’ punitiveness to both 
groups. With regards to tougher punishments for children, seven participants strongly agreed 
or agreed, which reduced to five with the inclusion of permanent exclusion. Consequently, 
the majority were not in favour of permanent exclusion. With welfare claimants, stiffer 
penalties resulted in eleven of twelve participants strongly agreeing or agreeing; this reduced 
to nine in agreement following the introduction of permanently stopping payments. So, 
whilst attitudes softened a little towards welfare claimants, 75% of participants continued to 
be in favour of permanently stopping payments. Overall, participants showed a more punitive 
attitude towards welfare recipients than towards school pupils, both in their answers and 
their discourse.  
 
Cognitive Interviews: Round Two Analysis 
Following the recommendations above, a decision was made to re-test the following three 
questions:  
• Question 1 – Replace ‘unruly’ with ‘disruptive’. A mid-point was not used in this 
question in order to compare it with round one interview distributions to see whether 
changing the word made a difference to responses.  
• Question 5 and Question 6 – Include a mid-point to explore whether this improves 
the distributions. Whilst ‘cheat the system’ may be provocatively worded, using this 
phrase may provide and insight as to whether political discourse is evident in public 
attitudes towards benefit recipients.  
 
A decision was also made not to use probes in round two due to the terms already being 
probed in round one. The focus of round two was to test the distributions of the answers and 




Recommendation 1 - Question 1 
The quantitative results comparing round one (12 participants) using ‘unruly’ and round two 
(29 participants) using ‘disruptive’ are shown in (Table 4.6.). In round 1, 58% either strongly 
agreed or agreed with the statement with 42% either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. In 
round 2, 48% strongly agreed or agreed and 52% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement. Analysing the data above in isolation, unruly appears to generate a more punitive 
response. However, this difference may be due to demographic differences in attitudes as 
round 2’s participant base covered a greater geographic area with a larger participant base.   
 
Response times between round one and round two were also examined. In round one, 
response times ranged from 6 to 58 seconds, with an average response time of 19 seconds, 
compared to round two which ranged from 7 seconds to 92 seconds, with the average 
response time of 23.8 seconds. Lengthier response times tended to be participants 
commenting on the nature of the question whilst completing the survey, for example, round 
two R13 commented that it was a difficult question to answer as her response is dependent 
on the circumstances of the child (response time – 92 seconds).    
 
 Table 4.6. Cognitive Interviews: Comparison of round one and round two                  
Round 1 – 
‘Unruly’ 





3 25 Strongly Agree 4 14 
Agree 4 33 Agree 10 34 
Disagree 3 25 Disagree 11 38 
Strongly 
disagree 




Following round two analysis, it was decided to revert to using the term ‘unruly’. Reflecting on 
round one, only one person stated that they did not know the word, but on elaboration had 
interpreted the word as intended. The word ‘disruptive’, whilst seemingly a more familiar word 
to participants, also resulted in its own challenges; for example, participants tended to 
interpret unruly as meaning any behaviours that break the rules, whereas disruptive tended to 
be interpreted as behaviours that only disrupted other children’s learning. The questions for 
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this project aim to capture attitudes towards all inappropriate behaviours, therefore unruly 
was assessed as more suitable in this instance. In terms of the quantitative data, there was 
little difference in response times once consideration was given to participants talking to the 
interviewer whilst answering the question. Consequently, a decision was made to use ‘unruly’, 
but to ensure that in the survey it will always follow other behaviour questions to ensure that 
respondents are familiar with the nature of the battery of questions.  
 
Recommendation 2 and 3: Questions 5 and 6.  
The quantitative results comparing round one (using no mid-point) and round two (using a 
mid-point) for Welfare benefit recipients who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer 
penalties, and Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped are shown in are shown in Table 4.7. and Figure 4.8. 
 
  Table 4.7. Rulebreaking welfare recipients: support for stiffer sentences results 
Round 1 Number Percentage Round 2 Number Percentage 
 Strongly 
Agree 
7 58 Strongly 
Agree 
6 20.5 
Agree 4 33 Agree 13 45 
   Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
6 20.5 
Disagree 1 9 Disagree 2 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 




In round 1 (Table 4.7.), 91% strongly agreed or agreed  that welfare recipients who repeatedly 
cheat the system should face stiffer penalties, whilst 9% disagreed, compared to round 2 where 
65.5% strongly agreed or agreed and 14% disagreed or strongly disagreed with 20% neither 







Table 4.8. Rulebreaking welfare recipients: support for permanently stopping welfare 
payments results 
Round 1 Number Percentage Round 2 Number Percentage 
Strongly Agree 3 25 Strongly Agree 1 4 
Agree 6 50 Agree 7 24 
   Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
5 17 
Disagree 2 17 Disagree 12 41 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 8 Strongly Disagree 4 14 
 
In round 1 (Table 4.8.), 75% strongly agreed or agreed that Welfare claimants who repeatedly 
cheat the system should have their payments permanently stopped, whilst 25% disagreed or 
strongly disagreed, compared to round 2 where 28% strongly agreed or agreed and 55% 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with 17% neither agreeing or disagreeing. Both results 
suggest that including a mid-point allows respondents to provide a neutral answer and 
improves the distributions. Whilst the question may contain provocative wording, 
participants are able to still acknowledge the complexities of the question in their answer by 
selecting ‘neither agree nor disagree’. Hough and Roberts (2005) note that efforts should be 
made to provide respondents with appropriate and sufficient response options to avoid 
presenting a false representation of attitudes. Additionally, as noted previously, this 
difference may in part be due to demographic differences as round one and round two 
interviews were undertaken in different areas with a greater geographic and larger 
participant base.   
 
The finalised questions following two rounds of CIs are shown below (Table 4.9.). A decision 
was also made to use ‘welfare claimants’ in both questions five and six as this made question 
six more succinct than using ‘welfare benefit recipients’. No concerns had been identified in 
the analysis to indicate doing so would be problematic; participants appeared to respond in 
the same way to both terms. Table 4.9 shows the six new survey questions designed for this 
project, plus the two questions used by the British Social Attitudes Survey to measure 




       Table 4.9. Final Draft of Survey Questions   
Item  Item Wording 
What is this 
measuring? 
Q1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  























Q6 Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have 












This chapter commenced by outlining the CI design process, presenting the measurement 
aims of the interviews. The CI framework was then presented prior to providing an overview 
of the cognitive interviews. The analysis of the cognitive interviews and the decision making 
involved throughout the question design has been discussed in detail to demonstrate the 
analytical process involved in the design of new survey questions. The process of undertaking 
cognitive interviews enabled questions to be pre-tested targeting the population 
representative of the eventual survey. This aims to assess whether questions work as 
intended, as much as this is possible. The process adopted for the nature of these CIs is 
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deemed to have been suitable in achieving the specific aims: key terms were tested to see if 
participants understood them in a consistent way; an understanding was gained into what 
these terms brought to participants’ minds when answering and what factors influenced 
responses; and, whether participants were able to answer sufficiently accurately and reliably 
to meet the measurement aims of the survey was assessed. The final draft of questions was 
then presented, which was tested in the pilot survey in September 2018, detailed in the next 




























Chapter 4.3. A Quantitative Framework 
 
4.3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the cognitive interviewing design process undertaken in the 
development of the new survey questions. Analysis of the cognitive interviews was then 
presented, which shows the decision-making process of question design for this study. The 
chapter concluded by presenting the final battery of questions, this included: four newly 
designed questions to measure punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils and welfare 
claimants; two questions fielded since the 1980s by the British Social Attitudes Survey to 
measure punitiveness towards lawbreakers; plus, two newly designed questions to measure 
beliefs about the punishment of school pupils (subsequently used to measure  
neo-conservative values, see Chapter 5). This chapter outlines the quantitative methodology 
used in this study. This short discussion presents the capacity of the chosen methodology for 
this study in achieving its objective of measuring public attitudes on a large scale. In doing so, 
limitations of using quantitative methods to examine punitive attitudes are also discussed 
whilst also outlining some of the efforts that have been made to reduce the effects of some 
of these limitations. The chapter concludes by outlining the pilot study, providing details 
about the pilot sample.   
 
4.3.2. Quantitative Methodology 
 
‘A survey is a systematic method for gathering information from (a sample of) entities 
for the purpose of constructing quantitative descriptors of the attributes of the large 
population of which the entities are members’ (Groves, 2004:2) 
 
This study applies quantitative methodology, derivative of an online survey, to the 
exploration of punitive public attitudes towards rulebreakers. The epistemology here 
suggests that knowledge about the social world can be gained through the use of a 
quantitative methodology (Bryman, 1984). The use of quantitative methodology to 
understand public opinion towards criminal justice has a relatively lengthy history in 
criminology (see Chapter 2.1.) and public attitudes (see Part 2). Quantitative methodology 
aims to be objective, replicable and able to examine relationships between factors (Bryman, 
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1984). The operationalization of concepts allows for objectivity maintaining a distance 
between researcher and participants (Bryman, 1984). Replicability is achieved through the 
ability to re-run the same survey in a different context (Bryman, 1984). Whilst the studying of 
relationships between factors is enabled through using statistical software (SPSS in this case) 
to conduct a range of statistical analyses (Farnworth et al., 1996; De Vaus 1995). Survey 
research then allows data collection from a large sample to be ‘structured’ and ‘systematic’ 
(De Vaus 1995:3), enabling analysis to be measurable and generalisable (Denscombe, 2014). 
However, it is also acknowledged that the researcher is present in every decision that is made 
throughout the project, from the formulation of the topic of study, the research design, 
question design, interpretation, analysis and write up. As such, steps have been undertaken 
along the way to be open and transparent about the decisions made in this project’s design; 
acknowledging the limitations and steps taken to attempt to reduce the effects of these 
limitations, where possible.   
 
4.3.3. Measuring Public Attitudes  
 
 ‘An attitude is shaped by, or some might say, created by, the measurement 
instrument.’ (Hough and Roberts, 2005:20).  
 
This study has aimed to measure public attitudes; this is ‘a snapshot’ of attitudes ‘at a given 
point in time’ (Denscombe, 2007:8). In doing so, it makes some fundamental assumptions: 
that individual, divergent and complex attitudes can be ‘standardised’ and simplified (Durand, 
2016).  
 
 ‘Structured surveys are blunt instruments’ (Hough, 1996:193) 
 
A clear limitation of survey research is the injustice that quantifying attitudes can do to the 
subtlety of individual viewpoints (Hough and Roberts, 2005). Hough and Roberts (2005) 
suggest that limitations can arise from an insufficient sampling strategy (see Chapter 5.2), 
inappropriate question wording and not providing sufficient and appropriate response 
categories. Efforts have been made to try and reduce some of the effects of these limitations 
throughout the study. The process of the study to this point, has detailed the efforts made to 
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design questions that are placed into context by literature, empirical research and trends in 
policies and political opinion. The cognitive interviewing process has outlined the attempts 
made to design questions that have appropriate wording, adequate response categories and 
measure attitudes as proposed by this study. For instance, the cognitive interviewing process 
highlighted the desire by some respondents to be provided with a mid-point (neither agree 
nor disagree), which has been detailed in the previous chapter.  
 
It is known that survey questions that are highly generalised can over-represent punitiveness 
(Hough and Roberts, 2005). Roberts and Hough (2005) found that providing more 
information to the public about sentencing scenarios tends to soften people’s responses to 
the use of (youth) custody. When people are given more time, information or questions on a 
subject, their punitiveness reduces (Hough and Roberts, 2005). This was observed in some 
the cognitive interviews (discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, section 7.4.). During verbal 
probing following participants’ completion of the main survey, some participants reflected on 
the severity of their answers or commented that they would have liked to have more 
information to enable them to make a more informed response. However, due to the 
constraints of the survey it was necessary to design the questions in a simple way. 
Additionally, the purposes of this study are to gain a general sense of punitive attitudes and 
attitudes towards the use of specific sanctions, to attempt to understand what influences 
these attitudes, and to compare attitudes towards different groups of rulebreakers. It was 
deemed that the questions were designed in a way that the objectives of the study could be 
achieved. The battery of questions designed for this project were embedded in a larger 
survey to explore contemporary social and political attitudes (Appendix D), as such these 
newly designed questions were well-suited to the style of questions of the survey. 
Additionally, survey research allows an understanding of a large number of people’s values 
and attitudes at a point in time (NatCen, 2020). Moreover, longitudinal survey research helps 
understand how attitudes and values change over time (NatCen, 2020).  
 
4.3.4. Web-based Surveys: Strengths and Limitations 
A web-based survey is a self-administered survey accessed via the internet and can be 
accessed via computers, smartphones and tablets (Callegaro et al., 2015). Web-based surveys 
have the strengths of speed of data collection, access to a geographically wide sample, and 
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the convenience of respondents completing the survey at their own pace (Callegaro et al., 
2015). Interviewer specific bias and interviewer’s variance, which can impact on the data 
through interviewer’s attitudes, moods and prejudices, are removed through web-based 
surveys (Callegaro et al., 2015). Additionally, the privacy afforded through this mode of 
delivery reduces the prevalence of socially desirable responses compared to other modes of 
delivery (Kreuter, Presser and Tourangeau, 2008; Heerwegh, 2009). Moreover, the more 
anonymous a person perceives themselves to be, the less respondents are likely to provide 
socially desirable answers (Heerwegh and Loosveldt, 2007). Web-based data collection 
strategies are now widely used and have become a mainstream form of data collection used 
by the Office for National Statistics and the Centre for Longitudinal Studies, for example 
(ONS, 2020; UCL, 2020). 
 
However, despite these strengths, there are some notable limitations. Non-response may 
occur in internet surveys (Callegaro et al., 2015) in which invited participants may refuse to 
participate altogether, cease participation at any point during the survey, or may only answer 
certain questions (Vehovar and Mantreda, 2017). There is also the increased likelihood of 
self-selection bias (Callegaro et al., 2015). In terms of the survey for this study, the non-
response rates are shown in Table 5.4 (p179). In total, there were 5,781 respondents; 3,178 
(29%) invited online panellists did not participate, and 488 (4%) dropped out at some point 
during the survey. Of the 488, 93 (91%) dropped on the introductory page of the survey, 
9.8% (48) dropped out when asked to submit their country and postcode, and a further 
12.1% (59) dropped out when asked their age and gender. Between 4 % and 5% tended to 
drop out during the attitudinal batteries of questions, with drop out percentages reducing as 
the survey progressed following the attitudinal based questions. These dropout rates 
potentially point to some limitations of web-based surveys highlighted by Callegaro et al. 
(2015). Lack of interest or motivation in the topic, time restrictions, lack of concentration 
when completing the survey, and problems understanding the questions may all impact on 
the data collected (Callegaro et al. (2015). Heerwegh and Loosveldt (2008) found in their 
comparison study of a face-to-face and a web-based survey in a student sample that the 
web-based survey was more likely to elicit higher item non-response and a higher number of 
‘don’t knows’. People also may refuse to answer a specific item if they feel it is sensitive, with 
some socio-demographic questions resulting in non-responses (Tourangeau et al., 2000).  
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Whilst the full sample of the main survey consisted of 5,781 respondents, once all variables 
were included in the multiple regression models, the sample size reduced considerably 
(n=2,090). This was due to the inclusion of some non-completed socio-demographic 
variables, specifically, religiosity, politics scale, class origin, income and ethnicity (detailed in 
the regression models). Religiosity resulted in the highest number of item non-response. The 
religiosity question was preceded by the question: ‘What is your religion?’, if respondents 
answered ‘none’ to this question, then they were not asked the subsequent question which 
asked, ‘Would you consider yourself as extremely religious or extremely non-religious?’. Of 
the 5,781 respondents, 2,453 respondents answered that they had no religion; therefore, 
they were not asked the subsequent religiosity question. However, religiosity was included in 
the survey and analyses due to its relevance to political attitudes (Friesen Ksiazkiewicz, 2014; 
McAndrew, 2020). The ordinal regression analyses also resulted in a reduced sample size 
(n=3,637) (see ordinal regression models for details). These limitations will be revisited in 
Chapter 10.     
 
In an attempt to mitigate some of the limitations of the web-based survey in this study, a 
range of steps were undertaken to attempt to design a survey instrument that not only 
operationalised and measured complex concepts, but also sought to test if certain aspects 
produced non-response issues. The range of steps taken consisted of expert reviews on the 
newly designed questions, two omnibus surveys, two rounds of cognitive interviews and a 
pilot survey during which questions were adapted and re-tested until the final survey 
instrument consisted of sixty-two items. The process undertaken in the design of the items 
specifically for this study are detailed throughout the thesis.  
 
4.3.5. The Pilot Survey  
Continuing the process of testing the survey questions a pilot survey was conducted between 
the 18th and 26th September 2018 to a representative sample, by BMG Research. It is 
important to pilot-test a survey to test the reliability, internal consistency and validity of a 
measurement instrument (Pallant, 2016) using participants representative of the targeted 
population of the study (Persaud, 2010). The pilot survey therefore was an online survey 
conducted by BMG Research of those aged over 16 years old (n=629). This was intended to 
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establish the relationships between items and batteries and to give an indication as to any 
potential problems with the survey. The main task was to check the distributions of items and 
to check the planned factor analyses worked as intended. Additionally, it was important to 
see if any questions were producing relatively high numbers of dropouts or if any questions 
were taking a relatively long time to answer. The median time for completion was 12 minutes 
and 51 seconds, which was assessed as acceptable. No questions were assessed as causing 
any noticeable concerns from the perspective of respondent engagement or willingness to 
answer the questions.    
 
The Pilot Sample 
The sample consisted of 629 respondents, 55% of which were male and 45% female. The 
modal age group was 55-64 with 22% of respondents in this age category. The second largest 
age group 45-54 with 20% of respondents in this group. Categories 25-34, 35-44 and 65-74 
were all similar at around 17%. The youngest (16-24) and oldest (75+) age groups consisted 
of 4% and 2% respectively. Eighty-seven percent of the sample classed themselves as White 
British, 66% of the sample reported growing up in a working-class household, whilst 29% 
grew up in a middle-class household.  Thirty-one percent of respondent households earned 
under £20,000 per year, with the majority (67%) earned under £40,000, and 7.4% earned 
over £70,000. Thirty-two percent reported that their financial situation was a lot worse (8%) 
or a little worse (24%) than a year ago, whereas almost 50% thought that it was the same, 
with 15% thinking it was a little better. Thirty-six percent had completed a university degree 
and 58% of respondents were married. Forty-seven percent reported that they had no 
religion, 26% were Church of England, 9.5% Roman Catholic, 5.4% Christian no denom, 2.1% 
other protestant or Christian, Methodist 1.4%, 2.2% Muslim, 1.1% Jewish and other religions 
accounted for less than 1% each. Only 1% reported being extremely religious, 5.1% very 
religious and 18.8% somewhat religious. Of the 510 respondents who reported voting in the 
2017 General Election, 30% voted Conservative and 27% voted Labour. Factor analyses were 
then conducted to assess validity (Pallant, 2016). This was used to explore if the questions 
measured what they were designed to measure (Pallant, 2016). There were no concerns 
noted from the analyses undertaken in the pilot survey.   





This chapter has presented the quantitative framework used in this study. The chapter began 
with a short discussion of the strengths of using quantitative methodology to examine public 
attitudes. These were highlighted as allowing a large-scale systematic analysis, which enables 
the operationalization of concepts and the study of relationships between variables of 
interest. The chapter then progressed to discuss the limitations of using quantitative 
methodology to explore public attitudes. This consisted of acknowledging that questions of a 
general nature can over-inflate punitive attitudes, the difficulty of trying to simplify complex 
attitudes and the efforts made to at least reduce some of the effects of these limitations in 
this study. The strengths and limitations of web-based surveys were then considered, 
including some reflections of the limitations of this online survey in regards to non-response 
items of some of the socio-demographic variables in this study. Finally, the chapter 
concluded by presenting the pilot study, which allowed the pre-testing of the questions and 
basic analyses to be undertaken. This process did not highlight any concerns with the survey 


















Chapter 5 Placing analysis into context 
 
5.1. Introduction  
Part 3 outlined the process used in developing survey questions. This entailed a review of the 
cognitive interviewing literature encompassing the strengths and limitations of this  
pre-testing method, the two main cognitive interviewing paradigms, and the challenges of 
conducting web-based surveys. The cognitive interviewing process for this study was then 
detailed, presenting the findings and the final survey questions. Finally, a short discussion on 
the strengths and limitations of survey research was presented before detailing the pilot 
study. This chapter aims to place the quantitative analysis into context in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the sample will be described followed by preliminary analyses of the key questions 
used in the analysis (the six newly designed questions plus the two criminal rulebreaker 
questions, see 5.2 below) will be presented. This chapter then progresses to present the 
descriptive statistics for each question, and subsequent analysis of the differences between 
gender and age for each question using t-tests and one-way ANOVAs. The construction of the 
independent variables used in the analyses will then be outlined, namely, neo-liberal values, 
neo-conservative values, social nostalgic values, economic nostalgic values, and political 
nostalgic values. This involves detailing the theoretical background and the practical steps to 
their construction.    
 
5.2. The Sample  
Fieldwork was conducted by BMG Research between Thursday 17th January to Tuesday 12th 
February 2019. Online panels have pre-recruited respondents enabling timely data collection 
(Callegaro et al., 2015). However, online panels may impact on measurement error through 
the presence of over-engaged or ‘professional’ respondents, the absence of non-internet or 
low-internet usage households, self-selection bias and representativeness (Callegaro et al., 
2015). The sampling strategy used by BMG detailed throughout this section aims to reduce 
the impact of these limitations. The British sample consisted of 5,781 responses to an online 
survey, which included 200 face-to-face interviews identified as low-level internet users. 
Internet use is less likely amongst the 65+ age group, and BAME individuals are generally less 
likely to use the internet relative to the white population (BMG, 2019). BMG uses a ‘panel 
blend’ approach sending survey invites simultaneously across other panels (Respondi, Cint, 
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Panelbase) in addition to its own panel with the aim of accessing a broader range of 
respondents (BMG, 2019). This method is designed to improve the quality of outputs by 
reducing the risk of selecting a single panel provider. Respondents were able to access the 
survey from desktops, laptops, tablets and mobile devices to increase accessibility (BMG, 
2019). A small pilot launch was conducted on the evening of the 17th of January. The pilot 
consisted of 45 completes, with the responses collected used to allow checks that data was 
being captured correctly and that the script was working as intended. The survey was 
launched fully on 18th January after no issues were identified following the pilot launch, with 
pilot completes included in the final dataset.   
 
A stratified random sampling approach was used drawing on online panelists’ profiled 
information with the sampling frame drawn to select a representative sample of 
approximately 500 respondents from each Government Office Region in Britain (Table 5.1.) 
(BMG, 2019). This is a more robust approach when compared to a quota design as it reduces 
the risk that ‘over-engaged’ panellists being over-represented in the final sample. An 
increased number of reminder invitations were sent to enable greater opportunity for 
panelists to respond to the survey.  
 
Table 5.1. The Composition of the Sample.  
Region Number Percent 
East Midlands 544 9.4 
East of England 559 9.7 
London 529 9.2 
North East 488 8.4 
North West 530 9.2 
Scotland 529 9.2 
South East 511 8.8 
South West 531 9.2 
Wales 517 8.9 
West Midlands 530 9.2 
Yorkshire and The Humber 513 8.9 
Total 5781 100.0 
 
Broad quotas for age, gender and Government Office Region were implemented to account 
for differential response rates. The sampling frame was not proportional in terms of the 
broader population of Great Britain. Instead, the sample was drawn in order to achieve a 
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representative sample of in the region 500 responses within each Government Office Region 
in Great Britain. Within each region the sample was stratified to be representative of age by 
gender and region. Educational level, ethnicity and IMD were monitored during fieldwork.  
 
Main Survey Face-to-face Interviews 
A small number (200) of face-to-face interviews by BMG were conducted with low internet 
users to increase the representativeness of the sample from the perspective of online 
connectivity. Whilst the internet is an increasingly 'normalised' mode of responding to 
surveys, analysis of ONS figures show that levels of internet use and access are considerably 
lower among older residents aged >65. Additionally, BAME individuals are, on average, less 
likely to use the internet relative to the white population. A total of 20 Lower Super Output 
Areas (LSOAs) were selected across Great Britain, with at least one LSOA selected in each 
Government Office Region. LSOAs were selected that either fell within the top decile in each 
Government Office region in terms share aged >65, or within the top decile in terms of BME 
population share. Interviews were conducted using a Computer-Assisted Self-Interview (CASI) 
methodology whereby an interviewer introduced the respondent to the computerised 
survey. Screening questions were conducted by the field interviewer, after which the tablet 
device was handed over to the respondent who then completed the survey on their own 
without interviewer involvement (unless where asked to provide technical support and 
assistance). Respondents were screened for their internet use prior to beginning the survey 
and only those respondents that used the internet for five hours or less per week (which 
includes any use of the internet at their place of work) were eligible to participate. The 












Table 5.2. Number of Face-to-face Interviews 
Government Office Region Over 65 BME 
East Midlands 9 9 
East of England 9 9 
London 9 11 
North East 10 9 
North West 9 9 
Scotland 8 9 
South East 8 10 
South West 9 3 
Wales 13 5 
West Midlands 9 15 
Yorkshire and Humberside 9 9 
TOTAL 102 98 
 
 
The overall composition of the final sample is as follows:  
 
Table 5.3. Number of Interviews 
Government Office Region Online Face-to-face TOTAL 
East Midlands 526 18 544 
East of England 541 18 559 
London 509 20 529 
North East 469 19 588 
North West 512 18 530 
Scotland 512 17 529 
South East 493 18 511 
South West 519 12 531 
Wales 499 18 517 
West Midlands 506 24 530 
Yorkshire and Humberside 495 18 513 
TOTAL 5581 200 5781 
 
 A total of 66 cases were removed for completing the survey at excessive speed. Any 
respondent that completed the survey in less than 40% of the median response time was 
removed from the dataset. All respondents in the data set therefore have a survey response 
time of greater than 363 seconds (6 minutes and 3 seconds). All counts cited here exclude 
removals. The median time for completion (excluding cases removed for completing the 
survey at excessive speed) was 14 minutes and 48 seconds. The valid completion rate was 
51%. The response/engagement rate was 71%. A breakdown of responses by status is 




 Table 5.4. Response Rates 
Status Definition Count Percentage 
Completed Completed and not removed for 
quality 
5781 51 
Target Full Target for region/soft launch reached 1579 14 
Refusal Did not participate 3178 29 





Completed the survey at excessive 
speed 
66 1 
TOTAL  10892 100 
 
A Nationally Representative Weight was calculated using targets ascertained for each 
Government Office Region. Targets3 were as follows within each Government Office Region:  
  • Age by gender (interlocking)  
• IMD (by quartile)  
• 2016 Past EU Referendum Vote  
• 2017 Past General Election Vote  
With the weights applied the effective sample size (a measure of sampling efficiency) was 
65%. Reduced efficiency at a national level is largely explained by the non-proportional 
targets for each Government Office Region. The Government Office Regions were specified 
by the Principle Investigator to ensure that the survey company did not recruit from limited 
areas, but instead recruited from a broad geographical area. A weighting variable was 
provided by the survey contractor. This weight  was not used for the purposes of the 
multivariate analyses undertaken for this study. A comparison of the weighted and 
unweighted frequencies for the socio-demographic variables was undertaken in which no 
substantial difference was noted (Appendix E). This gives support that the survey was broadly 
representative of the population of Britain without the need for the weighting variable.   
 
Who Is The Sample? 
The sample4 consists of 47% males and 53% females with a mean age of 49.66, SD 16.75, 
ranging from 16 to 94 years old with a normal distribution (Figure 5.1.). Fifty-eight percent 
 
3 All targets are based on Official Statistics from the ONS that are awarded National Statistics status, as well as 
the BBC's published election results (BMG, 2019).  
4 As noted in Chapter 4.3. there are some limitations with the sample; this will be revisited in Chapter 10. 
180 
 
are in a marriage-type relationship (married, living as married or in a civil partnership). Thirty-
three percent of the sample are degree educated, 52% educated up to degree level, and 15% 
have no qualifications. The median household income category before deductions is £25,000 
to £29,999 per annum, 35.5% earned under £20,000, 71.7% earned under £40,000 and 6.7% 
earned above £70,000. The Office for National Statistics measures the median household 
disposable income (after deductions) in the UK at £28,400 (ONS, 2019). Forty-two percent 
describe themselves as having no religion, with the largest religious group (28%) being 
Church of England. Almost 8% of the sample were unemployed and 64% described the 
household they were raised in as working class. Thirty percent of the sample voted 
conservative at the 2017 General Election, whilst 29% voted for Labour. Figure 5.2. shows 
respondents’ political self-identification (In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. 
Where would you place yourself on the following scale?). 
 
 












Figure 5.2. Politics Scale.  
 
 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics, T-Tests and One-way ANOVAs 
Six new survey questions were designed. Four of the six new survey items were designed to 
measure punitiveness towards rulebreaking welfare claimants and school children (Questions 
1, 2, 5 and 6 below), whilst the remaining two questions were designed to measure beliefs 
about school punishments aiming to explore beliefs relating to authoritarianism, discipline 
and social control (Questions 3 and 4 below, subsequently used to measure neo-conservative 
values). Question 1 to 6 formed one battery of questions in the survey and used a five-point 
Likert scale5, with all questions sharing the same response codes provided to the question: 
‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’  
1. Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments. 
2. School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded. 
3. Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behavior.  
4. School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behavior.   
5. Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties.  
6. Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped. 
 
Additionally, two survey items (Questions 7 and 8 below) developed and used over a period 
of decades by the British Social Attitudes Survey, were presented to participants in another 
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section of the survey sharing the same response codes5 as question 1 to 6, are to be used to 
analyze punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers: 
 
7. People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
8. For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. 
 
The higher the respondent’s score, the more punitive the person’s attitudes are. The 
questions designed for this project were embedded in a larger survey (Appendix D) aiming to 
explore public sentiments and political attitudes, therefore the questions designed here were 
well suited to the larger survey. 
 
The descriptive statistics for the eight items above are show in Table 5.5. The mean result 
shows that support for stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants received the most 
punitive response (mean=4.28, SD=.864). Caning was a good way of tackling disruptive 
behaviour received the least punitive response (mean=2.69, SD=1.320). Notably, the two 
statements with the largest standard deviations are those referring to physical punishments 
indicating a greater spread of responses with data points dispersed more widely from the 
mean (Field, 2018). Responses to the death penalty question has the largest standard 
deviation (SD=1.490) followed the corporal punishment question (Caning was a good way of 
tackling disruptive behaviour) (SD=1.320). The mode for both questions referring to 
rulebreaking welfare claimants and lawbreakers is 5, suggesting that the strongly agree 
category was the most frequent response category for these four questions. The median for 
all variables is 4 (agree) apart from for the caning statement (neither agree nor disagree). 
These findings suggest that respondents generally expressed support for more punishment, 





















































Number  5781 5781 5781 5781  5781 5781  5781 5781 
Mean  3.91 3.57 2.69 4.02  4.28 3.94  3.99 3.37 
Median  4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00  4.00 4.00  4.00 4.00 
Mode  4 4 2 4  5 5  5 5 
Std. 
Deviation 
 .937 1.103 1.320 .949  .864 1.084  .950 1.490 
Variance  .878 1.216 1.744 .900  .747 1.175  .902 2.219 
 
5.3.1. Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments 
Seventy-four percent of respondents strongly agreed (27%) or agreed (47%) with this 
statement, 17% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 9% either disagreed (7%) or strongly 
disagreed (2%) (see Figure 5.3). Scores for this variable indicate negative skewness (-.842) 
indicating that values are clustered at the high end (more punitive scores) and positive 
kurtosis (.474) indicating that the values are peaked. These skewness and kurtosis scores 
indicate that this variable is not normally distributed with a mean standard error of 0.12. 
Whilst descriptive statistics indicate that this variable is not normally distributed parametric 
tests will be carried out on the data due to the large number of cases involved. Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2013:80) suggest that the risk of distortion from skewed data is reduced with 
200+ cases. Additionally, parametric tests have historically been used to analyse data in 
criminology, therefore their use here will allow comparison with previous research in the 
field6.  
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare responses to this statement 
between males and females (Figure 5.4). There was a significant difference (p=.001) 
between scores for males (M= 3.96, SD=.923) and females (M=3.86, SD=.947; 
t(5709)=4.133). The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean=.102, 95% CI: .054 to 
 
6 Non-parametric tests were also undertaken for completion as these are normally used for items measured on 
ordinal scales (Pallant, 2016). Statistical results did not differ to those outlined in this chapter.   
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.150) was very small (eta squared=.003). Eta squared ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the 
proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent group 
(Pallant, 2016).  
 
Figure 5.3. Frequencies for tougher punishments       Figure 5.4. Gender responses for  
for unruly school children.                              punishments for unruly school children.     
  
 
A one-way between-groups analysis found a statistically significant difference at the <.05 
level for responses for the different age categories, however, the effect size calculated using 
eta-squared, was .02 indicating that the actual difference in mean scores was small. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) test indicated that there 
was a statistically significant difference in the mean scores for both the 16-24 and 25-34 age 
categories compared to every other age group, with the younger age groups being less 
punitive. The means plot (Figure 5.5) illustrates the responses with the higher scores being 
more punitive.  
 
Figure 5.5. Mean by age range for tougher punishments  
for unruly school children. 
 
 












The majority of respondents (74%) were in agreement that unruly school children should 
receive tougher punishments indicating an overall punitive response. There are statistically 
significant differences, with small effect sizes, between gender and certain age groups, with 
males being more punitive and the two youngest age groups being less punitive in 
comparison to older age groups.  
 
5.3.2. School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded  
Fifty-nine percent of respondents strongly agreed (22%) or agreed (37%) with this 
statement, 20% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 21% either disagreed (18%) or strongly 
disagreed (3%) (Figure 5.6). Scores for this variable indicate negative skewness (-.408) and 
negative kurtosis (-.795) suggesting that the variable is not normally distributed, with a mean 
standard error of .015. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare responses 
to this variable between males and females (Figure 5.7). There was a significant difference 
(p=.001) between males (M=3.64, SD=1.106) and females (M=3.51, SD=1.096; 
t(5779)=4.324). The magnitude of the differences in the means (.126, 95% CI: .069 to .182) 
was very small (eta squared=.003).  
 
Figure 5.6. Frequencies for permanent exclusion.   Figure 5.7. Gender responses for permanent   




A one-way between-groups analysis of variance indicates that there is a statistically 
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however, the effect size calculated using eta-squared, was .01 indicating that the actual 
difference in mean scores was small. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean score for both the 16-24 age category was significantly difference 
from every other age group apart from the 75+ category. The 25-34 age category was 
significantly different to the 16-24 and 45-54 age category. Whilst these younger age groups 
were less punitive than older age groups, the means plot below shows a curvilinear 
relationship between age and support for the permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school 
pupils, suggesting a more complex relationship than with support for tougher punishments 
for rulebreaking school pupils (Figure 5.8).  
 





The majority of respondents (59%) were in agreement that school pupils who repeatedly 
break school rules should be permanently excluded, a reduction of 15% from agreement 
with unruly school pupils should receive tougher punishments. This suggests that the 
introduction of a specific severe sanction reduces punitive responses from some 
participants. Despite this reduction, the responses still indicate an overall punitive response. 
There are statistically significant differences between gender and certain age groups, with 
males being more punitive and the youngest age group being the least punitive, however the 
means plot illustrates a more complex relationship between age and punitiveness with the 
45-54 age category being the most punitive. Despite these findings, the effect sizes were 




5.3.3. Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behavior 
Thirty percent of respondents either strongly agreed (11%) or agreed (19%) with this 
statement, 21% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 49% either disagreed (25%) or strongly 
disagreed (24%) (Figure 5.9). Scores for this variable indicate positive skewness (.252) and 
negative kurtosis (-1.112) suggesting that the variable is not normally distributed, with a 
mean standard error of .017. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare 
responses to between males and females (Figure 5.10). There was a significant difference 
(p=.001) between males (M=3.01, SD=1.335) and females (M=2.41, SD=1.243; 
t(5541.15)=17.408). The magnitude of the differences between the means (.594, 95% CI: 
.527 to .660) was a small to moderate effect (eta squared = .05). 
 
Figure 5.9. Frequencies for caning.                       Figure 5.10. Gender responses for caning.   
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance shows a statistically significant difference at 
the <.05 level for the responses for the different age categories, however, the effect size 
calculated using eta-squared, was .03 indicating that the actual difference in mean scores 
was quite small. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
score for the 16-24 age category was significantly different from every other age group. The 
25-34 age category was significantly different to all age categories except the 34-44 age 
group. The 35-44 age category was significantly different to all apart from the 25-34 age 
group. The 45-54, 55-64, 65-74 and 75+ age groups were significantly different to the 
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The minority of respondents (30%) were in agreement that caning was a good way of 
tackling disruptive behaviour indicating less support for physical punishments. There are 
statistically significant differences, with small effect sizes, between gender and certain age 
groups, with males being more supportive of the statement and the youngest age group 
being less supportive than older age groups.  
 
5.3.4. School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behavior 
Seventy-six percent of respondents either strongly agreed (35%) or agreed (41%) with this 
statement, 16% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 8% either disagreed (6%) or strongly 
disagreed (2%) (Figure 5.12). Scores for this variable indicate negative skewness (-.911) and 
positive kurtosis (.482) suggesting that the variable is not normally distributed, with a mean 
standard error of .012. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare responses 
to between males and females (Figure 5.13). There was a significant difference (p=.003) 
between males (M=4.05, SD=.952) and females (M=3.98, SD=.945; t(5779)=2.960). The 
magnitude of the differences between the means (.074, 95% CI: .025 to .123) was very small 








Figure 5.12 Frequencies for punishments not      Figure 5.13. Gender responses for 
punishments strict enough.                                    not strict enough.  
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance shows a statistically significant difference at 
the <.05 level for the responses for the different age categories. The effect size calculated 
using eta-squared, was .04 indicating that the actual difference in mean scores was small to 
medium. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for 
both the 16-24 and 25-34 age categories were significantly different from every other age 
group. The 35-44 age category was significantly different to all age groups apart from the  
55-64 and 75+ groups (Figure 5.14).  
 





The majority (76%) were in agreement that school punishments these days are not strict 
enough to stop bad behaviour. There are statistically significant differences between gender 
and certain age groups, with males being more supportive of the statement and the 
0% 20% 40% 60%
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
School punishments these days are not strict 




youngest age group being less supportive than the older age groups. However, the effect 
sizes are small which is also reflected in the differences in mean scores.    
 
5.3.5. Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties 
Eighty-four percent of respondents either strongly agreed (49%) or agreed (35%) with this 
statement, 12% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 4% either disagreed (3%) or strongly 
disagreed (1%) (Figure 5.15). Scores for this variable indicate negative skewness (-1.214) and 
positive kurtosis (1.321) suggesting that the variable is not normally distributed. The mean 
standard error is .011. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare responses 
to support for stiffer penalties between males and females (Figure 5.16). There was no 
significant difference (p=.097) between males (M=4.26, SD=.893) and females (M=4.30, 
SD=.837; t(5556.11)=-1.661).  
 
Figure 5.15: Frequencies for welfare claimants     Figure 5.16. Gender responses for welfare 




A one-way between-groups analysis of variance shows a statistically significant difference at 
the <.05 level for the responses for the different age categories. The effect size calculated 
using eta-squared, was small at .02. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated 
that the mean scores for both the 16-24 and 25-34 age categories were significantly different 
from every other age group apart from each other. The 35-44 age category was significantly 
different to the youngest and two oldest age groups, and the 45-54 age group was 
significantly different to the two youngest and 64-74 age groups. The 65-74 age group is 
statistically significantly different to the youngest four age groups, whilst the 75+ age 
category is statistically different to the youngest three age groups (Figure 5.17). 
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The majority (84%) were in agreement that welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the 
system should face stiffer sentences indicating the most punitive response of all the 
statements. There was no statistically significant difference between genders. There were 
differences in mean scores between certain age groups, with youngest age group being less 
punitive than the older age groups with a small effect size.     
 
5.3.6. Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped 
Sixty-nine percent of respondents either strongly agreed (39%) or agreed (30%) with this 
statement, 19% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 12% either disagreed (10%) or strongly 
disagreed (2%) (Figure 5.18). Scores for this variable indicate negative skewness (-.778) and 
negative kurtosis (-.264) suggesting that the variable is not normally distributed. The mean 
standard error is .014. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare responses 
between males and females (Figure 5.19). There was a significant difference (p=<.001) 
between males (M=3.87, SD=1.125) and females (M=3.99, SD=1.044; t(5534.43)=-4.013). The 
magnitude of the differences between the means (-.115, 95% CI: -.171 to -.059) was very 










Figure 5.18: Frequencies for permanently         Figure 5.19: Gender responses for  
stopping welfare.                                                   permanently stopping welfare.             
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance shows a statistically significant difference at 
the <.05 level for the responses for the different age categories. However, the effect size 
calculated using eta-squared, was very small at .004. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey 
HSD test indicated that the mean scores for the 16-24 age category were statistically 
significantly different from the 45-54, 65-74 and the 75+ age categories. The 25-34 age 
category was statistically significantly different to the 75+ age group. The means shows a 
more complex relationship between age and support for permanently stopping payments for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants compared to support for stiffer penalties with the 55-64 age 
group decreasing in punitive attitudes compared to its direct peers. Despite these 
differences the effect sizes were very small (Figure 5.20).  
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The majority (69%) were in agreement that welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the 
system should have their payments permanently stopped; this is a 15% reduction in support 
from those who were in agreement with welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system 
should face stiffer penalties. This suggests that the introduction of a specific extreme sanction 
reduces punitiveness for some respondents. This follows the same trend as the responses for 
rulebreaking school pupils. There are statistically significant differences between gender and 
certain age groups, with females being more punitive and the youngest age group being least 
punitive. Despite these findings, the effect sizes were very small, which is also reflected in the 
small differences between mean scores.     
 
5.3.7. People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences 
Seventy-one percent of respondents either strongly agreed (36%) or agreed (35%) with this 
statement, 22% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 7% either disagreed (6%) or strongly 
disagreed (1%) (Figure 5.21). Scores for this variable indicate negative skewness (-.682) and 
negative kurtosis (-.098) suggesting that the variable is not normally distributed. The mean 
standard error is .012. An independent samples t-test found that the differences in mean 
scores between males and females were not statistically significant (Figure 5.22). 
 
Figure 5.21: Frequencies for stiffer sentences       Figure 5.22: Gender responses for stiffer  
for lawbreakers.                                                           sentences for lawbreakers.          
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of age 
on responses to support for stiffer sentences for lawbreakers. There was a statistically 
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However, the effect size calculated using eta-squared, was small at .02. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for the 16-24 age 
category was statistically significantly different from all other age groups. The 25-34 age 
group was statistically different to all age groups except the 35-44 group, whilst the 35-44 
age group was statistically different to the youngest and two oldest age groups (Figure 5.23). 
 
Figure 5.23. Mean by age range for stiffer sentences  





The majority (71%) were in agreement that people who break the law should be given stiffer 
sentences indicating an overall punitive response. There are no statistically significant 
differences between genders. There were statistically significant differences in mean scores 
between certain age groups, with punitiveness increasing with age with a small effect size.     
 
5.3.8. For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence 
Fifty-four percent of respondents either strongly agreed (32%) or agreed (22%) with this 
statement, 16% neither agreed nor disagreed, and 30% either disagreed (11%) or strongly 
disagreed (19%) (Figure 5.24). Scores for this variable indicate negative skewness (-.409) and 
negative kurtosis (-1.255) suggesting that the variable is not normally distributed with a mean 
standard error of .020. An independent samples t-test results indicate a significant difference 
(p=<.05) between males (M=3.42, SD=1.50) and females (M=3.33, SD=1.48; t(5779)=2.523). 
The magnitude of the differences between the means (.099, 95% CI: .022 to .176) was very 




Figure 5.24. Frequencies for death penalty           Figure 5.25. Gender responses for death  
       penalty 
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance shows a statistically significant difference at 
the <.05 level for the responses for the different age categories. However, the effect size 
calculated using eta-squared, was very small at .004. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey 
HSD test indicated that the mean scores for the 16-24 age category were statistically 
significantly different from the 45-54, 55-64 and 64-74 age categories, whilst the 25-34 age 
group was statistically different to the 65-74 age groups (Figure 5.26).  
 




Fifty-four percent were in agreement that for some crimes the death penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence, a reduction in 17% in punitiveness from support for stiffer sentences 
for lawbreakers suggesting that the introduction of an extreme sanction reduces 
punitiveness in some respondents. This result follows a similar trend to both the 
rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants questions. There are statistically significant 
differences between gender and certain age groups, with males being more punitive and the 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree





youngest age group being least punitive with very small effect sizes, which is also reflected in 
the small differences between mean scores. 
 
Overall Summary 
The most punitive response from the eight items was support for stiffer penalties for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants, whilst the belief that caning was a good way of tackling 
disruptive behaviour received the least support. The two questions involving physical 
punishments (caning and the death penalty) received the least support. The questions which 
posed non-specific sanctions towards rulebreakers received the top three most punitive 
responses. The introduction of specific extreme sanctions appears to reduce punitiveness for 
some respondents. The mean plots for most of the questions show a general trend of 
punitiveness increasing with age with the two youngest age brackets being least punitive. 
Table 5.6. below shows an overview of the percentages for each question with the numbers 
in brackets of respondents in each category.  
              
 


























































































































5.4. Constructing variables for analysis   
This project aims to assess the prevalence of punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers, to 
explore the relationship between punitive and political attitudes, to examine the factors 
influencing these public attitudes, and to explore the extent to which punitive attitudes vary 
towards different groups of rulebreakers. To achieve these aims, in addition to the new 
variables designed specifically for this study, new variables have been constructed from the 
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sixty-two questions fielded in the main survey to explore a range of social and political values 
and attitudes, crime related factors, plus a range of socio-demographic factors (see Appendix 
D).  
 
This study aimed to explore the extent to which a range of political values and social attitudes 
were related to punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers, specifically neo-conservative values, 
neo-liberal values, and social, economic and political nostalgic values. During the early 1980s, 
New Right political ideologies emerged in many western industrialised nations and are 
characterised by a combination of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideals (Gamble, 1988; 
Hay, 1996; Hayes, 1994). Whilst there is some overlap between these two strands, they each 
offer distinct perspectives (Hayes, 1994). Hayes (1994) notes that the interconnected themes 
of neo-conservativism include social order, traditional values, the authoritarian state 
expressed through law, and nationalism. Whilst neo-liberalism’s interconnected themes 
assert the free market, competition, profit, and the belief that state authority should be 
limited to defence, the rule of law and monetary control (Hayes, 1994). The literature reviews 
exploring the long terms trends in policies towards rulebreakers suggest that since the early 
1980s these policies have increasingly become underpinned by neo-liberal and neo-
conservative ideals.  
 
The design of the new survey questions was partly influenced by parliamentary discourse 
relating to young people prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter 3.3). The power of 
the state to be able to administer physical discipline to young people as a form of social 
control was a much debated topic by Conservative MPs during this period. During the same 
period, the education system was criticised by government for a range of social problems, 
such as anti-social behaviour (Dorey, 2014). There were concerns about the link between 
indiscipline in schools and anti-social behaviour in neighbourhoods (Berridge et al., 2001). 
Conservative MPs supported the caning of school children to ‘save them from a life of crime’ 
(HC Deb 28 January 1997). An educational strategy emerged under the Conservative 
government during this period, which reiterated ‘social skills, respect for authority, 
traditional values and discipline’ founded on a traditional education (Hall, 1979:19). The core 
of the neo-conservative belief system is to advocate authority to secure order (Hayes, 1994). 
Neo-conservativism represents traditional impulses with order and authority clearly evident 
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(Hayes, 1994). The Education Act 1988 increased the regulation of teaching through a set 
curriculum, stronger accountability of teachers, and advocated broadly Christian acts of 
worship in schools (Evans, 1989; Jones, 2009). Neo-conservativism is also an evaluation of the 
past in response to how people observe and experience the present. It is an underlying belief 
that is rooted in the past. It differs from punitiveness due to this historical construction.  
 
Punitiveness, by contrast, is an attitude which is a reflection on the present form of 
punishment, which is supportive of harsher punishments in the future. Punitiveness has 
‘connotations of excess’, suggests an intensification of punishment either by duration or 
severity, and is applied disproportionately (Matthews, 2005:179). The operationalisation of 
punitiveness in this study aims to tap into the public’s desire for harsher penalties (school 
punishments, welfare sanctions, sentences). It is an attitude that suggests that punishment as 
it is, in its present form, is not enough, and that it should be harsher (Kury and Ferdinand, 
1999; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007; Roberts et al., 2003). It is a reflection on the present 
form of punishment and shows a desire for harsher punishments in future. This distinction 
was evident in the cognitive interviews.   
 
Cognitive Interviews 
The design phase of the new survey questions aimed to construct questions that measured 
people’s evaluation of historical authoritarian measures. These questions were then tested in 
the first round of cognitive interviews (these questions were only tested in the first round as 
people were assessed as understanding the wording and the sentiments of the newly 
designed items).  
 
The school punitiveness items (Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments; 
School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded) were 
designed to tap into people’s direct support for harsher sanctions. They are reflections on the 
current sanctions as not being harsh enough and the desire for harsher sanctions in the 
future. The neo-conservative items (Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive 
behaviour; School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour) were 
designed to tap into people’s beliefs about traditional impulses focussing on a steady 
maintenance of authority and order. 
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There was a distinction between people’s beliefs about how authority was administered in 
the past (neo-conservative items) and their attitudes towards how rulebreakers ought to be 
punished (school punitiveness items). Respondents held beliefs that social control measures 
were more effective in the past but did not generally hold punitive attitudes now i.e. they did 
not also necessarily seek harsher punishments. Some respondents were clear that past forms 
of behaviour management are not a form of social control that they would desire today. 
Those old enough to have been subject to caning in schools, made extensive nostalgic 
references to their own experiences of being caned as children. Some respondents agreed 
with the question but were clear that they were unsupportive of corporal punishment being 
reintroduced.    
 
‘…I didn’t agree with caning...I don’t think children should be physically punished, no.’ (R5, 
agreed with the statement when completing the survey showing her belief that caning was a 
good way of managing behaviour, but was clear in her discourse that she did not support it as 
a form of behavioural control today). 
 
‘I think if you got the cane I think some people wouldn’t do it again would they? I don’t think 
that sort of thing is needed these days’ (R11, agreed with the historical compliance effect of 
caning on some school children’s behaviour, but disagreed with it as a form of behavioural 
control today).  
 
R7 referred to his own experiences of corporal punishment in schools and noted that being 
caned taught you to respect authority.  
 
In response to School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour, 
the following observations were made. Ten out of twelve respondents agreed with the 
statement, whilst only seven out of twelve agreed with Unruly school children should receive 
tougher punishments, and four out of twelve were in agreement that School pupils who 
repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded. Participants’ discourse 
appeared to make a distinction between the historical nature of the statement and the 




‘…school punishments these days are not strict enough to stop poor behaviour, so they are 
not stopping the bad behaviour…but I disagreed because I don’t really see how they can get 
much stricter…bar hitting the children…’ (R12) 
 
‘I’m going to agree, because I don’t think punishments in schools are strict enough…’ (R5, 
disagreed with the school punitiveness items). 
 
Whilst there are some similarities in the nature of the neo-conservative values variable and 
the punitiveness questions (particularly school punitiveness), there is also a clear distinction 
in the root of these questions as discussed above. Respondents made a clear distinction 
between the historical nature of the neo-conservative items and their reflections on current 
school punishments in relation to the school punitiveness items. A further discussion 
regarding the neo-conservative values variable is included in Chapter 10.  
 
In addition to the neo-conservative and neo-liberal values variables, nostalgia has also been 
linked to public support for politicians espousing radical right views in recent years (Gest, 
2016). As such, nostalgic values will also be examined in this study taking the form of social, 
economic, and political nostalgia. A range of steps were undertaken to attempt to design a 
survey instrument that operationalised and measured complex concepts. The range of steps 
taken consisted of expert reviews on the newly designed questions, two omnibus surveys, 
two rounds of cognitive interviews and a pilot survey during which questions were adapted 
and re-tested until the final survey instrument consisted of the final sixty-two items. The 
following section details the construction of key variables used in the analyses, specifically, 
neo-liberal values and neo-conservative values (belief systems) and social nostalgic values, 
economic nostalgic values and political nostalgic values (nostalgia).    
 
5.4.1. Beliefs Systems 
Belief systems, specifically neo-liberal values and neo-conservative values, are central 
concepts in analyzing the relationship between punitive and political attitudes towards 
rulebreakers (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). The questions were measured using a Likert scale7 
 




with the higher the respondent’s score, the more neo-liberal or neo-conservative the 
respondent’s values were viewed to be. This section will first outline the theoretical 
background to the construction of the separate items, before proceeding to present the 
practical construction of the neo-liberal values and neo-conservative values variables in SPSS.  
 
  Table 5.7. Measuring neo-liberal values  
Item Wording 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. 
There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and wages. 
Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems. 
Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership. 
It would be better for everyone if we all paid less tax. 
Welfare benefits should be reserved for only the extremely needy. 
 
Theoretical background to neo-liberal values items 
Neo-liberalism’s interconnected themes assert the free market, competition, profit and the 
belief that state authority should be limited to defence, the rule of law and monetary control 
(Hayes, 1994). Six separate items used in the survey to measure neo-liberal values (existing 
and newly designed items) aimed to relate to neo-liberalism’s core themes asking, ‘How 
much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’ (Table 5.7): 
 
• Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth: This question was 
designed by the British Election Study (BES) and suggests that everyone is deemed to 
benefit from the market (Hayes, 1994).  
• There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and 




• Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems: a central theme 
to neo-liberalism is a belief in ‘the power of the market’ (Hayes, 1994:27). Designed by 
the BES. 
• Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership: anti-privatisation 
(BES). 
• It would be better for everyone if we all paid less tax: aims to tap into support for   
      anti-taxation (New). 
• Welfare benefits should be reserved for only the extremely needy: State intervention for 
those deemed as in ‘genuine need’ i.e. ‘the old, the sick and the incapable’ (Hayes, 
1994). (New).  
 
Constructing the neo-liberal values variable  
Factor analysis was undertaken to construct a new variable from these six separate items 
with the aim of conducting regression analyses. Exploratory factor analysis was undertaken 
(as with the construction of all new variables composed of multiple variables) using principle 
axis factoring, which does not assume normal distribution, with oblique rotation allowing for 
correlation between variables (Field, 2018). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) for all six items 
verified sampling adequacy, KMO=.757, which is above the minimum criteria of 0.5 and falls 
into the range of ‘middling’ (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). All items loaded onto one factor with the 
Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership question loading 
negatively onto the factor. The Cronbach’s alpha for the original six items was .491 showing 
an increase to .665 should Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership 
be removed. Exploratory factor analysis was re-run omitting this item. The KMO measure 
verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis (KMO=.754) and all KMO values for individual 
items were greater than .80, which is above the acceptable limit of 0.5. with one eigenvalue 
over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 43.54% of the variance. The scree 
plot confirmed retaining 1 factor. The neo-liberal items have a medium to high reliability 
(Cronbach’s α=.665). Results from factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability 
of constructing a single variable from the five items, namely neo-liberal values. Figure 5.27 





Figure 5.27: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for neo-liberal values items Factor 1 
There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and wages .674 
Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems .617 
Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth .600 
Welfare benefits should be reserved for only the extremely needy .438 
It would be better for everyone if we all paid less tax .368 
 
Theoretical background to neo-conservative values  
Hayes (1994) notes that the interconnected themes of neo-conservativism include a desire 
for social order, support for traditional values and support of an authoritarian state 
expressed through law. Four separate items were used in the survey to measure  
neo-conservative values (existing and newly designed) aiming to relate to  
neo-conservativism’s core themes (Table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8. Measuring neo-conservative values   
Item Wording 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behaviour.  
School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour.  
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values. 
Schools should teach children to obey authority. 
 
The four items included two newly designed items for this project and two designed and used 
by the British Election Study and the British Social Attitudes Survey. The first two newly 
designed questions were presented in the battery of newly designed questions for this 
project (see section 5.3), whilst the British Election Study and British Social Attitudes 
questions were presented in a battery with neo-liberal values items above. Respondents 




• Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behaviour: refers to the 
‘romantic appraisal of the past’ in achieving order in schools (Apple, 2006:67). 
(Designed for this project). 
• School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour: past 
methods for maintaining order in schools was more effective then present-day 
methods (Apple, 2006) (Designed for this project).  
• Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values: support for 
traditional values (Hayes, 1994). Traditional values are viewed by the neo-conservative 
as featuring ‘good’ social order which should be preserved (Hayes, 1994). Christian 
values, discipline and respect are central to this (Hayes, 1994). (British Election Study; 
British Social Attitudes Survey). 
• Schools should teach children to obey authority: a central theme of neo-conservativism 
is a desire for social order (Hayes, 1994). (British Social Attitudes Survey).  
 
Constructing the neo-conservative values variable  
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted using principle axis factoring with oblique rotation. 
The KMO measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO=.778, which falls 
into the range of ‘Middling’ (Kaiser and Rice, 1974) and all KMO values for individual items 
were greater than .75. Analysis resulted in one factor with an eigenvalue above 1 and in 
combination explained 59.72% of the variance with the scree plot confirmed retaining 1 
factor. The neo-conservative items have a good reliability (Cronbach’s α=.759). Results from 
factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of constructing a single variable 
from the four items, namely neo-conservative values, with factor loadings are shown in Table 
5.28. 
 
Figure 5.28. Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for neo-conservative values  Factor 1 
Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behaviour .571 
School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour .752 
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values .703 






5.4.2. Nostalgia Items  
The nostalgia battery consisted of thirteen individual questions designed to measure social, 
economic and political nostalgic values (see Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11) asking respondents 
‘How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?’ with the same 
response categories as the beliefs systems variables8 with the higher the respondent’s score, 
the more nostalgic the respondent’s values were viewed to be. The questions were tested in 
the cognitive interviews to understand whether young people were able to answer the 
questions. Analysis showed that they were able to answer these questions, did have attitudes 
and were able to choose the ‘don’t know’ category if they so wished9.  This section will first 
outline the theoretical background to the construction of the separate items, before 
proceeding to present the practical construction of the nostalgic values variables. 
 
Theoretical background to social nostalgic values 
The social nostalgic values battery contains six questions which aimed to assess the extent to 
which respondents felt that the country, or areas they are familiar with, have changed and 
that this change provokes a sense of sadness for them (Table 5.9).  
 
Table 5.9. Measuring social nostalgic values  
Item Wording 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
I would like my country to be the way it used to be. 
More and more, I don’t like with what my country has become. 
These days I feel like a stranger in my own country. 
The country’s best days are behind it. 
I feel sad when I think about how areas like the one I grew up in have changed. 
I feel sad when I think about how areas like the one I now live in have changed. 
 
8 Response codes were: 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly 
agree. 
9 Two rounds of cognitive interviews and online pilots pre-tested the questions, which included fielding the 
questions to young people. Most noted some historical knowledge through education or family and were able 




The six items include three newly designed questions and three questions designed and used 
by IPSOS MORI. Respondents were asked, ‘How much do you agree or disagree with each of 
the following statements?’ 
 
• I would like my country to be the way it used to be: refers to feeling that country has 
changed for the worse. (IPSOS MORI). 
• More and more, I don’t like with what my country has become: a sense that the 
country is getting worse. (IPSOS MORI). 
• These days I feel like a stranger in my own country: Feelings of alienation. (IPSOS 
MORI). 
• The country’s best days are behind it: The idea that the country is in decline. (New). 
• I feel sad when I think about how areas like the one I grew up in have changed: change 
which provokes sadness. (New). 
• I feel sad when I think about how areas like the one I now live in have changed: change 
which provokes sadness. (New). 
 
Constructing the social nostalgic variable  
These six items were factor analysed to form one social nostalgic values variable. The KMO 
measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO=.837, falling into the range of 
‘meritorious’ (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). All KMO values for individual items were greater than 
.78; one factor had an eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 
57.5% of the variance and the scree plot confirmed retaining 1 factor. The six social nostalgic 
values items have a high reliability (Cronbach’s α=.849), however, reliability analysis indicated 
that removing the item The country’s best days are behind it would increase the alpha to 
.855. Reliability analysis was repeated with item 3.4. removed and confirmed that no 
additional items required removing. The KMO of the 5 items = .819 verified the sampling 
adequacy for the analysis with all individual items greater than .76, and analysis confirmed 
retaining one factor explaining 63.4% of the variance.  Results from factor analysis and 
Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of constructing a single variable from the five items. 





Figure 5.29: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for social nostalgic values Factor 1 
I feel sad when I think about how areas like the one I grew up in have changed .824 
I feel sad when I think about how the areas like the one I now live in have changed .787 
These days I feel like a stranger in my own country .730 
I would like my country to be the way it used to be .720 
More and more, I don't like what my country has become .617 
 
Theoretical background to economic nostalgic values 
The economic nostalgic values battery consists of five items (Table 5.10) aiming to assess the 
extent to which respondents believe that there has been an economic change which is 
dominated by profit, market forces and increased economic inequalities and that this has 
been detrimental to communities.     
 
Table 5.10. Measuring economic nostalgic values  
Item Wording 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
The profit motive has come to dominate all aspects of our society. 
Making money is all people care about these days. 
The reliance on market forces has increased the gap between rich and poor. 
It feels to me like the country lost something when coal mines, steel mills and shipyards 
closed. 
I feel that there has been a loss of community spirit around here since the 1980s. 
Three of the five items were newly designed and asked, ‘How much do you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements?’ 
  
• The profit motive has come to dominate all aspects of our society: Change which goes 
beyond the economy. (Designed by Karstedt and Farrall, 2007).  
• Making money is all people care about these days: Focus on money in society. (New). 
• The reliance on market forces has increased the gap between rich and poor: Increased 
inequality. (Designed by Karstedt and Farrall, 2007). 
• It feels to me like the country lost something when coal mines, steel mills and shipyards 
closed: Loss of heavy industry. (New).  
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• I feel that there has been a loss of community spirit around here since the 1980s: 
change that has been detrimental to local communities (New). 
 
Constructing the economic nostalgic variable  
Factor analysis was conducted to form one economic nostalgic values variable. The KMO 
measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO=.779 falling into the range of 
‘middling’ (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). All KMO values for individual items were greater than .75, 
one factor had an eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 
50.66% of the variance with the scree plot confirming the retention of one factor. The 
economic nostalgic values items have a medium to high reliability (Cronbach’s α=.753). 
Results from factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of constructing a 
single variable from the five items. Figure 5.30 shows the factor loadings. 
 
Figure 5.30: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for economic nostalgic values items Factor 1 
The profit motive has come to dominate all aspects of our society .682 
Making money is all people care about these days (REC High = more punitive) .666 
The reliance on market forces has increased the gap between rich and poor .608 
I feel there has been a loss of community spirit around here since the 1980s .594 
It feels to me like the country lost something when coal mines, steel mills and shipyards closed .543 
 
Theoretical background to political nostalgic values 
The political nostalgic values item contained questions that referred explicitly to Margaret 
Thatcher and her governments. These items aimed to assess the extent to which respondents 
believed that the Thatcher governments had a detrimental impact on ordinary people’s lives 
and communities and that this detrimental impact endures today (Table 5.11).  
 
Table 5.11. Measuring political nostalgic values  
Item Wording 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Margaret Thatcher’s governments decreased the quality of life for many ordinary people. 
Margaret Thatcher’s governments did a lot of damage to communities around here. 
Many of the problems we now face started in the 1980s with Margaret Thatcher. 
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   Two of the three items were designed by the project team and asked, ‘How much do you 
agree or disagree with each of the following statements?’ 
• Margaret Thatcher’s governments decreased the quality of life for many ordinary 
people: Refers to the impact that Thatcher’s governments had on the quality of normal 
people’s lives.  (Adapted from Holbrook and Schindler, 1994).  
• Margaret Thatcher’s governments did a lot of damage to communities around here: 
Refers to the impact that Thatcher’s governments policies had on local communities. 
(New).  
• Many of the problems we now face started in the 1980s with Margaret Thatcher: 
Refers to whether current problems in Britain can be traced back to policies of the 
Thatcher governments. (New).  
 
Constructing the political nostalgic variable  
Results from factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of constructing a 
single variable from the three items. The KMO=.765 falls into the range of ‘middling’ (Kaiser 
and Rice, 1974) and all KMO values for individual items were greater than .75. One factor had 
eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 87.06% of the variance 
with the scree plot confirming retention of one factor. The political nostalgic values items 
have a high reliability (Cronbach’s α=.926). Results from factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha 
confirm the suitability of constructing a single variable from the three items. Figure 5.31 
shows the factor loadings.  
Figure 5.31: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for political nostalgic values items  Factor 1 
Margaret Thatcher's governments decreased the quality of life for many ordinary people .908 
Many of the problems we now face started in the 1980s with Margaret Thatcher .897 
Margaret Thatcher's governments did a lot of damage to communities around here .889 
 
5.5. Summary 
This chapter commenced by detailing the sample, prior to presenting basic analyses of both 
the newly designed questions and the two survey items developed by the British Social 
Attitudes Survey to measure attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers. Frequencies, t-tests and 
one-way ANOVAs were presented which appears to show a distinction in punitiveness 
towards each group of rulebreaker with the most punitive response towards support for 
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stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants. Support for physical punishments 
received the least punitive. This suggest that whilst there is strong support for more 
punishment, this desire does not take the form of physical punishments. Additionally, the 
questions referring to non-specific sanctions towards rulebreakers received the top three 
most punitive responses, whilst the introduction of specific, extreme sanctions appears to 
reduce punitive attitudes. This chapter has also detailed the development of the variables to 
be used in the subsequent analyses in Chapter 6 to Chapter 9, namely, neo-conservative 
values, neo-liberal values, and the nostalgia variables (social, economic and political 
nostalgia). Chapter 6 will now commence the process of analyzing punitive attitudes towards 
distinct groups of rulebreakers, specifically, examining public attitudes towards rulebreaking 

























Part Four: Examining Punitiveness Towards Rulebreakers 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Chapter 6 Quantitative analysis of punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school 
pupils 
 
6.1. Introduction  
Chapter 5 commenced by presenting the basic analyses of the newly designed questions, 
along with the two survey items developed by the British Social Attitudes Survey to measure 
attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers. This analysis involved frequencies, t-tests and  
one-way ANOVAs and has revealed some interesting findings. There appears to be a variation 
in punitiveness towards each group of rulebreaker with the most punitive response towards 
support for stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants. Whereas, physical 
punishments, caning and the death penalty, received the least support respectively. Notably, 
the questions referring to non-specific sanctions towards rulebreakers received the top three 
most punitive responses, whilst the introduction of specific, extreme sanctions appears to 
reduce the extent of punitive attitudes. Chapter 5 also detailed the development of the 
variables to be used in the subsequent analyses throughout the remaining chapters. These 
variables comprise of beliefs systems (neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values) and 
nostalgia (social, economic and political nostalgic values).  
 
Further detailed quantitative analyses, starting from this chapter through to Chapter 9, aims 
to build on the initial findings presented in Chapter 5 to examine the unique factors 
influencing punitive attitudes; first as distinct groups of rulebreakers (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) 
and then as a collective group (Chapter 9).  This chapter starts this process by exclusively 
exploring attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils. The steps taken to examine the data 
are as follows: 
 
1. Ordinal Logistic Regression was used to conduct separate analyses on the two items 
developed to measure punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils, Unruly school 
pupils should receive tougher punishments and School pupils who repeatedly break 
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school rules should be permanently excluded,10 which have an ordinal outcome 
measured by a Likert scale. The same four models were run for each variable with 
each model introducing a further set of factors. Model 1 introduced a range of  
socio-demographic factors; Crime-rated factors were entered in Model 2; Model 3 
introduced belief systems; and, finally, nostalgia items were added in Model 4 (see 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). 
 
2. Hierarchical multiple linear regression was then used to analyze School Punitivity, a 
continuous variable constructed through factor analyzing Unruly school pupils should 
receive tougher punishments and School pupils who repeatedly break school rules 
should be permanently excluded.  Hierarchical multiple regression allows the inclusion 
of a range of factors entered into the model in a specified order based on theoretical 
grounds (Tabacknick and Fidell, 2014; Pallant, 2016). Sets of variables were entered 
into the model in blocks, with each block being assessed in terms of its effect on the 
dependent variable once the previous variables have been controlled for (Pallant, 
2016). The four blocks consist of socio-demographic factors, crime-related factors, 
beliefs systems and nostalgic values.  
 
3. Qualitative data from the cognitive interviews is also included in the chapter. This 
aims to provide a little insight into public attitudes towards the punishment of 
rulebreaking school pupils not attainable through quantitative analysis alone. The 
cognitive interviews were limited to probing specific terms within the newly designed 
questions as testing the questions was the main objective of the cognitive interviews, 
however, despite this limitation, themes in participants’ beliefs emerged from the 
data.   
 
4. Previous criminological literature on punitiveness will also be considered in relation to 
the findings in this chapter due to there being no evidence base exploring 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils.    
 
 
10 Response codes were: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly 
agree.   
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6.2. Exploring support for tougher punishments for unruly school pupils    
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors11 
As shown in Table 6.1, age group 45 to 54 (beta=.577, p=<.001), degree education  
(beta=-.401, p=<.001), class origin (beta=.241, p=<.001) religion (beta= -.215, p=<.001), and 
politics (beta=.185, p=<.001) were found to have the strongest effect on punitive attitudes 
towards unruly school children. This suggests that those aged between 45 and 54 are more 
punitive when compared to the 16 to 24 age group, those with degree level education are 
less punitive when compared to those with no qualifications, those from a working-class 
origin are more punitive compared to those from a middle-class origin, those with no religion 
are less punitive than those with a religion, and self-identified political conservativism 
increased punitive attitudes. Ages 35 to 44 (beta=.474, p=<.01), 55 to 64 (beta=.437, p=<.01) 
and over 65 year olds are also associated with increased punitive attitudes when compared 
to those aged between 16 and 24 years old. Additionally, males (beta=.191, p<.01) were 
found to be more punitive than females and those earning between £60,000 and £84,999 
(beta=.290, p=<.05) were found to be more punitive than those in the lowest earning group. 
All other factors in Model 1 were not significant. The Nagelkerke R-Square value suggests that 
socio-demographic factors as a whole account for 9.4% of the variance in punitive attitudes 
towards unruly school children.   
 
Model 2: Crime related factors 
The next model introduced crime related factors into the model. The victimisation variable 
asked if respondents had experienced any victimisation in the last 5 years and has no 
significant effect in any of the models. Fear of crime (How safe do you feel walking around in 
the area you live in after dark?) has a significant effect when introduced in Model 2  
(beta = .202, p=<.001) with punitive attitudes increasing as fear increases. Fear of crime has 
very little impact on the socio-demographic variables in Model 2.  
 
 
11 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=65+, 2=55-64, 3=45-54, 4=35-44, 5=25-34, 
6=16-24; Income: 1=£85,000+, 2=£60,000-£84,999, 3=£40,000-£59,999, 4=£25,000-£39,999, 5=below £24,999; 
Education: 1=Degree level, 2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; Religion: 0=No, 1=Yes; 
Politics scale is continuous from 0=left to 10=right; Class Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship 
status: 0=single, 1=in relationship; Universal Credit: 0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 4=last 
quartile; Ethnicity: 1=Other, 2=Black Caribbean/African, 3=Chinese, 4=Asian/Sub-continent, 5=Multiple ethnic 
background, 6=White.    
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Table 6.1: Beta coefficients for ordinal regression models predicting punitiveness towards      
‘Unruly school pupils should receive tougher punishments’ (n=3,637)12 
Socio -demographic factors11  
0a = reference category 
Model 1 95% CI Model 2 95% CI Model 3 95% CI Model 4 95% CI 
Gender male (= 0) 
 






















Age Range 25-34  
 
.198 -.101,  
.496 
.217 -.082,  
.516 
-.258 -.574,  
.058 
-.270 -.587,  
.046 
Age Range 35-44 .474** .163,  
.786 
.492** .181,  
.804 
-.060 -.391,  
.271 
-.071 -.402,  
.260 
Age Range 45-54 .577*** .275,  
.879 
.605*** .303,  
.908 
-.159 -.483,  
.165 
-.180 -.504,  
.144 
Age Range 55-64 .437** .127,  
.748 
.459** .148,  
.770 
-.205 -.539,  
.129 
-.219 -.553,  
.115 
Age Range 65+ .394* .083,  
.706 
.423** .111,  
.735 




Age Range 16-24 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Income: £25,999 - £39,999  
 
.139 -.019,  
.296 
.144 -.013,  
.302 
.072 -.096,  
.239 
.073 -.095,  
.240 




.243* .049,  
.437 
.248* .054,  
.442 
£60,000 - £84,999 .290* .036,  
.545 
.308* .053,  
.563 
.420** .148,  
.692 
.431** .158,  
.703 
Over £85,000  -.044 -.381,  
.293 
.005 -.333,  
.343 
.187 -.173,  
.548 
.198 -.163,  
.559 
Income: below £24,999 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Education – below degree 
qualification 
-.011 -.207,  
.186 
.005 -.192,  
.201 
.187 -.023,  
.396 
.190 -.020,  
.400 






.229* .003,  
.456 
.242* .015,  
.469 
Education – no qualifications 0a  0a  0a  0a  
No Religion (= 0) 
 





















Politics (0-10 scale; 10 = more 
conservative) 




-.007 -.042,  
.028 
-.010 -.048,  
.027 
Working class origin (=0) 
 





















Relationship single (=0) 
 





















Universal Credit claimant (=0) 
 





















IMD 1st quartile  
 




.210* .005,  
.414 
.215* .009,  
.421 




.134 -.060,  
.327 
.145 -.049,  
.339 




-.051 -.235,  
.134 
-.049 -.233,  
.136 
IMD 4th quartile 0a  0a  0a  0a  










Black Caribbean/African -.231 -.742,  -.216 -.727, -.495 -1.003,  -.417 -.956,  
 
12 See p217 for  details about the sample size.  
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(n=91) .280 .295 .073 .122 
Chinese 
(n=42) 














-.278 -.753,  
.196 
-.285 -.760,  
.191 
Multiple ethnic background 
(n=72) 




-.317 -.880,  
.246 
-.303 -.868,  
.262 
White ethnicity (n=5,174) 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Crime related factors  
No victimisation (=0)  
 
Victimisation (=1) 















Fear of crime scale 
(1=very safe to 4=very unsafe) 
  .202*** .119,  
.284 
.059 -.029,  
.148 
.043 -.047,  
.133 
Belief systems (high 
scores=increase in values) 
        
Neo-liberal values     -.009 -.032,  
.014 
-.008 -.032,  
.016 
Neo-conservative values     .536*** .507,  
.566 
.520*** .488,  
.551 
         
Nostalgia (high scores=increase 
in values) 
        
Social nostalgic values       .015 -.005,  
.035 
Economic nostalgic values       .023 -.004,  
.050 
Political nostalgic values       -.018 -.044,  
.008 
         
Nagelkerke R-square .094  .100  .468  .469 
 
0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05.             
 
Most of the significant socio-demographic factors have slight variations in beta coefficients 
with the exception of gender which increases in effect size and becomes significant at the 
p=<.001 level and the over 65 age group which also increases in effect size and becomes 
significant at the p=<.01 level. In contrast, class origin decreases in both effect size and 
significance to the p=<.01 level. This suggests that fear of crime slightly exacerbated the 
effects of working-class origin in Model 1. The Nagelkerke value of 10% suggests that there is 
a very slight increase from Model 1 in explaining the variance in punitiveness toward unruly 
school children.  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values were entered in Model 3, only neo-
conservative values has a significant effect on punitive attitudes towards unruly school 
children (beta=.536, p=<.001), whilst neo-liberal values has no significant effect. This suggests 
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that neo-conservative values has a strong effect on punitive attitudes towards unruly school 
children; as neo-conservative values increase so does support for tougher punishments for 
unruly school children.  
 
The introduction of neo-conservative values in Model 3 has a notable effect on a number of 
socio-demographic factors. Firstly, Chinese ethnicity (beta=-.942,) increases in effect size and 
becomes significant at the p=<.001 level, suggesting that this group is associated with lower 
levels of punitiveness when compared to those from white background. Although, it is worth 
noting that there are only 42 Chinese respondents and the 95% confidence intervals are very 
wide. Secondly, the effects of all age ranges, politics, and class origin diminish, suggesting 
that the neo-conservative values exacerbated the effects of age, self-identified political 
conservativism and class origin in the previous models. Thirdly, the effects of degree 
education (beta=.229, p=<.05), gender (beta=-.170, p=<.05), and religion (beta=.253, 
p=<.001) reverse. Once neo-conservative values were introduced, the degree educated 
become more punitive when compared to those with no qualifications, being male is 
associated with less punitive attitudes when compared to females, and those with no religion 
were found to be more punitive when compared to those with a religion. Finally, the effects 
of some variables increase. Income category £60,000 to £84,999 (beta=.420, p=<.01) and 
£40,000 to £59,999 (beta=.243, p=<.05) increase in effect size and significance suggesting 
that those with household incomes within these income categories are more punitive when 
compared to the lowest income bracket. Relationship (beta=.191, p=<.05) and IMD 1st 
quartile (beta=.210, p=.05) also become significant with those who are single being more 
punitive compared to those who are in a relationship and those in the lowest quartile being 
more punitive when compared to those in the highest quartile. The variance explained by 
Model 3 as a whole is 46.8%, an increase of 36.8% from Model 2.  
 
Model 4: Nostalgia 
The nostalgic values items in Model 4 have no significant effect on punitive attitudes toward 
unruly school children. The increase in variance explained by introducing the nostalgia items 
is very small shown by the Nagelkerke value of .001. The significance of Chinese ethnicity 
reduces to the p=<.01 level whilst the over 65 age group (beta=-.350, p=<.05) becomes 
significant and were found to be less punitive compared to those aged between 16 and 24 
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years old. The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (32, N=3637) 
= 2057.44, p=<.001, indicating that the model is significantly better at predicting punitive 
attitudes towards unruly school pupils than not fitting the model. The Nagelkerke value13 
suggests that the model as a whole accounts for 46.9% of the variance in punitive attitudes 
towards unruly school pupils.14  
 
The sample size reduced from 5,781 to 3,637 in the ordinal regression models due to the 
inclusion, and therefore missing data (item non-response), of some socio-demographic 
variables. Most notably, politics, income, class, ethnicity and religion resulted in item  
non-response, as follows:  ‘In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would 
you place yourself on the following scale?’ 1,252 answered ‘don’t know’ and 140 said ‘prefer 
not to say’; ‘Which of all the following income brackets best represent your household 
income?’ 689 respondents ‘preferred not to say’; ‘When you were growing up, would you say 
your family was middle class or working class?’ 382 respondents answered ‘don’t 
know/other’; ‘Which of the following categories would describe your ethnicity?’ 200 
respondents did not answer the question and 55 preferred not to say; and, when asked, 
‘What is your religion?’ 127 respondents preferred not to say. Item non-response may occur 
with some socio-demographic questions when respondents feel the question is sensitive or 
feel they are unable to answer the question (Tourangeau et al., 2000). Web-based surveys 
may also result in a higher number of ‘don’t knows (Heerwegh and Loosveldt (2008). 
However, the inclusion of socio-demographic variables is important theoretically (Friesen 
Ksiazkiewcz, 2014; McAndres, 2020). A further discussion on the limitations of item non-
response in relation to this study is included in Chapter 10.  
 
Summary 
Findings suggest that support for tougher punishments for unruly school pupils are largely 
driven by neo-conservative values. Higher income, degree level education, no religion, being 
 
13 The Nagelkerke value provides an indication of the amount of variance in the dependent variable explained by the model, 
from a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of approximately 1 (Pallant, 2016). 
14 No concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix of all variables included in the models. 
There are no correlations between independent variables greater than .9 which would indicate concerns with 
multicollinearity (Field, 2018) with the largest (r=.552, p=<.001) between political nostalgic values and economic nostalgic 
values. The largest correlation between the unruly school children variable and the independent variables was with neo-




single and those in the lowest IMD quartile are associated with higher levels of punitiveness, 
whilst being male and those over 65 years old appear to be associated with less punitive 
attitudes towards unruly school children. Whilst Chinese ethnicity is significant there are only 
42 respondents in this category and the 95% confidence intervals are very wide. When 
confidence intervals are very wide the sample mean could be very different to the true mean 
and therefore suggests that this is a bad representation of the population (Field, 2018).    
 
6.3. The need to punish? 
The apparent desire, or aversion, to punish school pupils for rulebreaking behaviours became 
evident throughout the cognitive interviews. Some respondents were clearly supportive of 
tougher punishments for unruly school pupils,  
 
‘They just deserve tough punishments sometimes, I think. I just feel like kids are more 
disruptive nowadays.’ (R2) 
 
‘A lot of children from the school I went to would purposely get kicked out of class. 
Tougher punishments would be making them do what they don’t want to do, but 
what they have to do.’ (R6) 
 
Whilst, some respondents were clearly opposed to the idea of punishing school children, 
 
‘No, I’m not into punishing kids’. (R5) 
‘I don’t think kids should be punished.’ (R11)  
 
Others outlined boundaries to when they thought punishment was acceptable, which was a 
sentiment voiced by a few respondents, 
 
‘If it's a child that has no learning needs, then yeah, I do think we need to punish 
them, maybe not hit them but to do some sort of disciplinary action.’ (R17) 
 
Support of tougher sanctions for certain types of indiscipline was found to be present in the 
majority (82%) of secondary school teachers in England and Wales (The Elton Report, 1989). 
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More recently in 2011, 71% of 2,014 teachers and 62% of school children agreed that 
teachers should be allowed to be tougher when it comes to discipline (Thompson, 2011).   
 
‘A wrap over the knuckles’ 
Personal accounts of being physically punished in school as children came to the fore in the 
cognitive interviews, 
 
‘I don’t believe in corporal punishment. I was thinking back, and we did get punished, 
we really got hit. Teachers used to hit you on the back of the knuckles with rulers and 
believe me it did hurt that.’ (R5)  
 
‘One of the teachers…he used to have a small cane…if you weren’t behaving, he’d 
pick it up and wrap you. But you learnt to respect him. I do agree with corporal 
punishment. (R7) 
 
Views on physical punishments in schools appeared to be driven by beliefs about whether 
physical punishments affect behavioural change. R7 noted how in school he learnt to behave 
himself due to witnessing some teachers throwing board rubbers at pupils or caning pupils 
who misbehaved. Others who were not in the education system when caning was used, also 
held views about the effectiveness of corporal punishments, 
 
‘I’m not talking about beating the child senseless or anything like that…but a quick tap 
is enough sometimes to make them go ‘oh, I won’t do that again’, and just sit up and 
think.’ (R8)  
 
‘I think sometimes it works, sometimes it was needed, I think. I wasn’t in school at the 
time when it was, but if you got the cane, I think some people wouldn’t do it again, 
would they?’ (R11) 
 




‘…if it is just a case of sitting down and sorting the kids out and finding out the 
reasons why, you know, quite often kids are like that for a reason. And if you can 
pinpoint that reason, then obviously you can sort it out without actually giving 
punishments…you get more of an understanding about kids by sitting down with 
them I think.’ 
 
The view that current school punishments fail to discipline school pupils was also evident in 
the cognitive interviews. This was apparent both with those who worked within the 
education system and those who had children at school,  
 
‘I think we should bring back national service personally…if you don’t set down 
punishments for children, they walk all over you…at the moment it seems like they 
think the world owes them a living.’ (R8) 
 
‘School punishments these days are not stopping the bad behaviour. That respect 
isn’t there. I think it is a really difficult thing for the teachers, I think their hands are 
tied now… I don’t really see how they [punishments] can get much stricter, bar hitting 
the children… all they can do is isolate them, or exclude them, or they can put them 
into after school detention, there’s not really much else they can do is there?’ (R12) 
In contrast, others were vehemently opposed to the idea that teachers should physically 
punish children, 
 
‘…producing a cane and battering them with it, but that is physical violence and no 
school teacher should be using physical violence on the kids.’ (R9) 
 
Whilst the qualitative data is limited due to the purpose of the interviews being to test the 
questions rather than explore the attitudes of participants in greater depth, it became clear 
that many participants had a fundamental belief about whether the punishment of school 
pupils was acceptable or not, in particular in relation to physical punishments. Previous 
research also found that teachers’ views on whether they supported or opposed the 
punishment of school children was driven by their fundamental beliefs of whether 
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punishment should be used as a form of moral retribution or, whether children’s rights 
should be recognised (Elton, 1989), rather than based on evidence of what works in schools.   
 
6.4. Exploring support for the permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school pupils  
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors15 
As shown in Table 6.2, when socio-demographic factors are considered in isolation in Model 
1, Black Caribbean/African ethnicity (beta=-.919, p=<.001), age group 45-54  (beta=.502, 
p=<.001), working class origin (beta=.223, p=<.001), males (beta=.213, p=<.001) and politics 
(beta=.178, p=<.001) have the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards permanent 
exclusion. This suggests that the Black Caribbean/African group are significantly less likely to 
hold punitive attitudes towards the permanent exclusion of school pupils when compared to 
the white ethnicity group, whilst the 45 to 54 age group are significantly more likely to hold 
punitive attitudes when compared to 16 to 24-year olds. The likelihood of holding punitive 
attitudes increases with working class origin when compared to middle class origin, being 
male compared to females and identifying as politically more conservative. Punitive attitudes 
also appear to increase with household incomes above £40,000 when compared to the 
lowest income bracket, and with those aged between 35 and 44 (beta=.387, p=<.05) 
compared to the youngest age group. Additionally, punitiveness appears to decrease with 
degree education (beta=-.282, p=<.01) when compared to those with no qualifications, and 
those with no religion (beta=-.130, p=<.05) compared to those with a religion. The 
Nagelkerke value suggests that Model 1 accounts for 7.9% of the variance in punitive 
attitudes towards the permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school pupils.    
 
Model 2: Crime related factors  
The next model introduced crime related factors. The victimisation variable asked if 
respondents had experienced any victimisation in the last 5 years. Those who have no 
experience of victimisation (beta=.221, p=<.05) are more likely to hold more punitive views 
when compared to those who have been a victim of crime in the last five years. Fear of crime 
has a strong effect when introduced in Model 2 (beta = .155, p=<.001) suggesting that 
punitive attitudes towards the permanent exclusion of school pupils increases as fear of 
 
15 See page 204 for coding.     
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crime increases. There is very little effect from the introduction of victimisation and fear of 
crime on the socio-demographic factors in Model 2, with the exception of an increase in 
effect and significance on those aged between 35 and 44 (beta=.404, p=<.01), a decrease in 
effect size and significance on those from a working class origin (beta=.207, p=<.01), and a 
decrease in effect and significance of degree (beta=-.248, p=<.05). The Nagelkerke value of 
8.4% suggests that Model 2 has a very small effect on the variance in attitudes towards 
permanent exclusion.  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When belief systems were introduced in Model 3, neo-conservative values (beta=.289, 
p=<.001) has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards the permanent exclusion of 
school children, whilst neo-liberal values also has a significant but smaller effect (beta=.062, 
p=<.001). This suggests that as neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values increase, so do 
punitive attitudes towards permanent exclusion. Victimisation increases in effect size and 
significance (beta=.272, p=<.01) when neo-conservative and neo-liberal values are 
introduced to the model, whilst the effect and significance of fear of crime diminish. This 
suggests that beliefs systems inflated the effects of fear of crime in the previous model. 
 
Neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values also have a notable effect on some socio-
demographic variables. Most notably the effects of gender, age, education, politics and 
working class origin all diminish in Model 3 suggesting that neo-conservative values and neo-
liberal values exacerbated the effects of these variables in the previous models. Additionally, 
punitive attitudes of those in income categories over £60,000 appear to increase once neo-
conservative and neo-liberal values are introduced to the model. Finally, the effects of no 
religion (beta=.165, p=<.05) reverse suggesting that those with no religion are more likely to 
hold punitive attitudes than those with a religion once belief systems are introduced to the 
model. All other factors remain stable. The variance explained by Model 3 as a whole is 







           Table 6.2: Beta coefficients for ordinal regression models predicting punitiveness towards   
          ‘School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded’ (n=3,637)16 
Socio -demographic factors 
0a = reference category 
Model 1 95% CI Model 2 95% CI Model 3 95% CI Model 4 95% CI 
Gender male (=0) 
 





















Age Range 25-34  
 
.240 -.052,  
.532 
.252 -.041,  
.544 
-.054 -.354,  
.245 
-.076 -.377,  
.224 
Age Range 35-44 .387* .084,  
.691 
.404** .100,  
.708 
.073 -.239,  
.385 
.044 -.269,  
.357 
Age Range 45-54 .502*** .207,  
.797 
.511*** .216,  
.806 
.119 -.187,  
.425 
.106 -.201,  
.413 
Age Range 55-64 .222 -.080,  
.525 
.222 -.081,  
.526 
-.128 -.443,  
.187 
-.133 -.448,  
.183 
Age Range 65+ .124 -.179,  
.428 
.130 -.175,  
.434 
-.272 -.588,  
.044 
-.275 -.592,  
.042 
Age Range 16-24 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Income: £25,999 - £39,999 
 
.091 -.061,  
.244 
.093 -.060,  
.245 
.030 -.125,  
.186 
.046 -.110,  
.201 
£40,000 - £59,999 .212* .036,  
.389 
.220* .044,  
.397 
.217* .037,  
.397 
.241** .061,  
.421 
£60,000 - £84,999 .375** .127,  
.622 
.389** .142,  
.637 
.417*** .164,  
.670 
.454*** .201,  
.708 
Over £85,000  .384* .055,  
.714 
.420* .090,  
.750 
.466** .126,  
.806 
.485** .145,  
.826 
Income: below £24,999 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Education – Degree  
 
-.282** -.486,  
-.078 
-.248* -.453,  
-.044 
.186 -.024,  
.397 
.218* .007,  
.429 
Education – below degree 
qualification  
-.071 -.260,  
.119 
-.054 -.244,  
.136 
.072 -.122,  
.266 
.082 -.112,  
.276 
Education – no qualifications 0a  0a  0a  0a  























Politics (0-10 scale; 10 = more 
conservative) 
.178*** .151,  
.205 
.180*** .153,  
.207 
.008 -.025,  
.040 
.007 -.028,  
.041 
Working class origin (=0) 
 





















Relationship single (=0) 
 





















Universal Credit claimant (=0) 
 





















IMD 1st quartile  
 
.017 -.167,  
.200 
.055 -.131,  
.240 
.131 -.059,  
.321 
.150 -.041,  
.342 
IMD 2nd quartile  -.118 -.292,  
.057 
-.078 -.254,  
.098 
-.015 -.228,  
.116 
.005 -.176,  
.185 
IMD 3rd quartile  -.119 -.287,  
.048 
-.089 -.257,  
.080 
-.056 -.228,  
.116 
-.060 -.233,  
.112 
IMD 4th quartile 0a  0a  0a  0a  
 
16 See P217 for details about the n-size 
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-.919*** -1.414,      
-.423 
-.911*** -1.407,  
-.415 
-.972*** -1.477,  
-.466 




.377 -1.031,  
.278 
-.441 -1.096,  
.214 
-.635 -1.302,  
.031 




.066 -.374,  
.506 
.015 -.426,  
.456 
-.072 -.520,  
.377 
-.089 -.538,  
.360 
Multiple ethnic background 
(n=72) 
.075 -.445,  
.595 
.073 -.447,  
.594 
.032 -.501,  
.566 
.117 -.417,  
.651 
White ethnicity (n=5,174) 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Crime related factors  
No victimisation (=0)  
 
Victimisation (=1) 















Fear of crime (1=very 
safe…4=very unsafe) 
  .155*** .075,  
.235 
.075 -.007,  
.157 
.039 -.044,  
.122 
Belief systems (high 
scores=increase in values) 
        
Neo-liberal values     .062*** .041,  
.084 
.059*** .037,  
.081 
Neo-conservative values     .289*** .265,  
.313 
.264*** .238,  
.290 
         
Nostalgia (high 
scores=increase in values) 
        
Social nostalgic values       .048*** .029,  
.066 
Economic nostalgic values       -.010 -.036,  
.015 
Political nostalgic values       .005 -.019,  
.029 
         
Nagelkerke R-square .079  .084  .272  .277  
0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
 
Model 4: Nostalgia  
Once the nostalgia items were introduced in Model 4, only social nostalgic values has a 
significant effect on punitive attitudes towards permanent exclusion (beta=.048, p=<.001) 
suggesting that as social nostalgia increases, so does support for the permanent exclusion of 
rulebreaking school pupils. Social nostalgic values slightly reduces the effect of  
neo-conservative values (beta=.264, p=<.001) and neo-liberal values (beta=.059, p=<.001). 
Whereas no victimisation (beta=.284) becomes significant at the p=<.001 level, suggesting 
that those who have not been victims of crime in the past five years are more likely to hold 
punitive attitudes than those who have been victimized. In Model 4, the effects on socio-
demographic variables remain largely stable with the exception of income bracket £40,000 to 
£59,999 and no religion becoming significant at the p=<.01 level. Additionally, degree 
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education (beta=.218, p=<.05) becomes significant suggesting that those with a degree 
education are more likely to hold punitive attitudes when compared to those with no 
qualifications once social nostalgic values are introduced to the model. The variance 
explained by Model 4 is 27.7%, an increase in variance of 0.5% from Model 3. The full model 
containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (32, N=3637) = 1101.33, p=<.001, 
indicating that the model is significantly better at predicting punitive attitudes towards 
permanent exclusion than not fitting a model.17 The Nagelkerke value suggests that the 
model as a whole accounts for 27.7% of the variance in punitive attitudes towards 
permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school pupils. 
 
Summary  
Findings suggest that punitive attitudes towards the permanent exclusion of rulebreaking 
school children are strongly influenced by neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values. 
This is demonstrated by the increase in the Nagelkerke R-Square value in Model 3 with neo-
conservative values appearing to have the strongest effect. Additionally, those with no 
experience of victimisation, those having no religion, higher incomes, degree level education 
and social nostalgic values appear to be related to an increase in punitive attitudes. Whilst 
those from a Black Caribbean/African background appear to hold less punitive attitudes than 
those from a white background.  
 
6.5. A Sense of Compassion  
The implementation of permanent exclusion, a specific, extreme sanction, highlighted a 
sense of compassion towards school children by some participants in the cognitive 
interviews. Assertions that the circumstances of the child should be taken into account were 
prevalent, as were participants’ reflections on their own experiences or work, family and 
friendships, which tended to illicit a more compassionate response. R8 reflected on her own 
experiences of working in a school and commented that her agreement with the use of 
permanent exclusion was dependant on whether the child has any other issues, 
 
 
17 No concerns were noted with multicollinearity of independent variables as noted with the unruly school pupil’s variable 
(the same independent variables are used in the analysis). The largest correlation between the permanent exclusion variable 




‘Are you just talking badly behaved kids that need a kick up the arse or are you 
actually talking about the educational special needs kids as well.’ 
 
Should the behaviour involve drugs then R8 thought they should be permanently excluded, 
but noted that she would have liked some clarification on the circumstances of the children,  
 
‘If they have got some underlying thing, like dyslexia or behavioural problems then 
perhaps not, because they need the help and where are they going to get it if not at 
school.’  
 
This was a sentiment that was also voiced by other respondents, 
 
‘Maybe the child wants to engage but they can't, you know and that’s why I say, if it’s 
just a kid, who is just alright, got a good home, really don’t have no problem, just 
being spoiled, then yeah I agree with the punishment but if there’s other factors into 
play then it's not as clear cut to me.’ (R17) 
 
Whilst some were completely opposed to the idea of permanent exclusion in any 
circumstance,  
 
‘If they are being naughty, and I mean really naughty, there should be something they 
can do to punish them for it, but I don’t think they should be permanently excluded. 
We are talking about school children, it’s going to affect their lives as they get older if 
they get stopped from going to school.’ (R5) 
 
 ‘That’s an admission of failure by the school’ (R9) 
 
‘A lot of children from the school I went to would purposely get kicked out of class, so 
I think it would be a better way of doing it to make them go into a class rather than 




The responses obtained during the cognitive interviews suggests that participants were 
generally less supportive of the idea of an extreme sanction such as permanent exclusion, 
than compared to the non-specific notion of ‘tougher punishments’. Respondents tended to 
deliberate more about the potential circumstances of the child in relation to permanent 
exclusion than when considering their responses to tougher punishments for unruly school 
pupils. This difference was also evident in the Teacher Voice Omnibus Survey (NFER, 2012), 
albeit with a much smaller difference in regards to secondary school children, which found 
90% of primary and 96% of secondary school teachers considered it reasonable for a school 
to implement a fixed term exclusion for poor behavior; this figure reduced to 65% of primary 
and 87% of secondary teachers who considered it reasonable to permanently exclude pupils 
for poor behavior.  
    
6.6. A comparison of support for tougher punishments and the permanent exclusion of 
rulebreaking school pupils    
There are similarities in the factors related to both support for tougher punishments and 
support for permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school pupils.  Table 6.3 below shows the 
significant factors relating to each variable. The introduction of beliefs systems has the 
strongest effect on both variables, but with the greater effect on support for tougher 
punishments which is shown by the increase in R-Square of 36.8% compared to 27.2% for the 
permanent exclusion variable. Increased punitiveness towards both tougher punishments 
and the permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school pupils appears to be related to those 
earning between £40,000 and £59,999, although the effects appear to be stronger regarding 
support for permanent exclusion. Additionally, degree level education and having no religion 
also appear to be significant factors related to increased punitiveness towards tougher 
punishments and permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school pupils. Whilst higher 
educational attainment has generally been found to decrease punitiveness towards offenders 
(Spiranovic et al., 2012; Costelloe et al., 2009; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007), findings here 
suggest that higher education attainment increases punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking 
school pupils.    
 
Neo-conservative values appears to be the most relevant factor related to support for 
tougher punishments for rulebreaking school pupils. Additionally, being female, being aged 
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16 to 24 years old (when compared to those aged over 65), being single, and those in the 
lowest IMD quartile (compared to highest quartile) also appear to be relevant factors. These 
findings are inconsistent with previous research relating to punitiveness towards criminal 
rulebreakers. Males have been found to be more punitive than females in relation to 
offenders (Hough et al., 1988; Spiranovic et al., 2012; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007). Whilst 
punitiveness towards offenders has been generally found to increase with age (Hough and 
Moxon, 1985; Hough et al., 1988; Spiranovic et al., 2012; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007), 
although more recently King and Maruna (2009) found that age was not a significant 
predictor of punitiveness. Lastly, Costelloe et al. (2009) found that marriage was a significant 
predictor of an increased punitive attitude towards offenders.  
 
Significant factors relating only to support for permanent exclusion appear to be neo-liberal 
values, social nostalgic values, no experience of victimisation, those from a white background 
(compared to those from a Black Caribbean/African background) and those earning incomes 
in excess of £85,000. These findings are consistent with previous criminological research 
which found Black Caribbean/African ethnicity (when compared to white ethnicity) to 
decrease punitiveness towards offenders (Unnever and Cullen, 2010; Useem et al., 2003; 
Costelloe et al., 2009).  The overall model explains a greater amount of variance in 
















Table 6.3 Summary: A comparison of significant factors relating to rulebreaking school pupils 
 




Unruly school children should receive 
tougher punishments 
School pupils who repeatedly break 
school rules should be permanently 
excluded 
Males gender (=0)  
(0a – females=1) 
* (beta=-.160) 
(Males less punitive than females) 
X 
Age Range 25-34 
(0a - 16-24) 
X X 
Age Range 35-44 X X 
Age Range 45-54 X X 
Age Range 55-64 X X 
Age Range 65+ * (beta=-.350)  
(Less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
X 
Income £25,999 - £39,999 
(0a - below £24,999) 
X X 
£40,000 - £59,999 * (beta=.248)  
(More punitive than below £24,999 ) 
** (beta=.241)  
(More punitive than below £24,999) 
£60,000 - £84,999 ** (beta=.431) 
(More punitive than below £24,999) 
*** (beta=.454)  
(More punitive than below £24,999) 
Over £85,000 X ** (beta=.485)  
(More punitive than below £24,999) 
Degree Education  
(0a - no qualifications) 
* (beta=.242)  
(More punitive than no qualifications) 
* (beta=.218) 
(More punitive than no qualifications) 
Below degree education X  X 
No Religion (=0) 
(0a – Religion=1) 
*** (beta=.267)  
(No religion more punitive) 
** (beta=.183)  
(No religion more punitive) 
Political conservativism  X X 
Class Origin  X X  
Relationship single  
(0a - In relationship=1)  
* (beta=.186)  
(Single more punitive) 
X 
Universal Credit X X 
IMD 
(0a - 4th quartile) 
* (beta=.215)  




(0a – white ethnicity) 
** (beta=-.961) 
(Chinese ethnicity less punitive)  
*** (beta=-.887)  
(Black Caribbean/African less punitive) 
No Victimisation (=0) 
(0a – Victimisation) 
X *** (beta=.284) 
(No victimisation more punitive) 
Fear of crime X X 
Neo-liberal values X *** (beta=.059) 
Neo-conservative values *** (beta=.520) *** (beta=.264) 
Social nostalgic values X *** (beta=.048) 
Economic nostalgic values X X 
Political nostalgic values X X 
Nagelkerke R-Square Value 36.8% 27.2% 
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6.7. School Punitivity  
This section explores general punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils through 
conducting multiple regression analysis18 (N=5,781) using the ‘school punitivity’ variable, 
which was constructed through factor analyzing Unruly school children should receive tougher 
punishments and School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently 
excluded. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted using principle axis factoring, which does 
not assume normal distribution, with oblique rotation allowing for correlation between 
variables (Field, 2018). The KMO measure for sampling adequacy was .500 which is at the 
minimum acceptable level (Field, 2018). The variables for school punitivity correlated quite 
high with each other r=.539 and had a one factor solution explaining 76.96% of the variance. 
The school punitivity items have a fairly high reliability (Cronbach’s α=.695). Results from 
factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of constructing a single variable 
(School Punitivity), which is also underpinned by theory, from the two items.  
 
The sample size reduced from 5,781 to 2,090 in the multiple regression analyses due to the 
inclusion, and therefore missing data (item non-response), of some socio-demographic 
variables. Most notably, in relation to the religiosity variable. The religiosity question was 
preceded by the question: ‘What is your religion?’ If respondents answered ‘none’ to this 
question, then they were not asked the subsequent question, which asked, ‘Would you 
consider yourself as extremely religious or extremely non-religious?’. Of the 5,781 
respondents 2,453 respondents answered that they had no religion, so were not asked the 
subsequent religiosity question. Other socio-demographic variables, which also resulted in 
missing data (non-response items) included: ‘In politics people sometimes talk of left and 
right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?’ 1,252 answered ‘don’t know’ 
and 140 said ‘prefer not to say’; ‘Which of all the following income brackets best represent 
your household income?’ 689 respondents ‘preferred not to say’; ‘When you were growing 
up, would you say your family was middle class or working class?’ 382 respondents answered 
‘don’t know/other’; and, finally, ‘Which of the following categories would describe your 
 
 18 The large sample size (n=5781) is considered large enough to meet the sample size required to undertake Green (1991, in 
Tabacknick and Fidell, 2014:159) suggest N≥50+8m (where m in the number of independent variables), so for the regression 
conducted in this section, 16 independent variables are used: 50 + (8) (16) = 178 cases. If the dependent variable is skewed a 
larger sample is required as a small effect size or substantial measurement error is expected from less reliable variables 
(Tabacknick and Fidell, 2014). 
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ethnicity?’ 200 respondents did not answer the question and 55 preferred not to say. 
Pairwise multiple regression was used to allow the inclusion in the analyses when the 
necessary information was available rather than unnecessarily limit the sample size (Pallant, 
2016). Pairwise regression includes cases when they have the necessary information and only 
excludes cases if they are missing data for a specific analysis (Pallant, 2015). A further 
discussion on the impact of missing data on the empirical results in this study will be included 
in Chapter 10. 
 
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors19 
When socio-demographic factors were considered in isolation in Model 1 (Table 6.4), politics 
(beta=.253, p=<.001) has the strongest effect on school punitivity. As respondents identify as 
more politically conservative their punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils increases. 
Class origin (beta= -.067) is also significant at the p=<.001 level with punitiveness increasing 
with those from a working- class origin. Education (beta=.061, p=<.01) and religiosity 
(beta=.056, p=<.01) also appear to be relevant factors, suggesting that lower educational 
attainment and decreased religiosity are related to increased punitiveness towards school 
children. Finally, gender (beta=-.042, p=<.05) and income (beta=.045, p=<.05) suggest that 
being male and higher earnings are related to increased school punitivity. Model 1 as a whole 
accounts for 8.9% of the variance in school punitivity.    
 
Model 2: Crime related factors 
When crime-related factors were introduced in Model 2, victimisation has no significant 
effect, whilst fear of crime has a significant effect (beta = .079, p=<.001) with punitive 
attitudes increasing as fear increases. Fear of crime has a small effect on gender and class 
origin. Gender (beta=-.058) becomes significant at the p=<.01 level with male punitiveness 
increasing when fear of crime is introduced to the model, whilst the effects of working-class 
 
19 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=16-24, 2=25-34, 3=35-44, 4=45-54, 5=55-64, 6=65-74, 
7=75+; Income: 1=below £5,000, 2=£5,000-£9,999, 3=£10,000-£14,999, 4=£15,000-£19,999, 5=£20,000-£24,000, 
6=£25,000-£29,999, 7=£30,000- £34,999, 8=£35,000-£39,999, 9=40,000-£44,999, 10=£45,000-£49,999, 11=£50,000-
£59,999, 12=£60,000-£69,999, 13=70,000-£84,999, 14=£84,000-£99,999, 15=over £100,000; Education: 1=Degree level, 
2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; Religiosity scale: 1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-
religious; Politics scale: 0=left to 10=right; Class Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship status: 0=single, 1=in 
relationship; Universal Credit: 0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 2=2nd quartile, 3=3rd quartile, 4=4th quartile; 
Ethnicity: 0=Other, 1=White.    
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origin (beta=-.62) decrease in significance (p=<.01). All other socio-demographic factors 
remain stable. Model 2 accounts for 9.5% of the variance in school punitivity, with the  
R-Square change very small at .006. 
 
Table 6.4: Beta weights for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘school punitivity’ 
(n=2,090)20 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors19     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) -.042* -.058** -.014 -.015 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) .039 .041 -.031 -.027 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .045* .052* .056** .060*** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
quals) 
.061** .055** -.028 -.032 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .056** .054** .035* .035* 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .253*** .254*** .016 .024 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.067*** -.062** -.023 -.019 
Relationship Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .020 .019 -.029 -.030 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) -.011 -.008 -.004 -.002 
IMD (1=lowest quartile to 4=highest quartile) .005 -.006 -.026 -.032 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) .003 .007 .029 .028 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.020 -.025 -.028 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .079*** .024 .016 
Belief systems (high scores=more neo-
con/neo-lib) 
    
Neo-liberal values   .061*** .063*** 
Neo-conservative values   .606*** .579*** 
Nostalgia (high score=more nostalgic)     
Social nostalgic values    .064** 
Economic nostalgic values    -.018 
Political nostalgic values    .035 
R-square .089*** .095*** .399*** .402** 
Adjusted R-square .085 .090 .395 .398 
R-square change  .006 .304 .003 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When beliefs systems were introduced in Model 3, neo-conservative values21 (beta=.606, 
p=<.001) has the strongest effect on school punitivity, with neo-liberal values also having a 
significant effect at the p=<.001 level but with a much smaller effect size (beta=.061). This 
suggests that as neo-conservative and neo-liberal values increase, so does punitiveness 
 
20 See p230 for detail regarding the n-size 
21 See Chapter 9.3 for an analysis of neo-conservative values.  
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towards rulebreaking school children. The introduction of neo-conservative values and neo-
liberal values has a notable effect on a number of other factors in the model. The effects of 
politics, fear of crime, class origin, education, and gender diminish once belief systems are 
entered into the model. This suggests that neo-conservative and neo-liberal values inflated 
the effects of these factors in the previous model. The effect of religiosity (beta=.035, p=<.05) 
also reduces once belief systems are introduced to the model. In contrast, the effect of 
income (beta=.056, p-=<.01) increases with those earning higher incomes holding more 
punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils. The variance explained by Model 3 as a 
whole is 39.9%, an increase of 30.4% from Model 2.  
 
Model 4: Nostalgia  
When nostalgia items were introduced in Model 4, social nostalgic values (beta=.064, p=<.01) 
is the only significant factor, suggesting that as social nostalgia increases, so do punitive 
attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils. Once the nostalgia items are introduced in 
Model 4, the effect size of neo-conservative values (beta=.579, p=<.001) decreases slightly, 
which suggests that there may be a relationship between nostalgic values and  
neo-conservative values. All other factors remain stable except for income (beta=.060, 
p=<.001) which increases suggesting that higher income becomes a more relevant factor 
once nostalgic values were entered into the model. The variance explained by the model as a 
whole is 40.2% with a very small R-square change of 0.3% (p=.01) from Model 3.  
 
Summary 
School punitivity appears to be strongly related to neo-conservative values, illustrated by the 
large increase in R-square change in Model 3 (30.4%) and the effect size of neo-conservative 
values (beta=.606). Other relevant factors appear to be neo-liberal values, those earning 
higher incomes, social nostalgic values and decreased religiosity, although the effect sizes of 
these variables suggest that their effect on increased punitiveness towards rulebreaking 
school children is substantially less than neo-conservative values. Table 6.5 below shows the 







Findings suggest that neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes 
towards rulebreaking school pupils. Analysis shows that separating the two measures draws 
out some notable differences between support for tougher punishments and support for the 
more punitive sanction of permanent exclusion. Most notably, this is that support for the 
general, non-specific sanction of ‘tougher punishments’ is predominately related to  
neo-conservative values. Support for the more extreme sanction of permanent exclusion 
appears to be related to a wider range of factors. Neo-conservative values has the strongest 
effect albeit a weaker one than for tougher punishments. Belief systems overall have a 
weaker effect on support for permanent exclusion than for tougher punishments. Secondly, 
neo-liberal values, social nostalgic values and those who have no experience of victimisation 
also appear to be relevant factors in the support for permanent exclusion.  
 
Drawing on criminological literature, due to the lack of literature relating to attitudes towards 
school pupils, decreased religiosity also appears to be related to punitive attitudes towards 
offenders (King and Maruna, 2009; Unnever and Cullen, 2010; Roberts and Indermauer, 
2007). There is conflicting research on the influence of income on punitive attitudes towards 
offenders. Those earning a higher income have been found to express more punitive views 
(King and Maruna, 2009), upper income has been found to be a significant predictor of a less 
punitive attitude (Spiranovic et al., 2012), whilst income has also been found to not be a 
relevant factor in punitive attitudes (Cullen et al., 1985; Costelloe et al., 2009). Findings here 
suggest that higher income is related to punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils. 
Finally, higher educational attainment has been found to be consistently related to decreased 
punitiveness towards offenders (King and Maruna, 2009; Costelloe et al., 2009; Roberts and 
Indermauer, 2007; Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997). Findings here suggest that punitive attitudes 









Table 6.5: Summary table for relevant statistically significant factors for school punitivity 
 






Variables School Punitivity 
Gender X 
Age Range  
1=16-24 to 7=75+ 
X 
Income 
1=<£5000 to 15=>£100,000  
*** 
(beta=.060, higher income) 
Education 
1=degree, 2 below degree level, 3=no qualifications  
X 
Religiosity  
1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious 
* 
(beta=.035, decreased religiosity) 
Political conservativism  
Scale: 1=left to 10=right 
X 
Class Origin  















0=no, 1=victimised  
X 
Fear of crime 
1=very safe to 4= very unsafe 
X 
Neo-liberal values *** 
(beta=.063) 
Neo-conservative values *** 
(beta=.579) 
Social nostalgic values ** 
(beta=.064) 
Economic nostalgic values X 
Political nostalgic values X 
R-Square Value 40.2% 
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School Punitivity: Evaluating the multiple regression model 
The full multiple regression model for school punitivity containing all the predictors was 
statistically significant (p=<.001).22 The model summary (Table 6.6) shows the multiple 
correlation coefficients between school punitivity and the predictors in column one (labelled 
R), showing that when all predictors are included in Model 4 the multiple correlation 
coefficient is .634. The R-Square value in the second column measures how much variability 
in the outcome variable is explained for by the predictors (Field, 2018). The adjusted  
R-square indicates how well the model generalises with the figure in the final model between 
the R-square (.402) and adjusted R-square (.398) equalling .004 or 0.4% meaning that if the 
model were derived from the population as opposed to a sample the model would account 
for approximately 0.4% less variance in the outcome (Field, 2018). The F change statistic 
indicates that the change in R-square is significant at the p=<.001 level for Model 1, 2 and 3, 
and significant at the p=<.01 level for Model 4. The combined explanatory power of all 
Models is R²=.402 suggesting that the model overall explains 40.2% of the variance in school 
punitivity.  
 
Table 6.6: Model summary for school punitivity 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 




Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .299 .089 .085 .79976536 .089 22.477 11 2518 .000 
2 .308 .095 .090 .79761778 .006 7.789 2 2516 .000 
3 .631 .399 .395 .65038511 .304 635.035 2 2514 .000 
4 .634 .402 .398 .64897490 .003 4.646 3 2511 .003 
 
Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers 
The histogram (Figure 6.1) shows that the normally distributed errors assumption is met with 
the mean (-0.01) very close to zero. The Normal Probability Plot (Figure 6.2) shows the data 




22 The ANOVA table shows the F-Test of whether the model is significantly better at predicting the outcome 
than using no predictors (Field, 2018). The p-values (p=<.001) indicates that all models significantly improve the 




Figure 6.1: Histogram for school punitivity  Figure 6.2: Normal P-P Plot for school  




Casewise diagnostics shows that 8 cases (0.14% of the sample) have standardized residual 
values below -3 or above +3, which is below the 1% which would otherwise indicate concerns 
(Pallant, 2016; Field, 2018). Further investigation of these 8 cases suggests that no cases had 
a Cook’s distance value23 greater than 1 with the largest value of .01. Inspection of the 
Mahalanobis distances24 shows 13 cases have Mahalanobis distances greater than 42.312 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). Further examination of the DFBeta and DfFit statistics for the 
independent variables, which indicate problematic cases having an undue influence on the 
model parameters, highlight no concerns with no cases close to 1 (Field, 2018).  
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
No preliminary concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix 
of all dependent and independent variables. This shows with no correlations between 
independent variables are greater than .9 with the largest between political nostalgic values 
and economic nostalgic values (r=.552). The largest correlation between the school punitivity 
variable and the independent variables was with neo-conservative values (r=.620). All 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) are well below 10 which would indicate concerns (Pallant, 
2016) with the highest 2.030 (Economic nostalgic values) in any of the equations. No 
Tolerance values were below .10 which would also indicate concerns (Pallant, 2016) with the 
 
23 Cook’s distance indicates whether a case has an undue influence on the results with values above 1 suggesting a potential 
problem (Pallant, 2016).  
24 Inspection of the Mahalanobis distances allow identification of outliers (Pallant, 2016). To identify which cases are outliers, 
the critical chi-square value was determined using 18 independent variables as the degrees of freedom (Pallant, 2016) from 
the critical values chi-square table and an alpha level of .001 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013: 10). 
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lowest value of .493 (Economic nostalgic values), and the standard errors are low (highest 
.068 for ethnicity in Model 2). The average VIF in model 4 is 1.34 is also not substantially 
more than 1 (Field, 2018), therefore suggesting no concerns with multicollinearity.  
 
6.8. Summary 
This chapter began by conducting ordinal logistic regression to examine the relationship 
between the two items developed to measure punitiveness towards rulebreaking school 
pupils and socio-demographic factors, crime-related factors, political beliefs and nostalgic 
values. The data showed that neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on punitive 
attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils, which was the case with both support for 
tougher punishments and support for permanent exclusion, although the model explained 
less variance in punitiveness towards permanent exclusion that towards tougher 
punishments.  
 
Additional factors that appear to be related to support for tougher punishments are having 
no religion, being female, higher incomes, those with degree level qualifications, being single 
and those in the lowest IMD quartile. Whilst those over 65 years old appear to be less 
punitive. Punitive attitudes towards permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school children 
appear to also be influenced by neo-liberal values, no experience of victimisation, having no 
religion, higher incomes, degree level education, social nostalgic values and those from a 
white background (when compared to those from a Black Caribbean/African background).  
   
Significant factors relating only to support for tougher punishments appear to be being 
female, being aged 16 to 24 years old (when compared to those aged over 65), being single, 
and those in the lowest IMD quartile (compared to highest quartile). Additionally, the overall 
model explains a greater amount of variance in punitiveness towards tougher punishments 
(46.9%) than towards permanent exclusion (27.7%). Whereas, significant factors relating only 
to support for permanent exclusion appear to be neo-liberal values, social nostalgic values, 
no experience of victimisation, those from a white background (compared to those from a 
Black Caribbean/African background) and those earning incomes in excess of £85,000. This 
suggests that there are different drivers for support for a specific extreme sanction than for 
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the non-specific idea of ‘tougher punishments’. This is an aspect that will be explored further 
throughout subsequent analyses.  
 
A multiple regression model was then conducted to examine the factors related to ‘school 
punitivity’ a variable consisting of the two items designed to measure punitiveness towards 
rulebreaking school pupils. Findings again suggest that school punitivity is strongly related to 
neo-conservative values. Other relevant factors appear to be neo-liberal values, those 
earning higher incomes, social nostalgic values and decreased religiosity, although the effect 
sizes of these variables suggest that their effect on increased punitiveness towards 
rulebreaking school children is substantially less than neo-conservative values.  
 
This chapter also incorporated themes that emerged in the cognitive interviews. As with the 
quantitative data, qualitative responses to the two different statements appeared to elicit 
differing responses.  Fundamental beliefs appeared to underlie attitudes toward the use of 
school punishments, particularly in relation to the use of physical punishments. Whilst 
responses towards the use of permanent exclusion tended to elicit more compassionate 
responses towards school pupils from participants which highlighted concerns about the use 
of punishments for children with special educational needs.  
 
The focus will now turn to examining punitive attitudes towards welfare claimants, using the 
















7.1. Introduction  
Chapter 6 explored punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils. Firstly, punitive 
attitudes were examined through conducting ordinal logistic regression using the two 
separate school pupil variables. Secondly, ‘school punitivity’ was examined (which merged 
the two individual school pupil items into one variable) by conducting multiple linear 
regression. Finally, qualitative data was included to highlight themes that emerged 
throughout the cognitive interviews. The analyses showed that neo-conservative values has 
the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils with a greater 
influence on support for tougher punishments than permanent exclusion. The model 
explained less variance in support for the use of permanent exclusion than towards tougher 
punishments. The predominant factor relating to support for tougher punishments was  
neo-conservative values, whilst neo-liberal values, social nostalgic values and no experience 
of victimisation were also relevant factors in the support for permanent exclusion. This 
suggests that there is a difference in drivers between support for tougher punishments and 
the use of an extreme sanction, in this case permanent exclusion. A difference in attitudes 
was also apparent in the cognitive interviews.  
 
This chapter aims to repeat the analyses conducted in Chapter 6 (see the introduction to 
Chapter 6 for more detail), but this time with the focus on rulebreaking welfare claimants. 
Chapter 5 detailed the development of the variables which will be used for the analyses, 
namely, Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer sentences, 
and, Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped. Following the same format as for rulebreaking school pupils in Chapter 
6, the steps taken to examine the data are as follows: 
 
1. Ordinal Logistic Regression was used to analyse the two separate welfare items: 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties; and, 
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Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped.25 (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). 
 
2. Hierarchical multiple linear regression was then used to analyse Welfare Punitivity, a 
continuous variable constructed through factor analyzing Welfare claimants who 
repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties, and Welfare claimants who 
repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments permanently stopped.  
 
3. Qualitative data from the cognitive interviews is included throughout the chapter 
aiming to provide some insight into public attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare 
claimants not accessible through the quantitative data.  
 
4. Previous welfare literature will also be considered in relation to the findings in this 
chapter.  
 
7.2. Exploring support for stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants 
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors26 
As shown in Table 7.1, higher income, age, education, class, gender, self-identified political 
conservativism, ethnicity and receipt of universal credit appear to be significant factors 
relating to punitiveness towards rulebreaking welfare claimants when considering support for 
stiffer penalties. Those earning above £25,999 appear to be more likely to hold punitive 
attitudes when compared to those earning below £24,999, those aged between 45 and 54 
(beta=.508, p=<.001) and those aged over 65 (beta=.507, p=<.001) appear to be more 
punitive when compared to those aged under 24, those from a working class origin 
(beta=.262, p=<.001) appear to be more likely to hold punitive views when compared to 
those from a middle class origin, and self-identified political conservativism (beta=.211, 
 
25 Response codes were: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly 
agree.   
26 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=65+, 2=55-64, 3=45-54, 4=35-44, 5=25-34, 
6=16-24; Income: 1=£85,000+, 2=£60,000-£84,999, 3=£40,000-£59,999, 4=£25,000-£39,999, 5=below £24,999; 
Education: 1=Degree level, 2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; Religion: 0=No, 1=Yes; 
Politics scale is continuous from 0=left to 10=right; Class Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship 
status: 0=single, 1=in relationship; Universal Credit: 0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 4=last 
quartile; Ethnicity: 1=Other, 2=Black Caribbean/African, 3=Chinese, 4=Asian/Sub-continent, 5=Multiple ethnic 
background, 6=White.    
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p=<.001) appears to be related to increased punitive attitudes. Whilst those with degree 
education (beta=-.538, p=<.001) appear to be less punitive when compared to those with no 
qualifications, being a universal credit claimant (beta=-.300, p=<.01) appears to decrease  
punitiveness when compared to non-claimants of universal credit, those with a Black 
Caribbean/African background (beta=-.732, p=<.01) appear to be less punitive than those 
with a white background, and males (beta=-.157, p=<.05) appear to be less likely to hold 
punitive attitudes when compared to females. No other factors in Model 1 were statistically 
significant. The Nagelkerke R-Square value suggests that socio-demographic factors as a 
whole account for 12.9% of the variance in punitiveness towards stiffer penalties for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants.  
 
Model 2: Crime related factors 
When crime related factors were introduced in Model 2, victimisation (victims of crime 
within the last five years) has no significant effect. Fear of crime (How safe do you feel 
walking around in the area you live in after dark?) has a significant effect (beta =.090, p=<.05) 
with punitive attitudes increasing as fear increases. Fear of crime has very little impact on the 
socio-demographic variables in Model 2, with the exception of small changes in effect size 
and significance of gender, those earning in excess of £85,000 and those from a Chinese 
background. Gender becomes not significant, those earning over £85,000 increases slightly in 
effect size and becomes significant at the p=<.001 level, whilst Chinese ethnicity (beta=-.691) 
becomes significant at the p=<.05 level, suggesting that those of Chinese ethnicity (n=42) are 
less punitive when compared to white ethnicity. The Nagelkerke value of 13.1% suggests that 
there is a very slight increase from Model 1 in explaining the variance in punitiveness.  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values were introduced in Model 3,  
neo-conservative values (beta=.273, p=<.001) has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes 
towards welfare claimants. Neo-liberal values also has a significant effect at the p=<.001 level 
with a much smaller effect size (beta=.038). This suggests that as neo-conservative values 
and neo-liberal values increase, so do punitive attitudes towards stiffer penalties for 




Table 7.1: Beta coefficients for ordinal regression models predicting punitiveness towards    
‘Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties’ (n=3,637)27 
Socio -demographic factors20 
0a = reference category 
Model 1 95% CI Model 2 95% CI Model 3 95% CI Model 4 95% CI 
Gender male (=0) 
 





















Age Range 25-34  
 
.135 -.167,  
.438 
.141 -.161,  
.444 




Age Range 35-44 .261 -.055,  
.577 
.270 -.046,  
.586 




Age Range 45-54 .508*** .200,  
.816 
.512*** .203,  
.820 




Age Range 55-64 .313 -.002,  
.629 
.312 -.004,  
.628 
-.008 -.340,  
.324 
-.044 -.376,  
.289 
Age Range 65+ .507** .189,  
.826 
.507** .189,  
.826 




Age Range 16-24 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Income: £25,999 - £39,999  
 
.361*** .197,  
.524 
.362*** .198,  
.526 




£40,000 - £59,999 .559*** .370,  
.910 
.562*** .371,  
.753 




£60,000 - £84,999 .640*** .370,  
.910 






Over £85,000  .570** .214,  
.927 






Income below £24,999 0a  0a  0a  0a  










Education – below degree 
qualification  
-.037 -.244,  
.170 
-.029 -.236,  
.178 




Education – no qualifications 0a  0a  0a  0a  
No Religion (=0)  
 





















Politics (0-10 scale; 10 = more 
conservative) 








Working class origin (=0) 
 





















Relationship single (=0)  
 





















Universal Credit claimant (=0) 
 





















IMD 1st quartile  
 




.153 -.055,  
.360 
.115 -.095,  
.324 




.015 -.179,  
.210 
.001 -.195,  
.197 




-.073 -.258,  
.112 
-.085 -.272,  
.101 














-.732** -1.241,  
-.222 
-.720** -1.229,  
-.210 
-.830** -1.351,  
-.310 
-.779** -1.301,  
-.257 
Chinese -.654 -1.326,  -.691* -1.363, -.940** -1.624,  -1.023** -1.710, 
 
27 See p217 for details about the n-size 
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(n=42) .018 -.018 -.256 -.336 
Asian/Sub-continent 
(n=136) 








Multiple ethnic background 
(n=72) 










0a  0a  0a  0a  
Crime related factors  
No victimisation (=0) 
 
Victimisation (=1)  















Fear of crime (1=very 
safe…4=very unsafe) 
  .090* .005,  
.176 




Belief systems (high 
scores=increase in values) 
        








         
Nostalgia (high 
scores=increase in values) 
        
Social nostalgic values       .011 -.010, 
 .031 
Economic nostalgic values       .070*** .042, 
.098 
Political nostalgic values       -.107*** -.135, 
-.080 
         
Nagelkerke R-square .129  .131  .276  .290  
0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05  
 
The effect of fear of crime diminishes once neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values 
are introduced to the model, suggesting that neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values 
inflated the effects of fear of crime on punitive attitudes in the previous model. When  
neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values are introduced in Model 3 the effects of 
having a degree and age diminish. Whilst the effect size of self-identified political 
conservativism (beta=.069) reduces substantially but remains significant at the p=<.001 level, 
and the effects of working class origin (beta=.164, p=<.05) reduce. In contrast, the effects of 
gender (beta=-.414, p=<.001), income in excess of £40,000, Black Caribbean/African ethnicity 
(beta=-.830, p=<.01) and Chinese ethnicity (beta=-.940, p=<.01) increase. This suggests that 
those earning higher incomes are more likely to hold punitive views when compared to the 
lowest income bracket, whilst males are more likely to hold less punitive views when 
compared to females and those with a Black Caribbean/African and Chinese background are 
more likely to hold less punitive views when compared to those with a white background. All 
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other variables remain stable. The variance explained by Model 3 as a whole is 27.6%, an 
increase of 14.5% from Model 2.  
 
Model 4: Nostalgia 
When the nostalgic items are introduced in Model 4, political nostalgic values28 (beta=-.107, 
p=<.001) and economic nostalgic values (beta=.070, p=<.001) have a significant effect on 
punitive attitudes towards welfare claimants. This suggests that as economic nostalgia 
increases so do punitive attitudes towards welfare claimants, whilst punitive attitudes 
decrease as political nostalgia increases. Social nostalgic values in contrast appears to have 
no effect on punitiveness towards welfare claimants in this model. The effect size of  
neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values reduce slightly once the nostalgia items are 
introduced to the model with neo-conservative values remaining significant at the p=<.001 
level whilst neo-liberal values reduces in significance to the p=<.05 level. The effect of politics 
diminishes once nostalgic items are introduced to the model, whilst the effect of working 
class origin (beta=.194, p=<.01) and no religion (beta=.164, p=<.05) increase, suggesting that 
those from a working class origin are more likely to hold more punitive attitudes than those 
from a middle class origin and those with no religion are more likely to hold punitive attitudes 
than those with a religion.  The nostalgia items have very little effect on all other variables in 
Model 4. The Nagelkerke value increases by 1.4% from Model 3. The full model containing all 
predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (32, N=3637) = 1092.99, p=<.001, indicating that the 
model is significantly better at predicting punitive attitudes supportive of stiffer penalties 
towards rulebreaking welfare claimants than not fitting the model. The Nagelkerke value29 
suggests that the model as a whole accounts for 29% of the variance in punitive attitudes 




28 Political nostalgic values: as agreement with the questions increases, punitiveness decreases. 
29 The Nagelkerke value provides an indication of the amount of variance in the dependent variable explained by 
the model, from a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of approximately 1 (Pallant, 2016). 
30 No concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix of all variables included in 
the models. There are no correlations between independent variables greater than .9 which would indicate 
concerns with multicollinearity (Field, 2018) with the largest (r=-.530, p=<.001) between political nostalgic 
values and economic nostalgic values. The largest correlation between the support for welfare stiffer penalties 





Findings suggest that support for stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants are 
largely driven by neo-conservative values shown by the relatively large increase in R-square 
value of Model 3. Additionally, political nostalgic values, economic nostalgic values, working 
class origin, no religion, higher incomes and neo-liberal values appear to be related to 
increased punitive attitudes, whilst being male, those in receipt of universal credit and Black 
Caribbean/African and Chinese ethnicity appear to be related to decreased punitiveness 
towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. Although there are only 42 Chinese respondents and 
the 95% confidence intervals are very wide suggesting that this may be a poor representation 
of the population (Field, 2018). 
 
7.3. Who are welfare claimants perceived to be?  
Distinct themes emerged from the cognitive interviews in relation to perceptions about the 
identities of welfare claimants. Terms used to describe welfare claimants generally fell into 
one of two categories; generic, neutral descriptors for welfare claimants, or in contrast, 
specific descriptors. The former tended to consist of responses such as ‘those who claim 
public funds’ (R2), ‘Any money that somebody gets from the government to help them out’ 
(R11) and ‘Could be unemployed, could be old age pensioners, could be people with learning 
or physical disabilities that require support.’ (R9).  
 
Whilst, the latter comprised of the following perceptions,    
 
‘Immigrants…they come in, get everything out of the system, and put nothing in.’ (R4) 
‘You can go in the Post Office…you’ll see a lot of Asians. They get a lot of money...they 
send it home to their families, and they get what they can out of the system. The 
Town Hall is full of people wanting to know what they can get. Scroungers. Anyone 
who is scrounging…coloured or white. People who try to get something out of the 
system and don’t appreciate it.’ (R7) 
‘People who don’t tend to get jobs because they don’t look for them.’ (R6)  
 ‘People on benefits that sign on...like the ones that are just doing it to get everything 
they can, so they don’t have to go to work.’   
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There are commonalities between these specific descriptors of welfare claimants in the 
cognitive interviews and observations in literature in recent years. Tinsley (2013:12) suggests 
a ‘rhetoric of division’ has re-emerged over the past decade or so towards the 
characterisation of unemployed people. Common terms used by politicians include 
‘scroungers’ and ‘workers and shirkers’ (Tinsley, 2013:12). Over recent decades, certain 
politicians have espoused the existence of a culture of worklessness within families and 
communities (Tinsley, 2013; The Guardian, 2012). On becoming Prime Minister in 1997, Tony 
Blair referred to the ‘workless class’ and to ‘households where three generations have never 
had a job’ (Blair, 1997).  More recently, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
between 2010 and 2016, Iain Duncan Smith, referred to families where ‘three generations 
are unemployed’ (Tinsley, 2013; The Guardian, 2012). Despite these frequent assertions, 
MacDonald et al. (2013:213) found it ‘impossible’ to locate families where ‘three generations 
have never worked’. Additionally, in recent years it has been suggested by those in favour of 
reducing immigration that the welfare system attracts some migrants to the UK  
(Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015). The British Social Attitudes Survey found that whilst support 
for additional spending on pensions and child benefit has increased since the 1980s, support 
for extra spending on the unemployed remains low with just 13% supporting benefits for the 
unemployed to be one of the top two priorities for additional spending (Taylor-Gooby and 
Taylor, 2015). Findings from the cognitive interviews indicates that these issues continue to 
dominate some respondents’ discourse towards welfare claimants with connections made 
between welfare and migrants, ‘scroungers’ and the belief that some claimants are reluctant 
to go to work.    
 
7.4. Exploring support for permanently stopping payments for rulebreaking welfare 
claimants  
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors31 
When socio-demographic factors are considered in isolation in Model 1 (Table 7.2), Black 
Caribbean/African ethnicity (beta=-.807, p=<.001), education in particular degree education 
(beta=-.681, p=<.001), universal credit claimant (beta=-.358, p=<.001), incomes between 
£25,000 and £85,999), gender (beta=-.240, p=<.001) and politics (beta=.214, p=<.001) appear 
 
31 See page 230 for coding.  
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to be relevant factors relating to punitiveness towards permanently stopping welfare 
payments for rulebreaking welfare claimants. This suggests that punitive attitudes increase 
with those earning over £25,999 when compared to those in the lowest income bracket, and 
with those who self-identity as politically conservative. Whilst punitive attitudes towards 
welfare claimants appear to decrease with Black Caribbean/African ethnicity when compared 
to white ethnicity, those with qualifications when compared to those with no qualifications, 
universal credit claimants when compared to non-claimants, and being male when compared 
to females. Additionally, those from a working class origin (beta=.162, p=<.05) appear to be 
more punitive when compared to those from a middle class origin, whilst those with no 
religion (beta=-.163, p<.05) appear to be less punitive when compared to those with a 
religion. The Nagelkerke value suggests that Model 1 accounts for 11.7% of the variance in 
punitive attitudes towards permanently stopping welfare for rulebreaking claimants.  
 
Model 2: Crime related factors  
When crime-related factors are introduced in Model 2, victimisation (any victimisation in the 
past five years) has no significant effect. Whilst fear of crime (beta=.127, p=<.01) appears to 
be a relevant factor with punitive attitudes increasing as fear increases. Apart from some 
small changes in effect sizes, there is very little effect from the introduction of crime-related 
factors on the socio-demographic factors in Model 2, with the exception of Black 
Caribbean/African ethnicity reducing in significant to the p=<.01 level. The Nagelkerke value 
of 12% suggests that Model 2 has a very small effect on explaining the variance in 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking welfare claimants with an increase of 0.3% from Model 1.   
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When belief systems are introduced in Model 3, neo-conservative values (beta=.265, 
p=<.001) has the strongest effect on increased support for permanently stopping payments 
for rulebreaking welfare claimants. Neo-liberal values is also significant at the p=<.001 with a 
smaller effect size (beta=.115). Once belief systems are introduced, the effects of 
victimisation increases slightly (beta=.201, p=<.05) suggesting that those who have no 
experience of victimisation in the past five years are more likely to hold more punitive 




Table 7.2: Beta coefficients for ordinal regression models predicting punitiveness towards 
‘Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments permanently 
stopped’ (n=3,637)32 
Socio -demographic factors 
0a = reference category 
Model 1 95% CI Model 2 95% CI Model 3 95% CI Model 4 95% CI 
Gender male (=0) 
 





















Age Range 25-34  
 
-.070 -.364,  
.225 
-.058 -.352,  
.237 




Age Range 35-44 -.036 -.343,  
.270 






Age Range 45-54 .034 -.263,  
.331 
.039 -.259,  
.336 




Age Range 55-64 -.230 -.535,  
.075 




-.578*** -.900,  
-.257 
Age Range 65+ -.245 -.551,  
.062 
-.244 -.551  
.063 




Age Range 16-24 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Income: £25,999 - £39,999  
 
.330*** .175,  
.485 
.330*** .175,  
.485 




£40,000 - £59,999 .420*** .240,  
.600 
.425*** .245,  
.604 












Over £85,000  .289 -.046,  
.623 






Income below £24,999 0a  0a  0a  0a  




-.656*** -.866,  
-.447 




Education – below degree 
qualification  








Education – no qualifications 0a  0a  0a  0a  
 No Religion (=0) 
 





















Politics (0-10 scale; 10 = more 
conservative) 








Working class origin (=0) 
 





















Relationship single (=0)  
 





















Universal Credit claimant (=0) 
 





















IMD 1st quartile  
 




.260** .066,  
.455 
.242* .046,  
.438 




.143 -.041,  
.326 
.139 -.045,  
.324 




.053 -.123,  
.228 
.051 -.125,  
.227 
IMD 4th quartile 0a  0a  0a  0a  












-.807*** -1.300,  
-.313 
-.794** -1.287,  
-.300 
-.960*** -1.464,  
-.456 
-.881*** -1.386,  
-.376 
 























Multiple ethnic background 
(n=72) 








White ethnicity (n=5,781) 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Crime related factors  
No victimisation (=0) 
 
Victimisation (=1) 















Fear of crime (1=very 
safe…4=very unsafe) 
  .127** .046,  
.209 




Belief systems (high 
scores=increase in values) 
        








         
Nostalgia (high 
scores=increase in values) 
        
Social nostalgic values       .014 -.005, 
 .033 
Economic nostalgic values       .063*** .037, 
.089 
Political nostalgic values       -.074*** -.099, 
-.049 
         
Nagelkerke R-square .117  .120  .304  .313  
0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
Neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values have a notable effect on many of the  
socio-demographic factors in Model 3. Age becomes a relevant factor. All age ranges increase 
in effect size and significance with age range 55 to 64 (beta=-.535, p=<.001) and over 65 year 
olds (beta=-.569, p=<.001) being the most relevant suggesting that higher age groups are 
more likely to hold less punitive attitudes towards the permanent cessation of payments for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants when compared to those aged under 25. There is a 
substantial increase in effect size of incomes over £40,000 in Model 3, with those earning in 
excess of £85,000 (beta=.711, p=<.001) becoming a significant factor once belief systems are 
introduced. This suggests that those earning higher incomes are more punitive than those in 
the lowest income bracket of below £25,000. Those in the lowest IMD quartile (beta=.260, 
p=<.01) appear to be more punitive when compared to those in the highest quartile in Model 
3. The effect size of gender (beta=-.497, p=<.001) and Black Caribbean/African ethnicity 
(beta=.960, p=<.001) also increase with males being less punitive than females, and those 
from a Black Caribbean/African background being less punitive than those from a white 
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background. The effect of education, religion, politics and class origin all diminish once belief 
systems are introduced to the model suggesting that neo-conservative values and neo-liberal 
values inflated the effects of these factors in the previous model. The variance explained by 
Model 3 as a whole is 30.4%, an increase of 18.4% from Model 2.  
 
Model 4: Nostalgia  
When nostalgia items are introduced in Model 4 economic nostalgic values (beta=.063, 
p=<.001) and political nostalgic values33 (beta=-.074, p=<.001) have a significant effect on 
punitive attitudes towards welfare claimants, whilst social nostalgic values has no effect. This 
suggests that as economic nostalgic values increase so do punitive attitudes, whilst punitive 
attitudes decrease as political nostalgia increases. The effect size of neo-conservative values 
reduces slightly but remains significant at the p=<.001 level once the nostalgia items are 
entered in Model 4, whilst the effects of neo-liberal values remain stable. The introduction of 
nostalgic values in Model 4 has the most notable effect on age, income, religion, IMD and 
Black Caribbean/African ethnicity. The effect sizes of age ranges above 45 to 54 increase 
notably, suggesting that these age groups are less punitive than those under 25 years old. 
The effect sizes of incomes in excess of £40,000 decrease substantially. Those in the lowest 
IMD quartile also decreases in effect size and significance (beta=.242, p=<.05) and Black 
Caribbean/African ethnicity also decreases in effect size. Finally, no religion (beta=.145, 
p=<.05) becomes a relevant factor in the final model with those having no religion being 
more punitive than those with a religion. The increase in variance explained by Model 4 is 
0.9% from Model 3. The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (32, 
N=3637) = 1263.23, p=<.001, indicating that the model is significantly better at predicting 
punitive attitudes towards permanent exclusion than not fitting a model34. The Nagelkerke 
value suggests that the model as a whole accounts for 31.3% of the variance in punitive 
attitudes towards permanently stopping payments for rulebreaking welfare claimants.  
 
 
33 Political nostalgic values: as agreement with the questions increases, punitiveness decreases. 
34 No concerns were noted with multicollinearity of independent variables as noted with the stiffer sentences 
for welfare claimants variable (see note 3-the same independent variables are used in the analysis). The largest 
correlation between the permanently stopping welfare payments and the independent variables was with neo-





Findings suggest that support for permanently stopping payments for rulebreaking welfare 
claimants is largely influenced by neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values shown by 
the increase in the Nagelkerke R-square value in Model 3. Other relevant factors also appear 
to be being female, those under 25 years old, incomes below £25,000, white ethnicity (in 
comparison to Black Caribbean/African ethnicity), not being in receipt of universal credit, 
having no religion, having no qualifications, belonging to the lowest IMD quartile, no 
experience of victimisation, economic nostalgic values and political nostalgic values.   
 
7.5. ‘A fair share of the money’: Fairness and deservingness 
A sense of fairness and deservingness expressed by some respondents in the cognitive 
interviews is a theme prominent in political discourse in recent years (Taylor-Gooby and 
Taylor, 2015). Contentious changes have been made to the welfare system with a view to 
ensure its fairness to society as a whole (Taylor-Gooby and Taylor, 2015). When asked to 
reflect on the permanency element of welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system 
should have their payments permanently stopped, cognitive interview participants who had 
strongly agreed with the statement continued to assert that those who cheat the system 
should have their benefits permanently withdrawn,  
 
‘We go to work, you go to work…don’t give them nowt, just stop it.’ (R3) 
‘If nothing happens to them, they just carry on doing it. They should stop all their 
money and not give them anything.’ (R4) 
‘If they are swinging the lead you can’t have your benefits. They don’t get no more’ 
(R8).  
 
In contrast, the majority of those who had agreed with the original statement when 
completing the survey tended to soften their response when asked to reflect on the 
permanency of the statement,  
 
‘Maybe that’s a bit strict…I think that is a bit too harsh. I’m in two minds about that 
then really.’ (R2)  
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‘They should be stopped to some degree…but mostly people are trying to get benefits 
because they are really needy, so I don’t think they should be permanently 
stopped.’(R5) 
 
‘…it shouldn’t be stopped but they shouldn’t get as much’. (R6) 
 
‘Deservingness’ and ‘fairness’ were prominent themes expressed by participants who 
strongly agreed or agreed with permanently stopping payments for rulebreaking welfare 
claimants,  
 
‘Why should people get benefits if they don’t really deserve them and the people that 
do, don’t get them?’ (R1)  
 
‘There are more people out there who need it, who are honest who need it, instead 
of like people who are lying and getting it through money like that, yeah they should 
just stop it. They don’t deserve it.’ (R2)  
 
‘They only get their hand slapped, so they keep on doing it, and keep dragging money 
out of the system, that they are not entitled to, and if nothing happens to them, they 
just carry on doing it’ (R4)  
 
‘…they shouldn’t get as much as they are because they should learn from their 
actions. Everybody else needs a fair share of the money.’ (R6)  
 
‘A lot of people that go to work and work really hard get no support at all.’ (R8) 
 
These findings are consistent with previous research that has found that the general public 
tend to implicitly link welfare and ‘deservingness’ (Stanley and Hartman, 2016). Despite 
agreeing that rulebreaking welfare claimants should have their payments permanently 





‘But mostly people are trying to get benefits because they are really needy and there 
are a lot of people like that.’ (R5) 
 
‘They would still need some form of money to survive.’ (R6) 
 
‘That would depend on what they had used the money for…there must be a reason 
why they have done it in the first place.’ (R11)  
 
Whilst participants who had disagreed or strongly disagreed with the permanent cessation of 
welfare payments tended to be more compassionate, 
 
‘Human beings have a right to live…you can’t leave people stranded.’ (R9) 
 
‘It just sets them back even further, it’s not beneficial to the person… it doesn’t 
benefit anybody actually’ (R12). 
 
‘People Like Me’ 
Some participants who expressed punitive attitudes towards welfare claimants were 
themselves in receipt of benefits. These findings echo a qualitative study involving 
unemployed people by Tinsley (2013), which found evidence of a divisive attitude amongst 
Jobseeker Allowance (JSA) claimants towards other JSA claimants. The majority of jobseekers 
were found to have a negative view of other jobseekers commenting that others could find 
work if they really wanted to or did not need the benefits they so claimed (Tinsley, 2013). 
Distinctions were also made between their own deservingness of the support they received 
and the undeservingness of others on benefits (Tinsley, 2013). These attitudes were also 
evident in the cognitive interviews.  
 
However, the quantitative analyses undertaken in this chapter suggests that universal credit 
claimants are significantly less punitive towards rulebreaking welfare claimants than those 
who are not in receipt of universal credit. The introduction of universal credit has led to 
increased financial difficulties for many claimants (Schmuecker, 2016; Dwyer and Wright, 
2014). Universal credit has also been the focus of numerous Work and Pension Committee 
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inquiries in recent years (see Work and Pensions Committee, 2020), which have found that 
universal credit claimants have experienced acute financial ongoing difficulties initiated by 
the initial six-week wait for their first payment (Work and Pensions Committee, 2017). A 
longitudinal survey of universal credit claimants commissioned by the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) (2018b) sought to understand the experiences of claimants who used 
their online universal credit account to manage their claims. Over half of universal credit 
claimants in the survey were found to be experiencing ongoing difficulties meeting financial 
commitments. Four in ten universal credit participants continued to experience financial 
difficulties eight months into their universal credit claim. Two-thirds of those who had fallen 
into arrears with their bills and credit commitments reported that this had happened after 
their universal credit claim had commenced. Around half of the claimants reported having to 
find additional funds obtained from family, friends, payment advances from the Jobcentre 
Plus, bank overdrafts and high-risk sources such as payday loans (DWP, 2018b). Additionally, 
in 2017, 25% of all new claims for universal credit were paid late, this equates to around 
113,000 new claims paid on average four weeks late (Comptroller and Auditor General, 
2018). It is possible then, that those who have experience of the universal credit system 
sympathise with others receiving welfare who may be experiencing financial difficulties. On 
consideration of the use of the extreme sanction of permanently stopping payments for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants, there appeared to be some softening of attitudes in 
comparison to the general idea of support for stiffer penalties. Although this softening did 
not always result in participants disagreeing with permanently stopping payments, it did tend 
to result in some participants acknowledging the circumstances of those rulebreaking 
claimants.   
 
7.6. A comparison of support for stiffer penalties and permanently stopping payments for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants 
There are similarities in factors related to both support for stiffer penalties and support for 
permanently stopping payments for rulebreaking welfare claimants. Table 7.3 below shows 
the significant factors relating to each variable. The introduction of belief systems to the 
model has the largest effect on punitiveness towards both support for stiffer sentences and 
permanently stopping benefits for rulebreaking welfare claimants. This is consistent with 
previous welfare literature that has found values and beliefs to be relevant factors relating to 
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punitiveness towards welfare claimants (Deeming, 2015; Schofield and Butterworth, 2015; 
Baumberg et al., 2012; Baumberg Geiger, 2017). Being female, higher incomes, having no 
religion, not being in receipt of universal credit, white ethnicity, economic and political 
nostalgia also appear to be related to both statements. Consistent with previous research, 
higher income has been found to be related to lower support of welfare (Taylor-Gooby and 
Martin, 2008; Deeming, 2015), and those with religious beliefs have been found to believe 
that welfare conditionality is too harsh (Deeming, 2015).  
 
The only factor relating exclusively to punitiveness towards support for stiffer penalties for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants appears to be being from a working-class origin. Deeming 
(2015) found that class (measured by occupation) was a relevant factor in beliefs about the 
welfare system with unskilled workers being less likely to believe that welfare benefits are 
too generous than other occupational groups. Professionals were also more likely to believe 
that welfare benefits have weak conditionality than unskilled workers (Deeming, 2015).  
 
Factors relating only to the more extreme sanction of permanently stopping payments for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants appear to be younger age, specifically those aged under 25, 
having no qualifications, those in the lowest IMD quartile and having no experience of 
victimisation. Deeming (2015) also found that young adults (aged 15-24 years old) were more 
likely than older people to believe that unemployment benefits are too high, and that welfare 
conditionality is weak in the British welfare system. Deeming (2015) also found that those 
with no qualifications were more likely to believe that benefits are too generous and that the 
welfare system disincentivizes the unemployed from working than those with a university 
degree. Additionally, not being in receipt of universal credit and neo-liberal values have a 
bigger effect on punitiveness towards permanently stopping welfare claimants than towards 














Welfare claimants who repeatedly 
cheat the system should face stiffer 
penalties 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly 
cheat the system should have their 
payments permanently stopped 
Gender male (=0) 
(0a – females=1)  
*** (beta=-.393) 
(males less punitive than females)  
*** (beta=-.477) 
(males less punitive than females) 
Age Range 25-34 
(0a - 16-24 year olds) 
X *(beta=-.373) 
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range 35-44 
 
X *(beta=-.339) 
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range 45-54 
 
X *(beta=-.368) 
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range 55-64 
 
X *** (beta=-.578) 
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range 65+ 
 
X *** (beta=-.643) 
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Income £25,999 - £39,999 
(0a - below £24,999) 
*** (beta=.338) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
*** (beta=.303) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
£40,000 - £59,999 *** (beta=.644) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
*** (beta=.480) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
£60,000 - £84,999 *** (beta=.731) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
*(beta=.335) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
Over £85,000 *** (beta=.726) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
*(beta=.348) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
Degree Education  
(0a - no qualifications) 
X *(beta=-.270) 
(less punitive than no qualifications) 
Below degree education X  X 
No Religion 
(0a – Religion=1) 
*(beta=.164) 
(no religion more punitive)  
*(beta=.145) 
(no religion more punitive) 
Political conservativism  X X 
Working class origin (=0) 
(0a -  middle class=1) 
**(beta=.194) 
(working class more punitive than 
middle class) 
X 
Relationship  X X 
Universal Credit claimant=0 
(0a – non claimant=1) 
**(beta=-.312) 
(Claimant less punitive than non-
claimant)  
*** (beta=-.360) 
(Claimant less punitive than non-
claimant) 
IMD 
(0a - 4th quartile) 
X *(beta=.242) 
(first quartile more punitive than 4th) 
Black Caribbean ethnicity 
(0a – white ethnicity) 
**(beta=-.779)  
(Black Caribbean/African less punitive 
than white)  
*** (beta=-.881)  
(Black Caribbean/African less punitive) 
Chinese ethnicity 
(0a – white ethnicity) 
** (beta=-1.023) 
(Chinese less punitive) 
X 
No Victimisation (=0) 
(0a – Victimisation=1) 
X *(beta=.212) 
(no victimisation more punitive) 
Fear of crime X X 
Neo-liberal values *(beta=.031) *** (beta=.114) 
Neo-conservative values *** (beta=.250) *** (beta=.238) 
Social nostalgic values X X 
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0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001 
 
7.7. Welfare punitivity  
The ‘welfare punitivity’ variable was constructed through factor analyzing ‘Welfare claimants 
who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties’ and ‘Welfare claimants who 
repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments permanently stopped’ (the 
construction of this variable is discussed in more detail below). The variables for welfare 
punitivity correlated quite high with each other r=.615, had a one factor solution explaining 
80.76% of the variance with a high reliability (Cronbach’s α=.750). Results from factor 
analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of constructing a single variable 
(Welfare Punitivity) from the two items. The large sample size (n=5,781) is considered large 
enough to meet the sample size required to undertake regression analysis.35   
 
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors36 
When socio-demographic factors are considered in isolation in Model 1 (Table 7.4), politics 
(beta=.268, p=<.001) has the strongest effect on welfare punitivity. As respondents  
self-identify as more politically conservative their punitive attitudes increase towards 
rulebreaking welfare claimants. Lower educational attainment (beta=.090, p=<.001), higher 
incomes (beta=.073, p=<.001), females (beta=.067, p=<.001), decreased religiosity 
(beta=.066, p=<.001), working-class origin (beta=-.066, p=<.001) and not being in receipt of 
 
35 Green (1991, cited in Tabacknick and Fidell, 2014:159) suggest N≥50+8m (where m in the number of 
independent variables), so for the regression conducted in this section, 18 independent variables are used: 50 + 
(8) (18) = 194 cases. If the dependent variable is skewed a larger sample is required as a small effect size or 
substantial measurement error is expected from less reliable variables (Tabacknick and Fidell, 2014). 
36 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=16-24, 2=25-34, 3=35-44, 4=45-54, 5=55-64, 
6=65-74, 7=75+; Income: 1=below £5,000, 2=£5,000-£9,999, 3=£10,000-£14,999, 4=£15,000-£19,999, 
5=£20,000-£24,000, 6=£25,000-£29,999, 7=£30,000- £34,999, 8=£35,000-£39,999, 9=40,000-£44,999, 
10=£45,000-£49,999, 11=£50,000-£59,999, 12=£60,000-£69,999, 13=70,000-£84,999, 14=£84,000-£99,999, 
15=over £100,000; Education: 1=Degree level, 2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; 
Religiosity scale: 1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious; Politics scale: 0=left to 10=right; Class 
Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship status: 0=single, 1=in relationship; Universal Credit: 
0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 2=2nd quartile, 3=3rd quartile, 4=4th quartile; Ethnicity: 
0=Other, 1=White.    
Economic nostalgic values *** (beta=.070) *** (beta=.063) 
Political nostalgic values *** (beta=-.107) *** (beta=-.074) 
Nagelkerke R-Square Value 29% 31.3% 
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universal credit (beta=.059, p=<.01 are also related to increased punitivity.  Model 1 as a 
whole accounts for 12.7% of the variance in explaining punitive attitudes towards 
rulebreaking welfare claimants.    
 
Model 2: Crime related factors 
When crime-related factors are introduced in Model 2 victimisation has no effect, whereas 
fear of crime (beta=.062, p=<.01) appears to be related to increased punitiveness, with 
punitive attitudes increasing as fear increases. The majority of all other factors in Model 2 
remain stable, except for a decrease in effect size and significance for gender (beta=.054, 
p=<.01) and an increase in effect size for politics (beta=.287, p=<.001). This suggests that fear 
of crime slightly inflated the effects of gender in Model 1. The R-Square change in Model 2 is 
very small at .003, with Model 2 explaining 13.1% of the variance in welfare punitiveness, an 
increase of 0.3% from Model 1. 
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
In Model 3, neo-conservative values37 has the strongest effect on welfare punitivity 
(beta=.476, p=<.001), with neo-liberal values also having a significant effect (beta=.080, 
p=<.001). This suggests that as neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values increase, so do 
punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. The effects of fear of crime and 
education diminish once neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values are introduced to the 
model, whilst the effects of class origin (beta=-.034, p=<.05) and politics (beta=.082, p=<.001) 
reduce substantially and religiosity (beta=.050, p=<.01) reduces slightly. This suggests that  
neo-conservative and neo-liberal values inflated the effects of these factors in the previous 
model. Whilst the effects of being female (beta=.089, p=<.001) increase in Model 3. Finally, 
IMD (beta=-.046, p=<.01) becomes a relevant factor in Model 3 with punitive attitudes 
increasing with lower quartiles, and universal credit becoming significant at the p=<.001 level. 




37 See Chapter 9.3 for an analysis of neo-conservative values 
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Table 7.4: Beta weights for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘welfare punitivity’ 
(n=2,090)38 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
Model 4: Nostalgia  
When nostalgia items are introduced in Model 4, economic nostalgic values (beta=.074, 
p=<.001) appears to be related to increased welfare punitiveness, whilst increased political 
nostalgic values (beta=-.100, p=<.001) appears to be related to decreased punitiveness 
towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. Social nostalgic values has no effect on welfare 
punitiveness. Neo-conservative values (beta=.453, p=<.001) continues to have the strongest 
effect on punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. There is very little effect 
on all other variables when nostalgic values are introduced to the model, with the exception 
of age (beta=-.043, p=<.05), politics (beta=.061, p=<.01), and IMD (beta=-.041, p=<.05). Age 
 
38 See P230 for more detail regarding the n-size 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors36     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .067*** .054** .089*** .088*** 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) .019 .021 -.033 -.043* 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .073*** .078*** .081*** .081*** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
quals) 
.090*** .086*** .018 .018 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .066*** .065*** .050** .047** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .268*** .287*** .082*** .061** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.066*** -.062*** -.034* -.037* 
Relationship Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .041 .040 .001 .003 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .059** .061** .064*** .062*** 
IMD (1=lowest quartile to 4=highest quartile) -.021 -.029 -.046** -.041* 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.001 .002 .020 .019 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.014 -.018 -.018 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .062** .019 .016 
Belief systems (high scores=more neo-
con/neo-lib) 
    
Neo-liberal values   .082*** .081*** 
Neo-conservative values   .476*** .453*** 
Nostalgia (high score=more nostalgic)     
Social nostalgic values    .008 
Economic nostalgic values    .074*** 
Political nostalgic values    -.100*** 
R-square .127*** .131** .327*** .333** 
Adjusted R-square .124 .126 .323 .328 
R-square change  .003 .196 .006 
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becomes significant once the nostalgia items are entered into the model with punitiveness 
increasing with younger age, whilst the effect size of politics decreases once the nostalgia 
items are introduced, and IMD reduces to in significance (p=<.05). The increase in variance 
explained by Model 4 is 0.6% from Model 3. The R-square indicates that the model as a 




Findings suggest that punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants is strongly 
related to neo-conservative values, which has the largest effect size of all the tested variables 
and the biggest increase in R-Square change when neo-conservative values and neo-liberal 
values were entered in Model 3. Additionally, political nostalgic values, economic nostalgic 
values, being female, neo-liberal values, higher income, non-universal credit claimants, those 
identifying as more politically conservative, decreased religiosity, younger age, working class 
origin and lower IMD quartile also appear to be related to increased punitiveness towards 
rulebreaking welfare claimants. Table 7.5 below shows the statistically significant factors 
related to welfare punitivity.  
 
Discussion 
Findings here suggest that neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on punitive 
attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. Again, as with the rulebreaking school 
pupils items, analysis shows that separating the two measures draws out some notable 
differences between support for stiffer penalties and support for the more punitive sanction 
of permanently stopping welfare benefits. Most notably, in relation to the values based 
variables, support for the general, non-specific sanction of ‘stiffer penalties’ is predominately 
related to neo-conservative values, with political nostalgic values with economic nostalgic 
values also having a smaller effect. Support for the more extreme sanction of permanently 
stopping welfare payments appears to be related to neo-conservative values, neo-liberal 
values and no experience of victimisation, with political nostalgic values and economic 




A very small amount of empirical research has sought to understand public attitudes towards 
welfare claimants through exploring socio-demographic factors. This available research also 
does not explore punitive attitudes as operationalized here but generally explores attitudes 
towards welfare and its claimants more broadly. However, despite this limitation, there are 
some similarities between the findings in this chapter and previous research towards welfare 
claimants. Younger age (aged between 18 and 34) has been found to be least supportive of 
welfare spending for the poor (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008), and those aged between 15 
and 24 were more likely to believe that unemployment benefits were too high, and that 
welfare conditionality is weak in the British welfare system (Deeming, 2015). Taylor-Gooby 
and Martin (2008) also found that those earning lower incomes were more supportive for 
increased welfare spending, whilst Deeming (2015) found that as household income 
increased so does the belief that welfare benefits are too generous. Those with religious 
beliefs have been found to believe that welfare conditionality is too harsh (Deeming, 2015). 
Those who self-identify as more politically conservative are less supportive of increased 
welfare spending (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008), more likely to believe that welfare 
benefits disincentivize claimants and that the welfare system has weak conditionality 
(Deeming, 2015).     
 
Welfare Punitivity: Evaluating the multiple regression model 
The full multiple regression model for welfare punitivity containing all the predictors was 
significant (p=<.001).39 The model summary (Table 7.6) shows the multiple correlation 
coefficients between welfare punitivity and the predictors in column one (labelled R), 
showing that when all predictors are included in Model 4 the multiple correlation coefficient 
is .577. The R-Square value in the second column measures how much variability in the 
outcome variable is explained for by the predictors (Field, 2018). The adjusted R-square 
indicates how well the model generalises with the figure in the final model between the  
R-square (.333) and adjusted R-square (.328) equalling .005, or 0.5%, meaning that if the 
model were derived from the population as opposed to a sample the model would account 
for approximately 0.5% less variance in the outcome (Field, 2018). The F change statistic 
 
39 The ANOVA table shows the F-Test of whether the model is significantly better at predicting the outcome 
than using no predictors (Field, 2018). The p-values (p=<.001) indicates that all models significantly improve the 




shows that the change in R-square is significant at the p=<.001 level for model 1, 3 and 4, and 
significant at the p=<.01 level for model 2. The combined explanatory power of all models is  
R²=.333 suggesting that the model overall explains 33.3% of the variance in welfare 
punitivity.  
 
Table 7.5: Summary table for relevant statistically significant factors for punitivity towards 
rulebreaking welfare claimants in Model 4 
 
 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
 





Age Range  
1=16-24 to 7=75+ 
* 
(beta=-.043, younger age) 
Income 
1=<£5000 to 15=>£100,000  
*** 
(beta=.081, higher income) 
Education 
1=degree, 2 below degree level, 3=no qualifications  
X 
Religiosity  
1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious 
** 
(beta=.047, decreased religiosity) 
Political conservativism  
Scale: 1=left to 10=right 
** 
(beta=.061) 
Class Origin  
0=working class, 1=middle class 
* 









(1=lowest quartile to 4=4th quartile) 
* 





0=no, 1=victimised  
X 
Fear of crime  
1=very safe to 4= very unsafe 
X 
Neo-liberal values *** 
(beta=.081) 
Neo-conservative values *** 
(beta=.453) 
Social nostalgic values X 
Economic nostalgic values *** 
(beta=.074) 
Political nostalgic values *** 
(-.100) 
R-Square Value 33.3% 
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Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .357 .127 .124 .81650784 .127 33.403 11 2518 .000 
2 .362 .131 .126 .81524563 .003 4.902 2 2516 .008 
3 .572 .327 .323 .71763056 .196 366.513 2 2514 .000 
4 .577 .333 .328 .71485802 .006 7.513 3 2511 .000 
 
Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers 
The histogram (Figure 7.1) shows that the normally distributed errors assumption is met with 
the mean (-0.03) very close to zero. The Normal Probability Plot (Figure 7.2) shows the data 
lie in a reasonably straight line suggesting no major deviations from normality.  
 






Casewise diagnostics shows that 15 cases (0.3% of the sample) have standardized residual 
values below -3 or above +3, which is below the 1% which would otherwise indicate concerns 
(Pallant, 2016; Field, 2018). Further investigation of these 15 cases suggests that no cases are 
have a Cook’s distance value40 greater than 1 with the largest value of .01. Inspection of the 
Mahalanobis distances41 shows 30 cases have Mahalanobis distances greater than 42.312 
 
40 Cook’s distance indicates whether a case has an undue influence on the results with values above 1 
suggesting a potential problem (Pallant, 2016).  
41 Inspection of the Mahalanobis distances allow identification of outliers (Pallant, 2016). To identify which cases 
are outliers, the critical chi-square value was determined using 18 independent variables as the degrees of 
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(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). Further examination of the DFBeta and DfFit statistics for the 
independent variables, which indicate problematic cases having an undue influence on the 
model parameters, highlight no concerns with no cases close to 1 (Field, 2018).  
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
No preliminary concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix 
of all dependent and independent variables. This shows with no correlations between 
independent variables are greater than .9 with the largest between political nostalgic values 
and economic nostalgic values (r=.552). The largest correlation between welfare punitivity 
and the independent variables was with neo-conservative values (r=.528, p=<.001). All 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) are well below 10 which would indicate concerns (Pallant, 
2016) with the highest 2.030 (Economic nostalgic values) in any of the equations. No 
Tolerance values were below .10 which would also indicate concerns (Pallant, 2016) with the 
lowest value of .493 (Economic nostalgic values), and the standard errors are low (highest 
.070 for ethnicity in Model 2). The average VIF in model 4 is 1.35 is also not substantially 
more than 1 (Field, 2018), therefore suggesting no concerns with multicollinearity.  
 
7.8. Summary 
This chapter began by conducting ordinal logistic regression to examine the 
relationship between the two items designed to measure punitiveness towards rulebreaking 
welfare claimants and a range of factors, including socio-demographic factors,  
crime-related factors, political beliefs and nostalgia. The data showed that neo-conservative 
values has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants, 
which was the case with both support for stiffer penalties and support for permanently 
stopping welfare payments, with the model explaining a similar amount of variance in both 
measures of welfare punitiveness. Additional factors that appear to be related to punitive 
attitudes towards stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants appears to be political 
nostalgic values, economic nostalgic values, white ethnicity, higher incomes, being female, 
working class origin, those not in receipt of universal credit and those with no religion. 
Additional factors that appear to be related to punitive attitudes towards permanently 
 
freedom (Pallant, 2016) from the critical values chi-square table and an alpha level of .001 (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2013: 10). 
266 
 
stopping payments for rulebreaking welfare claimants appears to be neo-liberal values, being 
female, those under 25 years old, incomes below £25,000, white ethnicity, not being in 
receipt of universal credit, having no religion, having no qualifications, belonging to the 
lowest IMD quartile, no experience of victimisation, economic nostalgic values and political 
nostalgic values.   
 
The only factor relating exclusively to punitiveness towards support for stiffer penalties for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants appears to be being from a working-class origin. Whereas, 
factors relating to the more extreme sanction of permanently stopping payments for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants appear to be younger age, specifically those aged under 25, 
having no qualifications, those in the lowest IMD quartile and having no experience of 
victimisation. Additionally, not being in receipt of universal credit and neo-liberal values have 
a bigger effect on punitiveness towards permanently stopping welfare claimants than 
towards support for stiffer penalties. This suggests that some socio-demographic factors are 
more relevant to support for the more extreme sanction of ceasing payments of rulebreaking 
welfare claimants than support for the more general idea of stiffer penalties.  
 
A multiple regression model was then conducted to examine the factors related to 
‘Welfare punitivity’ a variable consisting of the two items designed to measure 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking welfare claimants through both support for stiffer 
penalties and permanently stopping welfare payments. As found in the ordinal regression 
models, welfare punitivity is strongly related to neo-conservative values. Other relevant 
factors relating to increased punitiveness appear to be political nostalgic values, economic 
nostalgic values, being female, neo-liberal values, higher income, non-universal credit 
claimants, those identifying as more politically conservative, decreased religiosity, younger 
age, working class origin and lower IMD quartiles.   
 
This chapter also incorporated themes that emerged during the cognitive interviews. As 
with the quantitative data, qualitative responses to the two different statements 
appeared to elicit different themes. In relation to attitudes towards stiffer penalties for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants, some respondents’ discourse towards welfare claimants 
appeared to be dominated by connections made between welfare and migrants, ‘scroungers’ 
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and the belief that some claimants are reluctant to go to work.  Deservingness and fairness 
were evident in the cognitive interviews in consideration of permanently ceasing welfare 
payments. Parallels were drawn between the discourse used by the cognitive interview 
respondents and political discourse. There was also some evidence of some softening of 
attitudes on reflection of the impacts of permanently stopping payments. Punitive attitudes 
towards rulebreaking welfare claimants were displayed by people who were themselves on 
benefits. However, the quantitative analyses undertaken in this chapter suggests that 
universal credit claimants are significantly less punitive towards rulebreaking welfare 
claimants than those who are not in receipt of universal credit.  
 
Attention now turns to examining punitive attitudes towards the final group of rulebreakers, 






















Chapter 8 Quantitative Analysis of punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers 
 
8.1. Introduction  
Chapters 6 and 7 examined punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils and 
rulebreaking welfare claimants, respectively. Firstly, the independent variables designed to 
measure punitiveness towards school pupils and welfare claimants were examined through 
conducting ordinal logistic regression. Secondly, multiple linear regression analyses were 
undertaken to examine ‘school punitivity’ and ‘welfare punitivity’; this analysis merged the 
two separate items for each rulebreaker into one single variable. Analyses shows that  
neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards both 
rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants, but with a much larger effect on 
rulebreaking school pupils. The model also explained a larger amount of variance in 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils than rulebreaking welfare claimants. 
Additionally, the model explained less variance in support for the use of permanent exclusion 
than towards tougher punishments for school pupils but explained a similar amount of 
variance between the two rulebreaking welfare claimant measures. This suggests that the 
model is more predictive of support for broad, non-specific sanctions for rulebreaking school 
pupils than it is for support for specific, extreme sanctions for school pupils and for any 
sanctioning of welfare claimants.  
 
There also appears to be some difference in drivers between support for broad, non-specific 
sanctions and specific, extreme sanctions for both rulebreaking school pupils and welfare 
claimants. Most notably, support for non-specific sanctions for rulebreaking school pupils is 
largely driven by neo-conservative values, whilst support for the specific, extreme sanction of 
permanent exclusion is related to a broader range of factors, namely, neo-conservative 
values, neo-liberal values, victimisation, and social nostalgic values. Support for general,  
non-specific sanctions for rulebreaking welfare claimants appears to be related to  
neo-conservative values, political nostalgic values, and to a lesser extent, economic nostalgic 
values. Support for the specific sanction of permanently stopping welfare payments appears 
to be related to neo-liberal values, having no experience of victimisation and to a lesser 
extent political nostalgic values and economic nostalgic values. Differences in attitudes 
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between general, non-specific sanctions and specific, extreme sanctions were also evident 
throughout the cognitive interviews.  
 
This chapter repeats the analyses conducted in the previous two chapters (see the 
introduction to Chapter 6 for more detail), analysing public attitudes towards criminal 
rulebreakers in the same way as for rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants 
enabling comparisons to be made. Following the same format as Chapters 6 and 7, the steps 
taken to examine the data are as follows: 
 
1. Ordinal Logistic Regression was used to analyse the two separate items with ordinal 
outcomes designed to measure punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers, 
namely, People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences, and For some 
crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence.42  
 
2. Hierarchical multiple linear regression was then used to analyse Law Punitivity, a 
continuous variable, which was factor analysed, consisting of People who break the 
law should be given stiffer sentences, and For some crimes the death penalty is the 
most appropriate sentence.  
 
3. Previous literature is considered in light of the findings in this chapter, which is 
included in the analysis of Law Punitivity. Previous research has generally combined 
both separate items in this chapter into a single variable (often with other variables as 
well) to explore punitive attitude towards offenders. Therefore, previous research is 
more relevant to the Law Punitivity analysis. Of note, there is no qualitative data from 
the cognitive interviews included in this chapter as with the school pupils and welfare 
claimants chapters. The questions used to analyse attitudes towards criminal 
rulebreakers have been used by the British Social Attitudes Survey since 1983 and are 
well tested and fielded questions; as such, they were not tested in the cognitive 
interviews.       
 
 
42 Response codes were: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly 
agree.   
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8.2. Exploring support for stiffer sentences for criminal rulebreakers     
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors43 
As shown in Table 8.1, education (beta= -.686, p=<.001) and age range, particularly 45 to 54 
year olds (beta= .607, p=<.001) and over 65 year olds (beta=.513, p=<.001) have the 
strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers. This suggests that those 
with a degree level education are more likely to hold less punitive views than those with no 
qualifications, and older people are more likely to be more punitive than those under 25 
years old. Additionally, class origin (beta=.321), no religion (beta= -.283) and politics 
(beta=.227) also appear to be relevant factors at the p=<.001 level suggesting those from a 
working class origin are more likely to hold punitive views compared to those from a middle 
class origin, those with no religion are less likely to hold punitive attitudes than those with a 
religion, and self-identified political conservativism increases punitive attitudes. Additionally, 
those from a Black Caribbean/African background (beta=-.673, p=<.01) appear to be less 
punitive than those from a white background and those from the middle IMD quartiles 
appear to be less punitive than those from the highest quartile. All other factors in Model 1 
were not significant. The Nagelkerke R-Square value suggests that socio-demographic factors 
as a whole account for 13.8% of the variance in punitive attitudes towards stiffer sentences 
for criminal rulebreakers.   
 
Model 2: Crime related factors 
The next model introduced crime related factors. Victimisation, those who had experienced 
any victimisation in the last 5 years, has no effect in Model 2, whilst fear of crime (How safe 
do you feel walking around in the area you live in after dark?) has a strong effect (beta=.299, 
p=<.001) with punitive attitudes increasing as fear increases. Fear of crime has very little 
impact on the socio-demographic variables in Model 2, with the exception of a decrease in 
effect size and significance level for Black Caribbean/African ethnicity, and the middle IMD 
 
43 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=65+, 2=55-64, 3=45-54, 4=35-44, 5=25-34, 
6=16-24; Income: 1=£85,000+, 2=£60,000-£84,999, 3=£40,000-£59,999, 4=£25,000-£39,999, 5=below £24,999; 
Education: 1=Degree level, 2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; Religion: 0=No, 1=Yes; 
Politics scale is continuous from 0=left to 10=right; Class Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship 
status: 0=single, 1=in relationship; Universal Credit: 0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 2=2nd 
quartile, 3=3rd quartile, 4=4th quartile; Ethnicity: 1=Other, 2=Black Caribbean/African, 3=Chinese, 4=Asian/Sub-




quartiles become non-significant. This suggests that fear of crime inflated the effects of these 
factors in Model 1. The Nagelkerke value of 15.1% suggests a 1.3% increase in explaining the 
variance in punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers from Model 1.   
 
Table 8.1: Beta coefficients for ordinal regression models towards ‘People who break the law 
should be given stiffer sentences’ (n=3,637)44 
Socio -demographic factors43 
0a = reference category 
Model 1 95% CI Model 2 95% CI Model 3 95% CI Model 4 95% CI 
Gender male (=0) 
 





















Age Range 25-34  
 
.432** .136,  
.727 
.455** .159,  
.751 




Age Range 35-44 .423** .116,  
.730 
.449** .142,  
.757 




Age Range 45-54 .607*** .309,  
.906 
.634*** .335,  
.934 








.035 -.292,  
.361 
.001 -.327,  
.329 
Age Range 65+ .513*** .205,  
.822 
.542*** .233,  
.851 




Age Range 16-24 0a  0a  0a  0a  
Income: £25,999 - £39,999  
 
.116 -.040,  
.271 
.124 -.032,  
.280 




£40,000 - £59,999 .166 -.014,  
.346 
.180 -.001,  
.360 




£60,000 - £84,999 .220 -.032,  
.472 
.250 -.003,  
.502 




Over £85,000  -.097 -.430,  
.235 
-.030 -.363,  
.303 




Income: below £24,999 0a  0a  0a  0a  










Education – below degree 
qualification  
-.093 -.289,  
.103 
-.076 -.273,  
.120 




Education – no qualifications 0a  0a  0a  0a  
No Religion (=0) 
 





















Politics (0-10 scale; 10 = more 
conservative) 








Working class origin  
 





















Relationship single (=0) 
 












































IMD 1st quartile  
 




.010 -.190,  
.210 
.028 -.174,  
.230 




.022 -.168,  
.211 
.044 -.147,  
.236 




-.071 -.253,  
.110 
-.077 -.260,  
.106 
 
44 See p217 for details about the n-size 
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IMD 4th quartile 0a  0a  0a  0a  













-.673** -1.173,  
-.174 
-.630* -1.130,  
-.130 
-.774** -1.292,  
-.256 






















Multiple ethnic background 
(n=72) 








White ethnicity  
(n=5,154) 
0a  0a  0a  0a  
Crime related factors  
No victimisation (=0) 
 
Victimisation (=1) 















Fear of crime  
(scale: 1=very safe …4=very 
unsafe) 
  .299*** .217, 
.382 




Belief systems (high scores=increase in values)      








         
Nostalgia (high scores=increase in values)     
Social nostalgic values       .056*** .036, 
 .075 
Economic nostalgic values       .078*** .051, 
.105 
Political nostalgic values       -.065*** -.091, 
-.039 
         
Nagelkerke R-square .138  .151  .429  .446  
0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When belief systems were introduced in Model 3, neo-conservative values (beta=.408, 
p=<.001) has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers.  
Neo-liberal values also has a significant effect at the p=<.001 level, but with a much smaller 
effect size (beta=.080). This suggests that as neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values 
increase, so does support for stiffer sentences for criminal rulebreakers. Once belief systems 
are introduced, the effect size of fear of crime reduces (beta=.207) but remains significant at 
the p=<.001 level. Whereas victimisation becomes a relevant factor (beta=.214, p=<.05) in 
Model 3 suggesting that those who have no experience of victimisation in the last five years 
are more punitive than those who have experienced victimisation within this timeframe. The 
introduction of belief systems also has a notable effect on some socio-demographic factors. 
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Firstly, the effects of age, education, religion and politics diminish, suggesting that the effects 
of neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values inflated the effects of these factors in the 
previous models. Additionally, the effect size and significance of class origin also reduce 
(beta=.194, p=<.01). Secondly, gender (beta=-.349, p=<.001) and income category £40,000 to 
£59,999 (beta=.224, p=<.05) and income category £60,000 to £84,999 (beta=.296, p=<.05) 
become relevant factors in Model 3. This suggests that males are more likely to be less 
punitive than females and those earning between £40,000 and £84,999 are more punitive 
than those earning below £24,999 when considering support for stiffer sentences for criminal 
rulebreakers. Finally, the effect of those from a Black Caribbean/African background  
(beta=-.774, p=<.01) increases once belief systems are introduced to the model. The variance 
explained by Model 3 as a whole is 42.9%, an increase of 27.8% from Model 2.  
 
Model 4: Nostalgia 
When nostalgic values were introduced in Model 4, economic nostalgic values (beta=.078), 
political nostalgic values45 (beta= -.065) and social nostalgic values (beta=.056) were all 
significant at the p=<.001 level. This suggests that as economic and social nostalgia increases, 
so does support for stiffer sentences, whilst punitive attitudes decrease as political nostalgia 
increases. The effect size of neo-conservative values reduces (beta=.352) but remains 
significant at the p=<.001 level, whilst the effect of neo-liberal values remains stable. The 
effect of victimisation increases (beta=.240, p=<.01), whilst the effect size of fear of crime 
reduces (beta=.147, p=<.001). There is little effect on the socio-demographic factors, with 
the exception of religion (beta=.144) which becomes significant at the p=<.05 level 
suggesting that those with no religion are more punitive than those with a religion. 
Additionally, working class origin (beta=.174, p=<.05) and Black Caribbean/African ethnicity 
(beta=-.639, p=<.05) reduce in effect size and significance. The increase in variance explained 
by Model 4 is 1.7% from Model 3. The Nagelkerke R-Square value46 suggests that the Model 
as a whole explains 44.6% in the variance in punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers when 
considering support for stiffer sentences. The full model containing all predictors was 
statistically significant, χ2 (32, N=3637) = 1940.13, p=<.001, indicating that the model is 
 
45 Political nostalgic values: as agreement with the questions increases, punitiveness decreases. 
46 The Nagelkerke value provides an indication of the amount of variance in the dependent variable explained by 
the model, from a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of approximately 1 (Pallant, 2016). 
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significantly better at predicting punitive attitudes supportive of stiffer sentences for criminal 
rulebreakers than not fitting the model. 47  
   
Summary  
Neo-conservative values has by far the strongest effect on punitive attitudes in this analysis 
measured through support for stiffer sentences for criminal rulebreakers. Findings suggest 
that being female, fear of crime, neo-liberal values, economic, political and social nostalgic 
values, no experience of victimisation, working class origin, having no religion, middle 
incomes (between £40,000 and £85,000) and white ethnicity (compared to Black 
Caribbean/African ethnicity) also appear to be relevant factors in punitiveness when 
measured through support for stiffer sentences for criminal rulebreakers.  
 
8.3. Exploring support for the death penalty  
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors48 
A range of socio-demographic factors appear to be related to punitiveness towards the use of 
the death penalty, when considered in isolation in Model 1 (Table 8.2.). Education  
(beta=-.921, p=<.001) has by far the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards the death 
penalty, with those with degree level education being significantly less punitive than those 
with no qualifications.  No Religion (beta= -.430, p=<.001), working class origin (beta=.417, 
p=<.001), IMD (particularly, first quartile, beta= -.398, p=<.001), relationship (beta= 
-.379, p=<.001), politics (beta=.279, p=<.001), and male gender (beta=.223, p=<.001) also 
appear to be relevant factors towards support for the death penalty. This suggests that those 
with no religion are less punitive than those with a religion, working class origin increases 
punitiveness, belonging to lower IMD quartiles decreases punitiveness when compared to 
the highest IMD quartile, those who are single are less punitive than those in a marriage-type 
relationship, political conservativism increases punitive attitudes, and males are more likely 
to hold punitive attitudes than females. Age range 55 to 64 (beta=-.428, p=<.01), those aged 
 
47 No concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix of all variables included in 
the models. There are no correlations between independent variables greater than .9 which would indicate 
concerns with multicollinearity (Field, 2018) with the largest (r=-.530, p=<.001) between political nostalgic 
values and economic nostalgic values. The largest correlation between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables was with neo-conservative values (r=.591, p=<.001).  




over 65 (beta=-.417, p=<.01), Black Caribbean/African ethnicity (beta=-.713, p=>.01), and 
universal credit claimant (beta=.289, p=<.01) also appear to be relevant factors, with 
punitiveness decreasing with those aged over 55 when compared to those under 25 years 
old, with Black Caribbean/African ethnicity when compared to those from a white 
background, and those in receipt of universal credit are more likely to be punitive than non-
claimants,  The Nagelkerke value suggests that Model 1 explains 19.7% of the variance in 
punitive attitudes towards the use of the death penalty.   
 
Model 2: Crime related factors  
When crime related factors are introduced in Model 2, victimization, those who have 
experienced victimization in the last five years, has no effect on punitive attitudes towards 
the death penalty. In contrast, fear of crime (beta=.226) is significant at the p=<.001 level, 
suggesting that punitive attitudes increase as fear increases. This suggests that perceptions 
about crime are more relevant than actual experiences of victimisation. Fear of crime has 
very little impact on the socio-demographic factors in the model with small changes in effect 
sizes for some factors. Most notably, the effect of higher age groups decreases once fear of 
crime is introduced to the model. The Nagelkerke value of 20.3% suggests an increase of 
0.6% from Model 1 in explaining the variance in support for the death penalty for criminal 
rulebreakers.  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When belief systems are introduced in Model 3, neo-conservative values (beta=.357, 
p=<.001) has the strongest effect on support for the death penalty. Neo-liberal values 
(beta=.066, p=<.001) is also a significant factor but with a much smaller effect size. The effect 
size of fear of crime reduces but remains significant at the p=<.001 level once belief systems 
are introduced to the model, suggesting that neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values 
inflated the effect of fear of crime a little in the previous model. The introduction of belief 
systems has a notable effect on some socio-demographic factors. The effect size and 
significance of all age groups increases to the p=<.001 level suggesting that those aged over 
25 are significantly less punitive than those aged under 25 when considering support for the 
death penalty, with those aged over 65 being the least punitive (beta=-.988). 
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Table 8.2: Beta coefficients for ordinal regression models towards ‘For some crimes the death 
penalty is the most appropriate sentence‘ (n=3,637)49 
Socio-demographic factors50 
0a = reference category 
Model 1 95% CI Model 2 95% CI Model 3 95% CI Model 4 95% CI 
Gender male (=0) 
 





















Age Range 25-34  
 
-.177 -.472,  
.118 
-.149 -.444,  
.147 




Age Range 35-44 -.281 -.587,  
.026 
-.253 -.560,  
.053 




Age Range 45-54 -.220 -.518,  
.077 
-.183 -.481,  
.115 




Age Range 55-64 -.428** -.734,  
-.122 
-.390* -.696,  
-.083 
-.941*** -1.268,  
-.613 
-.988*** -1.318,  
-.659 
Age Range 65+ -.417** -.724,  
-.110 
-.379* -.686,  
-.071 




Age Range 16-24  0a  0a  0a  0a  
Income: £25,999 - £39,999  
 
.068 -.085,  
.222 
.068 -.086,  
.222 




£40,000 - £59,999 .090 -.087,  
.267 
.091 -.086,  
.269 




£60,000 - £84,999 .137 -.111,  
.385 
.157 -.092,  
.406 




Over £85,000  -.167 -.496,  
.162 
-.122 -.451,  
.208 




Income: below £24,999 0a  0a  0a  0a  










Education – below degree 
qualification  
-.187 -.380,  
.006 
-.168 -.361,  
.025 




Education – no qualifications 0a  0a  0a  0a  
No Religion (=0) 
 





















Politics (0-10 scale; 10 = more 
conservative) 








Working class origin (=0) 
 





















Relationship single (=0)  
 





















Universal Credit claimant (=0) 
 



























-.249* -.444,  
-.053 
-.236* -.433,  
-.038 




-.096 -.282,  
.090 
-.073 -.261,  
.114 
IMD 3rd quartile  -.218* -.387,  -.172* -.342, -.095 -.273,  -.112 -.291,  
 
49 See p217 for details about the n-size 
50 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=65+, 2=55-64, 3=45-54, 4=35-44, 5=25-34, 
6=16-24; Income: 1=£85,000+, 2=£60,000-£84,999, 3=£40,000-£59,999, 4=£25,000-£39,999, 5=below £24,999; 
Education: 1=Degree level, 2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; Religion: 0=No, 1=Yes; 
Politics scale is continuous from 0=left to 10=right; Class Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship 
status: 0=single, 1=in relationship; Universal Credit: 0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 4=last 
quartile; Ethnicity: 1=Other, 2=Black Caribbean/African, 3=Chinese, 4=Asian/Sub-continent, 5=Multiple ethnic 
background, 6=White.    
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-.049 -.002 .084 .067 
IMD 4th quartile 0a  0a  0a  0a  












-.713** -1.208,  
-.218 
-.686** -1.181,  
-.191 
-.942*** -1.458,  
-.426 






















Multiple ethnic background 
(n=72) 










0a  0a  0a  0a  
Crime related factors  
No victimisation (=0)  
 
Victimisation (=1) 















Fear of crime  
(scale: 1=very safe…4=very 
unsafe) 
  .226*** .145,  
.307 




Belief systems (high scores=increase in values)      








         
Nostalgia (high scores=increase in values)        
Social nostalgic values       .084*** .065, 
 .103 
Economic nostalgic values       .019 -.007, 
.046 
Political nostalgic values       -.040** -.065, 
-.015 
         
Nagelkerke R-square .197  .203  .415  .431  
0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
The effect size of gender and religion diminish in Model 3, suggesting that neo-conservative 
values and neo-liberal values inflated the effects of gender and religion in Model 2.  
Additionally, the effect sizes of degree education (beta=-.501, p=<.001) and politics 
(beta=.107, p=<.001) reduce somewhat in Model 3. The effects of IMD also reduce 
substantially and only IMD 1st quartile (beta=-.249, p=<.05) remains significant. Whilst the 
effect size of universal credit (beta=.317, p=<.01) and Black Caribbean/African (beta=-.942, 
p=<.001) increase. The variance explained by Model 3 as a whole is 41.5%, an increase of 






Model 4: Nostalgia  
When nostalgic values are introduced in Model 4, social nostalgic values (beta=.084, 
p=<.001) has the strongest effect on support for the death penalty, with political nostalgic 
values (beta=-.040, p=<.01) also being a significant factor. This suggests that as social 
nostalgia increases so does punitiveness towards the death penalty, whilst increased political 
nostalgia decreases punitive attitudes.  The effect size of neo-conservative values reduces 
slightly but remains significant at the p=<.001 level once the nostalgia items are entered in 
Model 4, whilst the effects of neo-liberal values remain relatively stable. The effect size and 
significance level of fear of crime reduces somewhat in Model 4 (beta=.097, p=<.05). This 
suggests that the nostalgic values inflated the effects of fear of crime in the previous models. 
The introduction of nostalgic values has very little impact on the socio-demographic factors, 
with the exception of increases in effect size for all age groups. The increase in variance 
explained by Model 4 is 1.6% from Model 3. The Nagelkerke value suggests that the model as 
a whole explains 43.1% of the variance in punitive attitudes towards support for the death 
penalty. The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (32, N=3637) = 
1930.46, p=<.001, indicating that the model is significantly better at predicting punitive 
attitudes towards the use of the death penalty than not fitting a model.51 
 
Summary  
Support for the use of the death penalty appears to be largely driven by neo-conservative 
values, as shown by its effect size and the large increase in variance explained by Model 3. 
Being aged under 25 and having no qualifications also appears to increase death penalty 
support. Additionally, being in a relationship, working class origin, being a universal credit 
claimant, white ethnicity (compared to Black Caribbean/African ethnicity), self-identifying as 
politically more conservative, social nostalgic values, neo-liberal values, fear of crime, political 
nostalgic values and belonging to the highest IMD quartile also appear to be relevant factors 
in attitudes supportive of the death penalty.  
 
 
51 No concerns were noted with multicollinearity of independent variables as noted with the stiffer sentences 
for law breakers variable (the same independent variables are used in the analysis). The largest correlation 
between support for the death penalty and the independent variables was with neo-conservative values 




8.4. A comparison of support for stiffer sentences and the death penalty  
There are similarities in factors related to both measures of punitiveness towards criminal 
rulebreakers, with the overall model explaining a similar amount of variance in punitive 
attitudes for both measures. Table 8.3 below shows the significant factors relating to each 
variable. The introduction of belief systems to the model has the largest effect on 
punitiveness in both models, with a stronger effect on support for stiffer sentences shown by 
the larger increase in variance explained by Model 3. Previous research has found that 
factors unrelated to crime are more relevant in explaining punitiveness towards offenders 
(King and Maruna, 2009; Gerber and Jackson, 2016; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Neo-
conservative values is strongly related to both measures of punitiveness. Neo-liberal values 
also appears to be related to both measures of punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers, 
although to a lesser extent than neo-conservative values. Additionally, social nostalgic values 
and political nostalgic values also appear to be relevant factors to both forms of punitiveness. 
Working class origin and white ethnicity (compared to Black Caribbean/African ethnicity) 
appear to be relevant socio-demographic factors to both measures of punitiveness. Working 
class origin has consistently been found to be a significant factor related to punitiveness (King 
and Maruna, 2009; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007), whilst Black Caribbean/African ethnicity 
(when compared to white ethnicity) has been found to decrease punitiveness towards 
offenders (Unnever and Cullen, 2010; Useem et al., 2003; Costelloe et al., 2009). In terms of 
crime related factors, fear of crime appears to have a small, but significant, effect when 
considering both support for stiffer sentences and the death penalty, with the largest effect 
in relation to support for stiffer sentences. This is consistent with previous research that has 
generally found fear of crime to have a small effect on increased punitiveness towards 
offenders (Hogan et al., 205; Sprott and Doob, 1997; Spironovic et al., 2012).  
 
When considering punitive attitudes through support for the non-specific term ‘stiffer 
sentences’, relevant factors appear to be being female, having no experience of criminal 
victimisation, higher incomes (between £40,000 and £59,999) and economic nostalgic values. 
A considerable amount of research has failed to find victimisation a significant predictor of 
punitive attitudes towards offenders (King and Maruna, 2009, Unnever et al., 2007; Costelloe 
et al., 2009). Findings in this chapter suggest that when considering any victimisation in the 
last five years, victimisation is relevant in relation to support for stiffer sentences once belief 
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systems and nostalgic values are introduced to the model. Punitiveness measured through 
support for the extreme sanction of the death penalty appears to be related to those aged 
below 25 years old, those with no qualifications, self-identified political conservativism, being 
in a relationship, being in receipt of universal credit and belonging to the fourth IMD quartile 
(compare to the first IMD quartile). Additionally, crime-related factors appear to be more 
relevant to support for stiffer sentences than for the death penalty, whilst socio-demographic 
factors appear to be more relevant to support for the death penalty.  
 
Previous research has generally combined two measures of support for stiffer sentences and 
support for the death penalty into one variable (and often in addition to other variables) to 
measure punitive attitudes towards offenders (King and Maruna, 2009; Roberts and 
Indermauer, 2007; Spironovic et al., 2012; Costelloe et al., 2009; Useem et al., 2003; Gerber 
and Jackson, 2016). This analysis suggests that there are some factors that are only relevant 
to each individual measure; either support for a non-specific sanction, or support for a 
specific extreme sanction. Previous research has generally found punitiveness towards 
offenders to increase with age (Hough et al., 1988; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007; Spiranovic 
et al., 2012). However, when support for a specific punitive sanction was measured in 
America, Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) found the young to be more punitive in relation to 
support for the ‘three strikes’ initiatives (beta=.22, p<.01). In this study, age is not found to 
be a relevant factor when punitiveness is measured alone through support for stiffer 
sentences for criminal rulebreakers. However, when punitiveness is measured through 
support for the death penalty, age is found to have a strong effect on punitiveness with those 
aged between 16 and 24 years old being significantly more punitive when compared to all 
other age groups. Gender has consistently been found to be a relevant factor with males 
being more punitive than females (Hough et al., 1988; Cullen et al., 1985; Robert and 
Indermauer, 2007). Findings here suggest that gender is not a relevant factor when 
considering support for the death penalty alone, but when considering support for stiffer 
sentences females are found to be significantly more punitive than males. There is some 
inconsistency with regards to the effect of income on punitiveness. Those earning higher 
incomes have been found to be more punitive (King and Maruna, 2009), less punitive 
(Spironovic et al., 2012), or alternatively, no relationship has been found between income 
and punitive attitudes (Cullen et al., 1985; Costelloe et al., 2009). Findings here suggest that 
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income is a relevant factor when considering support for stiffer sentences in isolation but is 
not a relevant factor when considering support for the death penalty. Higher educational 
attainment has consistently been found to decrease punitiveness towards offenders (Roberts 
and Indermauer, 2007; Spiranovic et al, 2012; Costelloe et al., 2009); this is the case here 
when considering punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers in relation to support for the 
death penalty, but education is not found to be a relevant factor when considering support 
for stiffer sentences. Religion or religiosity has been found to be relevant in decreased 
punitiveness towards offenders (King and Maruna, 2009; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007; 
Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Those with no religion were found to be more punitive than 
those with a religion when considering support for stiffer sentences, whilst religion did not 
appear to be a significant factor in relation to support for the death penalty. Several previous 
studies have found that self-identified political conservativism endorses tougher sentences 
(King and Maruna, 2009; Costelloe et al., 2009; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). This study is 
consistent with these previous findings when considering support for the death penalty, but 
not for support for stiffer sentences in the final model. Finally, Costelloe et al. (2009) found 
that married people are more punitive than those who are single; findings here suggest that 
those in a marriage-type relationship are more punitive than those who are single when 

















Table 8.3. Summary: A comparison of significant factors relating to criminal rulebreakers 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001; 0a is the reference category and has a coefficient of 0. 
Variables People who break the law should be 
given stiffer sentences 
For some crimes the death penalty is 
the most appropriate sentence 
Gender male (=0), 
(0a – females=1) 
*** (beta=-.319) 
(males less punitive than females)  
X 
Age Range: 25-34 
(0a – 16-24) 
X ***(beta=-.643) 
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range: 35-44 X ***(beta=-.840) 
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range: 45-54 X ***(beta=-.884)  
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range: 55-64 X ***(beta=-.988)  
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Age Range: over 65 X ***(beta=-1.031)  
(less punitive than 16-24 year olds) 
Income £25,999 - £39,999 
(0a below £24,999) 
X X 
£40,000 - £59,999 *(beta=.242) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
X 
£60,000 - £84,999 *(beta=.322) 
(more punitive than below £24,999) 
X 
Over £85,000 X X 
Degree Education  
(0a - no qualifications) 
X ***(beta=-.453) 
(less punitive than no qualifications) 
Below degree education X  X 
No Religion (=0) 
(0a – Religion) 
*(beta=.144) 
(no religion more punitive than religion) 
X 
Political conservativism  X ***(beta=.093) 
Working Class Origin (=0) 
(0a – middle class origin)  
*(beta=.174) 
(working class more punitive) 
***(beta=.328) 
(working class more punitive) 
Relationship single (=0) 
(0a - In relationship=1) 
X ***(beta=-.406) 
(single less punitive) 
Universal Credit claimant (=0) 
(0a – non-claimant=1) 
X **(beta=.312 
(claimant more punitive) 
IMD 
(0a - 4th quartile) 
X *(beta=-.236) 
(1st quartile less punitive than 4th 
quartile) 
Ethnicity 
(0a – white ethnicity) 
*(beta=-.639) 
(Black Caribbean/African less punitive)   
**(beta=-.797) 
(Black Caribbean/African less 
punitive) 
No victimisation (=0) 
(0a - victimisation=1) 
**(beta=.240) 
(No victimisation more punitive) 
X 
Fear of crime ***(beta=.147) *(beta=.097) 
Neo-liberal values ***(beta=.084) ***(beta=.058) 
Neo-conservative values ***(beta=.352) ***(beta=.303) 
Social nostalgic values ***(beta=.056) ***(beta=.084) 
Economic nostalgic values ***(beta=.078) X 
Political nostalgic values ***(beta=-.065) **(beta=-.040) 
Nagelkerke R-Square Value 44.6% 43.1% 
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8.5. Law punitivity  
The ‘law punitivity’ variable was constructed through factor analyzing ‘People who break the 
law should receive stiffer sentences’ and ‘For some crime the death penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence’.  The variables for law punitivity correlated quite high with each other 
r=.503, have a one factor solution explaining 75.13% of the variance and have a reasonably 
high reliability (Cronbach’s α=.626). Results from factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha 
confirm the suitability of constructing a single variable (Law Punitivity) from the two items.52   
 
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors53  
When socio-demographic factors were considered in isolation in Model 1 (Table 8.4), politics 
scale (beta=.348, p=<.001) has the strongest effect with punitiveness towards criminal 
rulebreakers increasing as respondents self-identify as more politically conservative. Lower 
educational attainment (beta=.162, p=<.001), decreased religiosity (beta=.100, p=<.001), 
working class origin (beta= -.096, p=<.001), being in a relationship (beta=.095, p=<.001) and 
belonging to higher IMD quartiles also appear to be related to increased punitivity towards 
criminal rulebreakers. These findings are consistent with recent research in Britain, suggesting 
that those who self-identify as politically more conservative and those with lower educational 
attainment are more punitive towards offenders when socio-demographic factors are 
considered in isolation (King and Maruna, 2009). The R-square value suggests that Model 1 
explains 19% of the variance in punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers. Previous research 
suggests that when socio-demographic factors are considered in isolation they explain 
between 10% and 13% of the variance in punitive attitudes towards offenders (Cullen et al., 
2009; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007). With the addition of conservative ideology and 
 
52 The large sample size (n=5781) is considered large enough to meet the sample size required to undertake 
regression analysis. Green (1991, in Tabacknick and Fidell, 2014:159) suggest N≥50+8m (where m in the number 
of independent variables), so for the regression conducted in this section, 18 independent variables are used: 
50 + (8) (18) = 194 cases. If the dependent variable is skewed a larger sample is required as a small effect size or 
substantial measurement error is expected from less reliable variables (Tabacknick and Fidell, 2014). 
53 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=16-24, 2=25-34, 3=35-44, 4=45-54, 5=55-64, 
6=65-74, 7=75+; Income: 1=below £5,000, 2=£5,000-£9,999, 3=£10,000-£14,999, 4=£15,000-£19,999, 
5=£20,000-£24,000, 6=£25,000-£29,999, 7=£30,000- £34,999, 8=£35,000-£39,999, 9=40,000-£44,999, 
10=£45,000-£49,999, 11=£50,000-£59,999, 12=£60,000-£69,999, 13=70,000-£84,999, 14=£84,000-£99,999, 
15=over £100,000; Education: 1=Degree level, 2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; 
Religiosity scale: 1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious; Politics scale: 0=left to 10=right; Class 
Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship status: 0=single, 1=in relationship; Universal Credit: 
0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 2=2nd quartile, 3=3rd quartile, 4=4th quartile; Ethnicity: 
0=Other, 1=White.    
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religiosity, King and Maruna (2009) found that socio-demographic factors in their research 
explained 25.4% of the variance in punitiveness. Therefore, socio-demographic factors in this 
study explain less of the variance in Law Punitivity than in King and Maruna’s (2009) study.  
 
Table 8.4: Beta weights for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘law punitivity’ 
(n=2,090)54 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors41     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .012 -.009 .033* .029* 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) -.013 -.008 -.073*** -.077*** 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) -.010 -.001 .003 .010 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
quals) 
.162*** .152*** .072*** .062*** 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .100*** .099*** .082*** .079*** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .348*** .348*** .109*** .099*** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.096*** -.089*** -.054*** -.048*** 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .095*** .094*** .047** .048** 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) -.036 -.031 -.028 -.025 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .063*** .048* .028 .021 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.022 -.017 .005 .003 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.005 -.010 -.015 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .107*** .056*** .035* 
Belief systems      
Neo-liberal values   .086*** .088*** 
Neo-conservative values   .572*** .485*** 
Nostalgia      
Social nostalgic values    .142*** 
Economic nostalgic values    .054** 
Political nostalgic values    -.044* 
R-square Value .190*** .200*** .478*** .497*** 
Adjusted R-square .186 .196 .475 .493 
R-square change  .010 .278 .019 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
Model 2: Crime related factors 
When crime related factors were introduced in Model 2, experiences of criminal victimisation 
in the last five years have no effect. This is consistent with the findings from previous 
research, which has failed to find support for the hypothesis that victimization is a significant 
predictor of punitive attitudes (King and Maruna, 2009; Costelloe et al., 2009). Fear of crime 
(beta=.107, p=<.001) does appear to be a significant factor relating to increased punitiveness 
 
54 See page 230 for more detail on the n-size 
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towards criminal rulebreakers, albeit a small effect as shown by the 1% increase in R-square 
change in Model 2. This finding is again consistent with previous research findings, which 
have generally found fear of crime to have a small, but significant, effect on punitive attitudes 
towards offenders (King and Maruna, 2009; Hogan et al., 2005; Spironovic et al., 2012). Fear 
of crime has very little impact on the socio-demographic factors in the model, with the 
exception of IMD, which reduces in both effect size and significance. This suggests that fear 
of crime inflated the effects of IMD in the previous model.  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
Neo-conservative values55 (beta=.572, p=<.001) has the strongest effect by far on 
punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers when belief systems are introduced in Model 3. 
Neo-liberal values (beta=.086, p=<.001) also appears to be a significant factor but with a 
much smaller effect size. This suggests that as neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values 
increase, so do punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers. Previous findings have also 
found factors external to real threats of crime to be more relevant factors in explaining 
punitive attitudes towards offenders (King and Maruna, 2009; Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997; 
Hough et al., 1988). The effect size of fear of crime (beta=.056, p=<.001) reduces but remains 
significant at the p=<.001 level. Age (beta= -.073, p=<.001) and gender (beta=.033, p=<.05) 
become significant factors once neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values are entered 
into the model, with punitiveness increasing as age decreases and with being female. In 
contrast, the effects of education (beta=.072, p=<.001), relationship status (beta=.047, 
p=<.01), class origin (beta=-.054, p=<.001), and politics (beta=.109, p=<.001) reduce in Model 
3, whilst the effects of IMD diminish. Several previous studies have also found that those who 
self-identify as politically more conservative endorse tougher sentences (King and Maruna, 
2009; Costelloe et al., 2009; Unnever and Cullen, 2010). The R-Square value suggests that the 
variance explained by Model 3 as a whole is 47.8%, an increase of 27.8% from Model 2.  
 
Model 4: Nostalgia  
When nostalgic values are introduced in Model 4, social nostalgic values (beta=.142, 
p=<.001) has the strongest effect, with economic nostalgic values (beta=.054, p=<.01) and 
 
55 See Chapter 9.3 for an analysis of neo-conservative values 
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political nostalgic values (beta=-.044, p=<.05) also appearing to be relevant factors. However, 
neo-conservative values (beta=.485, p=<.001) continues to have the strongest effect on 
punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers. The effect of fear of crime (beta=.035, 
p=<.05) reduces somewhat once nostalgic values are introduced to the model suggesting that 
nostalgic values inflated the effects of fear of crime in Model 3. The effects of all other 
factors remain largely stable in Model 4. The increase in variance explained by Model 4 is 
1.9% from Model 3, suggesting nostalgia has a very small effect on punitive attitudes towards 
criminal rulebreakers. The R-square indicates that the model as a whole explains 49.7% of the 
variance in punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers.  
 
Summary  
Findings suggest that Law Punitivity is strongly related to neo-conservative values as shown 
by the effect size and the large increase in R-square value in Model 3. Additionally, social 
nostalgic values, those who self-identify as politically more conservative, neo-liberal values, 
decreased religiosity, younger age, lower educational attainment, working class origin, 
economic nostalgic values, being in a relationship, political nostalgic values, fear of crime and 
being female also appear to be related to increased punitiveness towards criminal 























Table 8.5: Summary table for relevant statistically significant factors for punitivity towards 
criminal rulebreakers in Model 4 




Findings here suggest that neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on punitive 
attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers. Again, as with the rulebreaking school pupils and 





Age Range  
Scale: 1=16-24 to 7=75+ 
*** 
(beta=-.077, younger age) 
Income 
Scale= 1=<£5000 to 15=>£100,000 
X 
Education 
1=degree, 2 below degree level, 3=no qualifications  
*** 
(beta=.062, no qualifications) 
Religiosity  
1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious 
*** 
(beta=.079, decreased religiosity) 
Political conservativism  
Scale: 1=left to 10=right 
*** 
(beta=.099) 
Class Origin  
0=working class, 1=middle class 
*** 
(beta=-.048, working class) 
Relationship Status 
0=single, 1=relationship  
** 













Fear of crime 
1=very safe to 4= very unsafe 
* 
(beta=.035) 
Neo-liberal values *** 
(beta=.088) 
Neo-conservative values *** 
(beta=.485) 
Social nostalgic values *** 
(beta=.142) 
Economic nostalgic values ** 
(beta=.054) 
Political nostalgic values * 
(beta=-.044) 
R-Square Value 49.7% 
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rulebreaking welfare claimants items, analysis shows that separating the two measures draws 
out some notable differences between support for stiffer sentences and support for the 
specific, extreme sanction of the death penalty. Socio-demographic factors appear to be 
more relevant to support for the death penalty than for support for stiffer sentences. 
Support for the extreme sanction of the death penalty appears to be related to those aged 
below 25 years old, those with no qualifications, self-identified political conservativism, being 
in a relationship, being in receipt of universal credit and belonging to the fourth IMD quartile 
(compare to the first IMD quartile). Whilst crime-related factors appear to be more relevant 
to support for stiffer sentences than for the death penalty, in addition to being female. In 
relation to the value-based variables, support for the general, non-specific sanction of stiffer 
sentences is predominately related to neo-conservative values with neo-liberal values, 
economic nostalgic values, economic nostalgic values and political nostalgic values all being 
relevant factors. Whilst support for the more extreme sanction of the death penalty appears 
to be related to neo-conservative values, social nostalgic values and, to a lesser extent, 
political nostalgic values.  
 
Consistent with previous research (Roberts and Indermauer, 2007; Spiranovic et al, 2012; 
Costelloe et al., 2009), higher educational attainment is found to decrease punitiveness 
towards criminal rulebreakers when considering law punitivity. Working class origin has 
consistently been found to be a relevant factor predicting punitiveness towards offenders 
(King and Maruna, 2009; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007), with punitiveness increasing with 
those from a working class origin. Findings here also suggest working class origin is a related 
to law punitivity. Decreased religiosity appears to be related to law punitivity, which is also 
evident in previous research (King and Maruna, 2009; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007; 
Unnever and Cullen, 2010). Findings suggest that those in a marriage-type relationship are 
more punitive than those who are single in relation to law punitivity, which is consistent with 
Costelloe et al.’s (2009) findings.  
 
Despite these similarities with previous research, there are some differences. In this analysis, 
law punitivity appears to decrease as age increases, this is inconsistent with previous 
research that has generally found punitiveness to increase with age (Roberts and 
Indermauer, 2007; Spiranovic et al., 2012). Additionally, males have consistently been found 
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to be more punitive than females (Hough et al., 1988; Cullen et al., 1985; Robert and 
Indermauer, 2007), however, findings here suggest that females are more punitive than 
males, albeit with a small effect.  
 
Law Punitivity: Evaluating the multiple regression model  
The full multiple regression model for law punitivity containing all the predictors was 
significant (p=<.001).56 The model summary (Table 8.6) shows the multiple correlation 
coefficients between law punitivity and the predictors in column one (labelled R), showing 
that when all predictors are included in Model 4 the multiple correlation coefficient is .705. 
The R-Square value in the second column measures how much variability in the outcome 
variable is explained for by the predictors (Field, 2018). The adjusted R-square indicates how 
well the model generalises with the figure in the final model between the R-square (.497) and 
adjusted R-square (.493) equalling .004, or 0.4%, meaning that if the model were derived 
from the population as opposed to a sample the model would account for approximately 
0.4% less variance in the outcome (Field, 2018). The F change statistic shows that the change 
in R-square is significant at the p=<.001 level for all four models. The combined explanatory 
power of all models is R²=.497 suggesting that the model overall explains 49.7% of the 
variance in law punitivity.  
 










Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .435 .190 .186 .73718905 .190 53.555 11 2518 .000 
2 .447 .200 .196 .73284696 .010 15.963 2 2516 .000 
3 .692 .478 .475 .59198682 .278 670.894 2 2514 .000 






56 The ANOVA table shows the F-Test of whether the model is significantly better at predicting the outcome 
than using no predictors (Field, 2018). The p-values (p=<.001) indicates that all models significantly improve the 




Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers 
The histogram (Figure 8.1) shows that the normally distributed errors assumption is met with 
the mean (0.02) very close to zero. The Normal Probability Plot (Figure 8.2) shows the data lie 
in a reasonably straight line suggesting no major deviations from normality.  
 
Figure 8.1: Histogram for law punitivity      Figure 8.2: Normal P-P Plot for law punitivity 




Casewise diagnostics shows that 14 cases (0.2% of the sample) have standardized residual 
values below -3 or above +3, which is below the 1% which would otherwise indicate concerns 
(Pallant, 2016; Field, 2018). Further investigation of these 14 cases suggests that no cases are 
have a Cook’s distance value57 greater than 1 with the largest value of .01. Inspection of the 
Mahalanobis distances58 shows 35 cases have Mahalanobis distances greater than 42.312 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). Further examination of the DFBeta and DfFit statistics for the 
independent variables, which indicate problematic cases having an undue influence on the 





57 Cook’s distance indicates whether a case has an undue influence on the results with values above 1 
suggesting a potential problem (Pallant, 2016).  
58 Inspection of the Mahalanobis distances allow identification of outliers (Pallant, 2016). To identify which cases 
are outliers, the critical chi-square value was determined using 18 independent variables as the degrees of 
freedom (Pallant, 2016) from the critical values chi-square table and an alpha level of .001 (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2013: 10). 
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No preliminary concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix 
of all dependent and independent variables. This shows with no correlations between 
independent variables are greater than .9 with the largest between political nostalgic values 
and economic nostalgic values (r=.509). The largest correlation between law punitivity and 
the independent variables was with neo-conservative values (r=.657, p=<.001). All variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are well below 10 which would indicate concerns (Pallant, 2016) with 
the highest 1.933 (Economic nostalgic values) in any of the equations. No Tolerance values 
were below .10 which would also indicate concerns (Pallant, 2016) with the lowest value of 
.517 (Economic nostalgic values), and the standard errors are low (highest .045 for universal 
credit in Model 2). The average VIF in model 4 is 1.39 is also not substantially more than 1 
(Field, 2018), therefore suggesting no concerns with multicollinearity.  
 
8.6. Summary 
This chapter commenced by conducting ordinal logistic regression to examine the 
relationship between the two items designed to measure punitiveness towards criminal 
rulebreakers. This analysis examined the relevance of socio-demographic factors,  
crime-related factors, political beliefs and nostalgia. The data showed that neo-conservative 
values has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers, which 
was the case with both support for stiffer sentences and support for the death penalty, with 
the model explaining a similar amount of variance in both measures of criminal punitiveness.  
 
There were factors which related specifically to each separate item. Factors relating 
exclusively to support for the non-specific sanctions of stiffer sentences appear to be being 
female, no experience of victimisation, incomes between £40,000 and £59,999 and economic 
nostalgic values appear to be related only to punitiveness towards support for stiffer 
sentences for criminal rulebreakers. Whilst, factors relating to punitiveness towards the 
specific extreme sanction of the death penalty, appears to be related to those aged below 25 
years old, those with no qualifications, self-identified political conservativism, those in a 
relationship, being in receipt of universal credit, belonging to the fourth IMD quartile 
(compare to the first IMD quartile). Additionally, crime-related factors appear to be more 
relevant to support for stiffer sentences for criminal rulebreakers, whilst socio-demographic 
factors appear to be more relevant to support for the death penalty.  
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‘Law punitivity’, a variable consisting of the two separate criminal rulebreaker items, was 
then examined by conducting multiple regression.  As found in the ordinal regression models, 
law punitivity is strongly related to neo-conservative values. Additionally, social nostalgic 
values, those who self-identify as politically more conservative, neo-liberal values, decreased 
religiosity, younger age, lower educational attainment, working class origin, economic 
nostalgic values, being in a relationship, political nostalgic values, fear of crime and being 
female also appear to be related to increased punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers.   
 
Throughout the last three chapters, punitiveness towards ‘rulebreakers’ as distinct groups 
has been considered. The next chapter commences by bridging these separate chapters 























Chapter 9 Punitiveness towards ‘Rulebreakers’ 
 
9.1. Introduction  
The previous three chapters (Chapters 6 to 8) analysed punitive attitudes towards the three 
distinct groups of rulebreakers. This chapter commences by bringing together these three 
distinct chapters by examining the variation in punitive attitudes towards the different groups 
of rulebreakers, asking the question, ‘How do punitive attitudes vary towards different 
groups of rulebreakers and what are the different influences?’ This analysis draws on the 
following three variables (the construction and separate analyses of these individual variables 
are detailed in the previous three respective chapters):  
 
• School punitivity: A measure combining Unruly school children should receive tougher 
punishments and School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be 
permanently excluded.  
 
• Welfare punitivity: A measure combining Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the 
system should face stiffer penalties and Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the 
system should have their payments permanently stopped.  
 
• Law punitivity: People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences and For 
some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence.  
 
A summary of the models discussed to compare the three rulebreaking groups from Chapters 
6 to 8 is presented in Table 9.1. Following this initial analysis, this chapter will then progress 
to merge these three distinct groups of rulebreakers to examine punitive attitudes towards 
rulebreakers as a collective group. ‘Tiered Punitiveness’ will then be introduced suggesting 
that punitiveness is not one distinct attitude but can be separated into two discrete levels, 
specifically, ‘basic’ and ‘ultimate’ punitiveness. Finally, the chapter undertakes Structural 
Equation Modelling to explore ‘Basic Punitiveness’, ‘Ultimate Punitiveness’ and ‘Collective 
Punitiveness’ towards rulebreakers. The chapter concludes by presenting a discussion on the 




9.2. Examining punitive attitudes towards the distinct groups of rulebreakers 
This section draws together the separate analyses conducted in Chapters 6 to 8 in relation to 
punitive attitudes towards the three groups of rulebreakers: school punitivity, welfare 
punitivity and law punitivity. A summary of the factors relevant to each rulebreaker (in Model 
4) is shown in Table 9.1. below.  
 
Model 1 – Socio-demographic factors 
Socio-demographic factors have the strongest effect on criminal rulebreakers (19%) 
compared to 12.7% on rulebreaking welfare claimants and 8.9% on rulebreaking school 
pupils. Gender has a significant effect on both punitive attitudes towards school pupils 
(beta=-.042, p=<.05) and welfare recipients (beta=.067, p=<.001), but not on lawbreakers, 
with males being more punitive towards rulebreaking school pupils and females being more 
punitive towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. Age has no significant effect on any group 
of rulebreakers. Higher income has the strongest effect on welfare claimants (beta=.073, 
p=<.001) with a smaller effect on school pupils (beta=.045, p=<.05), and no effect on 
lawbreakers. Education appears to be a relevant factor for all three rulebreakers, with lower 
levels of education increasing punitiveness towards rulebreakers, with the strongest effect on 
criminal lawbreakers (beta=.162, p=<.001). Religiosity (Would you describe yourself as 
extremely religious or extremely non-religious?) also has a significant effect on all 
rulebreakers, with the strongest effect on lawbreakers (beta=.100, p=<.001) suggesting that 
punitive attitudes increase as respondents describe themselves as less religious. Politics has a 
strong effect at the p=<.001 level on all three groups of rulebreakers with the strongest 
effect on lawbreakers (beta=.348) suggesting as respondents self-identify as more politically 
conservative, their punitive attitudes increase. Class origin has a similar effect on all 
rulebreakers (p=<.001) with the strongest effect on lawbreakers (beta=-.096) suggesting that 
punitive attitudes increase with those from a working-class origin. Marital status only 
appears to be a relevant factor for lawbreakers (beta=.095, p=<.001) suggesting that those 
who are in a marital type relationship are more punitive than those who are single. Universal 
credit (beta=.059, p=<.01) appears only to be relevant factor in welfare punitivity, suggesting 
that punitive attitudes increase with those not in receipt of universal credit. Whilst IMD 
appears to only be related to law punitivity (beta=.063, p=<.001) with punitiveness increasing 
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with higher IMD quartiles. Lastly, ethnicity does not appear to be a relevant factor for any 
group of rulebreaker.    
 
Model 2: Crime related factors  
Crime related factors have the strongest effect on law punitivity (R-square = 1%). 
Victimisation has no effect on any group of rulebreakers, whilst fear of crime appears to have 
a small, but significant, effect on all three groups of rulebreakers with the strongest effect on 
increased punitivity towards lawbreakers (beta=.107, p=<.001) suggesting that as fear of 
crime increases, so too do punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers.  
 
Fear of crime has a small effect on gender and class origin for school punitivity. Gender 
(beta=-.058) becomes significant at the p=<.01 level) with male punitiveness increasing when 
fear of crime is introduced to the model, whilst the effects of working-class origin  
(beta=-.062) decreases in significance (p=<.01). All other socio-demographic factors remain 
stable for law punitivity. The majority of all other factors in Model 2 for welfare punitivity 
remain stable, with a decrease in effect size and significance for gender (beta=.054, p=<.01) 
and an increase in effect size for politics (beta=.287, p=<.001). This suggests that fear of 
crime slightly inflated the effects of gender in Model 1, with welfare punitivity increasing with 
being female. Finally, for law punitivity fear of crime has very little impact on the  
socio-demographic factors in Model 2, with the exception of IMD, which reduces in both 
effect size and significance (beta=.048, p=<.05). This suggests that fear of crime inflated the 
effects of IMD in the previous model. Model 2 as a whole accounts for a greater amount of 
variance towards lawbreakers (20%) compared to 13.1% for welfare rulebreakers and 9.5% 
for rulebreaking school pupils.  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
Belief systems appear to have the strongest effect on punitiveness towards rulebreaking 
school pupils (R-square change= 30.4%), with a slightly smaller effect on law punitivity 
(27.8%) and the smallest effect on welfare punitivity (19.6%). Neo-liberal values appears to 
be a relevant factor towards all groups of rulebreakers with a similar effect on lawbreakers 
(beta=.086, p=<.001) and welfare rulebreakers (beta=.082, p=<.001), and a smaller effect on 
rulebreaking school pupils (beta=.061, p=<.001). Neo-conservative values has a very strong 
296 
 
effect on all three groups of rulebreakers, with the strongest effect on school punitivity 
(beta=.606, p<.001), followed by law punitivity (beta=.572, p=<.001) and welfare punitivity 
(beta=.476, p=<.001).  
 
The introduction of neo-conservative and neo-liberal values has a notable effect on a number 
of other factors in Model 3 for all rulebreaking groups. For school punitivity the effects of 
politics, fear of crime, class origin, education, and gender diminish once belief systems are 
entered into the model. This suggests that neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values 
inflated the effects of these factors in the previous model. In contrast, the effects of income 
(beta=.056, p-=<.056) increase with those earning higher incomes holding more punitive 
attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils, whilst the effects of religiosity (beta=.035, 
p=<.05) decrease. For welfare punitivity, the effects of fear of crime and education diminish 
once neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values are introduced to the model, whilst the 
effects of class origin (beta=-.034, p=<.05) and politics (beta=.082, p=<.001) reduce 
substantially and religiosity (beta=.050, p=<.01) reduces slightly. This suggests that  
neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values inflated the effects of these factors in the 
previous model. Whilst the effects of gender (beta=.089, p=<.001) and universal credit 
(beta=.064, p=<.001) increase in Model 3. Finally, IMD (beta=-.046, p=<.01) becomes a 
relevant factor in Model 3 with punitive attitudes increasing with those belonging to lower 
IMD quartiles. Lastly, for law punitivity the effect size of fear of crime (beta=.056) reduces 
substantially but remains significant at the p=<.001 level. Age (beta= -.073, p=<.001) and 
gender (beta=.033, p=<.05) become significant factors once neo-conservative values and 
neo-liberal values are entered into the model, with punitiveness increasing as age decreases 
and with being female. In contrast, the effects of education (beta=.072, p=<.001), relationship 
status (beta=.047, p=<.01) and class origin (beta=-.054, p=<.001) reduce in Model 3, whilst 
the effects of IMD diminish. Additionally, the effect size of politics (beta=.109, p=<.001) 
reduces somewhat. The variance explained by the model as a whole is 47.8% for lawbreakers, 
39.9% for rulebreaking school pupils and 32.7% for rulebreaking welfare claimants.  
 
Model 4: Nostalgia 
The final model introduces social, economic and political nostalgic values, which have the 
strongest effect on law punitivity (R-Square change = 1.9%) followed by welfare punitivity 
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(0.6%) and school punitivity (0.3%). Social nostalgic values appears to be relevant to law 
punitivity (beta=.142, p=<.001) and school punitivity (beta=.064, p=<.01), but no effect on 
welfare punitivity. This appears then to indicate that increased punitiveness towards 
rulebreaking school pupils and criminal lawbreakers is related to attitudes feeling that the 
country is in decline, that it has changed for the worse and which provoke a sense of sadness. 
Economic nostalgic values has the strongest effect on welfare punitivity (beta=.074, p=<.001), 
with a weaker, but significant, effect on law punitivity (beta=.054, p=<.01), and no effect on 
school punitivity. This appears to suggest that punitiveness towards rulebreaking welfare 
claimants and criminal rulebreakers is related to views disagreeable with the loss of industry 
and community spirit and the increase in the dominance of profit and money. Finally, political 
nostalgic values appears to have the strongest effect on welfare punitivity (beta= -.100) with 
a weaker effect on law punitivity (beta=-.044, p=<.05) and no effect on rulebreaking school 
pupils. This appears to indicate that punitiveness towards welfare and criminal rulebreakers is 
related to a disagreement that Margaret Thatcher’s governments has had a lasting 
detrimental impact on ordinary people’s lives. Whilst nostalgic values appears to have varying 
degrees of relevance to punitiveness for the three rulebreaking groups, it is worth 
highlighting that these effects are very small as seen by the R-square changes in each model. 
 
Once the nostalgia items are introduced in Model 4 for school punitivity, the effect size of 
neo-conservative values (beta=.579, p=<.001) decreases slightly, which suggests that there 
may be a relationship between social nostalgic values and neo-conservative values. All other 
factors remain stable with the exception of income (beta=.060, p=<.001), which increases 
suggesting that higher income becomes a more relevant factor once social nostalgic values is 
entered into the model. For welfare punitivity, neo-conservative values (beta=.453, p=<.001) 
continues to have the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare 
claimants. There is very little effect on all other variables when nostalgic values are 
introduced to the model, with the exception of age (beta=-.043, p=<.05) and politics 
(beta=.061, p=<.01). Age becomes significant once the nostalgia items are entered into the 
model with punitiveness increasing with younger age, whilst the effect size and significance 
of politics (beta=.061, p=<.01) reduces once the nostalgia items are introduced. Lastly, for 
law punitivity neo-conservative values (beta=.485, p=<.001) continues to have the strongest 
effect on punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers. The effects of fear of crime 
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(beta=.035, p=<.05) reduce somewhat once nostalgic values are introduced to the model 
suggesting that nostalgic values inflated the effects of fear of crime in Model 3. The effects of 
all other factors remain largely stable in Model 4. 
  
Summary 
The model as a whole explains the largest amount of variance in punitive attitudes towards 
lawbreakers explaining 49.7% of the variance in law punitivity, 40.2% of the variance in 
school punitivity and 33.3% of the variance in welfare punitivity. This suggests that the model 
is a better predictor of punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers than for the 
rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants. This is perhaps not surprising as the 
theoretical framework for the models is largely shaped by a criminological foundation.  
 
There are some similarities in the factors related to all three groups of rulebreakers, shown in 
Table 9.1 below. Firstly, belief systems appear to have the most notable effect on punitive 
attitudes towards all three groups of rulebreakers shown by the increase in R-Square value 
for Model 3 for each group, with the largest effect on rulebreaking school pupils (30.4%). 
Neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on all groups of rulebreakers, with the 
strongest effect on rulebreaking school pupils, closely followed by criminal rulebreakers. 
Whilst, neo-liberal values also appears to be related to all three rulebreaking groups with the 
strongest effect on criminal rulebreakers. The only other factor relating to all three 
rulebreakers is religiosity, with the strongest effect on law punitivity.  
 
Additionally, punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils appears to be related to 
social nostalgic values and increased income. Welfare punitivity appears to be influenced by 
political nostalgic values, economic nostalgic values, being female, higher income, those not 
receiving universal credit, increased political conservativism, younger age, working class 
origin and lower IMD. Whilst law punitivity appears to be related to social nostalgic values, 
increased political conservativism, younger age, lower education attainment, working class 
origin, economic nostalgic values, being in a marital type relationship, political nostalgic 
values, fear of crime and being female. School punitivity appears to be related to the least 
amount of significant factors (five), whereas welfare and law punitivity appear to have a more 
complex mix of factors with twelve and thirteen significant factors respectively.  
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Table 9.1. Summary: Relevant factors for punitivity towards different groups of rulebreakers (Model 4) 
 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001 
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(beta=.048, in relationship 
more punitive) 
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 R-Square Value 40.2% 33.3% 49.7% 
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9.3. Neo-conservative Values 
Throughout the previous models, analyses suggest that neo-conservative values is 
consistently related to all groups of rulebreakers. Additionally, when neo-conservative values 
is added to the models it appears to have a notable effect on other variables, in particular 
socio-demographic variables. A multiple regression analysis (pairwise, n=2,090)59 was 
conducted with neo-conservative values as the dependent variable to explore what variables 
predicts this variable and to explain some of the main changes that occur when it is added to 
the models throughout this thesis (Appendix G).   
 
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors 
Socio-demographic factors appear to be important explaining 20.4% of the variance in neo-
conservative values. Most notably, politics scale, education and age range appear to have a 
strong effect suggesting that political conservativism, older age and less education are 
related to neo-conservativism. Additionally, working class origin, being in a relationship, 
being male, higher IMD and non-white ethnicity appear to be related to increased neo-
conservative values.  
 
Model 2: Crime-related factors 
When victimisation and fear of crime are entered into the model, victimisation has no effect 
on neo-conservative values. Whilst fear of crime has a relatively strong effect suggesting that 
as fear of crime increases, so too do neo-conservative values. However, the R-Square change 
(.8%) suggests that this effect is very small.  
 
Model 3: Belief systems 
Neo-liberal values have a significant effect when entered into the model suggesting that as 
neo-liberal values increase so does neo-conservative values. However, the R-Square change is 





59 See P230 for information about the n-size 
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Model 4: Nostalgic values 
Nostalgic values appear to be relevant factors related to neo-conservative values shown by 
the relatively large R-Square change of 17.8% when entered in Model 4. Social nostalgic 
values appear to have the strongest effect suggesting that neo-conservative values increase 
as social nostalgia increases. This is perhaps not surprising as neo-conservativism is inherently 
socially conservative.  Economic nostalgia also has a strong effect with neo-conservative 
values increasing as people feel more economically nostalgic. Lastly, political nostalgic values 
have the smallest effect from the nostalgia items, with neo-conservativism decreasing as 
political nostalgia increases. As people agree that Margaret Thatcher had a negative impact 
on ordinary life and communities, they are less likely to hold neo-conservative values.  
 
Socio-demographic variables generally remain consistent across the models, with some beta 
coefficients reducing but remaining significant in Model 4, suggesting that these socio-
demographic variables (being male, older age, lower education, self-identified political 
conservativism, working class origin, and being in a relationship) are important in 
understanding neo-conservative values. This explains the notable impact on some socio-
demographic variables when neo-conservative values is added to the punitiveness models 
throughout this thesis.    
 
9.4. Exploring collective punitiveness towards rulebreakers  
This next section examines rulebreakers as a collective group. Collective punitiveness was 
explored through constructing a new ‘punitiveness’ variable, consisting of the six rulebreaker 
variables below. The questions were designed with the aim of taping into people’s desire for 
both harsher sanctions (questions 1,3,5) and people’s desire for the most extreme sanctions 
(questions 2,4,6). 
 
1. Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments. 
2. School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded. 
3. Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties.  
4. Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped. 
5. People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
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6. For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. 
 
Collective Punitiveness then is operationalised as a person’s level of support for harsher 
penalties towards rulebreakers, with an emphasis on a desire for both tougher punishments 
and extreme sanctions across three regulatory systems. Models of punitivity were estimated 
using standard multiple regression allowing for exploration of interrelationships among sets 
of variables (Pallant, 2016).60 Exploratory factor analysis was conducted using principle axis 
factoring with oblique rotation. The KMO=.825 verified the sampling adequacy for the 
analysis falling into the range of ‘meritorious’ (Kaiser and Rice, 1974) and all KMO values for 
individual items were greater than .80. One factor had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 
and in combination explained 53.28% of the variance, with the scree plot confirming 
retaining 1 factor. The collective punitiveness items have a high reliability (Cronbach’s 
α=.806). Results from factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of 
constructing a single variable from the six items (Collective Punitiveness). Table 9.2. shows the 
factor loadings for each item.  
 
Table 9.2: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for ‘Collective Punitiveness’ items Factor 1 
Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments .693 
School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded .577 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties .681 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped 
.700 
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences .750 







60 Multiple regression also explores how much variance in punitivity can be explained by the independent 
variables entered in each model (Pallant, 2016).  Tests for violations of assumptions did not reveal any apparent 
problems. Due to the large sample size of this study (n=5781) sample size is not considered problematic. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013:123) provide a formula to assess adequacy of sample size: N>50+8m (m= number of 
independent variables). In this case, N>50+8x16 (independent variables), equating to a minimum of 178 cases, 
with more cases required if the dependent variable is skewed (Pallant, 2016).   
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Model 1: Socio-demographic factors61  
When socio-demographic factors are considered in isolation in Model 1 (Table 9.3), politics 
(beta=.347, p=<.001) has the strongest effect on collective punitiveness suggesting that as 
respondents self-identify as more politically conservative, punitivity increases. Education 
(beta=.122), class origin (beta=-.091), and religiosity (beta=.086) are also significant at the 
p=<.001 level suggesting that lower educational attainment, working class origin and 
decreased religiosity increase punitiveness towards rulebreakers. Additionally, being in a 
marital-type relationship (beta=.059, p=<.01) and higher income (beta=.045, p=<.05) also 
appear to be related to increased punitiveness towards rulebreakers. The R-square value for 
Model 1 suggests that socio-demographic factors explain 17.3% of the variance of collective 
punitiveness towards rulebreakers.   
 
Model 2: Crime related   
When crime-related factors are introduced to the model, victimisation has no effect. 
Whereas fear of crime (How safe do you feel walking around in the area you live in after 
dark?) does have a significant effect (beta =.099, p=<.001) with punitive attitudes increasing 
as fear of crime increases. Fear of crime has very little effect on the socio-demographic 
factors, with the exception of increasing the effect of income (beta=.054, p=<.01) which 
increases in effect size and significance. The R-Square change in Model 2 is small at .009, with 









61 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=16-24, 2=25-34, 3=35-44, 4=45-54, 5=55-64, 6=65-74, 
7=75+; Income: 1=below £5,000, 2=£5,000-£9,999, 3=£10,000-£14,999, 4=£15,000-£19,999, 5=£20,000-£24,000, 
6=£25,000-£29,999, 7=£30,000- £34,999, 8=£35,000-£39,999, 9=40,000-£44,999, 10=£45,000-£49,999, 11=£50,000-
£59,999, 12=£60,000-£69,999, 13=70,000-£84,999, 14=£84,000-£99,999, 15=over £100,000; Education: 1=Degree level, 
2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; Religiosity scale: 1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-
religious; Politics scale: 0=left to 10=right; Class Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship status: 0=single, 1=in 
relationship; Universal Credit: 0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 2=2nd quartile, 3=3rd quartile, 4=4th quartile; 
Ethnicity: 0=Other, 1=White. 
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Table 9.3: Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models 
predicting collective punitiveness (n=2,090)62 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors61     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .024 .004 .054*** .051*** 
Age Range (1=16-24… 5=75+) .029 .033 -.046** -.050** 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .045* .054** .058*** .062*** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
qualifications) 
.122*** .116*** .022 .018 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .086*** .085*** .063*** .061*** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .347*** .348*** .074*** .065*** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.091*** -.084*** -.042** -.040** 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .059** .058** .003 .004 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .011 .015 .019 .020 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .014 .000 -.023 -.025 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.009 -.004 .021 .020 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.017 -.023 -.026 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .099*** .038** .027 
Belief systems (high scores=more values)     
Neo-liberal values   .086*** .090*** 
Neo-conservative values   .673*** .620*** 
Nostalgia (high score=more nostalgic)     
Social Nostalgic Values    .067*** 
Economic Nostalgic Values    .062*** 
Political Nostalgic Values    -.053** 
R-square .173*** .182*** .563*** .570*** 
Adjusted R-square .169 .177 .560 .560 
R-square change  .009 .381 .007 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
When beliefs systems are introduced in Model 3, neo-conservative values has the strongest 
effect on punitive attitudes (beta=.673, p=<.001), whilst neo-liberal values also has a 
significant, but much smaller, effect (beta=.086, p=<.001). These effects suggest that as  
neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values increase, so do punitive attitudes towards 
rulebreakers. The introduction of neo-liberal values and neo-conservative values does have a 
notable effect on some of the socio-demographic variables. Gender (beta=.054, p=<.001) and 
age (beta=-.046, p=<.01) become significant factors suggesting that increased punitiveness is 
related to being female and being younger. Income (beta=.058) also becomes significant at 
the p=<.001 level. In contrast, the effects of education and marital status diminish suggesting 
 
62 See page 230 for more detail on the sample size 
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that neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values inflated their effects in Model 2. Politics 
remains significant at the p=<.001 level but reduces substantially in effect size (beta=.074), 
suggesting that whilst neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values inflated the effect size 
of politics in Model 2 those identifying as politically more conservative remains a relevant 
factor. Finally, class origin (beta=-.042, p=<.01) and fear of crime (beta=.038, p=<.01) also 
reduce in effect size and significance. The R-Square value suggests that Model 3 explains 
56.3% of the variance in punitiveness towards rulebreakers, an increase of 38.1% from Model 
2.   
 
Model 4: Nostalgia  
All nostalgic items in Model 4 have a significant effect on punitive attitudes with social 
nostalgic values (beta=.067, p=<.001) and economic nostalgic values (beta= .062, p=<.001) 
having a stronger effect than political nostalgic values (beta=-.053, p=<.01).  Once the 
nostalgia items are introduced in Model 4, the effect size of neo-conservative values reduces 
slightly (beta=.620, p=<.001). This suggest that the nostalgia items inflated the effect of  
neo-conservative values a little in Model 3. The effects of fear of crime diminish in Model 4, 
suggesting that the nostalgia items inflated the effect of fear of crime in Model 3.  There is 
very little impact on the remaining factors in Model 4. The R-Square change of 0.7% suggests 
that whilst nostalgia items appear to be significant factors, they do in fact have a very small 
effect on explaining the variance in punitiveness towards rulebreakers. The Model as a whole 
explains 57% of the variance in collective punitiveness towards rulebreakers.  
 
Summary 
Findings suggest that punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers are largely driven by  
neo-conservative values; this is illustrated by the large increase in R-square value in Model 3 
(38.1%) and the effect size of neo-conservative values (beta=.620). Additional relevant 
factors appear to be neo-liberal values, social and economic nostalgic values, self-identified 
political conservativism, decreased religiosity, higher income, political nostalgic values, being 
female, younger age and lower-class origin. Table 9.4 below shows the statistically significant 




Table 9.4: Summary of relevant statistically significant factors for punitivity towards 
rulebreakers in Model 4 
 










Variables General Punitivity  
Female *** 
(beta=.051, females more punitive) 
Age Range  
 
** 





Lower educational attainment  X 
Decreased religiosity *** 
(beta=.061) 
Political conservativism *** 
(beta=.065) 
Working Class Origin ** 
(beta=-.040) 
Marital Status X 
Universal Credit X 
IMD X 
Ethnicity X 
Victimisation X  
Fear of crime X 
Neo-liberal values *** 
(beta=.090) 
Neo-conservative values *** 
(beta=.620) 
Social nostalgic values *** 
(beta=.067) 
Economic nostalgic values *** 
(beta=.062) 
Political nostalgic values ** 
(beta=-.053) 
R-Square Value 57% 
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Collective Punitiveness: Evaluating the multiple regression model 
The full model containing all the predictors was significant (p=<.001).63 The model summary 
(Table 9.5) shows the multiple correlation coefficients between punitiveness and the 
predictors in column one (labelled R), showing that when all predictors are included in Model 
4 the multiple correlation coefficient is .755. The R-Square value in the second column 
measures how much variability in the outcome variable is explained for by the predictors 
(Field, 2018). The adjusted R-square indicates how well the model generalises with the figure 
in the final model between the R-square (.570) and adjusted R-square (.567) equalling .003 or 
0.3% meaning that if the model were derived from the population as opposed to a sample 
the model would account for approximately 0.3% less variance in the outcome (Field, 2018). 
The F change statistic shows that the change in R-square is significant at the p=<.001 level for 
models. The combined explanatory power of all models is R²=.570 suggesting that the model 
overall explains 57% of the variance in punitivity.  
 
Table 9.5: Model summary for collective punitiveness 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 




Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .416 .173 .169 .83236937 .173 47.846 11 2518 .000 
2 .426 .182 .177 .82834183 .009 13.273 2 2516 .000 
3 .750 .563 .560 .60583045 .381 1094.785 2 2514 .000 
4 .755 .570 .567 .60109505 .007 14.255 3 2511 .000 
 
 
Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers 
The histogram (Figure 9.1) shows that the normally distributed errors assumption is met with 
the mean (-0.03) very close to zero. The Normal Probability Plot (Figure 9.2) shows the data 




63 The ANOVA table shows the F-Test of whether the model is significantly better at predicting the outcome 
than using no predictors (Field, 2018). The p-values (p=<.001) indicates that all models significantly improve the 




Figure 9.1: Histogram for collective                         Figure 9.2: Normal P-P Plot for 




Casewise diagnostics shows that 12 cases (0.2% of the sample) have standardized residual 
values below -3 or above +3, which is below the 1% which would otherwise indicate concerns 
(Pallant, 2016; Field, 2018). Further investigation of these 12 cases suggests that no cases are 
have a Cook’s distance value64 greater than 1 with the largest value of .016. Inspection of the 
Mahalanobis distances65 shows 64 cases have Mahalanobis distances greater than 42.312 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). Further examination of the DFBeta and DfFit statistics for the 
independent variables, which indicate problematic cases having an undue influence on the 
model parameters, highlight no concerns with no cases close to 1 (Field, 2018).  
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
No preliminary concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix 
of all dependent and independent variables. This shows with no correlations between 
independent variables are greater than .9 with the largest between political nostalgic values 
and economic nostalgic values (r=.509). The largest correlation between the punitivity 
variable and the independent variables was with neo-conservative values (r=.728, p=<.000). 
All variance inflation factors (VIFs) are well below 10 which would indicate concerns (Pallant, 
2016) with the highest 1.933 (Economic nostalgic values) in any of the equations. No 
 
64 Cook’s distance indicates whether a case has an undue influence on the results with values above 1 
suggesting a potential problem (Pallant, 2016).  
65 Inspection of the Mahalanobis distances allow identification of outliers (Pallant, 2016). To identify which cases 
are outliers, the critical chi-square value was determined using 18 independent variables as the degrees of 
freedom (Pallant, 2016) from the critical values chi-square table and an alpha level of .001 (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2013: 10). 
309 
 
Tolerance values were below .10 which would also indicate concerns (Pallant, 2016) with the 
lowest value of .517 (Economic nostalgic values), and the standard errors are low (highest 
.071 for ethnicity in Model 2). The average VIF in model 4 is 1.39 is also not substantially 
more than 1 (Field, 2018), therefore suggesting no concerns with multicollinearity.  
 
9.5. ‘Tiered Punitiveness’  
This section explores the concept of ‘tiered punitiveness’. Analysis of the frequencies for the 
separate variables shows a reduction in punitive attitudes once questions specify an extreme, 
permanent sanction when compared to the questions referring to a general increase in 
punishment. Table 9.6. shows the differences in agreement between the statements 
referring to increased, non-specific punishments (second column) and the statements 
referring to specific, extreme sanctions (column three). The right-most column shows the 
reduction in agreement once an extreme, permanent sanction is included.    
 
Additionally, detailed analyses over the previous three chapters appears to show differences 
in influences towards support for the general toughening of sanctions compared to support 
for specific, extreme sanctions. Based on this difference, the collective punitiveness variable 
has been separated into two categories: ‘Basic Punitiveness’ and ‘Ultimate Punitiveness’, with 
the aim of exploring whether these two tiers of punitiveness have different influences (Table 
9.7). Basic punitiveness is operationalized as a person’s level of support for harsher penalties 
for rulebreakers with an emphasis on tougher sanctions across three regulatory systems. 
These sanctions are purposefully non-specific and aim to tap into a person’s general level of 
support for the idea of tougher sanctions for rulebreakers. Ultimate punitiveness is 
operationalized as a person’s level of support for extreme, permanent sanctions for 
rulebreakers across three regulatory systems. These sanctions are purposely explicit and aim 









 Table 9.6. Reduction in agreement in ‘Tiered Punitiveness’ 
 Unruly school children should 
receive tougher punishments 
School pupils who repeatedly break 






27% 22% -5% 
Agree 47% 37% -10% 
Agreement 
Total 
74% 59% -15% 
 Welfare claimants who 
repeatedly cheat the system 
should face stiffer penalties 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly 
cheat the system should have their 






49% 39% -10% 
Agree 35% 30% -5% 
Agreement 
Total 
84% 69% -15% 
 People who break the law 
should be given stiffer 
sentences 
For some crimes the death penalty is 




36% 32% -4% 
Agree 35% 22% -13% 
Agreement 
Total 




 Table 9.7. Basic and Ultimate Punitiveness Variables  
Type of 
punishment 





Unruly school children 
should receive tougher 
punishments. 
Welfare claimants who 
repeatedly cheat the 
system should face stiffer 
penalties. 
People who break the 






School pupils who 
repeatedly break school 
rules should be 
permanently excluded. 
Welfare claimants who 
repeatedly cheat the 
system should have their 
payments permanently 
stopped. 
For some crimes the 








Constructing Basic and Ultimate Punitiveness Variables 
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted using principle axis factoring with oblique rotation 
for both basic and ultimate punitiveness. Firstly, the KMO measure verified the sampling 
adequacy for the analysis of the ‘basic punitiveness’ variable, KMO=.681, which is above the 
minimum criteria of 0.5 and falls into the range of ‘mediocre’ (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). All KMO 
values for individual items were greater than .65, which is above the acceptable limit of 0.5. 
One factor had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 65.67% 
of the variance with the scree plot confirming the retention of 1 factor. The basic 
punitiveness items have a good reliability (Cronbach’s α=.738). Results from factor analysis 
and Cronbach’s alpha confirm the suitability of constructing a single variable, specifically, 
Basic Punitiveness, from the three items. Table 9.8 shows the factor loadings.  
 
Table 9.8: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for ‘basic punitiveness’ Factor 1 
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences .768 
Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments .669 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties .655 
 
The KMO measure for the ‘ultimate punitiveness’ variable verified the sampling adequacy for 
the analysis, KMO=.644, which is above the minimum criteria of 0.5 and falls into the range of 
‘mediocre’ (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). All KMO values for individual items were greater than .63, 
which is above the acceptable limit of 0.5. One factor had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion 
of 1 and in combination explained 57.20% of the variance, with the scree plot confirming 
retaining 1 factor. The ultimate punitiveness items have a lower reliability than basic 
punitiveness (Cronbach’s α=.611). Values of α=0.7 and above are generally accepted values, 
however, when more complex psychological constructs are involved values below 0.7 can be 
expected due to the diversity of constructs being measured (Kline, 1999 in Field, 2018: 823). 
Based on the results from factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha, a single variable, namely, 








Table 9.9: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for ‘ultimate punitiveness’ Factor 1 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 
permanently stopped 
.663 
For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence .570 
School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded .564 
 
Exploring the different influences of basic and ultimate punitiveness towards rulebreakers  
Model 1: Socio-demographic factors66 
Socio-demographic factors explain a similar amount of the variance in both basic (15.3%) and 
ultimate punitiveness (16.3%). The results follow a similar trend but with some differences in 
effect size and significance values. Politics and education have the strongest effects for both 
basic punitiveness (beta=.311, p=<.001; beta=.103, p=<.001, respectively) and ultimate 
punitiveness (beta=.353, p=<.001 and beta=.135, p=<.001, respectively) with the effect size 
for both variables being greater for ultimate punitiveness. As respondents self-identify as 
more politically conservative their punitive attitudes increase and those with lower education 
appear to be more punitive. Notably, age for basic punitiveness (beta=.072, p=<.001) 
suggests that basic punitiveness increases with age. In contrast, age for ultimate punitiveness 
(beta=-.050, p=<.05) has a weaker, but still significant, effect and suggests that younger age is 
related to increased ultimate punitiveness. Class origin and religiosity also appear to be 
relevant factors to both tiers of punitiveness. Marital Status has a stronger effect on ultimate 
punitiveness (beta=.071, p=<.001) than on basic punitiveness (beta=.048, p=<.05) suggesting 
that those who are in a marriage type relationship are more punitive than those who are 
single. Finally, income appears to be a relevant factor for basic punitiveness (beta=.043, 
p=<.05) but not for ultimate punitiveness, suggesting that as income increases support for 




66 These are coded as follows: Gender: 0=Male, 1=female; Age=1=16-24, 2=25-34, 3=35-44, 4=45-54, 5=55-64, 
6=65-74, 7=75+; Income: 1=below £5,000, 2=£5,000-£9,999, 3=£10,000-£14,999, 4=£15,000-£19,999, 
5=£20,000-£24,000, 6=£25,000-£29,999, 7=£30,000- £34,999, 8=£35,000-£39,999, 9=40,000-£44,999, 
10=£45,000-£49,999, 11=£50,000-£59,999, 12=£60,000-£69,999, 13=70,000-£84,999, 14=£84,000-£99,999, 
15=over £100,000; Education: 1=Degree level, 2=below degree level qualifications, 3=no qualifications; 
Religiosity scale: 1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious; Politics scale: 0=left to 10=right; Class 
Origin: 0=working class, 1=middle class; Relationship status: 0=single, 1=in relationship; Universal Credit: 
0=claimant, 1=non-claimant; IMD: 1=1st quartile, 2=2nd quartile, 3=3rd quartile, 4=4th quartile; Ethnicity: 
0=Other, 1=White.    
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Model 2: Crime related factors 
When crime related factors were introduced in Model 2, victimisation has no significant 
effect on either basic or ultimate punitiveness. The effect and significance of fear of crime 
(How safe do you feel walking around in the area you live in after dark?) is significant at the 
p=<.001 level for both basic (beta=.090) and ultimate punitiveness (beta=.101) when 
introduced in Model 2, indicating that as fear increases so too does punitiveness. Fear of 
crime has very little effect on the socio-demographic factors in the model, with the exception 
of income for ultimate punitiveness (beta=.045, p=<.05) which becomes a significant factor. 
Whilst fear of crime appears to be a significant factor in Model 2, the R-Square change is 
small at .007 for basic punitiveness and .009 for ultimate punitiveness. The variance 
explained by Model 2 as a whole is 16% for basic punitiveness and 17.2% for ultimate 
punitiveness.  
 
Model 3: Belief Systems 
Model 3 introduces belief systems. Neo-conservative values has a significant effect at the 
p=<.001 level for both tiers of punitiveness, with the strongest effect on basic punitiveness 
(beta=.684), suggesting that as neo-conservative values increase, so too does support for 
both harsher sanctions and extreme sanctions. Notably, neo-liberal values only has a 
significant effect on ultimate punitiveness (beta=.157, p=<.001) indicating that as neo-liberal 
values increase, so too does support for extreme, permanent sanctions. The introduction of 
neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values has an interesting effect on fear of crime. 
Regarding basic punitiveness, the effect of fear of crime diminishes once neo-conservative 
values are introduced to the model; this suggests that neo-conservative values inflated the 
effect of fear of crime for basic punitiveness in Model 2. In contrast, for ultimate 
punitiveness, fear of crime in Model 3 remains significant at the p=<.001 but with a reduced 
effect size (beta=.053). This suggests that whilst neo-liberal values and neo-conservative 
values inflated the effect of fear of crime in Model 2, fear continues to remain a significant 
factor related to increased ultimate punitiveness.  
 
The introduction of neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values has a notable effect on 
some socio-demographic factors for both tiers of punitiveness. Gender becomes significant 
for both tiers of punitiveness, but with the strongest effect on basic punitiveness (beta=.059, 
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p=<.001), with punitiveness increasing with being female. The effect of age diminishes for 
basic punitiveness once neo-conservative values are introduced, suggesting that neo-
conservative values inflated the effects of age in Model 2. In contrast, the effect and 
significance of age increases for ultimate punitiveness (beta=-.101, p=<.001) suggesting that 
support for extreme, permanent sanctions increases with younger age groups and that this is 
related to neo-conservative values. 
 
Table 9.10: Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models 
predicting ‘Basic Punitiveness’ (n=2,090)67 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors66     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .028 .010 .059*** .057*** 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) .072*** .076*** -.007 -.012 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .043* .051* .057*** .059*** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no quals) .103*** .098*** .007 .005 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7=unextremely) .085*** .084*** .061*** .059*** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .311*** .312*** .064*** .056** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.093*** -.087*** -.040** -.038** 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .048* .047* -.008 -.007 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .010 .013 .018 .019 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .013 .000 -.022 -.023 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.001 .002 .025 .024 
Crime related     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.013 -.021 -.023 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .090*** .022 .020 
Belief systems (high scores=more values)     
Neo-liberal values   .030 .035* 
Neo-conservative values    .684*** .643*** 
Nostalgia (high score=more nostalgic)     
Social nostalgic values    .038* 
Economic nostalgic values    .066***  
Political nostalgic values    -.053** 
R-square Value .153*** .160*** .536*** .541*** 
Adjusted R-square .149 .156 .533 .538 
R-square change  .007 .376 .005 
  *** p < .001, ** p<.01, *p<.05 
 
The effects of education diminish for basic punitiveness suggesting that neo-conservative 
values inflated the effects of education in the previous models, whilst for ultimate 
punitiveness the effects reduce somewhat but remain a relevant factor with support for 
extreme sanctions increasing with those with lower qualifications.  The effects of income 
 
67 See page 230 for more detail on the n-size 
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increase with both tiers of punitiveness with a stronger effect on basic punitiveness 
(beta=.057, p=<.001). The effects of marital status diminish for both tiers of punitiveness 
once belief systems are introduced to the model, whilst class origin reduced somewhat but 
remains significant at the p=<.01 level for both tiers of punitiveness. The effects of those 
identifying as politically more conservative reduce substantially for both tiers of punitiveness 
but remains significant at the p=<.001 level with a stronger effect on ultimate punitiveness 
(beta=.087). Finally, ethnicity (beta=.031, p=<.05) becomes a significant factor for ultimate 
punitiveness suggesting that support for extreme, permanent sanctions increases with white 
ethnicity. Model 3 explains 53.6% of the variance (an increase of 37.6% from Model 2). 
 
Table 9.11: Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models 
predicting ‘Ultimate Punitiveness’ (2,090)68 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .013 -.008 .035* .032* 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) -.050* -.046* -.101*** -.104*** 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .036 .045* .047** .053** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no quals) .135*** .128*** .046** .039* 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7=unextremely) .071*** .070*** .056*** .053*** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .353*** .354*** .087*** .076*** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.077*** -.070*** -.044** -.039* 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .071*** .069*** .022 .023 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .005 .009 .011 .013 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .023 .009 -.012 -.017 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) .008 .011 .031* .029 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.020 -.022 -.026 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .101*** .053*** .036* 
Belief systems      
Neo-liberal values   .157*** .158*** 
Neo-conservative values   .542*** .473*** 
Nostalgia      
Social nostalgic values    .113*** 
Economic nostalgic values     .047* 
Political nostalgic values    -.044* 
R-square Value .163*** .172*** .448*** .460*** 
Adjusted R-square .159 .167 .445 .456 
R-square change  .009 .276 .012 




68 See page 230 for detail on the n-size 
316 
 
Model 4: Nostalgia 
When nostalgic values are entered in Model 4, all items appear to be relevant factors to both 
tiers of punitiveness, albeit with varying degrees of effect size and significance, suggesting 
that as nostalgia increases, so does punitiveness. Social nostalgic values (beta=.113, p=<.001) 
has the strongest effect for ultimate punitiveness of all the nostalgic items. Social nostalgic 
values (beta=.038, p=<.05) also appears to be a significant factor in regard to basic 
punitiveness, but with a much weaker effect. In contrast, economic nostalgic values 
(beta=.066, p=<.001) has the strongest effect on basic punitiveness, whilst also relevant with 
a weaker effect for ultimate punitiveness (beta=.047, p<.05). Finally, political nostalgic values 
(beta=-.053, p=<.01) has the strongest effect on basic punitiveness, with a slightly weaker 
effect on ultimate punitiveness (beta=-.044, p=<.05). 
 
The introduction of nostalgic values in Model 4 has the largest effect on ultimate 
punitiveness in comparison to basic punitiveness, with some notable changes to some of the 
other variables, whilst the other factors for basic punitiveness remain largely stable with the 
exception of belief systems. Firstly, neo-conservative values continues to have the strongest 
effect for both basic punitiveness (beta=.643, p=<.001) and ultimate punitiveness (beta=.473, 
p=<.001) once nostalgic values are introduced to the model, with the most notable effect on 
ultimate punitiveness which sees the largest effect size reduction. This suggests that  
neo-conservative values and social nostalgic values (as this has the strongest effect) may be 
related. Neo-liberal values continues to be strongly related to ultimate punitiveness 
(beta=.158, p=<.001) remaining stable from Model 3, whilst neo-liberal values (beta=.035, 
p=<.05) becomes a significant factor, with a very small effect, for basic punitiveness in Model 
4. Considering the effects of nostalgic values on crime-related factors, there is very little 
change with the exception of the effect on fear of crime (beta=.036, p=<.05) for ultimate 
punitiveness which reduces substantially. This suggests that nostalgic values (most likely 
social nostalgic values as this has the largest effect size) inflated the effects of fear of crime in 
the previous model. Finally, in consideration of the socio-demographic factors, there is very 
little change in regard to basic punitiveness with the exception of politics, which reduces in 
effect size and significance (beta=.056, p=<.01). For ultimate punitiveness most of the  
socio-demographic factors remain largely stable with the exception of a reduction in effect 
size and significance for class origin (beta=-.039, p=<.05) and education (beta=.039, p=<.05), 
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whilst the effects of ethnicity diminish. Nostalgic values explains a greater amount of variance 
in ultimate punitiveness (R-square change = 1.2%) compared to basic punitiveness (R-square 
change = 0.5%). The total variance explained by Model 4 as a whole is 54.1% for basic 
punitiveness and 46% for ultimate punitiveness suggesting that the model is a better fit for 
basic punitiveness.  
 
Table 9.12. Relevant statistically significant factors for tiered punitiveness towards 
rulebreakers (Model 4) 










Age X *** 
(beta=-.104, younger age) 




Lower educational attainment  X * 
(beta=.039) 












Marital Status X X 
Universal Credit X X 
Victimisation X X 
Fear of crime X * 
(beta=.036) 
























Analyses suggests that both tiers of punitiveness are largely driven by neo-conservative 
values, with a stronger effect on basic punitiveness, shown by the large increase in R-square 
values in Model 3 (37.6% for basic punitiveness and 27.6% for ultimate punitiveness) and a 
bigger effect size. Whilst the findings for both tiers are similar in some respects, there are 
some notable differences. Factors relating to only ultimate punitiveness appear to be 
younger age, lower educational attainment and fear of crime. Additionally, neo-liberal values 
and social nostalgic values have a much stronger effect on support for extreme, permanent 
sanctions. The model explains a greater amount of variance in basic punitiveness, which also 
appears to more strongly related to being female, economic nostalgic values and political 
nostalgic values. Table 9.12 shows the statistically significant factors, and the effect sizes in 
brackets, related to basic and ultimate punitiveness. 
 
 
Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and outliers 
The histograms (Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.4) shows that the normally distributed errors 
assumption is met with the means (0.02 for Basic Punitiveness and 0.03 for Ultimate 
Punitiveness) very close to zero for both tiers of punitiveness. The Normal Probability Plots 
(Figures 9.5 and 9.6) show the data lie in a reasonably straight line suggesting no major 
deviations from normality for both tiers.  
 
Figure 9.3. Histogram for basic punitiveness    Figure 9.4. Histogram for ultimate  








Figure 9.5. Normal P-P Plot for basic                    Figure 9.6. Normal P-P Plot for ultimate 





For basic punitiveness, casewise diagnostics shows that 14 cases (0.2% of the sample) have 
standardized residual values below -3 or above +3, which is below the 1% which would 
otherwise indicate concerns (Pallant, 2016; Field, 2018). Further investigation of these 14 
cases suggests that no cases are have a Cook’s distance value69 greater than 1 with the 
largest value of .014. Inspection of the Mahalanobis distances70 shows 64 cases have 
Mahalanobis distances greater than 42.312 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013) for both tiers of 
punitiveness. Further examination of the DFBeta and DfFit statistics for the independent 
variables, which indicate problematic cases having an undue influence on the model 
parameters, highlight no concerns with no cases close to 1 (Field, 2018). In relation to 
ultimate punitiveness, casewise diagnostics shows that 10 cases (0.17% of the sample) have 
standardized residual values below -3 or above +3, which is below the 1% which would 
indicate concern. Further investigation of these 10 cases suggests that no cases have a Cook’s 
distance greater than 1, with the largest value of .014 suggesting that no cases are having an 
undue influence of the model. Inspection of the Mahalanobis distances shows 63 cases have 
Mahalanobis distances greater than 42.312 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013) for both tiers of 
punitiveness. Further examination of the DFBeta and DfFit statistics for the independent 
 
69 Cook’s distance indicates whether a case has an undue influence on the results with values above 1 
suggesting a potential problem (Pallant, 2016).  
70 Inspection of the Mahalanobis distances allow identification of outliers (Pallant, 2016). To identify which cases 
are outliers, the critical chi-square value was determined using 16 independent variables as the degrees of 
freedom (Pallant, 2016) from the critical values chi-square table and an alpha level of .001 (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2013: 10). 
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variables, which indicate problematic cases having an undue influence on the model 
parameters, highlight no concerns with no cases close to 1 (Field, 2018). 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
No preliminary concerns were raised with multicollinearity by viewing the correlation matrix 
of all dependent and independent variables for both tiers of punitiveness. This shows with no 
correlations between independent variables are greater than .9 with the largest between 
political nostalgic values and economic nostalgic values (r=.509). The largest correlation 
between both tiers of punitiveness and the independent variables was with neo-conservative 
values (r=.718, p=<.001 for basic punitiveness and r=.624, p=<.001 for ultimate punitiveness). 
All variance inflation factors (VIFs) are well below 10 which would indicate concerns (Pallant, 
2016) with the highest 1.932 (Economic nostalgic values) in any of the equations. No 
Tolerance values were below .10 which would also indicate concerns (Pallant, 2016) with the 
lowest value of .518 (Economic nostalgic values), and the standard errors are low (highest 
.049 for universal credit in Model 2 for basic punitiveness and .044 for universal credit for 
ultimate punitiveness). The average VIF in model 4 is 1.39 is also not substantially more than 
1 (Field, 2018), therefore suggesting no concerns with multicollinearity.  
 
9.6. Developing a Structural Equation Model for Tiered Punitiveness 
Structural Equation Modelling takes a hypothesis testing approach using a series of 
regression equations, modeled pictorially, to assess the concepts theorized (Byrne, 2016). 
Basic punitiveness (Figure 9.7), ultimate punitiveness (Figure 9.8) and collective punitiveness 
(Figure 9.9) have been modelled following the multiple regression models applied in the 
previous sections of this chapter. These models only include the conceptual variables, as not 
all of the socio-demographic variables are suitable for linear regression, allowing a focus on 
the value-based variables. Included independent variables are social nostalgic values, 
economic nostalgic values, political nostalgic values, neo-liberal values and neo-conservative 
values. Figure 9.7 and Figure 9.8 below show Basic Punitiveness and Ultimate Punitiveness 
respectively. The models show specified regression paths from social nostalgic values, 
economic nostalgic values and political nostalgic values to both neo-liberal values and  
neo-conservative values, and then regression paths from neo-liberal values and  
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neo-conservative values to first Basic Punitiveness and then Ultimate Punitiveness. A 
regression path is also specified from social nostalgic values to both basic and ultimate 
punitiveness. Both models show statistically significant regression paths (p=<.001) between 
all of the variables in the models. Both models fit the data well, with reference to the CFI 
(.997) and the RMSEA (.059)71 for Basic Punitiveness and the CFI (.998) and the RMSEA (.039) 
for Ultimate Punitiveness.    
 
As shown by the diagrams (Figure 9.7 and Figure 9.8) the Basic Punitiveness model explains a 
great amount of variance (52 percent) than Ultimate Punitiveness (43 percent). The models 
suggest that social nostalgic values is positively associated with neo-liberal values 
(standardized coefficient = .30) and more strongly with neo-conservative values 
(standardized coefficient = .47). This suggests that social nostalgia, that is a sense of sadness 
about local and national change, is associated with attitudes supportive of the free market, 
reduced state intervention and privatization (neo-liberal values) and a desire for social order, 
traditional values and authoritarianism (neo-conservative values). Additionally, whilst social 
nostalgic values is positively associated with both Basic Punitiveness (standardized coefficient 
= .06) and Ultimate Punitiveness (standardized coefficient = .13), it is much more relevant to 
Ultimate Punitiveness. A sense of sadness about local and national change is more strongly 
associated with support for specific extreme sanctions than support for general non-specific 
sanctions. Economic nostalgic values is negatively associated with neo-liberal values 
(standardized coefficient = -.23) but positively associated with neo-conservative values 
(standardized coefficient = .16). This suggests that those who agree that profit dominates 
society, the market has increased inequality and that local and national losses occurred 
through the closure of traditional industries (economic nostalgia) are less likely to support 
neo-liberal ideals of the free market, reduced state intervention and privatization but are 
more supportive of the neo-conservative themes of social order, traditional values and 
authoritarianism. Finally, political nostalgic values are negatively associated with both  
neo-liberal values (standardized coefficient = -.29) and neo-conservative values (standardized 
co-efficient = -.26) suggesting that those in agreement that Margaret Thatcher has had a 
 
71 The CFI (Comparative Fit Index) should be >.95 to represent a good fitting model and the RMSEA (Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation) values <.06 indicate a good fit between the hypothesized model and the data 
(Byrne, 2016).  
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negative impact on communities and the quality of ordinary people’s lives (political nostalgia) 
are less likely to hold neo-conservative values and neo-liberal values.  
 
Turning the attention now to the regression paths between neo-liberal values and  
neo-conservative values and punitiveness. The models suggest that neo-conservative values 
has the strongest effect on both tiers of punitiveness but is more strongly associated with 
Basic Punitiveness (standardized co-efficient = .67) than Ultimate Punitiveness (standardized 
coefficient = .49). Support for social order, traditional values and authoritarianism is more 
strongly associated with support for general, non-specific sanctions for rulebreakers than 
with support for specific, extreme sanctions. Whereas neo-liberal values has a stronger 
association with Ultimate Punitiveness (standardized coefficient = .19) than Basic 
Punitiveness (standardized coefficient = .05). This suggests that support for the free market, 
reduced state intervention and privatization is more strongly associated with support for 
specific, extreme sanctions.  
 






Figure 9.8. Structural Equation Model of Ultimate Punitiveness (n=5,781) 
 
 
The Collective Punitiveness Model (Figure 9.9), which incorporates all variables from both 
basic and ultimate punitiveness models, shows statistically significant regression paths 
(p=<.001) between all of the variables in the models. The model fits the data well, with 
reference to the CFI (.997) and the RMSEA (.058)72. The variance explained by the model is 55 
percent, with social nostalgic values (standardized coefficient = .09), neo-liberal values 
(standardized coefficient = .11) and neo-conservative values (standardized coefficient = .64) 







72 The CFI (Comparative Fit Index) should be >.95 to represent a good fitting model and the RMSEA (Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation) values <.06 indicate a good fit between the hypothesized model and the data 
(Byrne, 2016).  
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First, in consideration of basic and ultimate punitiveness models. The findings suggest that 
support for generally harsher sanctions for those who break the rules is largely associated 
with support for social order, traditional values and authoritarianism. Interestingly, support 
for specific, extreme sanctions appears to be associated with a greater range of factors 
suggesting that it is a more complex attitude. Again, support for social order, traditional 
values and authoritarianism has the biggest influence on ultimate punitiveness, however, 
neo-liberal values and social nostalgic values also appear to have an important influence. 
Neo-liberal values is operationalized here as a belief in the power of the market, anti-taxation 
and reduced state intervention and promotes individualism and self-reliance. It suggests that 
the market works for everyone and people should be able to look after themselves. Findings 
here then suggest that there is a relationship between these neo-liberal ideals and attitudes 
supportive of extreme sanctions for rulebreakers. Social nostalgic values refers to feelings of 
sadness about local and national change. People who experience higher levels of social 
nostalgia are also more likely to want to sanction people who break the rules very harshly. 
The lower variance explained by the ultimate punitiveness model also suggest that extreme 
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attitudes are harder to predict, at least by the concepts used in this study. The Collective 
Punitiveness model incorporates all of the basic and ultimate punitiveness items into one 
variable. This shows that neo-conservative values has by far the largest effect on general 
punitiveness and that the model explains 55 percent of the variance in punitiveness. What 
this shows is that using all items together to measure punitiveness as a discrete concept does 
not allow us to tease out the differences in complex attitudes.  
 
Previous criminological research has generally examined punitive attitudes towards 
lawbreakers through a combination of numerous questions; this mostly uses either support 
for stiffer sentences, support for the death penalty, or occasionally both. King and Maruna 
(2009) used a punitiveness scale containing eight questions which included With most 
offenders, we need to ‘condemn more and understand less’, My general view towards 
offenders is that they should be treated harshly, and We should bring back the death penalty 
for serious crimes. Roberts and Indermaur (2007) operationalised punitiveness using three 
questions, The death penalty should be the punishment for murder, People who break the law 
should be given stiffer sentences and Judges should reflect public opinion about crimes when 
sentencing criminals. Spiranovic et al. (2012) used a punitive scale of seven items, which 
included People who break the law should be give stiffer sentences. Useem et al. (2003) 
explored punitiveness towards criminal offenders through support of the death penalty, 
Courts in this area do not deal harshly enough with criminals, Spending too little money to 
halt the rising crime rate and Spending too little on law enforcement. Costelloe et al. (2009) 
operationalised punitiveness through support for a range of punitive policies including the 
Death penalty for juveniles who murder, Send repeat juvenile offenders to adult court, Lock up 
more juvenile offenders, Make sentences more severe for all crimes and Limit appeals to 
death sentences. Finally, Gerber and Jackson (2016) operationalised punitiveness by using the 
single-item People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
 
Research exploring the hardening of attitudes towards welfare claimants has generally used a 
range of questions exploring people’s views of the welfare system, of welfare claimants or 
the extent of inequality. Taylor-Gooby and Martin (2008) used The government should spend 
more on welfare for the poor. Sefton (2005) used a range of questions including If welfare 
benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet, Many people 
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who get social security don’t really deserve any help and Most people on the dole are fiddling 
in one way or another. Schofield and Butterworth (2015) used People who receive welfare 
benefits should be under more obligation to find work, Around here most unemployed people 
could find a job if they really wanted to, Welfare benefits make people lazy and dependent 
and Most people getting welfare are trying to get a job. There is little research exploring 
public attitudes towards welfare claimants who break the rules. Baumberg et al. (2012) 
examined respondents’ estimates of ‘claiming falsely’ and ‘committing fraud’ to determine 
the extent to which claimants were seen as undeserving or deserving. Bamfield and Horton 
(2009) explored attitudes between benefit fraud and tax evasion, and Marriott (2017) asked 
People who commit welfare fraud deserve to be punished. The British Social Attitudes survey 
2000 (Hills, 2001) explored the extent to which respondents thought that lone parents should 
have their benefits reduced should they fail to attend an interview when asked.  
 
Finally, there is much less empirical research exploring public attitudes towards rulebreaking 
school pupils than for the other two groups of rulebreakers. The majority of studies have 
surveyed teachers, pupils and parents. In 2011, a YouGov survey asked both teachers and 
children, Teachers should be allowed to be tougher when it comes to discipline, Corporal 
punishments, such as the cane or slipper, should be reintroduced for very bad behaviour, Is 
smacking or caning children an acceptable form of discipline by teachers and 
Expelling/suspending children is an appropriate form of discipline by teachers (Thompson, 
2011). The NFER (2012) asked primary and secondary school teachers whether it was 
reasonable for teachers to exclude pupils for a fixed term for poor behaviour and reasonable 
to formally exclude pupils permanently for reasons of poor behaviour. Grasmick et al. (1992) 
asked adults their level of support for corporal punishment use ‘ ‘if the child talked back to 
other children; used obscene language; deliberately inflicted injury on another child; skipped 
school without good reason; and, stole something from school or another child’. Finally, the 
Gallup Poll (1974) explored public attitudes towards pupils who fail to comply with school 
rules by asking, ‘What should be done with a high school student who refuses to obey his 
teachers?’. 
 
Analyses in this chapter suggest two things. One, that attitudes towards ‘rulebreakers’ can be 
studied across different areas and that there is some value in doing so. Whilst specificity 
327 
 
allows us to examine complex attitudes in more detail, widening the focus has allowed an 
insight here into how political values can influence our views on the treatment of a range of 
people who break the rules. Two, that Tiered Punitiveness allows us to tease out the 
differences in divergent and complex attitudes towards rulebreakers. Tiered punitiveness 
appears to show that more extreme attitudes are influenced by a greater range of factors 
than more general attitudes.  
 
9.7. What does this study add to the theories of punitiveness?  
A relatively large body of empirical criminological research has found that punitiveness is 
strongly related to factors external to crime. King and Maruna (2009) found that punitiveness 
is strongly related to generational anxiety, expressed through concerns about loss of 
discipline and respect amongst young people in society. Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) found 
that the deterioration of social values (authoritarianism, dogmatism and liberalism) and 
family social bonds were key predictors of punitiveness. Moral decline (Unnever and Cullen, 
2010), a disciplinarian outlook (Hough et al., 1988), conservative beliefs (King and Maruna, 
2009; Costelloe et al., 2009; Unnever and Cullen, 2010), economic beliefs (Kornhauser, 2015; 
Hogan et al., 2005; Costelloe et al., 2009), economic anxieties (King and Maruna, 2009) and 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Gerber and Jackson, 2016; Palasinski and Shortland, 2017) have 
also been found to be significantly related to punitiveness towards offenders. Consistent with 
these previous findings, this study contributes to this body of work by suggesting that 
criminological punitiveness is strongly related to factors external to crime. Primarily, this 
study suggests that this can be explained largely by neo-conservative values and to a lesser 
extent neo-liberal values and nostalgia when measuring support for general and specific 
extreme sanctions together. Additionally, this study proposes that there is value in examining 
these two measures separately.  
 
This study also expands criminological punitiveness into examining attitudes towards 
rulebreaking welfare claimants and school pupils. Previous research has found that less 
support for welfare is related to conservative beliefs (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008; 
Deeming, 2015), social values, perceptions and beliefs (Deeming, 2015), self-serving attitudes 
(Schofield and Butterworth, 2015), subjective beliefs (Baumberg et al., 2012; Bamfield and 
Horton, 2009), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Marriott, 2017), and deservingness (Baumberg 
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et al., 2012). Firstly, this study has designed two new measures to assess punitive attitudes 
towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. Secondly, this study contributes to this field by 
suggesting that punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants is related to  
neo-conservative values, neo-liberal values, economic nostalgic values and political nostalgic 
values. Again, this study proposes that a deeper insight into punitive attitudes can be gained 
through studying these measures separately as they tap into different forms of punitiveness. 
Thirdly, this study contributes to the limited welfare literature, which has sought to explore 
socio-demographic factors related to  welfare attitudes.  
 
Finally, this study also expands punitiveness into exploring attitudes towards rulebreaking 
school pupils. There are very few studies that have sought to analyse public attitudes towards 
school pupils. Previous findings in America have found that attitudes supportive of the use of 
corporal punishment are related to Evangelical Protestants (Owen and Wagner, 2006), 
southern culture, rural states, religion, republican political affiliation (Font and Gershoff, 
2017), being male, being older, fundamental protestants and lower educational attainment 
(Grasmick et al., 1992). This study has designed two new measures to explore attitudes 
towards rulebreaking school pupils. Contributing to this previous work, this study suggests 
that punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils is related neo-conservative values, 
neo-liberal values and social nostalgic values, although again these attitudes can be better 
understood by examining these separately as each question appears to tap into different 
values. Additionally, this study contributes to the existing literature through exploring  
socio-demographic factors relating to punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils.     
 
Punitiveness towards rulebreakers appears to be rooted in political values, and political 
values are related to feelings about macro-level change (nostalgia) (Figure 10.1). There is also 
an interplay with socio-demographic factors, more recent experiences and the ‘structuring 
processes’ that form these attitudes. This macro-level change appears to stem from feelings 
of nostalgia about social and economic change. Political attitudes take the form of  
neo-conservativism (support for state authority, traditional values and a desire for social 
order) and neo-liberalism (support for the free market, competition and profit),  
with neo-conservativism having the greatest effect on punitiveness. Again, political values 
interplay with various socio-demographic factors, experiences and structuring processes.  
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Figure 10.1. Theoretical Model of Punitiveness  
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The analysis in this chapter has undertaken a range of tasks. Firstly, attitudinal differences 
between the different rulebreakers were examined. This chapter commenced by connecting 
chapters 6 to 8 together by examining the variation in punitive attitudes towards the 
different groups of rulebreakers (Section 9.2). Analyses show that the model as a whole 
explains the largest amount of variance in punitive attitudes towards lawbreakers (49.7%; 
40.2% of the variance in school punitivity; and 33% of variance in welfare punitivity 33.3%). 
As the theoretical framework for the models is largely shaped by a criminological foundation 
this is perhaps not too surprising. There also appears to be some similarities in the factors 
related to all three groups of rulebreakers. Belief systems has the most notable effect on 
punitive attitudes towards all three groups of rulebreakers shown by the increase in R-Square 
value for Model 3 for each group, with the largest effect on rulebreaking school pupils 
(30.4%). Neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on all groups of rulebreakers, with 
the strongest effect on rulebreaking school pupils. Whilst, neo-liberal values also appears to 














In addition to the relevance of beliefs systems towards each group of rulebreaker, punitive 
attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils appears to also be related to social nostalgic 
values and higher income. Welfare punitivity appears to be influenced by political nostalgic 
values, economic nostalgic values, being female, higher income, those not receiving universal 
credit, increased political conservativism, younger age, working class origin and lower IMD. 
Whilst law punitivity appears to be related to social nostalgic values, increased political 
conservativism, younger age, lower education attainment, working class origin, economic 
nostalgic values, being in a marital type relationship, political nostalgic values, fear of crime 
and being female. School punitivity appears to be related to the least number of significant 
factors (five), whereas welfare and law punitivity appear to have a more complex mix of 
factors with twelve and thirteen significant factors respectively.  
 
Secondly, section 9.3 then progressed to examine collective punitiveness by combining the 
three distinct groups of rulebreakers into one rulebreaker group. Again, unsurprisingly, 
punitive attitudes towards the collective rulebreaker are largely driven by neo-conservative 
values illustrated by the large increase in R-square value in Model 3 (38.1%) and the effect 
size of neo-conservative values (beta=.620). Additional relevant factors appear to be  
neo-liberal values, social and economic nostalgic values, self-identified political 
conservativism, decreased religiosity, higher income, political nostalgic values, being female, 
younger age and lower-class origin.  
 
Thirdly, section 9.4 introduced ‘tiered punitiveness’ exploring whether there is a difference in 
drivers between ‘basic punitiveness’, that is support for harsher, non-specific punishments, 
and ultimate punitiveness, that is support for specific, extreme, permanent sanctions. 
Analysis suggests that whilst neo-conservative values has a very strong effect on both tiers of 
punitiveness, it stands out as the predominant factor in explaining basic punitiveness, as seen 
by the large effect size in comparison to the other factors which are all small, despite being 
significant. Ultimate punitiveness on the other hand appears to be driven by a wider range of 
factors with a relatively strong influence in addition to neo-conservative values, most notably, 
neo-liberal values, younger age and social nostalgic values. This suggests that ultimate 




Section 9.5 then presented the Structural Equation Models for basic punitiveness and 
ultimate punitiveness focusing on the values-based variables. The findings suggest that 
support for generally harsher sanctions for those who break the rules is largely associated 
with neo-conservative values, that is support for social order, traditional values and 
authoritarianism. Whilst support for specific, extreme sanctions appears to be associated 
with a greater range of factors suggesting that it is a more complex attitude. Support for 
social order, traditional values and authoritarianism also has the biggest influence on 
ultimate punitiveness, however, neo-liberal values and social nostalgic values also appear to 
have an important influence. Neo-liberal values, that is a belief in the power of the market, 
anti-taxation and reduced state intervention promoting individualism and self-reliance, 
appears to be important in understanding attitudes supportive of extreme sanctions for 
rulebreakers. Additionally, people who experience higher levels of social nostalgia are also 
more likely to want to sanction people who break the rules very harshly. The lower variance 
explained by the ultimate punitiveness model also suggest that extreme attitudes are harder 
to predict, at least by the concepts used in this study. Sections 9.5 concluded by presenting 
the Structural Equation Model for collective punitiveness, which incorporated all of the basic 
and ultimate punitiveness items into one variable. This analysis showed how examining 
punitiveness as one discrete attitude does not allow the teasing out of differences in complex 
attitudes.  
  
The chapter concluded by reflecting on the contributions this study has made to the theories 
of punitiveness. This study has examined punitiveness from a multi-disciplinary perspective 
suggesting that the root of punitiveness towards rulebreakers across the three systems are 
rooted in political values and that these values are related to nostalgia about social and 











Part 5: What is the Relationship between Political Attitudes and 
Punitiveness? 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chapter Ten: Conclusion  
 
10.1. Introduction   
The aim of this thesis has been to explore the prevalence of punitive attitudes towards 
‘rulebreakers’ in contemporary British society drawing on data from a new national survey of 
5,781 respondents. In doing so, it focuses on the relationship between punitiveness and a 
range of political and social values. This exploration has expanded ‘punitiveness’ into the 
welfare system and education system with a view to answering the following research 
questions: What is the relationship between punitive attitudes and political attitudes? How 
prevalent are punitive attitudes towards ‘rulebreakers’ of the law, the welfare system, and 
education system evident in British society today? How do punitive attitudes vary towards 
different groups of ‘rulebreakers’?  
 
Part One placed the thesis in context by reviewing the literature most relevant to the 
operationalisation of punitiveness in this study towards the three different rulebreakers. Part 
Two focused on exploring long-term trends in government policies, political discourse and 
public attitudes towards the distinct groups of rulebreakers considering the extent to which 
these three areas have become more punitive over the last four decades. Part One and Part 
Two formed the basis for the development of the survey questions and research detailed in 
Part Three; this presented a review of the cognitive interviewing literature, the pre-testing of 
the newly designed questions through cognitive interviewing, the final draft of the survey 
questions, and the pilot survey. Part Four commenced by placing the quantitative analysis 
into context by presenting the descriptive statistic and basis analyses for the battery of 
questions, prior to presenting the construction of the conceptual variables to be used in the 
subsequent analyses. The remainder of Part Four examined punitive public attitudes in 
relation to the distinct groups of rulebreakers before moving on to consider punitiveness 
towards rulebreakers as a collective group. Part Four concluded by introducing ‘tiered 
punitiveness’ suggesting that ‘punitiveness’ is not a discrete attitude but has different forms, 
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identified here as ‘basic punitiveness’ and ‘ultimate punitiveness’. This chapter begins with a 
summary of each chapter, before reflecting on the empirical, methodological and theoretical 
contributions of this thesis, in addition to considering its limitations.  
 
10.2. Summary 
‘Punitiveness’, operationalised by analysing attitudinal data from surveys measuring public 
support for harsher sentences in the criminal justice system, has an established history in 
criminological research over the past few decades. Public demands for harsher sentences for 
offenders have become customary in many countries across the world (Gerber and Jackson, 
2016). ‘Populist punitiveness’ is a feature of criminal justice over the past 40 years and has 
influenced sentencing change observed in most Western countries resulting in increases in 
prison populations (Bottoms, 1995:18). Bottoms (1995) proposes that punitiveness appeals 
to some politicians due to their belief that prison reduces crime through general deterrence 
and incapacitation, increases society’s moral consensus against certain behaviours and 
satisfies the electorate. ‘Populist punitiveness’ reflects the idea of politicians ‘tapping into, 
and using for their own purposes, what they believe to be the public’s generally punitive 
stance’ (Bottoms, 1995:40), therefore appealing to the public and politicians alike. Hough and 
Walker (1988:203) suggest that punitive is ‘shorthand to indicate a preference for heavy 
sentences’ irrespective of the basis of this punitiveness.  
 
Empirical research in criminology has sought to understand public punitiveness. Whilst levels 
of education (King and Maruna, 2009; Spironovic et al., 2012; Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997; 
Costelloe et al., 2009) and gender (Hough et al., 1988; Useem et al., 2003; Roberts and 
Indermauer, 2007; Spironovic et al., 2012) emerge as relevant predictors of punitive attitudes 
towards criminal rulebreakers, socio-demographic factors alone appear to be weak 
predictors of punitive attitudes. Fear of crime (Hough et al., 2005; Sprott and Doob, 1997; 
Spironovic et al., 2012), fear of victimisation (Costelloe et al., 2009) and perceptions of crime 
(Spironovic et al., 2012) have been found to be relevant factors increasing punitiveness 
towards offenders, albeit with a small effect. Whereas victimisation has consistently been 
found not to be a relevant factor in punitiveness (King and Maruna, 2009; Unnever et al., 
2007; Hough and Moxon, 1985; Costelloe et al., 2009; Kleck and Baker Jackson, 2016). Beliefs 
that there has been a loss of discipline and respect in society (King and Maruna, 2009), loss of 
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social cohesion (Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997) and moral decline (Unnever and Cullen, 2010) 
appear to be more relevant factors then crime related factors in understanding punitive 
attitudes. Additionally, conservative beliefs (King and Maruna, 2009; Unnever and Cullen, 
2010; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007), right-wing authoritarianism (Gerber and Jackson, 
2016) and economic beliefs (Kornhauser, 2015; Costelloe et al., 2009; King and Maruna, 
2009; Hanslmaier and Baier, 2016) emerge as more relevant factors in understanding 
punitive attitudes towards offenders than socio-demographic factors and crime experiences. 
 
‘Punitiveness’ has not previously been operationalized in welfare survey research. 
Exploration of welfare attitudes has generally been assessed in Britain through analyzing 
longitudinal data from the British Social Attitudes Survey measured by responses to questions 
regarding the welfare system and individuals in receipt of welfare. The majority of studies to 
date do not specifically examine public attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants, but 
instead explore attitudes more generally. This literature generally shows a trend in attitudes 
towards welfare recipients hardening over time. Very few studies have sought to explore the 
relevance of socio-demographic factors to public attitudes towards welfare claimants. Age 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Deeming, 2015; Baumberg Geiger, 2017), education (Taylor-Gooby and 
Martin, 2008; Deeming, 2015; Baumberg Geiger, 2017) and occupational class (Deeming, 
2015) emerge as relevant factors in explaining punitive attitudes towards welfare and welfare 
claimants, albeit explaining a small amount of variance in attitudes. Those holding 
conservative beliefs have been found to be less supportive of increased spending on the 
welfare system and welfare benefits (Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Deeming, 2015). Interactional 
effects between political party support and class have also been found to be relevant in 
explaining attitudes towards welfare, with conservative supporters and those belonging to 
the professional class being less supportive of welfare (Deeming, 2015). Beliefs about the 
value of the welfare state and welfare claimants are also found to be relevant in explaining 
attitudes; those who hold negative beliefs are less supportive of welfare (Schofield and 
Butterworth, 2015). Subjective beliefs about the reciprocal contribution of welfare claimants 
has also been found to be related to welfare attitudes (Bamfield and Horton, 2009; 
Baumberg et al., 2012). Finally, deservingness perceptions have been found to influence 
support for welfare with those who perceive claimants as undeserving holding less 
supportive views (Baumberg et al., 2012).  
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The examination of public attitudes towards school pupils has received very little attention.  
Indeed, there is very little empirical research exploring public attitudes towards school pupils 
at all. Much of the research to date has explored teachers, parents and/or children’s 
attitudes generally to school behaviour and discipline, rather than members of the public. 
What the available literature does show is that teachers, parents or the general public, 
generally support the use of stricter punishments for school indiscipline (Elton, 1989, 
YouGov, 2011; White et al., 2013). The most relevant literature to this study is recent 
research in America, which has explored public attitudes towards the use of corporal 
punishment due to its continued use in some US states (Grasmick et al., 1992; Owen and 
Wagner, 2006; Font and Gershoff, 2017). However, much of this research focuses on  
state-level data and factors rather than individual attitudes to its usage. Corporal punishment 
has been found to receive more support in South American states where religion (Font and 
Gershoff, 2017; Grasmick et al., 1992; Owen and Wagner, 2006), southern culture, rural 
states, political affiliation, higher income (Font and Gershoff, 2017), being male and older 
(Grasmick et al., 2012) were found to be predictive of corporal punishment use, whilst higher 
education was found to be related to lower support (Font and Gershoff, 2017; Grasmick et 
al., 1992). In Britain, whilst the majority of parents and children disagreed with corporal 
punishment use in schools, both groups were in agreement that teachers should be allowed 
to be tougher towards school indiscipline (YouGov, 2011). Support for the use of school 
exclusions remains high across all groups surveyed, although questions did not differentiate 
between temporary and permanent exclusions (YouGov, 2011). 
 
Political discourse and policies within the criminal justice system over the last forty years 
demonstrate an increasing trend of punitiveness (Newburn, 2007; Hay and Farrall, 2014). In 
the 1970s, the prison population began to cause concerns (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). 
Despite this concern, there was an attempt to restrain the prison population through 
progressive measures (Jennings et al., 2017a). This approach generally prevailed until the 
early 1990s, when legislation took a punitive turn (Farrall et al., 2016). At this time the prison 
population began to increase and remains at high levels today (Jennings et al., 2017a). 
Punitive discourse was ramped up by Margaret Thatcher in her election campaign in 1979, 
despite her subsequent legislation not employing the same tone (Hay and Farrall, 2014). This 
discourse however appears to have set the trend for subsequent political leaders to continue 
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with a tough on crime discourse, which endures today (Farrall and Jennings, 2016). Trends in 
public attitudes towards lawbreakers using British Social Attitudes survey questions dating 
back to the early 1980s were also analysed. Analysis shows that support for stiffer sentences 
for lawbreakers remains high, although this has reduced substantially in recent years. 
Younger age groups appear to be more punitive than they were in the late 1980s until 
around 2016, when punitive attitudes began to decrease overall. Whilst support for the 
death penalty appears to have decreased for all age groups over time.   
 
Historical and contemporary responses to the unemployed were considered by reviewing 
government policies, political discourse and trends in public attitudes since the 1980s, 
suggesting that these areas have become increasingly more punitive towards welfare 
claimants over time. Legislation has increased conditionality, responsibility and sanctions for 
benefit recipients (Deeming, 2015; Watts et al., 2014). These sanctions have resulted in 
negative outcomes for some claimants increasing financial difficulties, hardship and resorting 
to ‘survival crime’ (Welfare Conditionality Project, 2018:18). Since the early 1980s politicians 
have embraced negative descriptors of welfare claimants. Negative depictions of welfare 
claimants have become embedded in modern day politics, regardless of the party in 
government (Hill and Walker, 2014). Finally, trends in public attitudes, drawing on British 
Social Attitudes survey data from the 1980s, generally shows a hardening of attitudes over 
time, although in the last few years these attitudes have started to soften. It appears that 
over time, it is the younger and older age groups that are less supportive of welfare 
claimants, with those around their mid-40s holding less punitive views. While there are  
long-term repeated measures of social attitudes towards those who claim welfare support, 
there are no survey questions currently that measure punitiveness as proposed by this study.  
 
Since the 1980s, the education system has received criticism by government for a range of 
social problems, such as anti-social behaviour, excessive liberalness and growing truancy, 
which has involved a political rhetoric of teachers ‘failing pupils’ by being incapable of 
maintaining classroom discipline (Dorey, 2014:109). Government discourse, which 
commenced during the 1980s, focused on the failings of education enabling the 
implementation of extensive policy reforms driven by market principles and managerial 
authority over professionals (Dorey, 2014). Since the early 1980s, legislation has been 
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enacted based on neo-liberal principles of competition and marketisation (Dorey, 2014). The 
introduction of league tables and the national curriculum led to an increase in the number of 
school exclusions (Farrall and Hay, 2014). Children who are excluded from school are 
disproportionally represented by SEN pupils, BAME pupils and children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds (Timpson, 2019; Gill et al., 2017). Additionally, research shows that those 
excluded from school are much more likely to end up in the criminal justice system (Evans, 
2010; Berridge et al., 2001; Gill et al., 2017). Exploring relevant BSAS survey questions since 
the 1980s, those holding beliefs that children should obey authority and that young people 
do not respect traditional values has remained generally high over time. What has changed 
however, is the age of those supportive of such beliefs; younger age groups, which were 
relatively less supportive of such beliefs when the questions were first fielded in the early 
1980s, appear to have become more supportive of such beliefs overtime. Additionally, 
general support for such beliefs have been declining in recent years. While there are  
long-term repeated measures of social attitudes towards young people, there are no survey 
questions currently that measure punitiveness as proposed by this study.  
 
The focus of this thesis then turned to the development of survey questions to explore 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils and welfare claimants. BSAS survey 
questions were used to examine punitiveness towards lawbreakers (People who break the 
law should be given stiffer sentences, and For some crimes, the death penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence). A review of cognitive interviewing literature presented the value of 
undertaking cognitive interviewing in the question design process. The two main cognitive 
interviewing paradigms of thinking aloud and verbal probing were detailed with their 
respective strengths and limitations, and the limitations of the method more generally. 
Considerations were also given to the challenges of conducting web-based surveys.  
 
The cognitive interviewing design process was then outlined, presenting the measurement 
aims of the interviews. These were to test whether the key terms were understood by 
participants in a consistent way; to gain an understanding into what these terms brought to 
participants’ minds when answering and what factors influenced responses; and, to assess 
whether participants were able to answer sufficiently accurately and reliably to meet the 
measurement aims of the survey. The cognitive interviewing framework was presented prior 
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to providing an overview of the cognitive interviews. The analysis of the cognitive interviews 
and the decision making involved throughout the question design was discussed in detail to 
demonstrate the analytical process involved in the design of new survey questions. The 
process of undertaking cognitive interviews enabled questions to be pre-tested targeting the 
population representative of the eventual survey. The finalised questions following two 
rounds of cognitive interviews were then presented.  
 
Reflections on the application of a quantitative methodology to explore public attitudes 
towards rulebreakers were then presented. In this study, this took the form of analyses using 
SPSS and AMOS of data captured through the use of an online survey. The use of quantitative 
methodology to understand public opinion towards criminal justice has a relatively lengthy 
history in criminology (see Chapter 2.1.) and public opinion (Bryman, 1984; BSAS, 2019). The 
strengths of using quantitative methodology to examine public attitudes were highlighted as 
allowing a large-scale systematic analysis, which enables the operationalization of concepts 
and the study of relationships between variables of interest. The chapter then progressed to 
discuss the limitations of using quantitative methodology to explore public attitudes. This 
consisted of acknowledging that questions of a general nature can over-inflate punitive 
attitudes, the difficulty of trying to simplify complex attitudes and the efforts made to at least 
reduce some of the effects of these limitations in this study. Finally, the chapter concluded by 
presenting the final survey questions and the pilot study.  
 
Chapter 5 then aimed to place the quantitative analysis into context in several ways. Firstly, 
the sample was described followed by preliminary analyses of the key questions used in the 
analysis (the six newly designed questions plus the two criminal rulebreakers questions). 
Frequencies, t-tests and one-way ANOVAs appeared to show a distinction in punitiveness 
towards each group of rulebreaker with the most punitive response towards support for 
stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants. Support for physical punishments 
appeared to receive the least punitive response. This suggest that whilst there is strong 
support for more punishment, this desire does not take the form of physical punishments. 
Additionally, the questions referring to non-specific sanctions towards rulebreakers received 
the top three most punitive responses, whilst the introduction of specific, extreme sanctions 
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appears to reduce punitive attitudes. The development of the variables to be used in the 
subsequent analyses in Chapter 6 to Chapter 9 were also detailed, namely, neo-conservative 
values, neo-liberal values, and the nostalgia variables (social, economic and political 
nostalgia).  
 
Chapter 6 exclusively explored attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils. The steps taken 
to examine the data took the form of ordinal logistic regression to examine the separate 
rulebreaking school pupils’ variables, and hierarchical multiple regression to analyze school 
punitivity, a factor analysis of the two separate items. Socio-demographic factors,  
crime-related factors, political values and nostalgic values were all examined in the analyses. 
Qualitative data from the cognitive interviews was also incorporated providing a little insight 
into public attitudes towards the punishment of rulebreaking school pupils not attainable 
through quantitative analysis alone. Previous criminological literature on punitiveness was 
also considered in relation to the findings due to there being no evidence base exploring 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils. Analyses showed that neo-conservative 
values has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils, 
which was the case with both support for tougher punishments and support for permanent 
exclusion, although the model explained less variance in punitiveness towards permanent 
exclusion that towards tougher punishments. Additional factors that appear to be related to 
attitudes supportive of tougher punishments for rulebreaking school pupils are having no 
religion, being female, higher incomes, those with degree level qualifications, being single 
and those in the lowest IMD quartile. Whilst those over 65 years old appear to be less 
punitive. Support for the permanent exclusion of rulebreaking school children also appear to 
be influenced by neo-liberal values, no experience of victimisation, having no religion, higher 
incomes, degree level education, social nostalgic values and those from a white background 
(when compared to those from a Black Caribbean/African background).  
   
Significant factors relating only to support for tougher punishments appear to be being 
female, being aged 16 to 24 years old (when compared to those aged over 65), being single, 
and those in the lowest IMD quartile. Additionally, the overall model explains a greater 
amount of variance in support for tougher punishments (46.9%) than towards permanent 
exclusion (27.7%). Whereas, significant factors relating only to support for permanent 
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exclusion appear to be neo-liberal values, social nostalgic values, no experience of 
victimisation, those from a white background (compared to those from a Black 
Caribbean/African background) and those earning incomes in excess of £85,000. This 
suggests that there are different drivers for support for a specific extreme sanction than for 
the non-specific idea of ‘tougher punishments’. A multiple regression model was then 
conducted to examine the factors related to ‘school punitivity’ a variable consisting of the 
two items designed to measure punitiveness towards rulebreaking school pupils. Findings 
again suggest that school punitivity is strongly related to neo-conservative values. Other 
relevant factors appear to be neo-liberal values, those earning higher incomes, social 
nostalgic values and decreased religiosity, although the effect sizes of these variables suggest 
that their effect on increased punitiveness towards rulebreaking school children is 
substantially less than neo-conservative values. Data that emerged from the cognitive 
interviews showed that, as with the quantitative data, qualitative responses to the two 
different statements appeared to elicit differing responses. Fundamental beliefs appeared to 
underlie attitudes toward the use of school punishments, particularly in relation to the use of 
physical punishments. Whilst responses towards the use of permanent exclusion tended to 
elicit more compassionate responses towards school pupils from participants which 
highlighted concerns about the use of punishments for children with special educational 
needs.  
 
Chapter 7 repeated the analyses conducted in the previous chapter, but this time focusing on 
punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants. Findings suggest that  
neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking 
welfare claimants. Again, as with the rulebreaking school pupils items, analysis shows that 
separating the two measures draws out some notable differences between support for stiffer 
penalties and support for the more punitive sanction of permanently stopping welfare 
benefits. Most notably, in relation to the value-based variables, support for the general,  
non-specific sanction of ‘stiffer penalties’ is predominately related to neo-conservative values 
and political nostalgic values with economic nostalgic values having a smaller effect. Support 
for the more extreme sanction of permanently stopping welfare payments appears to be 
related to neo-conservative values, neo-liberal values and no experience of victimisation, 
with political nostalgic values and economic nostalgic values having a smaller effect.  
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Additional socio-demographic factors that appear to be related to support for stiffer 
penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants are white ethnicity, higher incomes, being 
female, working class origin, those not in receipt of universal credit and those with no 
religion. Additional socio-demographic factors that appear to be related to punitive attitudes 
towards permanently stopping payments for rulebreaking welfare claimants appears to be 
being female, those under 25 years old, incomes below £25,000, white ethnicity, not being in 
receipt of universal credit, having no religion, having no qualifications, and belonging to the 
lowest IMD quartile. The only factor relating exclusively to support for stiffer penalties for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants appears to be being from a working-class origin. Whereas, 
factors relating only to the more extreme sanction of permanently stopping payments for 
rulebreaking welfare claimants appear to be younger age, specifically those aged under 25, 
having no qualifications, and those in the lowest IMD quartile. Additionally, not being in 
receipt of universal credit and neo-liberal values have a bigger effect on punitiveness towards 
permanently stopping welfare claimants than towards support for stiffer penalties.  
 
A multiple regression model was then conducted to examine the factors related to ‘welfare 
punitivity’, a variable consisting of the two items designed to measure punitiveness towards 
rulebreaking welfare claimants. As found in the ordinal regression models, welfare punitivity 
is strongly related to neo-conservative values. Other relevant factors related to increased 
punitiveness towards rulebreaking welfare claimants appear to be political nostalgic values, 
economic nostalgic values, being female, neo-liberal values, higher income, non-universal 
credit claimants, those identifying as more politically conservative, decreased religiosity, 
younger age, working class origin and lower IMD quartile. This chapter also incorporated 
themes that emerged during the cognitive interviews. As with the quantitative data, 
qualitative responses to the two different measures appeared to elicit different themes. In 
relation to attitudes towards stiffer penalties for rulebreaking welfare claimants, some 
respondents’ discourse towards welfare claimants appeared to be dominated by connections 
made between welfare and migrants, ‘scroungers’ and the belief that some claimants are 
reluctant to go to work, suggesting a link with political discourse. Deservingness and fairness 
were evident in the cognitive interviews in consideration of permanently ceasing welfare 
payments. There was also evidence of some softening of attitudes on reflection of the 
impacts of permanently stopping payments. Punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare 
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claimants were displayed by people who were themselves on benefits. However, the 
quantitative analyses undertaken in this chapter suggests that universal credit claimants are 
significantly less punitive than those who are not in receipt of universal credit.  
 
Chapter 8 then turned to examine punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers using two 
established BSAS questions of People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences, 
and For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. As with the previous 
two chapters ordinal logistic regression and hierarchical multiple linear regression were 
conducted to analyze the questions first separately, and then, together. Ordinal logistic 
regression showed that neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on punitive 
attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers, which was the case with both support for stiffer 
sentences and support for the death penalty, with the model explaining a similar amount of 
variance in both measures of criminal punitiveness. Factors relating exclusively to support for 
stiffer sentences appear to be being female, no experience of victimisation, incomes between 
£40,000 and £59,999 and economic nostalgic values. Whilst, factors relating to support for 
the specific extreme sanction of the death penalty appear to be those aged below 25 years 
old, those with no qualifications, self-identified political conservativism, those in a 
relationship, being in receipt of universal credit, belonging to the fourth IMD quartile 
(compare to the first IMD quartile). Additionally, crime-related factors appear to be more 
relevant to support for stiffer sentences for criminal rulebreakers, whilst socio-demographic 
factors appear to be more relevant to support for the death penalty.  
 
‘Law punitivity’, a variable consisting of the two separate criminal rulebreaker items, was 
then examined by conducting multiple regression.  As found in the ordinal regression models, 
law punitivity is strongly related to neo-conservative values. Additionally, social nostalgic 
values, those who self-identify as politically more conservative, neo-liberal values, decreased 
religiosity, younger age, lower educational attainment, working class origin, economic 
nostalgic values, being in a relationship, political nostalgic values, fear of crime and being 
female also appear to be related to increased punitiveness towards criminal rulebreakers.   
 
Chapters 9 commenced by bringing together the previous distinct chapters by examining the 
variation in punitive attitudes towards the different groups of rulebreakers. The model as a 
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whole explains the largest amount of variance in punitive attitudes towards lawbreakers, 
explaining 49.7% of the variance in law punitivity, 40.2% of the variance in school punitivity 
and 33.3% of the variance in welfare punitivity. This suggests that the model is a better 
predictor of punitive attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers than for the rulebreaking school 
pupils and welfare claimants. This is perhaps not surprising as the theoretical framework for 
the models is largely shaped by a criminological foundation. There are some similarities in the 
factors related to all three groups of rulebreakers. Firstly, belief systems appear to have the 
most notable effect on punitive attitudes towards all three groups of rulebreakers shown by 
the increase in R-Square value for Model 3 for each group, with the largest effect on 
rulebreaking school pupils (30.4%). Neo-conservative values has the strongest effect on all 
groups of rulebreakers, with the strongest effect on rulebreaking school pupils, closely 
followed by criminal law breakers. Whilst, neo-liberal values also appears to be related to all 
three rulebreaking groups with the strongest effect on criminal rulebreakers. The only other 
factor relating to all three rulebreakers is religiosity, with the strongest effect on law 
punitivity.  
 
Additionally, punitive attitudes towards rulebreaking school pupils appears to be related to 
social nostalgic values and increased income. Welfare punitivity appears to be influenced by 
political nostalgic values, economic nostalgic values, being female, higher income, those not 
receiving universal credit, increased political conservativism, younger age, working class 
origin and lower IMD. Whilst law punitivity appears to be related to social nostalgic values, 
increased political conservativism, younger age, lower education attainment, working class 
origin, economic nostalgic values, being in a marital type relationship, political nostalgic 
values, fear of crime and being female. School punitivity appears to be related to the least 
amount of significant factors (five), whereas welfare and law punitivity appear to have a more 
complex mix of factors with twelve and thirteen significant factors respectively.  
 
Following this initial analysis, the chapter then progressed to merge these three distinct 
groups of rulebreakers to examine punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers as a collective 
group. Unsurprisingly, findings suggest that punitive attitudes towards collective rulebreakers 
are largely driven by neo-conservative values; this is illustrated by the large increase in  
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R-square value in Model 3 (38.1%) and the effect size of neo-conservative values (beta=.620). 
Additional relevant factors appear to be neo-liberal values, social and economic nostalgic 
values, self-identified political conservativism, decreased religiosity, higher income, political 
nostalgic values, being female, younger age and lower-class origin. 
 
Finally, ‘Tiered Punitiveness’ was introduced exploring whether there is a difference in drivers 
between ‘basic punitiveness’, that is support for harsher, non-specific punishments, and 
‘ultimate punitiveness’, that is support for specific, extreme, permanent sanctions. Analysis 
suggests that whilst neo-conservative values has a very strong effect on both tiers of 
punitiveness, it stands out as the predominant factor in explaining basic punitiveness, as seen 
by the large effect size in comparison to the other factors which are all small, despite being 
significant. Ultimate punitiveness on the other hand appears to be driven by a wider range of 
factors with a relatively strong influence in addition to neo-conservative values, most notably, 
neo-liberal values, younger age and social nostalgic values. This suggests that ultimate 
punitiveness is influenced by a greater complexity of factors than basic punitiveness. This was 
confirmed by the Structural Equation Models which applied only the conceptual variables to 
the models. The model explained a greater amount of variance in basic punitiveness with 
neo-conservative values having the most notable influence. Whilst ultimate punitiveness also 
appears to be largely influenced by neo-conservative values (but to a lesser extent than for 
basic punitiveness), neo-liberal values and social nostalgic values also appear to play an 
important role. Lastly, the Structural Equation Model for collective punitiveness incorporated 
all of the basic and ultimate punitiveness items into one variable. This shows that  
neo-conservative values has by far the largest effect on general punitiveness and that the 
model explains 55 percent of the variance in punitiveness. What this shows is that using all 
items together to measure punitiveness as a discrete concept does not allow us to tease out 
the differences in complex attitudes.  
 
10.3. Limitations 
Before moving on to discuss potential research implications, the shortcomings of this study 




(a) Due to the nature of this project, there were limitations on the number of questions 
allocated to explore punitiveness towards the different groups of rulebreakers.  An increased 
number of questions per group of rulebreaker may have allowed a further exploration of 
punitiveness. Are there more than two tiers of punitiveness for example?   
Due to the criminal rulebreaker questions being used and fielded by the British Social 
Attitudes Survey since the 1980s, these questions were not tested in the cognitive interviews. 
Previous research has suggested that people tend to think of violent crime when answering 
questions about crime (Roberts and Doob, 1990). Had the criminal rulebreaker questions 
been tested in the cognitive interviews, some light may have been shed on the types of 
offenders and crimes brought to people’s minds when answering such questions today. 
Additionally, some interesting differences emerged from the cognitive interviews between 
attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants and rulebreaking school pupils. Testing the 
criminal rulebreaker questions in the cognitive interviews would have enabled comparisons 
to be made with the other two groups of rulebreakers.  
 
(b) There are a range of limitations of web-based surveys, such as self-selection bias, lack of 
interest or motivation in the topic, lack of concentration when completing the survey, and 
problems understanding the questions, which may all impact on the data collected (Callegaro 
et al. (2015). Non-response may also occur; invited participants may refuse to participate 
altogether, cease participation at any point during the survey, or may only answer certain 
questions (Vehovar and Mantreda, 2017). The non-response rates for this study (see Table 
5.4) resulted in 29% of invited online panellists (3,178 invitees) not participating and 4% (488) 
dropped out at some point during the survey.  
 
Web-based surveys have also been found to be more likely to elicit higher item non-response 
and ‘don’t knows’ compared to face-to-face surveys (Heerwegh and Loosveldt, 2008). Refusal 
to answer specific items perceived to be sensitive, such as some socio-demographic 
questions, may also result in item non-responses (Tourangeau et al., 2000). Once all variables 
were included in the regression models in this study the sample size reduced quite 
considerably. This was most notable in relation to the multiple regression models with a 
reduction in sample size from 5,781 to 2,090. This was due to the inclusion of some non-
completed socio-demographic variables, specifically, religiosity, politics scale, class origin, 
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income and ethnicity (detailed in the regression models). Religiosity resulted in the highest 
number of item non-response due to being preceded by a filter question about whether the 
respondents had a religion. Of the original sample (n=5,781), 2,453 respondents answered 
that they had no religion; therefore, they were not asked the subsequent religiosity question. 
However, religiosity was included in the analyses due to its relevance to political attitudes 
(Friesen Ksiazkiewicz, 2014; McAndrew, 2020).  
 
In an attempt to mitigate some of the above limitations of the web-based survey in this 
study, a range of steps were undertaken to attempt to design a survey instrument that not 
only operationalised and measured complex concepts, but also sought to test if certain 
aspects produced non-response issues. The range of steps taken consisted of expert reviews 
on the newly designed questions, two omnibus surveys, two rounds of cognitive interviews 
and a pilot survey during which questions were adapted and re-tested until the final survey 
instrument consisted of sixty-two items. There were no particular concerns noted with the 
drop-out rates or item non-responses following the completion of these steps. The drop-out 
rates for the pilot survey were deemed acceptable by the Principle Investigator and BMG 
Research.  
 
Further analyses have been undertaken to explore how serious the issue of item non-
response (the inclusion of some non-completed socio-demographic variables) was on the 
empirical results in this study. These analyses compare the existing results of a selection of 
the four-step multiple regression models (welfare punitivity, law punitivity, ultimate 
punitiveness) with results when only complete cases from the full model are used at each of 
the four steps in the multiple regression models (see Appendix F). The results generally show 
some changes in the relevance of some socio-demographic variables and some small changes 
in beta coefficients for other variables. However, the results generally show that the main 
conclusions of this thesis are valid.    
 
Online panels may impact on measurement error through the presence of over-engaged or 
‘professional’ respondents, the absence of non-internet or low-internet usage households, 
self-selection bias, and representativeness (Callegaro et al., 2015). The sampling strategy 
used by BMG aimed to reduce the impact of these limitations. BMG use a ‘panel blend’ 
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approach inviting participants from a range of panels to spread the fieldwork. Additionally, 
they also use a range of recruitment methods to recruit participants, which allows them to 
recruit a more diverse sample. 
 
 (c) There is also potential to expand the scope of the neo-conservative values variable, which 
has been found to be consistently related to all forms of punitiveness in this study. Whilst 
neo-conservativism in this study was designed to measure the themes of social order, 
support for traditional values and authoritarianism, it is perhaps limited in its scope whereby 
the questions relate to young people and children. It might be useful to expand this variable 
to include a greater range of questions to incorporate variables external to young people.  
 
It is also important to consider the distinction between punitiveness and neo-conservative 
values (in particular between neo-conservative values and the school punitiveness variables), 
as the construction of the new survey questions for neo-conservative values refer to beliefs 
about school punishments. Neo-conservative ideals assert social order, traditional values and 
the authoritarian state (Hayes, 1994). During the 1970s, there was an increasing concern 
over falling standards and ‘violent’ schools (Hall, 1979). There were also concerns about the 
link between indiscipline in schools and anti-social behaviour in neighbourhoods (Berridge et 
al., 2001). An educational strategy emerged under the conservative governments during this 
period, which reiterated ‘social skills, respect for authority, traditional values and discipline’ 
founded on a traditional education (Hall, 1979:19).  
 
The design of the new survey questions was partly influenced by parliamentary discourse 
relating to young people prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter 3.3). The power of 
the state to be able to administer physical discipline to young people as a form of social 
control was a much debated topic by Conservative MPs during this period. During the same 
period, the education system was criticised by government for a range of social problems, 
such as anti-social behaviour (Dorey, 2014). Conservative MPs supported the caning of school 
children to ‘save them from a life of crime’ (HC Deb 28 January 1997). The core of the neo-
conservative belief system is to advocate authority to secure order (Hayes, 1994). Neo-
conservativism represents traditional impulses with order and authority clearly evident 
(Hayes, 1994). Neo-conservativism essentially is an evaluation of the past in response to how 
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people observe and experience the present. It is an underlying belief that is rooted in the 
past. It differs from punitiveness due to this historical construction.  
 
Punitiveness is explicitly related to attitudes to punishment, in particular about how people 
think that rulebreakers ought to be punished. Punitiveness has ‘connotations of excess’, 
suggests an intensification of punishment either by duration or severity, and is applied 
disproportionately (Matthews, 2005:179). The operationalisation of punitiveness in this study 
aims to tap into the public’s desire for harsher penalties and extreme sanctions (school 
punishments, welfare sanctions, sentences). It is an attitude that suggests that punishment as 
it is, in its present form, is not enough, and that it should be harsher (Kury and Ferdinand, 
1999; Roberts and Indermauer, 2007; Roberts et al, 2003). It is a reflection on the present 
form of punishment and shows a desire for harsher punishments in the future. 
 
The distinction between punitiveness and neo-conservativism was evident in the cognitive 
interviews (See Chapter 5). There was a clear distinction between people’s beliefs about how 
authority was administered in the past (neo-conservative items) and their attitudes towards 
how rulebreakers ought to be punished (school punitiveness items); respondents held beliefs 
that social control measures were more effective in the past but did not generally seek 
harsher punishments (punitive attitudes). Some respondents were clear that past forms of 
behaviour management are not a form of social control that they would desire today.  
 
Whilst there are some similarities in the nature of the neo-conservative values variable and 
the punitiveness questions (particularly school punitiveness), there is also a clear distinction 
in the root of these questions. Respondents in the cognitive interviews made a distinction 
between the historical nature of the neo-conservative items and their reflections on current 
school punishments in relation to the school punitiveness items. Additionally, collinearity 
diagnostics were performed in all multiple regression models and no concerns were raised 
with multicollinearity (see p237, p264, p290, p308, p320) (Pallant, 2015; Field, 2018). Further 
analysis using the neo-conservative values variable as the dependent variable demonstrated 
that there were differences in the age and gender profile of neo-conservative values and 
punitiveness, with being male and being older being related to neo-conservativism but not 
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punitiveness. This analysis also showed that nostalgia (R-square change 17.8) is more strongly 
related to neo-conservative values.    
 
Whilst a range of steps were taken to attempt to design a survey instrument that 
operationalised and measured complex concepts, there remains some limitations with the 
various scales, most notably, political nostalgia. The political nostalgic values items refer 
explicitly to Margaret Thatcher, and as such the results are most likely a reflection of people’s 
admiration or distain for Margaret Thatcher rather than a general sense of political nostalgia.  
In relation to the economic nostalgia variable, I feel there has been a loss of community spirit 
around here since the 1980s, could possibly be construed as social nostalgia. However, the 
question was included within this battery alongside It feels to me like the country lost 
something when coal mines, steel mills and shipyards closed in order to tap into the 
community spirit that accompanied the coal mining, steel and shipbuilding industries.  
 
(d) A clear limitation of survey research is the injustice that quantifying attitudes can do to 
the subtlety of individual viewpoints (Hough and Roberts, 2005). Using general questions can 
inflate punitiveness and providing more information to the public about sentencing scenarios 
has been found to soften people’s responses to the use of (youth) custody (Roberts and 
Hough, 2005). When people are given more time, information or questions on a subject, their 
punitiveness reduces (Hough and Roberts, 2005). Sprott (1999) noted that different 
responses may be elicited from general questions and case specific questions and this 
disparity may relate to different concerns being highlighted by each questioning technique.  
This study has explored punitive attitudes by using generally broad questions; the nature of 
the rulebreaking behaviours for each rulebreaker have not been specified, nor has 
information been provided about the rulebreakers. However, the purposes of this study are 
to gain a general sense of punitive attitudes and to understand how this relates to political 
attitudes, to attempt to understand what influences these attitudes, and to compare 
attitudes towards different groups of rulebreakers. In order to do so, within the constraints of 
the survey, it was necessary to design the questions in a simple way. Additionally, when 
people answer survey questions, they draw on their emotional backlog, so their attitudes 
express deep-seated opinions and emotions, as well as their experiences (Farrall et al., 2009); 
Jackson, 2004). Moreover, using the same style of questions for each rulebreaker has 
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enabled comparisons to be made. Zamble and Kalm (1990:336) suggest that generalised 
questions are attitudinal in nature and that they ‘express a generalised cognitive and 
emotional response to all sorts of information and experience’. This is also the manner in 
which politicians use punitiveness.  
 
10.4. Part Two: Future Research Directions 
 
1. Tiered Punitiveness: Basic and Ultimate Punitiveness 
Previous criminological research has examined punitiveness towards offenders as a 
discrete concept. This has taken the form of either using the items used in this study 
towards criminal rulebreakers together, as single questions to represent punitiveness, or 
in combination with a range of other measures. Through the basic quantitative analyses 
and the cognitive interviews, attitudinal differences were observed between support for 
increased, non-specific punishment and support for specific, extreme sanctions. 
Subsequent advanced statistical analyses aimed to explore whether there are different 
degrees of punitiveness. In pursuit of this aim, this thesis has introduced the idea of 
Tiered Punitiveness. ‘Tiered Punitiveness’ suggests that ‘punitiveness’ is not a discrete 
attitude but has different degrees to it, here identified as ‘Basic Punitiveness’ and 
‘Ultimate Punitiveness’. There is potential for future research to consider Tiered 
Punitiveness, and to develop this idea further, in an examination of punitiveness.  
 
2. Age Period Cohort Analyses 
Throughout the analyses, certain age effects have been noted. Firstly, previous literature 
has found age to be inconsistently related to punitiveness. Conditional formatting of 
longitudinal BSAS survey questions shows that attitudes of younger age groups have 
generally hardened from the early to mid-1990s onwards towards lawbreakers, welfare 
claimants and young people. Findings in this study have found that age is a relevant factor 
in relation to Ultimate Punitiveness. The Age Period Cohort (APC) approach acknowledges 
the distinct temporal processes of individual ageing, contexts and generational 
membership and aids understanding into social changes (Gray et al., 2018; Grasso et al., 
2018). When measuring age in a group of people, Gray et al. (2018) highlight the 
importance of considering how much change is due to the individual aging process, how 
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much is due to the historical context of the data collection and how much due to the 
generation in which the individual grew up in. Gray et al. (2018) found that public 
perceptions of crime can be impacted by the socio-political environment in which people 
spend their formative years, that is the age at which individuals are most responsive to 
forming their opinions. This ‘political socialisation’ can impact on public perceptions and 
can endure throughout a person’s life course (Grasso et al., 2017). APC analysis requires 
longitudinal data; therefore, the continued fielding of the newly designed questions for 
this study would enable APC modelling to be undertaken in the future.  
 
3. Education and Welfare Research  
This thesis has expanded the punitiveness lens into two additional two policy areas. This 
has enabled comparisons to be drawn and differences to be observed between the 
criminal justice system, the welfare system, and the education system. There is little 
empirical investigation into public attitudes towards the punishment of school pupils; this 
study has aimed to begin to fill that gap. Previous scholars have made links between 
education and the criminal justice system. Kim et al. (2010) identify the failures of the 
education system as a key source of why children enter the criminal justice system, whilst 
McAra and McVie (2013) found that offending pathways for young people is driven by 
school exclusions and truancy. This study also suggests a link between the punishment of 
school pupils and the punishment of lawbreakers in a range of ways. It has been argued 
that government policies towards the two groups of rulebreakers have followed a similar 
trend since the early 1980s, and that the repercussions of these policies have resulted in 
negative consequences for those involved. It is suggested that these policies are 
underpinned by neo-conservativism and neo-liberalism and that these same values are 
related to punitive attitudes in the general population. Additionally, nostalgia also 
appears to be relevant in explaining attitudes towards criminal rulebreakers and 
rulebreaking school pupils. Further research may wish to expand on this link between 
British society’s treatment of school pupils and lawbreakers. Why do we treat school 
children in the same manner in which we treat adults who have committed crime, when 
often the misdemeanours of school children are inconsequential in comparison to some 
of the graver offences committed by adults? What is it about school children’s unruly 
behaviours that instils so much concern into society? Additionally, this study also suggests 
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attitudes towards rulebreaking welfare claimants have followed a similar trend as for 
lawbreakers and rulebreaking school pupils and that public attitudes are related to 
political attitudes and nostalgia. Future work may seek to explore punitiveness in a  
multi-disciplinary way.  
 
4. Mixed Methods 
This study applied a quantitative methodology to the examination of punitiveness. At the 
outset it was envisaged that qualitative interviews may also be undertaken. However, due 
to time constraints it was not deemed possible to undertake the expanse of qualitative 
interviews necessary to do this work justice. Future research may wish to consider the 
value of conducting mixed methods research into punitive attitudes. A purposive 
sampling approach to in-depth qualitative interviews with members of the public 
identified through being a respondent of a survey could enable a greater exploration into 
the complexities of punitive attitudes and attitude formation that is limited through a 
survey alone. This would have allowed a deeper exploration into the differences between 
Basic and Ultimate Punitiveness for example, or to draw out some of the differences 
towards the different rulebreakers and the influences that underpin these.  
 
5. Subgroup Analyses 
The interaction of socio-demographic factors may be very powerful and increase our 
understanding of punitive attitudes. Repeating the analyses with a larger dataset for 
socio-demographic factors may allow further valuable insights into punitiveness. The 
complex background information of respondents may allow insight into attitudinal shifts 
within social cleavages.  
 
6. Exclusionary punishment 
Support for physical punishments received the least punitive responses in this study. 
Thus, whilst there is strong support for more punishment, this desire does not take the 
form of physical punishments. However, attitudes generally appear to be supportive of 
exclusionary measures, shown particularly in response to welfare claimants who 
repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments permanently stopped and school 
pupils who frequently break school rules should be permanently excluded. Whilst 
353 
 
‘sentences’ does not explicitly refer to prison sentences, Roberts and Hough (2005) note 
that people normally answered sentencing related questions with imprisonment in mind, 
which also shows support for social exclusion. Further analysis of exclusionary measures 
as a form of punishment would provide further insight into this observation.  
 
10.5 Final Words 
It has been almost fifty years since Cohen first noted the public’s ‘short-term reactions to 
the immediate and long-term general reflections on the state-of-our-times’ (Cohen, 
2002:vii). Cohen (2002) observes that these emotions endure but are projected towards 
different groups of people over time suggesting that there are always ‘problematic’ 
groups in society that require ‘managing’. The observations in this thesis support this 
observation; the general public appear to support the harsh sanctioning of rulebreakers 
across different policy domains, and these attitudes can fluctuate over time. Punitive 
attitudes are complex; this study highlights the importance of considering the role of 
politics in understanding punitive public attitudes towards rulebreakers, which is 
powerful across disciplines. Political values motivate how we respond to certain groups of 
people. The political culture that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in Britain (and 
America) endures and has increased the use of exclusionary and social control practices 
(Garland, 2001). ‘Deep-seated anxieties’ are expressed through practices that aim to 
manage social change and reassert social order (Garland, 2001:194). 
 
This thesis has highlighted the relevance of considering political values and nostalgia in 
understanding the public’s punitive response towards rulebreakers. Drawing on work by 
Garland (2001), Chancer and Donovan (1994) and Hogan et al. (2005), Hanslmaier and 
Baier (2016:295) suggest that punitive attitudes can be explained by ‘the subjective 
experience of social conditions’, which can derive from a broad range of experiences. In 
line with this observation, punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers in this study are 
related to individual feelings about macro-level change. This nostalgia is related to  
neo-conservative values and to neo-liberal values. Political values therefore are central to 




The findings of this thesis make an additional observation: that using a tiering model can 
aid a deeper understanding into public punitiveness. Whilst values supportive of authority 
and traditional values are relevant to both tiers of punitiveness, these values are the most 
important driver in understanding more general support for harsher sanctions towards 
rulebreakers.  However, we can see here how more extreme attitudes are influenced by a 
wider range of values. Feelings of sadness about local and national change, along with a 
belief in reduced state intervention and the free market are more relevant in explaining 
more extreme punitive attitudes towards rulebreakers. Additionally, research so far has 
explored punitiveness in disciplinary isolation, this thesis suggests that punitiveness is not 
exclusive to criminal rulebreakers but is prevalent towards rulebreakers across different 
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Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Contemporary Social Attitudes Towards “Rulebreakers”:  
Information Sheet 
 
What is the project about? 
I am interested in the social attitudes of people living in the UK today. I am exploring attitudes 
towards people who break the law, benefit ‘cheats’, and school pupils who break school rules. 
I am interested in how these attitudes form, what influences these attitudes, and their 
relevance to society today. If you agree to become involved, you will be asked a number of 
questions about your attitudes towards these people.  
 
Participation is voluntary. If you agree to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
You may withdraw at any time. 
 
The researcher, Vickie Barrett, is supervised by Professor Stephen Farrall and Dr Emily Gray 
who work at the University of Sheffield. The project will run until 2020. For further details 
about the project see: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/law/phd-research/ourstudents/vbarrett.  
 
Why have I been asked to be interviewed? 
We have chosen your house and street completely randomly. 
 
Who will interview me? 
Vickie Barrett, a PhD student in the School of Law at Sheffield University, will interview you. 
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Who is funding the research? 
The School of Law at the University of Sheffield.  
 
What kinds of questions will the interviewer ask me? 
The interviewer will ask you some general questions about your thoughts and opinions about 
certain groups of people (as noted above). You will also be given some scenarios which the 
researcher will explore in more detail with you.  
 
How long will the interview last? 
This varies, but it is expected to last between 30 – 45 minutes. The interview will be audio-
recorded, as long as you do not mind (this makes things faster). The audio-recording will only 
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be used for analysis and no-one outside the project will be allowed access to the original 
recordings.  
 
Who can I contact if I have any further questions about the project? 
You can contact Professor Stephen Farrall or Dr Emily Gray at the School of Law, Sheffield 
University, Bartolome House, Winter Street, Sheffield, S3 7ND. Stephen’s contact details are: 




Everything you say in the interview will be kept private and confidential. Only members of the 
research team will be able to listen to or read what you have said. If anything that you have 
said is quoted in writing in any reports or articles that we write, you will be given a 
pseudonym (pretend name) or a number, and your real name will never be used.  
 
What will happen to what I say in the interview? 
After the interview, the recording will be transcribed (written down on paper). The 
transcription and the recording will be securely stored on the School of Law’s premises in 
Sheffield. I will carefully read and analyse what you tell me during the interview – along with 
what other people tell me. My aim is to try to understand public attitudes in more detail. 
Extracts from your interview may be used in reports or articles that I write for other 
researchers and policy makers to read, but your real name will not be used in any written 
reports. The anonymised interview transcripts will be archived with the UK Data Service so 
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Participant Consent Form 
 
Title of Project: Contemporary Social Attitudes Towards “Rule Breakers” 
                                   Please  
                                                                                                                                    initial  
                                                                                                                                    box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
      for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason.  
 
 
3. I understand that any publication or presentation of the research will not refer 
      to me by name and that I will not be able to be identified.  
 
 
4. I understand that the anonymised interview transcripts will be archived 
      with the UK Data Service so that other researchers can use them, if they wish    
      to do so.  
 
 
5. I consent to the recording of this interview.  
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above research project. 
 
________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Researcher Date Signature 








1.1   How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: 
Competition brings out the worst in people, it makes them greedy and selfish.  
1.2   The law should be obeyed, even if it is wrong  
1.3   British governments of any party will place the needs of the nation above the interests of 
their own political party? 
1.4   When their child is being badly behaved, it is okay for a parent to smack them  
1.5   Do you think that trade unions in this country have too much power or too little power?  
Far too much power 
Too much power 
About the right amount of power 
Too little power 
Far too little power 
Can’t choose 
1.6   What do you think of the gap between rich and poor in UK? 
1 = too large 
2 = about right 





VB1   
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
School pupils who repeatedly break school rules should be permanently excluded. 
VB2   
 
Unruly school children should receive tougher punishments. 
VB3   
 
Caning in schools was a good way of tackling disruptive behaviour.  
VB4   
 
School punishments these days are not strict enough to stop bad behaviour 
VB5   
 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should face stiffer penalties. 
VB6   
 
Welfare claimants who repeatedly cheat the system should have their payments 





Item No Item Wording 
2.1   How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth.  
2.2   Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values.  
2.3   There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and wages. 
2.4   Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems.  
2.5   Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership. 
2.6       For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. 
2.7 It would be better for everyone if we all paid less tax. 
2.8 Welfare benefits should be reserved for only the extremely needy. 
2.9 People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
2.10   Schools should teach children to obey authority 
 
Item No Item Wording 
3.1   How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?: 
I would like my country to be the way it used to be.  
3.2   More and more, I don’t like with what my country has become. 
3.3   These days I feel like a stranger in my own country. 
3.4   The country’s best days are behind it.  
3.5   The profit motive has come to dominate all aspects of our society. 
3.6   I feel sad when I think about how areas like the … 
…one I grew up in have changed. 
3.7   …one I now live in have changed. 
3.8   Making money is all people care about these days 
4.1   The reliance on market forces has increased the gap between rich and poor. 
4.2   Margaret Thatcher’s governments decreased the quality of life for many ordinary people.  
4.3   It feels to me like the country lost something when coal mines, steel mills and shipyards closed. 
4.4   Margaret Thatcher’s governments did a lot of damage to communities around here.  
4.5   I feel that there has been a loss of community spirit around here since the 1980s. 







 Item No Item Wording 
5.1   Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how much do you think politicians care about people like 
you?   
    
The end marked 0 means ‘politicians don’t care at all about people like me’, and the end 
marked 10 means that ‘politicians care a lot about people like me’. 
5.2   Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how much do you think politicians cared about people like 
you 30 years ago?   
    
The end marked 0 means ‘politicians didn’t care at all about people like me’, and the end 
marked 10 means that ‘politicians cared a lot about people like me’. 
5.3   Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how important to society do you think people like you are 
today?   
    
The end marked 0 means ‘people like me are not at all important to society today’, and the 
end marked 10 means that ‘people like me are very important to society today’. 
5.4   Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how important to society do you think people like you were 
30 years ago?   
    
The end marked 0 means ‘people like me were not at all important to society 30 years ago’, 
and the end marked 10 means that ‘people like me were very important to society 30 years 
ago’. 
5.5   Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how much power do people like you have in the UK? 
    
The end marked 0 means ‘people like me don't have any political power’, and the end 
marked 10 means that ‘people like me have a lot of political power’ 
5.6  Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how much power do you think people like you had in the UK 
30 years ago?  
    
The end marked 0 means ‘people like me didn't have any political power’, and the end 
marked 10 means that ‘people like me had a lot of political power' 
5.7  Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how financially well off do you consider yourself compared to 
other people in the UK?   
    
The end marked 0 means ‘I am less financially well off than other people in the UK’, and the 
end marked 10 means that ‘I am more financially well off than other people in the UK' 
5.8  Using the 0 to 10 scale below, how financially well off were people like you 30 years ago 
compared to other people in the UK?   
    
The end marked 0 means ‘People like me were less financially well off 30 years ago than 
others’, and the end marked 10 means that ‘People like me were a lot better off 30 years 






Item No Item Wording 
6.1   How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Margaret 
Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister? 
Margaret Thatcher made Britain Great again. 
6.2   Margaret Thatcher was right to sell council houses to tenants. 
6.3   
 
Private companies run utilities like gas, electricity and water better than the 
government ever could. 
6.4   
 
The social and economic changes since the 1980s have ensured a brighter future for 
all. 
6.6   
 
Although there were some losers, overall the changes Margaret Thatcher’s 
governments made were necessary. 
6.7   Margaret Thatcher was right to take on trade unions.  
6.8   Margaret Thatcher only looked after the interests of the rich.  





Item No Item Wording 
7.1   Do you or a member of your household own (or co-own) a business? [tick all that apply] 
[Yes, myself, Yes, someone I live with, yes, no, Don’t know] 
7.2   
 
Do you or a member of your household own stocks or shares? 
[Yes, no, Don’t know] 
7.3   Are you yourself covered by a private health insurance scheme, that is, an insurance scheme 
that allows you to get private medical treatment? 
[tick all that apply] 
[Yes, paid for by my employer (or my partner’s); Yes, paid for by myself or my family; Yes, 
partly paid for by my employer and partly paid for by myself; Yes, other; No, I am not 
covered by private medical insurance]. 
7.4   Have you, or any of your children, ever attended a fee-paying school? 
[yes, just myself; yes, just my children; yes, both myself and my children; no neither of us].  
7.5   
 
Excluding music lessons, have you ever paid for additional tutoring outside of school for any 
of your children for any of their school subjects?  
[tick all that apply] 
[Yes, for children still at school; Yes, for children who have now left school; No, but I would 
consider doing this; No; Not applicable] 
7.6   Do you, or anyone in your household, own any residential property in the UK or abroad 
which you do not permanently live in?  
[tick all that apply] 
Include properties that are let out to others, second homes, or which are co-owned with 
others. Exclude caravans, park homes and timeshares. 
[Yes, rented out to someone as their home; Yes, used as a holiday home/weekend cottage; 
Yes, rented to others as a holiday home; Yes, for occupation while working away from 
home; Yes, other; No]  
 
 




7.8   
Some say that certain kinds of information should be made available to help people make 
informed choices about public services such as schools and hospitals. Others think that this 
information is irrelevant or cannot be trusted.  
How useful do you think it would be for someone choosing which surgeon to see to be given 
league tables that show the number of patients who have died under the care of different 
surgeons?    
[Very useful, quite useful, Not very useful, Not at all useful] 
How useful do you think it would be for someone choosing which school to send their child 
to be given league tables that compare the exam results of secondary schools in their area? 
[Very useful, quite useful, Not very useful, Not at all useful] 
7.9   Have you ever used this sort of information to make choices about which hospital or school 
to use?  




Item No Item Wording 
8.1   In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the 
following scale? 
 
Item No Item Wording 
9.1   
 
Can you remember which party your father voted for when you were growing up? 
 
[Conservative, Labour, Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats/SDP, Scottish National Party (SNP), 
Plaid Cymru, Green Party, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), British National Party 
(BNP), National Front (NF), Other (write in), Varied, Not brought up in Britain, Did not vote, 
Can’t remember, DK, refused]. 
9.2   
 
Can you remember which party your mother voted for when you were growing up? 
 
[Conservative, Labour, Liberal Party/Liberal Democrats/SDP, Scottish National Party (SNP), 
Plaid Cymru, Green Party, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), British National Party 
(BNP), National Front (NF), Other (write in), Varied, Not brought up in Britain, Did not vote, 






Item No Item Wording 
10.1   Around 28% of people did not vote at the UK’s EU Referendum held on the 23rd June 
2016. Many said that this was because they were sick, too busy or simply weren’t 
interested in politics. How about you? Did you vote at the EU Referendum?  
10.2   … and how did you vote at the EU Referendum?  
10.3   Just under one third of people did not vote at the General Election held in June 2017 
because they were away, ill or are not interested in elections. How about you? Did you 
vote at the General Election held in June 2017? 
10.4   You indicated that you voted at the previous General Election held in June 2017. How did 
you vote at the election?  
10.5  
Do you know if you are you currently registered to vote in UK General Elections?  
I know I am definitely registered; I think I am probably registered; I think it is unlikely 
that I am registered; I know I am definitely not registered 
10.6  
In November last year the UK and the European Union agreed on terms of a deal which 
is designed to settle the terms for Britain’s exit from the EU.   
To what extent would you support or oppose another referendum being held asking the 
public whether they accept or reject the terms of the deal?   
Strongly support another referendum 
Somewhat support another referendum 
Neither support nor oppose another referendum 
Somewhat oppose another referendum 
Strongly oppose another referendum 
Don’t know 
10.7  
In November last year the UK and the European Union agreed on terms of a deal which 
is designed to settle the terms for Britain’s exit from the EU.   
To what extent would you support or oppose a people’s vote being held asking the public 
whether they accept or reject the terms of the deal?   
Strongly support another referendum 
Somewhat support another referendum 
Neither support nor oppose another referendum 
Somewhat oppose another referendum 
Strongly oppose another referendum 
Don’t know 
10.8  In November last year the UK and the European Union agreed on terms of a deal which 
is designed to settle the terms for Britain’s exit from the EU. 
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 To what extent would you support or oppose another referendum being held asking the 
public whether they accept or reject the terms of Theresa May’s deal agreed with the EU 
in November 2018? 
 
Strongly support another referendum 
Somewhat support another referendum 
Neither support nor oppose another referendum 
Somewhat oppose another referendum 
Strongly oppose another referendum 
Don’t know 
10.9  Imagine you were given the choice and the options below were available to you. In this 
scenario, how do you think you would vote?  
 
To leave without a deal in place 
To leave with a different deal to Theresa May's 
To accept Theresa May's deal and leave the EU 
To remain 







Item No Item Wording 
11.1   Please can you tell me your age at your last birthday?  
 
If they refuse to give exact age, ask: 
 
Which of these age ranges best describes your age?  
[standard age codes] 
11.2   What is your gender 
11.3   What is your religion?  
11.4   Would you describe yourself as extremely religious or extremely non-religious? [Extremely, 
Very, Somewhat, Neither Somewhat non, Very non-, Extremely non-, Can’t choose]. 
11.5   Which of the following best describes your occupation?  
 
If you are retired and have an occupational pension, or if you are not in employment and 
have been out of work for less than 6 months, please answer for your most recent 
occupation.  
 
* Semi or unskilled manual work (e.g. Manual workers, all apprentices to be skilled trades, 
caretaker, Park keeper, non-HGV driver, shop assistant) 
 
Skilled manual worker (e.g. Skilled Bricklayer, Carpenter, Plumber, Painter, Bus/ Ambulance 
Driver, HGV driver, AA patrolman, pub/bar worker, etc.) 
 
Supervisory or clerical/ junior managerial/ professional/administrative (e.g. Office worker, 
Student Doctor, Foreman with 25+ employees, salesperson, etc.) 
 
Intermediate managerial/ professional/ administrative (e.g. Newly qualified (under 3 
years) doctor, Solicitor, Board director small organisation, middle manager in large 
organisation, principle officer in civil service/local government) 
 
Higher managerial/ professional/ administrative (e.g. Established Doctor, Solicitor, Board 
Director in a large organisation (200+ employees, top level civil servant/public service 
employee) 
 
Full time Student 




Retired and living on state pension (i.e. no private or work-related pension scheme) 
Unemployed or not working due to long-term sickness 
Full-time carer of another household member 
Other 
11.5a   What is the employment status of the chief income earner?  
 
Full time paid job (31+ hours) 
Part time paid job (<31 hours) 
Doing paid work on a self-employed basis or within your own business 
Student (full time) / On a government training programme (Nation Traineeship/Modern 
Apprenticeship) 
Out of work (6 months or less) 
Out of work (more than 6 months) 
Looking after home / Homemaker 
Retired and living on basic state pension (i.e. no private or work-related pension scheme) 
Retired and living on an occupational pension  
Disabled or long-term sick 
Unpaid work for a business, community or voluntary organisation 
Prefer not to say 
11.6   When you were growing up, would you say your family was middle class or working class? 
[Middle class, Working class, Other, Don’t know]. 




Other household theft 
Robbery/mugging 
Violence with injury 
Violence without injury 




Prefer not to say 
11.7   Which of all of the following income brackets, best represents your household income, 
before deductions for income tax, National Insurance etc.  
Less than £5,000 
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£5,000 - £9,999 
£10,000 - £14,999 
£15,000 - £19,999 
£20,000 - £24,999 
£25,000 - £29,999 
£30,000 - £34,999 
£35,000 - £39,999 
£40,000 - £44,999 
£45,000 - £49,999 
£50,000 - £59,999 
£60,000 - £69,999 
£70,000 - £84,999 
£85,000 - £99,999 
More than £100,000 
Prefer not to say 
11.8   Do you have any qualifications? [Y/N] 
11.9   Do you have a Bachelor’s degree or higher (e.g. BSc, BA, MA, MSc, PhD etc)? [Y/N] 
11.10  Which of the following do you currently claim? 
Child Benefit 
Basic State Pension 
Pension Credit 
Disability Living Allowance 
Universal Credit (this now includes Housing Benefit, Working Tax Credit, Job Seekers 
Allowance, Income Support, Child Tax Credit, Employment & Support Allowance) 
Winter Fuel Allowance 
Additional State Pension (on-top of the basic state pension) 
Other state benefit (please specify)  
I do not claim any tax credits or benefits 
11.11  What is your current marital or civil partnership status? 
11.12  Are there any dependent children living in your household? Dependent children are those 
aged under 18 living in your household.  
11.12B Which of the following applies to you? Are you … [Multi response] 
A parent of children aged under 18 
A carer of children aged under 18 
Neither of the above [Exclusive] 
11.13  Which of the following categories would best describe your ethnicity? 
[Standard list offered]. 
11.14  Now a question about economic conditions. How does the financial situation of your 
household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? [A lot worse, A little worse, The 
same, A little better, A lot better].  
11.15  Which of these best describes the ownership of your home?  
11.16  Did you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, buy your present home from the local 
authority as a tenant? [Yes, No, DK] 
11.16a  In what year did you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, buy your present 
home from the local authority? 
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If you are unsure, can you give an estimate? 
 
1. Before 1980 
2. 1980 - 1984 
3. 1985 - 1989 
4. 1990 - 1994 
5. 1995 - 1999 
6. 2000 - 2004 
7. 2005 - 2009. 
8. 2010 - 2014 
9. 2015 – Present 
10. Don't know 
11.17  Have you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, ever bought any previous home 
from the local authority as a tenant? [Yes, No, DK] 
11.17a  In what year did you, or the person responsible for the mortgage, buy your previous 
home from the local authority? 
If you are unsure, can you give an estimate? 
 
1. Before 1980 
2. 1980 - 1984 
3. 1985 - 1989 
4. 1990 - 1994 
5. 1995 - 1999 
6. 2000 - 2004 
7. 2005 - 2009. 
8. 2010 - 2014 
9. 2015 – Present 
10. Don’t know 
11.19  Which of these do you have access to in your household? 
 
A landline telephone 
A mobile phone (Smartphone) 





Smart Watch / Fitness Tracker 
Games Console (i.e. Nintendo, PlayStation, X-Box etc.) 
None of the above 
11.20  Approximately how many hours in total have you spent using the internet in the last week?   
11.21  How safe do you feel walking around in the area you live in after dark? 
[Very safe, quite safe, a bit unsafe, very unsafe] 




11.23  Including yourself, how many people live in your household? 
11.24   Are you the chief income earner in your household? 
Yes - I am the chief income earner 
No - Another member of the household is the chief income earner 
Don't know 
11.25   How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: 
One day, I would like to own my own business. 
11.26   How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: 
One day, I would like to send my children to a private school. 
11.27   How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: 
One day, I would like to buy my own home. 
 
Item No Item Wording 
12.1   Some of the questions we have asked you have been aimed at finding out your 
thoughts and feelings about Margaret Thatcher and her time as Prime Minister. 
 
On balance, do you think that Mrs Thatcher’s governments were good or bad for the 
country?  
[good; bad; no opinion]  
12.2   And what about the area you now live in? On balance, do you think that Mrs 
Thatcher’s governments were good or bad for that area? 
[good; bad; no opinion] 
12.3   
 
The changes that Margaret Thatcher’s governments made … 
 
1: went too far 
2: were about right 
3: did not go far enough 
4: I can’t decide 
12.4   Right now, the country needs a leader like Margaret Thatcher. 
12.5   How much would you say you know about [Margaret Thatcher’s period as Prime 
Minister? 
 
1. Not informed at all 
2. Not very informed 
3. Somewhat informed 
4. Fairly well informed  















Credit IMD Ethnicity 
Valid 9636 9636 9636 9636 9636 9427 9636 9636 9636 9636 9636 9247 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 209 0 0 0 0 0 388 
Mean .48 4.60 6.92 1.85 3.99 1.00 6.78 .34 .82 .90 2.51 .93 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
.005 .017 .036 .007 .014 .000 .022 .005 .004 .003 .011 .003 
Std. Deviation .500 1.628 3.546 .687 1.423 .034 2.189 .474 .387 .303 1.086 .257 
Variance .250 2.650 12.576 .473 2.025 .001 4.791 .225 .150 .092 1.180 .066 
Skewness .086 -.487 .467 .206 .346 -29.584 -.336 .672 -1.636 -2.633 -.014 -3.341 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.025 .025 .025 .025 .025 .025 .025 .025 .025 .025 .025 .025 
Kurtosis -1.993 -.736 -.658 -.893 -.529 873.373 .102 -1.548 .676 4.932 -1.285 9.167 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .051 
Range 1 6 14 2 6 1 10 1 1 1 3 1 
Minimum 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Maximum 1 7 15 3 7 1 11 1 1 1 4 1 
 
Unweighted  








Credit IMD Ethnicity 
Valid 5781 5781 5092 5781 3303 5654 4389 5399 5781 5781 5781 5526 
Missing 0 0 689 0 2478 127 1392 382 0 0 0 255 
Mean .53 4.02 6.50 1.83 3.97 .57 6.10 .31 .74 .86 2.58 .94 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
.007 .022 .049 .009 .025 .007 .035 .006 .006 .005 .014 .003 
Std. Deviation .499 1.702 3.516 .674 1.449 .496 2.328 .464 .439 .347 1.097 .244 
Variance .249 2.895 12.365 .454 2.101 .246 5.421 .215 .192 .120 1.204 .060 
Skewness -.136 -.092 .492 .217 .387 -.267 -.196 .803 -1.096 -2.080 -.107 -3.574 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.032 .032 .034 .032 .043 .033 .037 .033 .032 .032 .032 .033 
Kurtosis -1.982 -1.063 -.632 -.823 -.448 -1.929 -.248 -1.356 -.800 2.329 -1.301 10.778 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.064 .064 .069 .064 .085 .065 .074 .067 .064 .064 .064 .066 
Range 1 6 14 2 6 1 10 1 1 1 3 1 
Minimum 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Maximum 1 7 15 3 7 1 11 1 1 1 4 1 
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                     Appendix F: Multiple regression pairwise and listwise comparison 
 
        Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘welfare   
        punitivity’ (pairwise regression – used in thesis model)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .067*** .054** .089*** .088*** 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) .019 .021 -.033 -.043* 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .073*** .078*** .081*** .081*** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
quals) 
.090*** .086*** .018 .018 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .066*** .065*** .050** .047** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .268*** .287*** .082*** .061** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.066*** -.062*** -.034* -.037* 
Relationship Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .041 .040 .001 .003 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .059** .061** .064*** .062*** 
IMD (1=lowest quartile to 4=highest quartile) -.021 -.029 -.046** -.041* 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.001 .002 .020 .019 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.014 -.018 -.018 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .062** .019 .016 
Belief systems (high scores=more neo-
con/neo-lib) 
    
Neo-liberal values   .082*** .081*** 
Neo-conservative values   .476*** .453*** 
Nostalgia (high score=more nostalgic)     
Social nostalgic values    .008 
Economic nostalgic values    .074*** 
Political nostalgic values    -.100*** 
R-square .127*** .131** .327*** .333** 
Adjusted R-square .124 .126 .323 .328 
R-square change  .003 .196 .006 




















        Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘welfare  




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .053* .043* .100*** .098*** 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) .070** .067** .022 .006 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .086*** .091*** .094*** .096*** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
quals) 
.125*** .122*** .051** .051** 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .051* .048* .046* .043* 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .265*** .269*** .093*** .059** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.030 -.026 -.012 -.017 
Relationship Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .027 .025 -.004 .004 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .059** .060** .058** .056** 
IMD (1=lowest quartile to 4=highest quartile) -.007 -.014 -.025 -.020 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.014 -.010 .002 .000 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.029 -.031 -.030 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .058** .024 .018 
Belief systems (high scores=more neo-
con/neo-lib) 
    
Neo-liberal values   .098*** .091*** 
Neo-conservative values   .449*** .409*** 
Nostalgia (high score=more nostalgic)     
Social nostalgic values    .017 
Economic nostalgic values    .100*** 
Political nostalgic values    -.148*** 
R-square .122*** .126* .315*** .328** 
Adjusted R-square .117 .120 .310 .322 
R-square change  .004 .189 .014 




















Summary table for relevant statistically significant factors for punitivity towards rulebreaking welfare  
claimants in Model 4: pairwise and listwise comparisons 
 











Variables Welfare Punitivity (pairwise 
regression-used in thesis model) 








Age Range  
1=16-24 to 7=75+ 
* 
(beta=-.043, younger age) 
X 
Income 
1=<£5000 to 15=>£100,000  
*** 
(beta=.081, higher income) 
*** 
(beta=.096, higher income) 
Education 
1=degree, 2 below degree level, 3=no qualifications  
X ** 
(beta=.051, lower education) 
Religiosity  
1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious 
** 
(beta=.047, decreased religiosity) 
* 
(.043, decreased religiosity) 
Political conservativism  





Class Origin  
0=working class, 1=middle class 
* 













(1=lowest quartile to 4=4th quartile) 
* 






0=no, 1=victimised  
X X 
Fear of crime  
1=very safe to 4= very unsafe 
X X 








Social nostalgic values X X 








R-Square Value 33.3% 32.8% 
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Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘law 
punitivity’ (pairwise regression - used in thesis model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors41     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .012 -.009 .033* .029* 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) -.013 -.008 -.073*** -.077*** 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) -.010 -.001 .003 .010 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
quals) 
.162*** .152*** .072*** .062*** 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .100*** .099*** .082*** .079*** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .348*** .348*** .109*** .099*** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.096*** -.089*** -.054*** -.048*** 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .095*** .094*** .047** .048** 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) -.036 -.031 -.028 -.025 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .063*** .048* .028 .021 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.022 -.017 .005 .003 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.005 -.010 -.015 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .107*** .056*** .035* 
Belief systems      
Neo-liberal values   .086*** .088*** 
Neo-conservative values   .572*** .485*** 
Nostalgia      
Social nostalgic values    .142*** 
Economic nostalgic values    .054** 
Political nostalgic values    -.044* 
R-square Value .190*** .200*** .478*** .497*** 
Adjusted R-square .186 .196 .475 .493 
R-square change  .010 .278 .019 























Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘law 
punitivity’ (listwise regression - new) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors41     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) -.053** -.071*** -.001 -.001 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) .039 .038 -.019 -.016 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .023 .031 .035 .044* 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no 
quals) 
.160*** .157*** .069*** .060*** 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .075*** .072*** .069*** .071*** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .280*** .285*** .068*** .057** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.088*** -.077*** -.059*** -.054*** 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .084*** .082*** .046* .048** 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) -.034 -.028 -.030 -.028 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .068*** .050* .036* .028 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.037 -.028 -.013 -.020 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.013 -.016 -.019 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .126*** .084*** .063*** 
Belief systems      
Neo-liberal values   .086*** .119*** 
Neo-conservative values   .572*** .467*** 
Nostalgia      
Social nostalgic values    .136*** 
Economic nostalgic values    .067** 
Political nostalgic values    -.059** 
R-square Value .145*** .159*** .448*** .467*** 
Adjusted R-square .141 .154 .444 .463 
R-square change  .014 .288 .020 






















Summary table for relevant statistically significant factors for punitivity towards criminal rulebreakers 
in Model 4: pairwise and listwise comparisons 







Variables Law punitivity (pairwise regression 
-used in thesis) 







Age Range  
Scale: 1=16-24 to 7=75+ 
*** 
(beta=-.077, younger age) 
X 
Income 
Scale= 1=<£5000 to 15=>£100,000 
X * 
(beta=.044, higher income) 
Education 
1=degree, 2 below degree level, 3=no qualifications  
*** 
(beta=.062, no qualifications) 
*** 
(beta=.060, no qualifications) 
Religiosity  
1=extremely religious to 7=extremely non-religious 
*** 




Political conservativism  





Class Origin  
0=working class, 1=middle class 
*** 
(beta=-.048, working class) 
*** 
(beta=-.054, working class) 
Relationship Status 
0=single, 1=relationship  
** 
(beta=.048, in relationship) 
** 
(beta=.048, in relationship) 
Universal Credit 
0=claimant, 1=non=claimant 
X  X 
IMD 








Fear of crime 

























R-Square Value 49.7% 46.7% 
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Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘Ultimate 
Punitiveness’ (pairwise regression - used in thesis model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) .013 -.008 .035* .032* 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) -.050* -.046* -.101*** -.104*** 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .036 .045* .047** .053** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no quals) .135*** .128*** .046** .039* 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7=unextremely) .071*** .070*** .056*** .053*** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .353*** .354*** .087*** .076*** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.077*** -.070*** -.044** -.039* 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .071*** .069*** .022 .023 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .005 .009 .011 .013 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .023 .009 -.012 -.017 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) .008 .011 .031* .029 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.020 -.022 -.026 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .101*** .053*** .036* 
Belief systems      
Neo-liberal values   .157*** .158*** 
Neo-conservative values   .542*** .473*** 
Nostalgia      
Social nostalgic values    .113*** 
Economic nostalgic values     .047* 
Political nostalgic values    -.044* 
R-square Value .163*** .172*** .448*** .460*** 
Adjusted R-square .159 .167 .445 .456 
R-square change  .009 .276 .012 

























Beta weights (standardized coefficients) for multiple linear regression models predicting ‘Ultimate 
Punitiveness’ (listwise regression - new) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) -.028 -.044* .026 .025 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) -.020 -.024 -.072*** -.070*** 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) .050* .057* .059** .066*** 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no quals) .144*** .140*** .052** .044* 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7=unextremely) .059** .054** .052** .053** 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .310*** .315*** .075*** .063** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.054* -.047* -.035* -.032 
Marital Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .057* .054* .019 .021 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) .020 .022 .019 .020 
IMD (scale: 1=1st quartile to 4=4th quartile) .031 .019 .004 -.002 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.009 -.002 .015 .008 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  -.036 -.040* -.042* 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .098*** .060*** .042* 
Belief systems      
Neo-liberal values   .180*** .176*** 
Neo-conservative values   .531*** .459*** 
Nostalgia      
Social nostalgic values    .121*** 
Economic nostalgic values     .045* 
Political nostalgic values    -.052* 
R-square Value .132*** .141*** .430*** .444*** 
Adjusted R-square .127 .136 .426 .439 
R-square change  .009 .289 .014 























Relevant statistically significant factors for Ultimate Punitiveness towards rulebreakers (Model 4): 
pairwise and listwise comparisons 
 





















(beta=-.104, younger age) 
*** 
(beta=-.070, younger age) 




















Marital Status X X 
Universal Credit X X 
Victimisation X * 
(beta=-.042) 
























R-Square Value 46% 44.4% 
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Appendix G: Neo-conservative Values – multiple regression analysis 
 
Beta weights (standardised coefficients) for multiple linear regression predicting  
neo-conservative values (using pairwise regression)  (n=2,090)73           
 




73 See P230 for information about the n-size 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socio -demographic factors     
Gender (0=male, 1=female) -.052** -.069*** -.062*** -.054*** 
Age Range (1=16-24…7=75+) .121*** .127*** .147*** .102*** 
Income (1=<£5000…15=>£100,000) -.017 -.009 -.013 .010 
Education (1=degree, 2=non-degree,3=no quals) .134*** .129*** .111*** .064*** 
Religiosity (1=extremely…7 unextremely) .036 .035 .042* .029 
Politics Scale (0-10, 10 = conservative) .338*** .338*** .213*** .157*** 
Class Origin (0=working class, 1=middle class) -.079*** -.073*** -.093*** -.050** 
Relationship Status (0=single, 1=relationship) .078*** .077*** .070*** .052** 
Universal Credit (0=claimant, 1=non-claimant) -.013 -.008 -.010 .001 
IMD (1=lowest quartile to 4=highest quartile) .046* .031 .026 -.003 
Ethnicity (0=Other, 1=White) -.037* -.032 -.024 -.020 
Crime related factors     
Victimisation (0=no, 1=yes)  .13 .020 .000 
Fear of crime (1=very safe, 4=very unsafe)  .092*** .097*** .023 
Belief systems (high scores=more neo-con/neo-lib)     
Neo-liberal values   .236*** .211*** 
Nostalgia (high score=more nostalgic)     
Social nostalgic values    .327*** 
Economic nostalgic values    .221*** 
Political nostalgic values    -.101*** 
R-square .204*** .212*** .251*** .429*** 
Adjusted R-square .201 .208 .246 .425 
R-square change  .008 .039 .178 
